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ABSTRACT 
This study explores how strategy links operational art, conduct and objectives to the 
achievement of political aims in war. It develops the concept of “strategic ability” as 
an analytical framework to assess the ability of states and non-state actors to perceive, 
institutionalize and practice strategy. While other factors affecting the outcome of war 
should be considered, political success in the immediate aftermath of war is best 
explained by having an advantageous ability in strategy making during the war; 
generating sound grand and military strategies, and guiding the operational 
capabilities and art to the fulfilment of strategic requirements.  
The crux of “strategic logic” is the use of military and non-military means to affect 
the political will of the enemy by specific ways and scales while keeping the means-
ways-ends calculus right. This is invariable but its contextualization varies with the 
times and within each case. Political-military relations should be organized in ways 
compatible with political structure and permitting specific functions: information 
sharing, critical assessment, clear political authorization, the formidable position of 
the military and strategic intervention of the political leadership. Operational art is 
not a fixed formula but it should be highly contextual, strategy sensitive and 
promoting jointness.  
This research is based on multiple case studies from the Arab-Israeli wars.  It shows 
that Israel has consistently demonstrated weak strategic ability in regular wars apart 
from the 1948 War thanks to Ben-Gurion, and more so in irregular wars,   which 
explains the comparatively small political gains it has achieved despite its 
outstanding battle-space decisiveness. The Arabs, focusing on the Egyptians, 
suffered from malfunctioning political and social dimensions which prevented their 
huge human and natural resources from being channelled into operational counter-
capabilities or strategic ability. Only in the first stage of the 1973 War and later with 
the rise of Hezbollah, has the modest improvement in the Arabs‟ strategic ability 
been sufficient to expose Israel‟s consistent weakness in strategy making, which has 
otherwise been concealed by the Arabs‟ incompetent performance.  
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Strategy has been known by political leaders and military commanders for centuries. 
The term originates from the Greek word Strategos1 which is the art of generalship. 
However, strategy only began to be considered as an autonomous concept and 
discipline in the 18th century. 2 
Strategic studies, as a field of knowledge with multiple ramifications in academia, 
statecraft and the military profession, have heterogeneous theoretical roots and have 
developed in varying ways, which means they have lacked a well formed conceptual 
skeleton in comparison with other disciplines. Strategic studies are interdisciplinary. 
“To understand the dimensions of strategy, it is necessary to know something about 
politics, economics, psychology, sociology and geography, as well as technology, 
force structure and tactics… It is a subject with sharp focus – the role of military 
power – but no clear parameters”.3 
Methodologically, there is an ongoing dispute on the nature of strategic studies and 
whether they should be considered primarily a science or an art.4 Should they 
imitate the natural sciences in their objective, rigorous and reliable methodology, or 
be thought of as a discipline with more human and artistic components? 
Moreover, the dispute about the methodology of strategic studies has been 
exacerbated by the different academic backgrounds of strategic thinkers, and their 
professional biases and perspectives.5 
                                                          
1
 Elinor Sloan, Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction (London: Routledge 2012) p.1. 
2
 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy; Thinking War from Antiquity To The Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp.4-6. 
3
 John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) pp.4-5. 
4
 Colin Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (London: Aldwych Press, 1982) pp.128 -133; Heuser, The 
Evolution of Strategy, pp. 4-6. 
5
 “Herman Khan was a physicist, Thomas Schelling was an economist, Albert Wholstetter was a mathematician, 
Henry Kissinger was a historian, and Bernard Brodie was a political scientist”, Baylis et al, Strategy in the 
Contemporary World, p.4, in addition to the long chain of soldier scholars not starting by Clausewitz or ending 
by Rupert Smith.  
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Without a unified methodology, strategic studies have suffered many discontinuities 
and contradictions. It is not unusual to find the basic concepts of strategy, its levels 
of analysis and its essential vocabulary still contested among strategic communities. 
J. C. Wylie‟s description in the 1960s: “Strategy as a subject of study, its intellectual 
framework is not clearly outlined, and its vocabulary is almost non-existent”6 still 
holds good as may often be seen in current debates. They re-question such basic 
concepts as „„victory”7, how military means are used for political purposes, why 
states with military prowess fail to achieve political successes8, whether there is a 
conceptual and organisational layer between policy/strategy and tactics, what 
constitutes the operational level of war9, whether there is a missing logic of strategy 
and, if there is, whether it varies between regular wars and irregular or hybrid 
wars?10, how this logic is applied institutionally, what degree of political supremacy 
                                                          
6
 J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Naval Institute Press, 1967) p. 11. 
7
 Stephen Biddle, The Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); William Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Everette Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and 
Information Age (London: Cass, 2005)pp.5-18; Patricia Sullivan, Who Wins: Predicting Strategic Success and 
Failure in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
8
 Sullivan, Who Wins; Gill Morem, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: a Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Thomas Mahnken, “Why the Weak Win: Strong Powers, Weak Powers, and the Logic of 
Strategy”, in B. Lee and K Walling, Strategic Logic and Political Rationality (London: Cass, 2003). 
9
 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Cass, 1997); 
Justin Kelly and Michael Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (US War College: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009); Christopher Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare (London: Routledge, 2014), and the 
ongoing debate in Infinity Journal led by William Owen (www.infinityjournal.com).  
10
 Colin Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, US War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006); John Nagl, Learning To Eat Soup With a Knife: 
Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya And Vietnam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005); Williamson 
Murray and Mansoor, The Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Christopher Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare (New York: 
Routledge, 2014); Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars. 
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and involvement is needed to conduct a war11 and what is needed in practice to 
formulate and execute strategy?12 
As strategic studies are a policy-oriented discipline, new practical dilemmas usually 
provoke conceptual reforms due to a desire among strategic thinkers to come up 
with new theoretical and practical solutions. 
An important question in the literature of strategic studies, especially in the post-
Vietnam war era was: Why military supremacy, even victory in battles and 
campaigns, does not always lead to winning wars by attaining political aims?13 This 
question was raised harshly with the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, as Bradford Lee 
put it “Why the US wins wars and loses the peace”. 14 As Sullivan indicated, 
between 1945 and 2003 the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
failed to achieve their political objectives in 40% of the wars that took place.15 This 
opened the door to the essential questions: what is victory in the first instance and 
how does strategy actually work? 
In Israel for instance, the question of the inability of military might to achieve 
political victory was addressed in the past by strategists such as Michael Handel and 
Gill Morem.16 The question was raised again after the 2006 war on Lebanon. As 
                                                          
11
 Hew Strachan, Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); Mackubin Thomas Owens, Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-
Military Bargain (New York: Continuum, 2011); Dale Herspring, Civil-Military Relations and Shared 
Responsibility (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 2013). 
12
 Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Hew Strachan, 
Direction of War. 
13
 Thomas Mahnken, Why the Weak Win, p. 60. 
14
Bradford Lee, “Winning Wars but Losing the Peace? The United States and the Strategic Issues of War 
Termination”, in Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (New York: 
Routledge, 2013) p. 249. 
15
 Patricia Sullivan, Who Wins: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict, p.4. 
16
 Michael Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: the Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute 
Security”, in Williamson Murray, Knox and Bernstein, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, 
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Winograd‟s committee concluded, the war was a sign of “failure”, especially at the 
political and strategic levels.17 
This study is an applied research in the field of strategic theory using the Arab-
Israeli Wars as the research area. 
Its primary aim is to provide clarification on how military conduct and objectives are 
linked to political aims, and how the contribution of military conduct to the political 
outcome is delineated, in order to answer the primary question: “Why states with 
military prowess may lose wars politically.” 
The inquiry as to why mighty military powers, even with irrefutable operational 
success, lose wars politically leads to the fundamental questions: How winning wars 
should be defined, and how it can be achieved? 
This study introduces two concepts: “strategic logic” and “strategic ability”. 
Strategic logic is how strategy works in theory; the principles and conditions 
governing the use of military and non-military means, principally the former, to 
achieve policy ends. It is also about how strategy links policy to operations. The crux 
of this logic is the use of military and non-military means to affect the political will 
of the enemy while keeping the means-ways-ends calculus right.  Policy has to pass 
the achievability test, and operational art should reflect the desired strategic and 
political requirements. 
Strategic ability, on the other hand, is a framework of analysis that examines the 
ability of the state or a non-state actor to perceive and apply strategic logic in war. It 
has three tiers: conceptual, institutional and practical. The conceptual tier is about 
the strategy makers having a competent strategic logic, as mentioned above. The 
institutional tier is about organising the dialogue between military and political 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Gil Merom, “The Architecture and Soft Spots of Israeli Grand 
Strategy”, in Strategic Logic and Political Rationality, p. 215. 
17
 Official English Summary of the Winograd Report (Press Release) 
https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/winogradreport-04302007.pdf, 2007. 
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leaderships to fulfil the requirements of strategy making. The practical tier is about 
generating sound grand and military strategies and guiding the operational art and 
capabilities along the strategic pathway. 
The main proposition here is that, putting all other variables aside, advantageous 
practical strategic ability should lead to an advantageous war outcome.  A state‟s 
failure to win a war in its immediate aftermath is due to weak strategic ability, 
whether or not military victory is achieved. 
Another proposition is that conceptual and institutional abilities should lead to a 
comparable ability in carrying out strategy (practical tier), unless other factors like 
personal aberration, changes in the political context or enemy actions intervene. 
By elaborating the elements of strategic logic in war and how it is put into practice 
by strategic ability - which includes moulding the operational art to suit the strategic 
requirements - this study aspires to show how strategy actually works in theory and 
practice in order to win wars. 
 To achieve this target, classical and modern strategic literature was examined in two 
areas. 
The first is how winning a war is defined. After exploring the strengths and 
weaknesses of different trends in defining the war outcome, the study chooses and 
explains its adopted model. 
The second area is how wars are won or lost, especially if the political outcome is not 
synchronised with the military achievements. After discussing the competing 
explanations, this chapter elaborates the main theory of strategic ability. This holds 
that advantageous strategic ability is the main determinant of the outcome, and 
methodology, structure and originality follow from it. 
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How Winning War Is Defined 
As many theorists have indicated recently, strategic thinking has lacked a convincing 
theory of victory and precise language to define it.18 The classic definition of victory 
has been understood in a purely military sense and shifted from territorial gains in 
antiquity to annihilation of the opponent on the battlefield in the industrial age.19 
Political scientists, on the other hand, focused on investigating the causes of war and 
neglected the examination of its outcomes.20 
This changed to some extent in the past two decades with research which addressed 
the outcome of wars. Some of these studies criticized the traditional understanding 
of victory and showed its incompatibility to the results of recent conflicts.21 Others 
offered an alternative concept, more differentiation or a detailed analytical 
framework.22 Lastly, some scholars highlighted specific elements in examining the 
theory of victory such as a just peace23, and the perception of victory.24 A concise 
survey of these studies will be made before offering our chosen model. 
                                                          
18
 Colin Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US War College Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2002); Martel, William, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Everette Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age 
(London: Cass, 2005).  
19
 Martel, Victory in War, pp.15-51. 
20
 Alan C. Stem III, Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1996), p.1.  
21
 Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Christopher 
Dandeker, “From Victory to Success: The Changing Mission of Western Armed Forces”, in Jan Angstrom and 
Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Modern War and the Utility of Force: Challenges, Methods and Strategy (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2010). 
22
 Mandel, The Meaning of Victory; William Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory. 
23
 Beatrice Heuser, “The Neglected Trinity: Victory, Peace and Justice”, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 69, April  
(Washington DC: NDU Press, 2013). 
24
 Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International 
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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Brian Bond‟s historical study on the Pursuit of Decisive Victory did not offer an 
alternative theory of victory, but made a clear demarcation between decisive victory 
on battlefield and translating military gains into advantageous and stable peace. The 
real aim of his study was to provide evidence that victory, and war in general, has 
been an effective political instrument, and to legitimize retrospectively the 
“soundness” of western political and strategic choices in the grand military shows, 
especially the two World Wars.25 
However, Bond offered more critical insights on how elusive the achievement of 
both political and military victories had been over the previous two centuries. 
Militarily, the Napoleonic model of victory was a landmark in its decisiveness and 
totality, which was then thought to be a thing of the past until its regeneration by the 
Prussian campaigns of 1866-71. After the debacle of WW1, the Napoleonic model 
became viable again thanks to developments in technology, doctrine and ruthless 
leadership, as in the Blitzkrieg. This was followed by fears of nuclear Armageddon 
during the Cold War and by Israel‟s military triumphs in 1967 and 1973. The   model 
also made a transient reappearance in the Gulf War of 1991.26 
William Martel produced a “pre-theory of victory” organising principles rather than 
formidable causal links. After surveying how classical and modern strategists 
perceived victory, he introduced his pre-theory by looking at four areas: The first, 
which is our interest here, examined the levels of victory. He counted three levels: 
tactical, politico-military and grand strategic. Tactical victory is winning battles and 
campaigns militarily. Politico-military victory “covers everything from conquering 
territories and defeating armies to successes in limited wars. In analytic terms, this 
level encompasses the range of political and military outcomes that occur when force 
is used to defeat the adversary‟s military forces and when that defeat compels 
changes in its political behaviour or policy”.  Strategic victory is “when the state 
                                                          
25
 Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998) pp.198-201. 
26
 Bond, The Pursuit of Victory, pp.198-201. 
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imposes strategic change by destroying the ideological and moral values of a society 
and then re-establishing the foundations of the enemy state”.27 
Clearly, Martel means by “strategic victory” deciding a war with total aims and 
“politico-military victory” as success in limited wars. However, describing them as 
different levels of victory risks “mixing theory of strategy with theory of victory”. 
Indeed, the strategic question concerns the selection of the type of war to be waged, 
with total or limited aims, and the specific aims to be achieved, rather than how 
victory should be categorized. 
This problem was resolved by Colin Gray‟s framework of tactical (winning battles 
and campaigns), strategic (achieving the policy ends), and political-grand strategic 
victory by which the political scene is permanently transformed to prevent further 
conflict. However, the latter can be achieved by compulsion and persuasion in either 
limited or total wars.28 
In a more specific but limited perspective, Robert Mandel dismissed two approaches 
to defining victory:  identification of a desired end status before the start of the war, 
and costs-gains calculus. He argued that the former suffers from ambiguity, as it is 
usually endorsed in very general terms, and also from potential fluctuation, as many 
wars end with the belligerents‟ aims far different from those at the beginning, and 
may turn out to be inappropriate to the national interest.29 
 Mandel also said that “attaining a fluid positive cost-benefit ratio - rather than fixed 
end-state identification, to gauge victory” could have contradictory elements. He 
then introduced his model of strategic victory as the achievement of detailed 
measures of success in six dimensions: informational, military, political, economic, 
social, and diplomatic.30 
                                                          
27
 Martel, Victory in War, pp.15-51. 
28
 Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory, pp.96-98. 
29
  Mandel, The Meaning of Victory, pp.5-7. 
30
  Mandel, The Meaning of Victory, pp.39-49. 
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Two weaknesses can be identified in this approach:  as a fixed and detailed formula 
for specific military interventions leading to regime change and state building, it 
lacks the potential for analysis of other war situations and ends. It also combines   
means and ends in a single category, which may lead to dogmatism and losing sight 
of policy ends. 
The same method was advocated by Rupert Smith to suit “war among people” 
which is characterized by open ends, timeless duration, and tasks not aiming to 
subdue the enemy decisively on the battlefield but to produce stability, maintain 
security and good governance as well as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. 
Dandeker described this as pursuing “conditions” rather than “success”.31 
Admittedly, there are some aspects of recent military interventions which do not fit 
the terms victory or success, or even the war model, as will be discussed later, but 
other aspects of counter-insurgency and regular warfare do. 
Dandeker also emphasised that the conditions suggested to be aimed for become an 
end in themselves, replacing or hindering the achievement or revision of overall 
policy aims for the campaign.32 
 Two further aspects of the theory of victory need to be addressed: perception and 
just peace. 
Johnson and Tierney pointed to the tension between military victory on the ground 
(score-keeping) and the perception of political elites and people of winning and 
losing wars (match-fixing). For score-keeping, “observers need a metric for what 
constitutes success and failure. A metric is the criterion against which to measure an 
outcome, and comprises two parts: a yardstick of what to measure (eg: territory or 
body counts); and a threshold on the yardstick to mark the point when success in 
considered to be achieved (e.g. strategic target captured or an enemy army 
destroyed).” But observers also need reliable information to reach an assessment.  
                                                          
31
 Dandeker, From Victory to Success, pp.21-23. 
32
 Dandeker, From Victory to Success, pp.23-24. 
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Johnson and Tierney counted five types of material gains that compose the concept 
of victory: absolute gains, relative gains vis-à-vis the enemy, achieving core aims 
which we may consider strategic gains, the price of peace that should be paid as 
post-conflict commitment and optimal policy (they mix policy with strategy here but 
they mean the best course of action compared to other options).33 
In match-fixing, assessment of the material gains of victory is distorted by a mind-set 
(expectations, historical experience, culture…) predating the war and affecting how 
its conduct and outcome are assessed. Also, observers may react to salient events in 
ways that inflate or deflate their weight in assessing the outcome. Finally, 
perceptions of war outcome are frequently manipulated by media, leaders or social 
pressure.34 
“Failing to win” showed efficiently how perceptions may distort the reality of war 
outcomes. However, the complexity of assessing outcomes was not only related to 
variable perceptions, but to the nature of war outcome itself. This is usually a 
mixture of gains and losses; the strategic effects are not only primary but can be 
secondary or tertiary as chain reactions; and the hybridity of some wars with 
different measures of success for each component can also affect perceptions of 
outcome. 
  Johnson and Tierney also de-prioritized the achievement of the policy aims of war 
by including it in the list of gains, which also featured tactical and operational gains. 
This risks losing insight on what is the most important and the difference between 
means and ends. 
Moreover, assuming there is a difference between perception and material gains, in 
which the latter are more related to “real” success in war, overlooked strategic logic. 
Using military and non-military means to achieve political ends is achieved by 
modifying the will of the enemy, as will be discussed, to affect its perception of the 
                                                          
33
 Johnson and Tierney, Failing to Win, pp. 22-26. 
34
  Johnson and Tierney, Failing to Win, pp.49-76. 
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costs/gains calculus and the probability of victory. So, when the authors examined 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war for instance, they underplayed the psychological effect of 
the Egyptian war-effort or even considered it as alien to the “real gain/losses”, 
although its effect as demolishing the Israeli theory and sense of security was exactly 
what the Egyptians were attempting to achieve, as Chapter 4 elaborates. More 
obviously, in irregular wars, the strategic effect  sought by irregular movements is to 
affect the perceptions of the political elites and the population (both in the front and 
at home)  which is not achieved by a clear military victory on the battlefields but 
rather by a sophisticated strategy of draining resources  while avoiding decisive 
confrontations. 
Heuser persuasively criticized the neglect of modern military theory and practice  of 
the importance of achieving a “just peace” as a war end, and the obsession with 
achieving decisive military victory and “imposing one‟s will upon the enemy”. She 
attributed this to some extent to the predominance of the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian 
cast.35 
From the strategic point of view, however, the role of strategy in the process of 
formulating policy ends is dependent on achievability. Policy is formulated through 
a complex environment in which all political, social, cultural, personal and 
geographical factors come into play. Heuser indirectly accepted the difference in the 
level of analysis between policy and strategy when she quoted Martel‟s distinction 
between the theory of “victory and the outcome of the employment of force through 
strategy”. The purpose of  strategic thinking, whether  in a military sense or in the 
context of  short-term grand strategy, is not to inform policy-making  of political 
aims and  define a peaceful conclusion, nor  to  expound a theory of world order to 
be adopted, but it can show if the chosen political aims  are achievable or not.  Long-
term grand strategy, however, attempts to find compatibility between the political 
aims of a specific war and long-term policy ends, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
                                                          
35
 Heuser, “The Neglected Trinity”, pp. 6-12. 
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The term “ just peace” – raising the question what is the legacy of war and how 
possible is it to achieve a just peace -- evokes deep philosophical rivalries between 
the realist and Hobbesian trend  on the one hand, and the more idealistic trend of 
Kant or a relativist approach.36 The merit of Heuser‟s criticism, even when 
considering the strategic level of analysis, was that most strategists in the Western 
world, as the authors of Strategy in the Contemporary World put it, “belong to the 
same intellectual tradition”. They are Realists with a Hobbesian pessimistic view of 
human nature and the eternity of war and conflict. “Realists see a limited role for 
reason, law, morality and institution in world politics” as the international system is 
without an “effective government”.37 Even this presumed world government may 
solve problems in legality but can it resolve what law philosophers see as the 
difference between legality and justice. 
As R. Sinnreich, concludes in “The Making of Peace”, the disputes among political 
scientists and historians on the plausibility and historical evidence supporting the 
three theories of peace making: world government, reaching equilibrium, and 
enhancing democratization are too great to be resolved.38 
At the level of grand strategy, however, the problem of a peaceful/just end arises as 
it is closer to policy level. Many strategists have advocated the aim of advantageous 
peace, in which many of the political aims achieved are accepted in order to keep the 
seeds of the next war as far away as possible. But does achieving “advantageous” 
peace means leaving “just” peace behind? 
Hence, it may be worth acknowledging a peaceful settlement of war which is viable 
for long time as a grand strategic success, while keeping in mind that the definition 
of peace is very debatable: is it a complete end of conflict or just an interlude 
                                                          
36
 Michael Howard, “Preface: Concluding Peace” in Williamson Murray and Jim Lacey (eds), The Making of 
Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
37
 Baylis et al, Strategy in the Contemporary World, pp.4-6. 
38
 Richard Sinnreich, “Conclusions: History and the Making of peace” in Williamson Murray and Jim Lacey (eds), 
The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
pp: 360-366. 
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between wars due to a perception that one generation shouldn‟t fight the same 
enemy twice.39 However, the concept of a “just” peace is too complex and relative to 
be addressed in acceptable objectivity. 
Many authors have criticised Clausewitz for advocating decisive military victory 
through a battle of annihilation as the ideal war end.40 This criticism, however, was 
offset by other scholars who pointed to the complexity; dialectical approach and 
different level of analysis of “On War”, which all make the old theorist‟s ideas open 
to contested interpretations.41 
Clausewitz appraised the peaceful ending of conflict from a purely strategic point of 
view, but of course what he meant was an advantageous peace.  He said absolute 
war was a “war on paper” but real war, as the history of war shows, is manipulated 
and its extreme form is altered by policy.42 Moreover, Clausewitz even considered 
“victory” a tactical or operational term at best in the modern sense to describe 
decisive success on the battlefield or in a series of battles. “In tactics the means are 
the fighting forces -- the end is victory." "The original means of strategy is victory -- 
that is, tactical success; its ends are those arrangements that lead to peace”.43 
The Chosen Model: 
This thesis adopts Gray‟s model in defining war outcome, but with an important 
modification. Rather than using the term “victory”, with its tactical and absolute 
sense, I propose the use of success at the strategic level. Grand strategy in war aims 
                                                          
39
 Sinnreich, “Conclusions”, pp.356-360. 
40
 A long chain of critics including Liddel Hart, William Martel, Hew Strachan and Beatrice Heuser. 
41
 This was a main theme in Michael Handel’s Masters of War and was reiterated by Clausewitz’s advocates 
such as Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); Hugh 
Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (London: Palgrave 2005) and persuasively by 
Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schliffen and Their 
Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp.16-18. 
42
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1989) pp. 80-88 and 579-581. 
43
 Clausewitz, On War, p. 143. 
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at using military and non-military means to achieve political aims and to provide the 
requirements for what policy adopts as longstanding peace and its major theorem. 
Military strategy on a lower level orchestrates military conduct and outcomes to 
fulfil the requirements of grand strategic success. 
The making of peace and consolidating the political conclusions of war is far beyond 
its frontiers, although it should be envisaged when making grand and military 
strategies. 
In addition, a big component of peace-making is dealing with the problems the war 
caused, which were hard to predict because of the chain reaction of events.44 Many 
of the effects or requirements on the social, geostrategic, political and economic 
spheres can either complicate or facilitate the achievement of policy aims or of 
making peace in the long term. 
“Strategic success” in war then should be defined as achieving the political aims 
confined to the frontiers of war and its direct aftermath, and  providing  the military 
and non-military requirements for achieving  long-term policy aims. “Strategic 
advantage” means the achievement of more policy aims or their requirements vis-à-
vis the opponent. In cases in which stalemate occurs, other factors such as costs or 
post-war end status (territorial gains, improved diplomatic position, recovery of 
power, and the long-term grand strategic outcome -- although these may not be 
exclusively linked the post war situation) are to be considered “relative superiority”. 
Complexities in identifying political aims 
As Mandel indicated, some methodological and practical problems appear when 
winning in war is defined by achieving pre-formulated political aims. 
Firstly, the researcher may find contested lists and different expressions of the 
political aims of the state going into a specific war. It is not unusual even to find 
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ongoing institutional conflicts within the state on the nature and scale of political 
aims before, during or after the war. These “contested” political aims, and strategies, 
can be due either to individual, corporate or inter-service rivalry or to domestic 
politics interests.45 Which list, then, should be adopted to estimate the outcome of 
war? 
The selected list of political aims should be the one which is endorsed for 
strategic/military planning at the political level, although the richness of policy 
formation will be tackled in this study. Generally, if the political aims of war are not 
clearly elaborated or not agreed upon, due to abnormal civil-military relations for 
example, this is a negative sign of strategic ability. 
Secondly, political aims may be modified during a war. Many states, for example the 
belligerents during World War I, entered the war with political aims which were 
totally different from their political aims in the middle or at the end stage of the war. 
Again, which political aims should be considered in our analysis in order to judge 
the meaning to them of “winning”? 
My research technique for dealing with this problem is to analyse qualitatively the 
“strategic” logic behind the alteration of political aims. Strategy is a link between 
political aims and operational capability which is not static but is shaped by events, 
the opponent‟s capability and his measures to resist. If, for example, the capability is 
found to fall short of achieving the strategic effect needed, the political aims are then 
reasonably modifiable, or as Clausewitz indicated, “That however does not imply 
that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process 
which radically changes it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration.”46 
However, if modifying the political aims here resulted from inaccurate strategic 
estimate, it is a sign of incompetence and the original political aims are still 
considered. 
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Thirdly, which may be a variant of the second problem; political aims are formulated 
to implement a new vision of the role of the belligerent country or a new theory of 
peace. How might political aims and their achievement be considered if the state, or 
its ruling agent, modifies the vision of its role and, in turn, changes the political aims 
of the war? Again, if changing the vision of the role is due to inaccurate strategic 
calculations, this is considered a red flag in assessing strategic ability. But, if 
modifying the vision of the role is non-strategic and due to political or cultural 
changes when, for example, another domestic player with different views comes to 
power, the new vision of the role, with its new policy, should be adopted for 
analysis. 
How Wars Are Lost or Won? 
Researchers of “power theory” have been divided in their attempts to explain why 
some states have been political winners and others were not.  The first group 
highlighted the resources of power, whether material (economic, human, weaponry, 
technology)47 or moral (resort and morale,48 political stability, social cohesion and 
know-how). Others who looked only at the manifestations of power were 
tautological as they simply recognized the victorious states as the more powerful.49 
As Mahnken explained, both ignored the area in which capabilities are recognized, 
organized and used intelligently to achieve an advantageous position. This area of 
action is what this study understands as strategy.50 
Inability to Achieve Military Victory 
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At the level of military conduct, Stephen Biddle described how military researchers 
made a causal link between the capabilities, usually material, of the contestants, and 
winning battles. This link ignored the most important factor, in which the 
capabilities are manipulated to produce an effect, in other words, force employment 
in the light of the modern system of combat.51 
Biddle‟s scope of research does not specifically answer the question as his arrival 
point is military not political victory, as indicated in the title “Explaining Victory and 
Defeat in Modern Battle” and his three case studies and operational research 
methodology. What he proposed was composition of a modern war system at a 
tactical (offensive and defensive) and operational level (breakthrough and 
exploitation, or limited aims approaches in the offensive, and depth, reserve and 
counterattack in the defensive) which assumedly would suffice to win battles and 
campaigns.52 
His answer was part of the conceptual problem within the discipline as he 
discredited policy and strategy as factors to be addressed on their own in order to 
explain winning and losing campaigns; hence he omitted studying them from his 
research methodology.53 
He overlooked three points: firstly, victories in battles and campaigns do not lead 
straightforwardly to winning the wars politically, as the main question of this study 
highlights. Second, it is strategy that fosters, shapes, and manipulates military 
capabilities and utility to follow “the modern system of war” in a complex and 
dynamic environment. Thirdly, is this modern system of war, which we may also 
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call operational art, a fixed formula to be applied in all contexts and missions, or is it 
very flexible, as the next chapter elaborates, and should analysis of it be sensitive to 
the contextual and strategic parameters?54 
Regarding our focused inquiry on the inability to achieve political winning in spite 
of military prowess, strategists offered some theoretical explanations or practical 
remedies. Although practitioners‟ remedies may look very pragmatic, they are based 
on some forms of theoretical assumptions at least. 
Poor Diplomacy 
The straightforward response of military institutions to the question why a political 
victory does not inevitably follow a military one was “we brought the victory on the 
battlefield but the politicians did not achieve the advantageous peace”.55 This belief 
may be supported by claims of poor diplomatic techniques, or of not addressing the 
concerns of the defeated, or anomalies in the political leaders‟ personalities and their 
institutions. The limitation of this explanation is that the scale and type of military 
outcome, even the very nature of military operations, affects the peace that follows, 
as explained by Clausewitz.56 Ignoring the fact that military practice is to a 
considerable extent responsible for the political outcome and should for this reason 
be subservient to policy is a sign of misconceiving the nature of strategy. 
As Geoffrey Blainey indicated “War is a dispute about measurement”57, which is a 
measurement of power and resolve, so war is concluded when this dispute is 
resolved. As Sinnreich commented, it is more complex than this, as there is fear, 
honour and all the drama of “religious fervour, tribal or ethnic identity and 
historical grudges” behind the will to fight. The will change, as discussed later, is the 
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strategic effect any grand strategy should aim to achieve on short term, and military 
strategy. 
Grand strategy uses both military and diplomatic methods interdependently to 
achieve the will change required for political conclusion and to pave the way for 
long-term handling of the conflict. Failed diplomacy is no doubt a legitimate reason 
for political failure, and it is still a sign of grand strategic weakness, but it cannot 
explain all cases. Especially, as the First World War indicates,58 the inability of 
military outcome, its scope and nature, to resolve the dispute of “power and resolve 
measurement” was undeniable and a major factor in “the failure of Versailles”. 
Defective Termination of War 
The second explanation acknowledges the nature of strategy and the 
interdependence between military, diplomatic and other means under political 
guidance. However, it considers that the problem lies at the final stage of war, 
termination. The main advocate for this explanation was Michael Handel.59 The 
limitation to this explanation is that many wars were fought using a faulty strategy 
from the very beginning. This explanation ignores Clausewitz‟s core advice that the 
primary task of a strategist is to know which kind of war he is going to fight.60 
Operational Defocusing 
Military institutions have become progressively more concerned after recent wars 
with the elusiveness of political aims. Some western doctrines acknowledge the 
problem and have coined the concept of “effect based operations” or similar ideas.61 
This approach not only illuminates the crux of strategy, which is using the military 
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and non-military means to achieve some strategic/political effect, but it put the 
strategic duties on the shoulders of the operational cadre. Also, its predilection for 
reducing complex strategic performance to algebraic formulas and a technological 
panacea is hazardous and endangers the essence of strategy as an art in which many 
variables cannot be measured quantitatively, the game is two-sided and interactive, 
and chance and frictions are at work.62 
The Existence of Operational Level of War 
A new approach, opposing the previous one, and supported by new technological 
developments and sensor warfare, claimed that the lack of strategic decisiveness is 
caused by the existence of the operational level itself. New technological 
developments enable political leaders to be instantly close to the tactical discourse 
and, on the other hand, the operational level undermines the ability of military 
leaders to identify and pursue political aims for the sake of chasing a military 
victory.63 Within this approach, the existence of an operational level is the main 
obstacle to linking military conduct with political aims. 
Actually, the operational level of war is not only an organisational necessity, as was 
seen during the Napoleonic era due to the massive expansion in the size and 
missions of armies, but  is also related to the character of modern war itself, as this 
study holds. Collecting and harmonizing the discrete tactical engagements, in time 
and space, is essential to achieving a purposeful and formidable military outcome 
which can serve the political aim in the process of strategy.64 
The real problem is not the existence of the levels of war but seeing these levels in a 
segmental rather than a diffusional pattern. Lower levels of strategy are purely 
operational, and higher levels, as Clausewitz said, are purely political. Colin Gray 
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advocates for cancelling the operational level and emphasising the operational art as 
a midway solution.65 Although this preserves the role of operational thinking, it does 
not accommodate the institutional and democratic necessities of having a formidable 
military institution and its compatibility with healthy civil-military relations. In 
these relations, the professionalism of the military institution should be invested in, 
and a separation sought between political and military levels for democratic 
practice, with civilian supremacy remaining the norm for strategic reasons as well.66 
Wars Being Asymmetrical  
Others have claimed the emergence of asymmetric war as a reason why militarily 
powerful states lose wars. These states lose wars  because they engage in asymmetric 
conflicts  in which  military advances aggravate the irregular movement to 
strengthen public support for it and its ability to inflict harm, which in turn catalyses 
economic, political, moral and social losses in the home country.67 However, this 
explanation does not account for the inability to claim political achievement in 
symmetric conflicts. Why Germany in the First and Second World Wars, Israel in the 
1956 and 1967 wars, and the US in the regular part of the Vietnam War did not 
achieve their desired political ends. In these wars, the stunning, if not decisive, 
operational superiority could not be leveraged to build up a strategic success 
manifested by the attainment of the political aims of each war. Despite the different 
presumed causes of this failure to achieve political aims in each case, it is more 
related to poor strategy than anything else. 
                                                          
65
 Gray, Strategy Bridge, p.20. 
66
 From the classic debate between Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and State: Theory and Politics of Civil 
Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1982) and Ian Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: a Social 
and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). Both agreed on professionalism, separation and 
civilian supremacy and differed upon the degree of civilian control and involvement. 
67
 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in 
Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
27 
 
The problem of disparity between military prowess and political outcome has also 
been addressed by political researchers. Herek et al. were convinced by the general 
idea that vigilant strategy-making leads to bad political outcomes, although their 
quantitative methods confirmed the correlation between both but not necessarily a 
causal link.68 Good strategic decision-making is based on meticulous information 
collection and review, comprehensive considerations of the alternatives, and 
contingency planning and implementation.69 Interestingly, these researchers have 
indicated that other variables at work during conflicts result in the lack of proper 
causation, not only the adversary‟s actions and responses but the general level of 
awareness of strategic ideas and consequences.70 
Defective Strategy Making Process 
Focusing on strategy-making in wars, Riza Brooks considered competent strategic 
assessment resulting from proper civil-military relations as the cornerstone in 
explaining victory or defeat. But she added: “good strategic assessment does not 
render a state infallible. It just lessens its chances of making large strategic errors”.71 
As with the examples above, Brooks‟s theory did not include other variables in 
defining  strategic assessment as the grip on sound strategic concepts and logic; 
neither did it address the other components of strategy making, implementation and 
reviewing. 
Comprehensive Formulas 
Patricia Sullivan came up with a highly organised theory to interpret the winning 
and losing of war. She rightly indicated the problem of defining victory and adopted 
the term strategic victory which was defined as achieving the political aims. She also 
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effectively discredited the material explanation and moral/resort explanations. 
Sullivan‟s study was a great step forward and is closely related to this study‟s topic 
and requires a deeper discussion here. 
She proposed four variables: military capabilities, resort/cost-tolerance, military 
strategy and war aims, stating that a complex relationship between them will lead to 
winning. She argued that states with high military capabilities will win if they 
choose “denial” war aims such as seizing or defending territory, removing regimes 
or defending the sovereignty, and used “destructive brute force” strategy that seeks 
battlefield decisions. Actors with low capability would win if they chose coercive 
war aims, a change in adversary policy, for example, and used a “punishment” 
strategy. We should not see wars, she claims, when the actor‟s perception of 
capability and cost tolerance is obviously lower or higher than the opponent‟s.72 
On the negative side, the theory she introduced was determinist, a fixed prescription 
underplaying the dynamic and reactive nature of war; rationalizing, overlooking the 
individual, social and cultural differences, all of which was contradicted by reality. 
A further criticism may be made of her rejection of the strategic explanation. 
Unfortunately, she misconceived the meaning of “strategy” as being merely an 
operational strategy or plan at best, as when she defined Biddle‟s “modern system of 
warfare” as a “strategy”. She did not even differentiate between operational theory 
and its viable and dynamic contextualization in operational strategy and plans. She 
could not see that her advocacy of matching capabilities, methods and war aims is 
the crux of strategy rather than anything else. 
Also, one of her determinist propositions, that an actor with high military capability 
and enough cost tolerance would win militarily and politically only if he chooses a 
“destructive” war aim, is not a universal law. Operational capabilities need strategic 
guidance at a more complex level than choosing between punishment or denial 
strategies in order to gain a political victory or, even as the 1948 Arab-Israeli war 
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shows, operational victory. Interestingly, both insurgencies and counter-insurgency 
were placed in this category and the model‟s advice for the latter is to use brute force 
in a denial strategy (battlefield decision) in order to prevail. 
All previous approaches diagnosed the problem as the inability to achieve political 
aims in spite of an outstanding military capability, but analysed it from a limited 
scope. Other explanations for losing wars were also offered. Wars might 
demonstrate disparities in resources, operational capability, low morale, poor 
leadership or dysfunctional civil-military relationships; all these explanations are 
piecemeal. Each can work in some but not all cases; they have a limited interpretive 
power. 
Is it feasible then to develop a wider explanation with greater interpretive power 
which can incorporate other theories by setting a framework of analysis and internal 
regulatory and conditioning factors? Can a general theory of “strategic ability”, the 
ability to link military conduct to political aims, or their requirements in the short 
aftermath of war, accommodate other working theories? 
Are there any relevant inputs to address the question of why wars are lost in spite of 
military supremacy? Does the type of war, being regular or irregular, make any 
difference in our theory? This thesis aims to deal with these inquiries. 
The essence of strategy in war is linking the military practice/outcome, primarily in 
the time scope of war, to the political effect/aims. If this link is chaotic, unhealthy or 
not productive, this is a strategic problem more than anything else. The remedy of 
this problem is to understand how strategy works (strategic logic), and to transform 
this logic into practice (strategic ability). Both, however, are shaped by conditioning 
elements in strategic dimensions. These theoretical frameworks will be explored 
before moving to the main argument and methodology of this thesis. 
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Theory of “Strategic Ability” 
The strategic ability of a state or non-state actor is its ability to perceive the logic of 
strategy conceptually; to have an institutional capacity to maintain a functioning 
bridge between military and political levels; and to apply the strategic logic 
practically by choosing sound strategies and by guiding the operational art and 
capability strategically. 
The Conceptual Tier 
The first layer is the conceptual which is the leaders‟ and ruling institutions‟ 
acquisition of a proper theory of war and strategy. 
There are three levels of strategic theory. The general theory deals with the 
phenomenon of war and how military force and other means, in general, are used to 
achieve policy ends. The basic assumptions on this level form the enduring skeleton 
of strategic logic. 
The elements of strategic logic will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter on 
theory. To proceed with the methodological articulation, they will be mentioned 
here briefly. 
Strategic logic is composed of some conditions and organizing principles that are 
essential to understanding how strategy works and how strategic thinking is linked 
to both policy formulation and operational art and conduct. 
Strategic logic is using military – and non-military – means to affect the will of the 
enemy. The grade and nature of will change, whether it needs to be destroyed or 
modified, is related to the type of war, with total or limited aims respectively. The 
strategic effect, as a currency for will change, is achieved by attacking the centre of 
gravity, or affecting the enemy‟s mindset (calculation, feeling of security and 
probability of winning). 
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Operational art is not a fixed formula but a dynamic consideration of the best way 
the military means are used to achieve military objectives. It is a continuous 
modulation of the army‟s mind depending on many variables:  technology and 
capabilities, lessons distilled from history and recent experience, geographical, 
cultural and administrative factors affecting both sides. But most importantly, it 
should reflect the strategic requirements and the type of war. 
Strategic logic, in its abstract form, should the same for all types of wars. However, 
its contextualization varies according to the age, type of war, and specific strategic 
context.  
The second level of theory is contextualizing the general strategic theory to the 
period of time: time-related strategic theory, which recognizes the effects of time-
related technological change (introducing new military means such as airpower or 
nuclear or even minor changes) and socio-political implications (such as 
democratization or politicising the conflict seen in irregular wars) on the ways of 
doing strategy. As Clausewitz indicated, “every age has its own kind of war.”73 
The third level of theory may be more related to practicing strategy rather than 
perceiving it. Strategic theory is further contextualized for a specific war and the 
idea of how this particular war should be fought and won. This level of theory is not 
merely the formulation of strategy in a planning/programming process; in fact it 
precedes and rules it. It is what Clausewitz meant when stating that the primary task 
of a commander is to know the war he is going to fight.74 Gray has named it the 
“story arc” which is the “theory of victory” in a specific war.75 
As a conceptual value, the theoretical level of strategic ability is hard to measure. 
However, some indicators for it can be drawn from the educational backgrounds 
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and systems of leaders and commanders, and content analysis of speeches, internal 
discussions, writings and explicit elaborations. 
Another complexity in researching how strategy makers perceived the basic strategic 
logic is not identical to what they articulate publicly or privately due to the 
possibility that they might merely be justifying decisions or past performance.76 
With or without the exposure to specific strategic theory, if this inference can be 
found empirically, strategy makers perceive strategy in a theoretical model 
(assumptions), and the role of research is to delineate this model first and then to 
compare it with the strategic logic. The elements of strategic logic discussed next 
chapter are summarized in table 1. 
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Table 1 
The Institutional Tier 
This can be studied through two approaches with different foci, functional or 
relational, to borrow Peter Feaver‟s terminology.77 
The relational approach is a political one which is interested in the way civil-military 
relations and structures are organised in relation to the type of regime, and in their 
implications for democratic integrity and civilian control. In this approach, which 
has been predominant in political sciences, as Suzanne Nielson has indicated, the 
primary focus is assessing the level of civilian control rather than military 
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Elements of Strategic Logic 
 War is a duel where military means are used for policy ends 
 Strategy attempts to keep means – ways – ends in harmony 
 Strategy works by affecting the enemy will to accept the required 
end state 
 In War with total aims: the will of enemy is destroyed by attacking 
COG which is contextual 
 In War with limited aims: the will is modified by affecting the 
enemy‟s calculation and security 
 Military objectives are variable and decided by strategy in each 
war 
 Levels of war are hierarchical but fusional 
 Operational level of war is a modern age requirement 
 Operational art is not a fixed formula but its contextual and 
should be strategy sensitive 
 Strategic logic is invariable but its contextualization in age and 
specific case varies 
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effectiveness.78 Nielson herself was more focused on the parameters of military 
effectiveness, which were mainly tactical and operational, rather than the more 
challenging impact of these relations which means managing the war strategically. 
Three relational patterns have been identified and their advocates linked them to 
better strategic outcomes. 
The first is the Huntingtonian model of political supremacy and “objective” control. 
In this pattern, the politicians decide on the policy aims of war and control the 
management of defence, but leave wide autonomy for the military to achieve these 
aims.79 Hence the strategy bridge was mostly broken, as in the case of US strategy in 
recent decades according to some critics.80 
The second pattern is what Janwitz advocated only one year after Huntington‟s 
textbook.  He argues that with the modern nature of war and conflict, military 
means should be used under meticulous and closely supervised civilian control, 81 
which Huntington earlier called “subjective” control. Eliot Cohen advocated this 
approach too in his “Supreme Command”.82 Supporting this point, one needs look 
not only at low intensity or asymmetric war scenarios, but even at a classic war like 
1973; both sides were attracted to following the finest developments on the 
battlefield when the Israeli breakthrough to the west of Suez occurred, as they 
deeply affected how each side would have to negotiate after the impending cease-
fire. 
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A similar theoretical rivalry was documented within Russian analysis earlier in the 
1920s between Svechin and Tukhachevisky, when the former emphasised the 
concept of absolute political supremacy over military conduct, while the latter only 
attributed defining the policy goals to the political level and insisted that the military 
be provided with autonomy in their actions.83 
A third pattern had one advocate recently, Hew Strachan, who was very critical of 
the political encroachment over the military area of expertise during the 2003 War in 
Iraq and thereafter. He advocated a pattern of political-military partnership in which 
the military command should form an acknowledged part of the strategy-making 
process.84 Interestingly, this pattern was used by Yoram Peri and Ben Meir,85 but in a 
critical sense, to describe the Israeli civil-military relations.86 
The functional approach assesses the ability of the institutional structures and norms 
to facilitate specific functions needed for better strategy-making. In this approach, as 
Colin Gray indicated, the strategist‟s bridging functions as theoretical planner, 
commander and politician or diplomat should be performed regardless of who does 
what, but with the preservation of military subordination to the political level.87 
Strategic perspectives on civil-military relations tend to focus on the functional 
attitude and outcome rather than democratic and relational settings. However, 
imbalance in the power centres between civilian and military leaderships, whether 
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both are equal or the military is more powerful, leads to tensions which either result 
in situations in which military conduct and policy are not synchronized,88 or the 
military hijack the policy and militarize policy options or “tacticize” strategy89 or, 
less damagingly, some compromises are made at the expense of the strategic 
bridging/collective thinking and action.90 
Risa Brooks has implicitly adopted a third combined approach. She provided a list of 
functions in civil-military relations that are decisive to the outcome of war: 
information-sharing between military and political bodies, comprehensive and 
critical analysis and decision-making, the competence of the military to assess its 
capabilities, and the clear authorization remaining in the hands of politicians. Brooks 
made a relational inference as well in connection with these functions. She argued 
that power skewing towards either political or military levels, and the preference 
divergence, can both affect the quality of the above functions.91 
Brooks‟s model is valuable, but it has three weak points methodologically. Firstly, it 
ignores the parameter of respecting professional expertise during the decision- 
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making process. Second, she did not address the real problem in this sphere and 
how it is solved: the degree of involvement with and delegation of the strategic and 
military topics. Third, she ignored the other parameters of strategy-making which 
are more than simply having a critical and healthy institution; they include having a 
proper perception of war and strategy, and executing strategy by moulding the 
military means and conduct to reflect the strategic guidance in the dynamic 
environment of war. These methodological shortcomings led to holes in her research 
collection and analysis of the 1967 and 1973 wars which will be focussed on in the 
next chapters. 
This study combines both relational and functional approaches with more focus on 
the second as the researcher is convinced by the emphasis on the weak causal links 
between policy outcomes and a specific political type of regime (for example:  
democratic vs. totalitarian regimes).92 
The functions examined in this study are what Brooks identified: information 
sharing between military and political layers, critical and comprehensive 
assessments of strategic alternatives, and the clear authorization process, the latter 
being relational anyway.93 However, the function of “the formidable position of the 
military”, which is relational as well, is added here to reflect their power 
representation in the decision-making process and to represent their perspective on 
capability so that the strategy bridge is functioning. Secondly, her criterion of 
“competence of the military to assess their capability” has been omitted here as this 
can be better described in the practical layer of strategy-making and as a net result of 
better conceptual, institutional and practical abilities. 
Regarding the involvement of politicians in military affairs, adding to the formal 
authorization of war, which may contradict professional necessities and expertise, it 
is argued that this involvement should be strategically sensitive, rather than the 
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crude demarcation between what constitutes strategy and what constitutes 
operations and tactics. “Strategically sensitive involvement” has three elements: 
firstly, authorizing the whole planning process; secondly, what was expected to have 
direct strategic effect, as the former Israeli Chief of Staff, Mordechai Gur, 
advocated,94 the politicians should intervene. But due to the fog of war and 
strategy95 there is usually a difficulty in predicting the consequences of specific 
action or force structure before its materialization and whether these consequences 
will be tactical, operational or strategic. This leads to the third point:  any military 
decision related to the effectiveness of the whole army or one of its services, as a 
whole, should be considered strategic until proven otherwise. 
But is there a relational model to be applied in all contexts in relation to democratic 
countries? 
Many indicated that some totalitarian actors such as the USSR, North Vietnam96 or 
China, or even religiously fanatical ones like Hezbollah or Iran, achieved a high level 
of institutional efficiency despite not being democracies.97 On the other hand, more 
established and “civilian controlled” civil-military relationships in the United States, 
Israel and Egypt have not prevented strategic practice from being incompetent. 
I argue that civil, or rather political, relations are a product of political, sociological, 
cultural and strategic developments of the state and non-state actors. However, there 
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is usually a “competent”, rather than ideal, structure compatible with the prevailing 
socio-political settings which results in a balance of power enabling the institution to 
perform the functions. The relational model for a democratic actor would be 
functionally catastrophic in other socio-political settings. This relative approach in 
examining civil-military relations, in which functions are the goal, is what this study 
adopts. 
Non-state actors, whether insurgent or terrorist,   are also required to follow the 
principles for formulating and implementing strategy. However, due to their 
different context and internal structure the principles need to be applied differently. 
Some irregular movements have separate political and military commands and so 
need to fulfil the same five requirements as states. But even if they have the same 
level of command to decide upon political and military strategy, there is a wide 
institutional gap between their strategic command and its operative or tactical 
subordinates. The movement is under security pressure which means that its 
institutional ability is always in a crisis of paradoxes. 
One paradox is how to keep a strong centrality at the strategic level in order to 
maintain strategic direction, especially in an over-politicised conflict in which 
tactical actions have more strategic impact. At the same time they need to 
decentralise at the lower levels to facilitate political campaigning and irregular 
military action. 
Another paradox is how a movement can maintain the healthy institutional 
characteristics of regeneration, critical thinking, comprehensive debate and avoiding 
its strategy becoming a dogma, while preserving security and unity.98 These 
institutional requirements are usually more difficult to achieve, if not more complex, 
than in the case of regular or state actors. They need to share information and 
maintain comprehensive debate and clear authority over the military and in guiding 
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operations. Innovative methods are needed to achieve these requirements to a 
suitable degree while coping with the previously mentioned contradictions, 
particularly to permit decentralized operational and tactical discourse. 
The Practical Tier 
Theories of war and strategy held by some actors may be excellent and the 
institutional pattern may be healthy but this is not sufficient to execute strategy 
competently. There is always a “bridge”, as it was called by Gray, between theory 
and practice. With this bridge all natural, instrumental and human frictions interact. 
The assessment of strategy is not reasonable if it does not include the practical 
application of theory through institutional channels to give a sound strategic 
product and shape military practice and institutions accordingly. 
Strategic performance may be good but winning war still is unattainable if it is 
below what is needed, if it falls short of the adversary‟s or is hampered by bad luck. 
Nevertheless, the strategic ability to manage better performance is the most 
pragmatic roadmap for winning. 
There are two major components in this practical layer: developing sound strategies 
and strategic guidance of operational competency. 
Assessing the detailed strategies relies upon assessing the steps of strategy 
formulations (building a strategic framework and outlook, planning and 
programming), and examining the actual strategies by counter-factual analysis of 
alternatives, while allowing for time limitations in knowledge and tools. 
The first step of strategy formulation is elaboration of a “story arc” or “specific 
theory for victory”. This necessitates holding a form of “strategic framework”99 
which is a general perception of the self, the opponent and others‟ major strategic 
dimensions, intentions and scenarios. 
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By examining this framework, the strategist tries in a continuous dual way between 
theory and reality to tailor his adopted theory of victory. As J.C. Wylie described it, 
The evolution of a plan is the connection between the theoretical 
consideration of war and the conduct of war. It is the situation in which 
the strategist finds himself with a foot in each camp, so to speak, the one 
the conceptual or theoretical aspect of strategy and the other the 
combatant or practical aspect of strategy.100 
To transform this theory of victory into practice, the strategist needs to formulate a 
strategic “plan” with a suitably dynamic character. As Murray et al. indicated, 
strategy is a “process” which requires “a constant adaptation to shifting conditions 
and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity 
dominate”.101 
Strategy is neither a mechanical process nor a chaotic phenomenon, as some post-
modern strategists shuttered by the institutional and practical complexities of 
making strategy in a democratic state have claimed.102 In one way, strategy as 
Churchill illustrated, is like painting; keeping the proportions and inter-relational 
characters right plus a hint of creativity.103 Another way is that by looking at all the 
complexities of making or assessing strategies, people can come up with formidable 
strategic ideas, plans and attitudes, albeit with some necessary reductionism.  This is 
the difference between the tasks of understanding and explanation respectively in 
examining politics, and both are needed.104 
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The formulation of strategy itself, in its military sense, involves setting operational 
objectives and guiding the drawing up of operational plans with enough flexibility 
to allow for refinement, remodelling and reverse feedback during the course of the 
war. 
Guiding the operational capabilities is studied through developing the major 
components outlined in the British Army Doctrine‟s definition of “Fighting 
Power”105 but with a different regrouping: military doctrine, human (including 
morale, training, and leadership), organization (command/control/communication, 
logistics and force structure), and materials. However, what this study focuses on is 
the role of strategic command not only in enhancing these elements to counter-
operationalize a specific opponent but, more importantly, how they shape fighting 
power to meet the strategic requirements. 
This  study strongly advocates the existence of the operational level of war, but only 
if levels of war are seen as diffusional and mutually dependent and  the operational 
art is not reduced to a fixed formula but is  strategically and contextually highly 
sensitive. 
Methodology 
The thesis uses the multiple case studies approach for theory development and 
refining. Its focus is a major theoretical problem:  why states, especially those with 
military prowess, may win or lose wars in the short or long terms. To answer this, 
the study formulates an analytical framework of strategic logic and ability. Strategic 
logic is the principles governing the use of military and non-military means, with the 
main focus on the former, to achieve the policy ends in war. Strategic ability is 
perceiving the logic of strategy conceptually, fulfilling its requirements 
institutionally, and applying it through sound strategies to guide the fighting power. 
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The straightforward thinking is that competent conceptual and institutional layers 
should lead to a competent practical layer. If a state‟s strategy makers hold a proper 
strategic logic and keep a functioning organisation between the political and military 
spheres, they should be able to formulate a superior strategy. But this thesis holds 
that strategic logic and ability should not be taken in a mechanical way as strategic 
choices and behaviours are shaped by complex dimensions: geographical, societal, 
economical, and regime-type. 
The study has two main assumptions to be tested: 
First, the degree of competency in conceptual and institutional tiers of strategic 
ability should be reflected in the practical tier of ability. However, this pathway is 
shaped by personal characters and the competency of strategic leaders, the reaction 
of the enemy which might bring strategic opportunities or blunders, and the 
intervention of regional and international actors. 
Second, having an advantageous strategic ability at the practical layer (sound 
strategies and guiding operational art and capability), leads to an advantageous war 
outcome over a scale of grades. 
While the study tests these assumptions in order to answer the main question (why 
states with military prowess may fail to win strategically), it also attempts to explore 
secondary questions related to perceiving strategic logic in war and its application: 
1. To what extent does strategic logic vary according to contexts and specific cases? 
Is there a different strategic logic in irregular versus regular wars? 
2. How political-military relations are best organised for an efficient strategic 
function? Is there an ideal relational model? And how should the politicians‟ 
intervention in military operations be framed? 
3. Is there a conceptual, institutional and practical usefulness in having an 
operational level of war? Is there a specific formula for operational art to be 
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militarily effective? Or is it rather a strategic function to shape the operational art 
according to the requirements of strategy and characters of war? 
Before elaborating the methodological approach that is followed here, the nature and 
role of strategic theory, and its ways of building will be discussed. 
The Nature and Role of Strategic Theory: 
As Gray indicated, theory as a term has been “eminently contestable” in the fields of 
strategic studies. It may range from the simple act of explanation to a hypothesis 
only testable by experimental cross examination.106 Harry Yarger defined strategic 
theory as a theory that “provides essential terminology and definitions, explanations 
of the underlying assumptions and premises, substantial propositions translated into 
testable hypotheses, and methods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify 
theory as appropriate”.107 
But as Gray indicated, if the controlled experiments required for scientific inquiry 
are not possible, this makes historical inquiry the available method to reach a theory. 
This historical evidence is usually incomplete, contestable and leads to an unreliable 
conclusion.108 
 Most experts in strategic studies do not consider the discipline to be a science.  As 
J.C. Wylie stated, 
I do not claim that strategy is or can be a „science‟ in the sense of the 
physical sciences. It can and should be an intellectual discipline of the 
highest order, and the strategist should prepare himself to manage ideas 
with precision and clarity and imagination in order that his manipulation 
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of physical realities, the tools of war, may rise above the pedestrian plan 
of mediocrity.109 
As Baylis et al. indicated, the real complexity of strategy is what moved Bernard 
Brodie away from seeking reliable, rigorously tested strategic theory in his 1949 
paper “Strategy as a Science”, to a “midcourse correction” when he criticized the 
negligence of political sense and diplomatic and military history,110 and arrived at 
what Gray described as a “pessimistic attitude towards strategic theory” by equating 
it to strategic thinking.111 
It is difficult to define causal links in strategic studies with determinist accuracy. As 
William Martel   noted, “the failure of theorists and practitioners to develop in social 
science what has been known for decades as a causal theory... or reliable 
knowledge... with any degree of predictive quality”.112 Each result, political or 
military, is mostly caused by a combination of many variables dispersed across 
different dimensions. To complicate things, these variables are interdependent and 
any attempt to attribute the strategic effect to a sole variable, for example morale, 
political coherency, material resources, public spirit, valid doctrine and high level of 
command, is unwise. Also, it is nearly impossible by any methodology to isolate the 
confounding factors or to differentiate decisively between independent and 
conditioning factors, as in scientific experiments. 
Secondly, as Clausewitz and others indicated, many of the variables such as moral 
factors are hard to identify, let alone quantify.113 
Thirdly, the phenomenon of war has a unique feature – the adversary‟s initiatives 
and responses -- which makes the predictive power of any theory inaccessible.   As 
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Clausewitz stated, a theory that aims to predict is unfeasible in a field in which 
adversary actions, frictions, ambiguity, uncertainty and chance dominate.114 
However, while granting all the shortcomings of political and strategic theory that 
make absolute and reliable knowledge unattainable in the phenomenon of war, 
advocates of a more rigorous discipline that is closer to scientific formulae 
responded that the alternative is leaving intellectual inquiry to vacuum filled only by 
personal whims.115 
Nevertheless, this study holds that the inability of strategic theory to predict, in a 
determinist way, is not a restricting factor on the desire and ability to formulate a 
strategic theory, albeit not a determinist positive one. The function of this theory is 
not simply to predict, or to guide the strategist by scientific formula, but to guide 
him in his self-education and to provide a framework of analysis.116 So, as Hugh 
Smith stated, it guides the “praxis”; the self-development pathway, rather than the 
“practice” in a direct way.117 
Models of theory development in Strategic Studies 
The first model is the pure historical approach. It is convinced by the uniqueness of 
historical events and the specific role of personal and moral factors, so a theory with 
wider application cannot be generated. This approach neglected the overriding 
concepts of war that transcend all times.118 There is a modification offered by Jon 
Sumida after studying Clausewitz:   use of a ready theory to fill in the inevitable 
gaps in historical records. So, theory is the path to a sound historical exploration, not 
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only an explanation. History is not a tool for theorizing, but for training the 
subconscious mind of the strategist.119 But Sumida did not clarify how this pre-
formed theory for the use of historians was already formed. 
The second is the American approach which was criticized by many.120 History, 
according to this approach, is irrelevant as everything changes:  technology, tactics, 
socio-political patterns, strategic problems and roles of command. This school 
adopted the practical approach:  if something works in practice once it will work 
again. This pragmatic approach neglects the fact that different contexts cause the 
governing principles to be applied differently. It grasps the tail, not the head, of the 
strategic phenomenon. 
The third model is an opposite approach to the previous one. Practice is very elusive 
and history is irrelevant because history can support any theoretical claims that are 
imposed upon it. This was represented by André Beaufre in his introduction on 
strategy. For him, the only way to theorize is by logical process.121 This approach 
shares the same methodological assumptions of the classic political scientists‟ 
deductive approach. 
The fourth is a modified approach. Admiral Wylie followed a methodology, as he 
described, combining the logical and practical pathways.122 Again, history was 
largely neglected. 
The fifth approach was the Clausewitzian, in its primitive form, which combines 
logical, historical and practical elements. What Clausewitz did in “On War” was a 
combination of logical process and historical analysis in a very dialectic way that left 
room for practice. He was in a continuous and dynamic double pathway between 
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logical processing and history or, to put it another way, between deductive and 
inductive methods. 
Although he relied on logical process to lay down his theory, historical inquiry was 
used to refine theoretical assumptions. His application of historical analysis to 
transform the logical reasoning of absolute war/war on paper to war constrained by 
politics and friction is illustrative.123 
The end theoretical product of “On War” was considered by Clausewitz himself as 
an intermediate product, as it needs practice, or critical analysis of history if practice 
is not available, to complete its maturation. He explained how the critical analysis of 
historical events may open the door for demonstrating general truth. However, in 
this analysis it “must be taken that every aspect bearing on the truth at issue is fully 
and circumstantially developed” and required a careful consideration of diverse 
circumstances to ensure historical examples are not misused. 124-125 The outcome of 
“On War” was not a rigid positive theory that guides the practice in a mechanical 
manner or predicts. Rather, it is a conceptual framework that guides the training of 
the strategist and is open to further modifications by him as practice indicates. 
The field of political science entered new phases of development too. Its curve 
shifted from the purely deductive approach in the 1950s and 1960s to the 
behaviourist peak in the 1970s, to more mature combined approaches after that. As 
Lauren discussed thoroughly, the last trend was to combine both deductive and 
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historically based approaches.126 This is best shown in the historically-based case 
studies approach. 
Case Studies and Theory Building 
Theory development in political and social observational studies was sought in two 
ways: Large-N studies and comparative controlled case studies.127 Large N studies 
use statistical logic to identify the frequencies of variables which are then used to 
draw causal links. Adding to the epistemological challenges mentioned above, one 
of the shortcomings of this method was the chaotic links being developed in some 
researches.128 New trends emphasise the necessity of applying some degree of 
qualitative research methods in order to guide the quantitative methods. This 
confirmed the value of comparative case studies. 
The case study is an essential tool in research methodology in the political and social 
sciences. It was believed that its functions lie in the exploratory sphere. Robert Yin 
asserted, however, that case study has both exploratory and explanatory functions, 
depending on the questions and the nature of the research.129 The rationale behind 
the explanatory function is to assess dependent and independent variables to 
confirm the presumed causal links. 
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Lijphart and Eckstein identified different types of case study depending on their 
objectives and methodology.130 The most challenging type is that in which case 
studies can help in building up a theory; this is called a “theory generating” or 
“heuristic” case study, and this is our interest here. 
Alexander George developed a methodological framework on how multiple case 
studies can be used in a focused and structured way in order to develop a theory, the 
heuristic case study approach. This approach is focused as “it deals selectively with 
only a certain aspect of the historical case”, and structured as “it employs general 
questions to guide the data collection and analysis in that historical case.”131 
In George‟s model, case studies pass through three stages: design, doing the actual 
case studies, and drawing the theoretical formula from them. 
In his more recent study,132 George illuminated two analytical techniques: causal link 
tracing inside each case, and cross comparisons among cases to testify the causal 
link. In the latter technique, different confounding variables are manipulated 
(silenced) from one case to another.133 
Another advantage George suggested from this approach suggested is the ability of 
focused structured comparisons to develop a typological theory which he described 
as “rich and differentiated theory”. This theory, in contrast to general theory, has 
“the capability for more discriminating explanations”. This type of theory explains 
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the “variety” of how the general theoretical themes are applied in different contexts, 
so it represents a more “policy- relevant theory”.134 
The Approach Adopted 
Seven case studies were selected to test the main hypotheses (2 majors: the 1967 and 
1973 wars; and 4 minors: 1948, Attrition, the PLO, Hezbollah and Hamas wars).135 
The method of difference136 is used for this selection.136 Four regular wars (1948, 
1967, Attrition and 1973) are between the same main belligerents, Israel and Egypt. It 
is useful to examine how variance in the proposed cause -- advantageous strategic 
ability -- leads to variable war outcomes. This can be found to some extent also in 
Israel‟s fight against Arab Irregulars. The 1948 War provides a case study in which 
Israel had a completely opposite war outcome than that which the study searches for 
(different dependent variable not just internal variation). 
 Competing explanations for war winning will be traced and assessed in each case: 
quantitative and qualitative power, quality of diplomacy and war termination, 
asymmetric strategy, achieving military victory. The strength of the thesis is 
represented by the congruity of the presumed link between advantageous ability 
and outcome, and by either silencing the competing theories or less congruity. 
In cases of mismatches between the proposed hypothesis and the articulated causal 
links in case studies, some modifications will be sought, either by acknowledging 
more interdependent or conditioning variables, or by reassessing the variables‟ 
interdependence. 
Measurements and Research Tools  
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Winning the war in its direct aftermath is measured in this study over three grades. 
“Strategic success” is achieving the political aims for which the war was waged in 
the short term, and providing the military and non-military requirements for policy 
success in the long term if they were delineated. “Strategic advantage” is when one 
state does not achieve its full list of political aims; however, its proportional political 
achievement is still higher than the opponent‟s. “Relative Superiority” occurs if 
neither party achieves its political aims,  or  they both achieve them  as a stalemate, 
so other factors in recognising the winning status are included, mainly the costs of 
war and the advantageous status of any post-war arrangement for either party. 
Measuring strategic ability is more complex as it contains three tiers with multiple 
components in each, and most of them are qualitatively assessed. The assessments of 
the tiers are then combined as low, medium and high depending on marking. Lastly, 
the grade of advantageous ability will be generated by comparing the strategic 
ability of each belligerent, as low, medium or high. 
The conceptual layer will be assessed by tracing the elements of strategic logic in 
political and military thinking and communications, and the quality of strategic 
education if it conveys these ideas. 
 This is a hard task as was indicated, but inferences can be made by looking at 
leaders‟ diaries, important speeches, educational curricula and, if possible, the 
minutes of the strategic meetings. 
The institutional layer will be assessed through five functional and relational criteria: 
information sharing, critical assessment, clear authorization by politicians, 
formidable position of the military and strategic-sensitive political involvements in 
operational and tactical matters. In the case of irregular movements, “decentralized 
operations and tactics” will replace “the formidable stand of military”. 
The practical layer has two major components: generating sound strategies and 
guiding operational art and capabilities. 
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Generating sound strategies is decomposed further to: clear policy aim, sound grand 
strategy and sound military strategy. It is assessed by considering the alternatives 
counterfactually137 and assessing which one was closer to applying the strategic logic 
with the given resources. 
Guiding fighting power is decomposed to: shaping operational art strategically and 
enhancing operational capabilities in four areas: military doctrine, human (including 
morale, training, and leadership), organization (command/control/communication, 
logistics and force structure), and materials. 
 Given the scarce archival sources for the wars in this study due to sensitivity to 
security matters in both the Arabs, and to lesser degree, Israel138, this research 
depends heavily on the diaries of political and military leaders of both sides. 
However, it uses cross comparisons and inferences distilled from other sources or 
from the actual course of events, to settle the contesting narratives.  On a few 
occasions like the original plan of Egyptian crossing in 1973, it applies what was 
suggested by Jon Sumida after studying Clausewitz:  use of a ready theory of 
strategy to fill in the inevitable gaps in historical records. 
The study also relies on secondary sources from both sides and international 
strategists. Two of these sources were exceptionally valuable. The first was based on 
the Israeli archives of the 1967 War which have been mostly available recently.139 
The second included Egyptian operational and tactical documents of the 1973 war 
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that were confiscated by the Israeli forces and   also made available.140 Heikal‟s 
books on the 1967 and 1973 wars also contained presidential minutes and other 
important documents. This thesis has also benefited from other primary sources 
such as the CIA military balance estimate of the belligerents on the eve of the 1967 
war and two British archives about the ceasefire proposals in 1973, and few 
interviews. 
Why the Arab/Israeli Wars? 
The Arab-Israeli Wars were chosen as the applied field for my research for various 
reasons: personal, general and methodological. 
Personally, the researcher had a previous knowledge of different phases of the 
conflict across many dimensions: cultural, social, political and military. Also, the 
researcher‟s mother tongue is Arabic which enables him to go through Arabic 
sources which are mostly unavailable in English. Regarding the Israeli resources, 
although the researcher is learning Hebrew, it is difficult to gain a strong grip on 
reviewing the complex literature available in the years allowed for a PhD. 
Nevertheless, the Israeli academic works on military matters have a high rate of 
translation to English or were written in English in the first place.141 
Generally, the Arab Israeli conflict, especially the events and outcomes of the 1967 
and 1973 wars,142 has been the triggering point of regional, and sometimes 
international, conflicts for decades. In the post-Cold War world, this has continued 
to be the case. Gulf War II, the Second Intifada, the rise of Al-Qaeda, and the Global 
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War on Terror,143 the Lebanon War and ongoing Middle East political and social 
problems can be linked, at least partially, to this conflict. 
However, personal and general factors are not the most important motivations. 
Methodologically, the three wars chosen fulfil the methodological requirements of 
this research. 
As this research aspires to add something to the general theory, this “act to 
generalize” is compatible with studying a conflict which has different phases, actors 
and types of war. Theory is all about defining the causal links and making a 
distinction between independent and confounding variables. Isolation (in an 
experimental sense), which aims to isolate the confounding variables from 
independent variables, is easy to undertake in the physical sciences. However, in the 
social and political sciences, isolation is not applicable but its effects can be achieved 
to some extent, albeit not completely or assertively, by studying different types and 
presentations of the phenomenon under research where the competing theories can 
be silenced on-off in cases.144 
The case studies, as indicated, are the best candidates   for using the method of 
difference. Also, competing theories were more prone to be silenced or be shown to 
be incongruous in the Conclusion. 
The military victories and strategic winning alternate among the selected study 
cases.  In the 1948 War, Israel achieved a strategic success due to a high strategic 
ability in spite her inferiority in the terms of battlefield outcomes, the state‟s power 
means and fighting power, at least for the first half of war. In the 1967 war, there was 
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a paradox between an outstanding Israeli military decisiveness and low political 
gain. A more complex pattern occurred in 1973 when the initial military 
breakthrough for Egypt did not lead to a strategic success; rather, poor strategic 
performance led to operational and strategic difficulties. Israel, on the other hand, 
suffered from operational difficulties and a far lesser military advantage in 1973 in 
comparison to 1967. However, due to the earlier devastating Egyptian strategic 
advantage and prevailing super power dynamics, Egypt managed finally to gain a 
calculated strategic advantage, and Israel achieved the best grand strategic 
advantage in her record by achieving a peace agreement with Egypt, albeit not until 
1979. 
Patterns were completely non-linear in asymmetric wars as well. Israel managed its 
war well with the PLO, but faced great strategic dilemmas with Hezbollah. The war 
with Hamas was mixed. 
These multiple cases with different patterns145 are an excellent research ground for 
cross comparison and developing a rich typological theory. 
Having studied both regular and irregular wars, the study also offers an ample 
opportunity to compare strategic logic and ability, operational art, or peculiarities of 
political-military relations between them. One of the main themes of this study is to 
clarify what is contestant and variable in the theory of strategy and operational art. 
Lastly, the primary question is related to the inability of some actors to achieve 
winning in war in spite of an ample military edge. This is dealt with extensively by 
studying the Arab/Israeli Wars where the Israelis‟ military power edge is 
incontestable for most of the conflict. Approaching the conflict as a whole is suitable 
as a single case study to shed some light on how long and protracted conflicts are, or 
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are not, concluded by manipulating the strategic dimensions or considering the 
conflict insoluble. 
Originality 
This study represents an endeavour at the level of general strategic theory.  It also 
attempts to locate the inquiry into the strategic weakness of actors with significant 
military prowess within the major lines of strategic thought. 
To answer this inquiry, the thesis developed a theoretical pathway which did not 
stop at the reformulation of general strategic theory, but had to resolve major 
theoretical disputes in conceptualizing the levels of war, the nature and strategic 
orientation of the operational art and efficient settings of political-military relations. 
The study also developed a framework for estimating war outcome strategically 
(strategic success, strategic advantage and relative success). It emphasises that the 
share of military outcome in achieving  political success  in the short and long term 
should be acknowledged in a reasonable sense, without amplification or diminution, 
and  should be considered contextual. 
More importantly, the study has developed the concept of “strategic logic in war” 
and laid out its internal structure, and introduced the framework of “strategic ability 
in war”. The thesis differentiated strictly between the latter and the “fighting 
power”, the concept that embodied western doctrines and dealt with the sub-
strategic level of war. 
Methodologically, it adopts a compound and more rigorous method than that which 
has dominated traditional strategic thinking, without being, as Clausewitz says, 
“dragged down to a state of dreary pedantry”. 146 
At the level of applied research, the study tries to fill in the gaps in the literature of 
the Arab-Israeli wars – in as fair and non-partisan a way as possible – since the 
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existing literature is mostly focused either on operational or political concerns and 
only a few exceptions deal with the link between military conduct and political aims.  
The study looks at seven Arab-Israeli Wars and uses their richness and heterogeneity 
to test different theoretical propositions which confuse the eternal “nature” of 
strategy with its evolving and changing “characters”. 
Structure 
The study will move after this introduction to enrich the theoretical foundations of 
strategic logic in war (Chapter Two). 
Chapters Three and Four examine the Wars of 1967 and 1973 respectively (the 
southern front between Egypt and Israel), with a brief discussion of the 1948 War 
and the War of Attrition. Each chapter starts by giving the political background of 
the war, and then the strategic ability with its three layers will be examined for each 
side in order to reach a comparative assessment. Finally, the outcome of war is 
measured on the adopted scale. Chapter Five includes short case studies; the 
irregular wars between Israel and three irregular Arab movements (the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), Hezbollah and Hamas). 
The Conclusion in the final chapter  sums up the fruits of studying the Arab Israeli  
wars, performing  cross comparisons and reaching  concluding points and 
answering the research questions at the levels of theory and the applied research 
area. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
THEORTICAL OUTLOOK: 
STRATEGIC LOGIC IN WAR 
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Elements of Strategic Logic in War 
All wars are simply a phenomenon in which military force is used to achieve 
specific political aims. 1 As the primary character of war is a duel, the path to the 
political aim materialises by affecting the opponent‟s will. There two distinct models 
of using military force:  the first is the war model which aims to affect the 
opponent‟s political will to resist.  In the second type, the public policy model, military 
means and operations aim to achieve destructive or pervasive intermediary 
conditions (concerning security, nation building and expertise) required by higher 
governmental policy. This study focuses on the first type.2 
Clausewitz highlighted affecting the enemy‟s will in On War, stating “War is thus 
an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”3 However, the general ways and 
conditioning elements of affecting the political will were insufficiently developed in 
On War. They were mentioned in different contexts and under a variety of titles, but 
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not clearly organized.  The inherited methodological and linguistic difficulties in the 
book further jeopardize the conceptual clarity of understanding how strategy works.   
In general, strategic logic can be understood as “how” the military is used through 
its operational objectives and tactical efforts to achieve the desired change in the 
enemy‟s political will. This is “the strategic effect” that paves the way to achieve 
political aims in war.  
The calculus of strategy is the means-ways-ends equation. Strategy uses military 
force, primarily in war, and other means in specific ways to achieve the policy ends. 
 
Strategy as a Bridge and the Levels of War 
The role of strategy, as a logic and institution, is to bridge the gap between policy 
and operations, and to keep a healthy link with feedback in both directions and 
refinement of plans. Strategy should make sure that military operations are directed 
to achieve a specific “strategic effect”, which is deemed necessary by policy, and not 
act to disrupt policy aims, exceed them or fall short of them. 
Strategy should also make sure that policy provides the military with the resources 
needed, and that policy does not ask for wider objectives beyond the military‟s 
ability. As simple as this looks on paper, it is tremendously difficult in practice given 
the institutional tensions and cultural clashes between the military and the 
politicians in ideas, attitude and language. Hence, the role of strategist, and strategy, 
is a bridging power between two spheres with different norms and attitudes, a 
“currency converter” as it was described by Gray.4 
Clausewitz used the word “strategy” in different contexts and in both strategic and 
operational senses.5 He says for example: “The strategist must therefore define an 
aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its 
purpose…” and he adds: “he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and 
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within this decide on the individual engagements. Since most of these assumptions 
may not prove correct, while other more detailed orders cannot be determined in 
advance at all, it follows that the strategist must go to the campaign itself”6.  
Clausewitz devoted Book Three “On Strategy in General”, mostly to the art of 
generalship in the operational, and sometimes even in the tactical, sense. Hugh 
Smith stated that Clausewitz used the term in a sense similar to what we call today 
“operational strategy” or “operational art”, or how major military means are 
organised and manipulated to achieve the higher operational (military) objectives.7 
This is clearly not the case, as Clausewitz spoke of strategy in the sense of using 
military means, and victories to achieve political aims. He indicated the fusionist 
character of levels of war which dictate the umbilical connection between policy and 
strategy, strategy and operations, and tactics.  
As the operational level of war was still in its infancy at the time of Clausewitz, he 
assumes that upper operational manipulation lies in the hands of strategists, so he 
had to coin the term “pure strategy” in Book Eight to differentiate things strategic 
from what strategists were required to do in the technological and communicational 
atmosphere of the early nineteenth century. Also important is his emphasis on the 
real time management of engagements by being on the spot. 
 It is important that levels of war are conceived as a whole and in order, not 
replacing ends with means, and also as an institutional (and democratic) necessity to 
keep policy and military apart. However, over-levelling is harmful. Strategy is a 
bridge, and the bridge does not exist analogically if it is not linking two edges. For 
this reason, Clausewitz noticed that the highest level of strategy is merged into 
policy. “In short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy, but a policy 
conducted by fighting battles rather than sending diplomatic notes”.8 And, based on 
that, the lowest level of strategy is merged into higher operational thinking and 
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practice. This “fusionist” approach in perceiving strategy was supported also by 
Alastair Finlan.9 Hence, the term “pure strategy” deals with the essence of strategic 
thinking and practice, exactly in the middle of the strategic rainbow but moving 
gradually to each edge.  
Although Clausewitz did not forge a strict definition of what he meant by “pure 
strategy”, he stated that it deals with war as whole and would be discussed in the 
chapters of Book Eight on War Plans. In this book, nobody can misunderstand what 
Clausewitz conceives as the essence of strategic thinking: linking military campaigns 
to political aims. Clausewitz discussed the impact of political aims on military 
objectives, the will of the enemy and how it is assessed, two types of war depending 
on the scale and limits of the war objectives, and different strategic and operational 
patterns in each type. 
Clausewitz was aware that his writings could evoke ambiguities and obscure the 
strategic lamp behind the fumes of operational and tactical issues. In his note of 
1827, he stressed the importance of Book Eight, its role in organising the mind of the 
strategist, and the need for more development of his thinking.10  
This not to deny that the most common usage of “strategy” in the nineteenth century 
was mainly operational, as was described by Vego.11 Clausewitz himself in his note 
of 1830 pointed to the lack of clarity in common usage of the word, “The theory of 
major operations (strategy, as it is called) presents extraordinary difficulties.”12 
Another source of confusion is the distinction between grand and military strategy. 
Grand strategy as coined in British strategic literature has two components: the 
comprehensive and higher manipulation of military and non-military means to 
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achieve the policy ends in a case of war, and long-term strategic planning of defence 
in war and peace. 
Grand strategy in war, as was described by Hart, aims to supply the fighting 
machine with its human and material resources, and also to regulate, orchestrate and 
combine military and non-military means for the purpose of war.13 
He also said: “The crux of grand strategy lies in policy, that is, in the capacity of the 
nation‟s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, 
for the preservation and enhancement of the nation‟s long-term (that is, in wartime 
and peacetime) best interests”. 
Adding to the routine mixing between policy and grand strategy in the previous 
definition, Hart made this distinction between grand strategy and military strategy, 
“whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning military victory, 
grand strategy must take the longer view – for its problem is the winning of the 
peace. Such an order of thought is not a matter of „putting the cart before the horse‟, 
but of being clear where the horse and cart are going”14.  
Clearly, Hart considers the utility of military conduct in order to achieve the political 
aim as a grand strategic responsibility, so he criticized the term of “strategic air 
bombing” and offered a more “correct” term “grand strategic bombing” as it does 
not aim to attain a military victory on the battlefield but to modify the opponent‟s 
political will directly.  
However, Hart keeps the means-ways-ends strategic calculus clear, and knows 
where the cart and the horse are going; it is not a problem in practice. Nevertheless, 
this requires the grand strategist to manipulate the detailed military strategies in 
order to direct and control their arrays towards the policy ends. The problem in this 
is incompatibility with the modern institutional parameters of civil-military relations 
and the usually weak military experience of political leaders. Hence, the military 
strategist in Hart‟s model should know exactly the political utility of its military 
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means and objectives. He should know how his military objectives produce the 
aimed “strategic effect” to achieve the ends of policy, whether the  objectives should 
be victory or not and on what scale, and that they should be under continuous 
review due to the unpredictable risks and chances of war. If we replace what Hart 
called “military strategy” with “operational strategy” or “operational art” this 
tension is resolved.  
The last point was best described by Clausewitz in the statement:  
Strategy is the use of engagement for the purpose of war. The strategist 
must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of war what will be 
in accordance with its purpose. He will draft the plan of the war, and the aim 
will determine a series of actions intended to achieve it. He will, in fact: 
1- Shape the individual campaigns and, within these, 
2- Decide on the individual engagements. 15 
Although the destruction of the enemy‟s army was considered many times by 
Calusewitz as the legitimate military objective in war, he also gave different 
variations: “They range from the destruction of the enemy‟s force, the conquest of 
his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate 
political purpose, and finally to passively waiting for enemies attacks. As any of 
these may be used to overcome the enemy‟s will, the choice depends on 
circumstances.”16 
Military objectives, then, are not ends in themselves; they are just means in the 
hands of the strategists to produce specific strategic effects to facilitate the 
materialization of the political aims. This strategic effect is the enabler of the enemy‟s 
change of will.  
The desired strategic effects are named by Clausewitz as the objectives of war. He 
says, “The object of war can vary just as much as its political purpose and its actual 
circumstances”.  
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The eternal malady in the world‟s militaries is mixing the levels of analysis; where 
strategy is replaced by operational thinking and the variety of military objectives is 
mummified in a single and rigid objective - the destruction of the enemy forces in 
the battlefield. The strategic outlook on the military conduct is mostly missed. 
Instead, Clausewitz enumerated many war, or strategic, objectives which vary 
depending on the scope and nature of the political purpose which drives them. In a 
war with limited aims the strategic effect needed maybe to increase the cost for the 
enemy in order to affect his political will. Increasing the cost as an aim presents 
different military options in order to inflict general and expensive damage. Hence, 
the strategist manipulates military conduct to choose specific operations with 
military objectives which may be different from a straightforward tactical victory.   
It is easy to imagine two alternatives: one operation is far more 
advantageous if the purpose is to defeat the enemy; the other is more 
profitable if that cannot be done. The first tends to be described as the 
more military, the second the more political alternative. From the highest 
point of view, however, one is as military as the other, and neither is 
appropriate unless it suits its particular condition.17 
In his discussion of defensive wars with limited aims, Clausewitz differentiated 
between two defensive patterns. The first is strategically passive and aims at 
wearing down the enemy and waiting for a turning point, as was the position of 
Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War. The second, exemplified by the 
Russian strategy in the 1812 campaign, involves a positive aim which requires a 
counter-attack to chase the enemy forces after an opening defensive phase. Although 
this description is mainly operational, the implications of the two approaches to 
defence cannot be understood without the strategic outlook.18  
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The Crux of Strategic Logic: Two Types of Wars 
There is an organizing principle in defining the ways of strategy which is related to 
how and to what extent the enemy‟s political will needs to be changed. Two major 
patterns of war were described briefly by Clausewitz: war with unlimited/total 
aims19 and war with limited aims.  
In the first, the enemy‟s will is destroyed and the military target is the total 
destruction of the enemy‟s capability to fight, this is ”annihilation of the enemy”.  
In explaining how this “will” might be crushed, Clausewitz stated that it required 
the destruction of the enemy‟s Centre of Gravity (COG). The term COG was coined 
by Clausewitz and is one of his great achievements. Alas, COG has been interpreted 
for generations, as Handel indicated, in purely mechanical and operational terms as 
simply the destruction of the enemy forces in the battlefields.20 
Clausewitz, however, defines COG in wider terms as, “the hub of all power and 
movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our 
energies should be directed”. Although the enemy‟s army is a COG as it is his main  
means of resistance, it is not the only one, or even the most important one in 
affecting the enemy‟s will in all cases. In his dialectic approach, Clausewitz describes 
the COG of “theoretical war” as annihilating the enemy‟s forces, but his 
comprehensive analysis has been continually misunderstood and over-simplified. A 
COG varies from one state to another or one actor to another depending on its 
character and circumstance. As Clausewitz said: “What the theorist has to say here is 
this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of 
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these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops.” Then he provided some 
examples of COG depending on the nature of the state: 
For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, 
the centre of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they 
would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to 
domestic strife, the centre of gravity is generally the capital. In small 
countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. 
Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular 
uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinions.21 
This list is not prescriptive but descriptive. Choosing the appropriate COG, whether 
one or more, depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Although Michael 
Handel warned seriously against handling the concept of COG in a mechanical and 
simplistic way, he himself did so in considering the ordered preferences of COG for 
Clausewitz in contrast to the order of Sun Tzu.22 
In the second pattern of war, the aim is to modify the enemy‟s will under pressure 
and the military targets are more diverse. Military targets are selected for their 
capacity to deliver an impact on the enemy to modify his will.   This effect is a 
proportional feeling of insecurity and a perception on the part of the enemy that 
victory is unreachable.  
There are indefinite ways to affect the opponent‟s will to give up his offensive aims 
(by defensive warfare) or to give some concessions (by offensive warfare), but all 
may catalyse the will change by affecting the enemy‟s calculations using one or 
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more of three drivers: “the first is the improbability of victory, the second is its 
unacceptable cost, 23 and the third is feeling insecure24.  
Clausewitz gave different examples of ways to attain the desired strategic effect: 
occupying land for bargaining at the peace table, inflicting general damage through 
destroying the enemy forces or seizure of territory, direct political pressure on his 
alliance or forming a new alliance for oneself.  One can add to these disrupting  the 
enemy‟s socio-political order,  and wearing him down  through human, economic or 
even moral losses, which is mostly confined to defensive wars.25The enemy‟s COG 
may be identifiable and targeted in wars with limited aims, albeit to a relative extent 
to reach the strategic effect mentioned above.  
The offensive side in a war chooses limited aims either because he is obliged to by 
the nature of the existing balance of power, or because of his preference for the best 
post-war political order, or due to his political ideology. 
Again, the strategic pathway chosen is a matter of contextualization and depends on 
the circumstances and the characteristics of the belligerents.  
 
Special Strategic Theories: Linking Operations to Strategy 
 
Now our analysis shifts to the means of strategy, which are not specifically the 
detailed military forces but their combined military effect.  
The question arises though as to whether an understanding of the military outcome 
can be approached without appreciating the ways the military are used under 
strategic guidance to attain both military objectives and strategic effects.  
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Strategy does not simply put military objectives in place and then leave the scene; it 
is there all the time when the best military measures are chosen to achieve the 
objectives; it patiently toughens their substance, acting as the „grammar‟, for its logic. 
J.C. Wylie reached another key understanding when he conceptualized the place of 
special or limited theories of land, air, sea, and peoples liberation wars in relation to 
a general theory of strategy which “should be able to provide a common and basic 
frame of references for the special talents of the soldier, the sailor, the airman, the 
politician, the economist, and the philosopher in theory [making] common efforts 
towards a common aim”.26 
The assumptions of each limited theory cannot function in all cases, and the selection 
between them or combining them in a specific mixture is a role of the strategist 
armed with higher “general” strategic theory. Wylie‟s general theoretical framework 
which accommodated the four types of special theories he mentioned is the theory of 
power control. It is the way of choosing between each arm or combining them, 
depending on the characters of each war and what each special theory may provide 
to reach the final desired outcome -- controlling the enemy.27 
In the study of strategy, a special theory elaborates the major utilities of a specific 
arm which can then be fitted into a comprehensive military strategy. These utilities, 
as discussed by Wylie, have conditions and room for manoeuvre which vary from 
one war to another and even during a single war depending on the circumstances.  
This variation demonstrates the inadvisability of relying solely on a specific arm or a 
special theory, whether air power, space, cyber- intelligence or Special Forces, as the 
single pathway to operational and strategic success.   
 Another difference between general and special theories of strategy, which adds to 
the conditionality of special theories, is the way that assumptions on which they are 
based may change with age and experience. 
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Special theories are vulnerable to technological and administrative developments 
which open the door to new special theories (for example of nuclear, space, cyber 
war and so on) or new utilities for the old theories in the strategic/upper operational 
sense (for example strategic bombings, aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines, and the strategic air campaign in the 1990s).  
Practice may also affect the evolution of special theory much more than general 
theory, whether the practice is in the past, the present or is anticipated for the future. 
An obvious example of this is the testing of Mahan‟s theory of decisive sea battle 
before and during WWI and its refinement by Corbett. 28 Douhet‟s theory of strategic 
air command and the ability of air power to achieve a decisive victory by strategic 
bombing which coerces the population was tested in WWI, and its refinement in the 
inter-war period was completed by Mitchell (American) and  Trenchard  (British) 
with their insights on “vital centres” as targets for morale bombing.29  
The ordeal of WWI facilitated the birth of new operational theories (Russian deep 
operation, Fuller‟s operational paralysis and Hart‟s indirect approach)30. Looking at 
how Desert Storm tested Warden‟s idea about the strategic use of air campaigns, or 
the evolution of counter-insurgency theory, further strengthens understanding of the 
dynamic nature of special theory.31 
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As the following chapters will show, the strategic utilities of major arms are almost 
always related to the type of war, the characteristics of the belligerents (political, 
military, geographical, technological and cultural), and the institutional capacity for 
self-learning. Special theories search for the conditions and assumptions governing 
these uses but their application remains fundamentally hugely contextual.  
Generally, the major utilities of military means have been of three types: attaining 
superiority and free movement in its respective domain or helping the other arm to 
do that (air supremacy, sea control, and land manoeuvre); participating solely or in 
combination to attain the operational military objectives which were mostly on the 
ground; and participating directly in attaining the strategic effect as was the case 
with strategic bombing, blockade and political decapitation by Special Forces. 
A clear demarcation line should be drawn between strategic logic – general and 
special – and another theoretical component: the doctrine. The detailed description 
of the functions, general trends and operational codes of air, land, sea or joint 
warfare for a specific strategic context, are the doctrine, or as defined in NATO 
documents, “the fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their 
actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in 
application”.32 
Doctrine can be defined as strategic, operational and tactical depending on the level 
of war it deals with. 
 Strategic doctrine decides which type of war the armed forces need to prepare for. 
It is built on a set of strategic assumptions regarding: the enemy, strategic 
requirements for the military to achieve, regular or irregular or hybrid warfare, and 
the dimensions that affect the use of force strategically (geostrategy, culture, 
technology, economy, regime type). However, as Colin Gray commented the issue of 
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having a “strategic” doctrine, strategic performance should not rely on a fixed 
formula, especially when the pace of change is fast. In strategy, what is overarching 
and constant is its logic and basic ideas which are transferred only by education, not 
indoctrination. 33  
At the levels of tactics, “how to do” and “best practice” is the rule and tactical 
knowledge/skill is easy to transfer and to train on. Geoffrey Sloan indicated two 
functions of the tactical doctrine: it enhances the tempo of operations, and it 
develops the ability of the army to produce what he called “transitory quality”, 
which has strong operational effects and may facilitate the ability to pursue a 
strategic effect.34 This quality is of great importance in wartime, or periods 
immediately preceded war, when a tactical blockage exists or is expected because of 
previous experience. However, for the transitory quality to build up operational or 
strategic effect, it needs an operational/strategic guidance to be exploited and not to 
exceed the culminating point of victory35 in the political, operational or logistic 
senses.  
Operational and upper operational doctrines aim also to instruct the army to 
improve its understanding and practice. They depend on theoretical assumptions on 
the use of combined or specific arms (special and operational theories). But they are 
shaped also by strategic assumptions of the forthcoming war mentioned above. This 
is the higher ramification for operational doctrine which is the responsibility of 
policy makers and strategists.36  
The lower ramification of operational doctrines is the practical feedback from 
operational or collective tactical levels which constitutes best practice.  
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Doctrine is the conceptual component of fighting power responsible for 
transforming  general strategic assumptions/logic and the strategic forecast  
concerning  forthcoming missions into a solid collection of ideas on how the army 
should train, equip itself, be commanded and work in accordance with best practice. 
 Hence, it is the laboratory in which general strategic theory, special theory, and 
operational best practice are engaged and distilled into ready materials for educating 
and training the operational and tactical cadres.37 
 
 
Strategic Logic and the Dilemma of Operational Art 
As armies became larger, weapons more lethal, communications (telegraph, then 
telephone and radio) faster and more immediate, and logistical lines longer and 
more complex, new challenges and opportunities were revealed. Neutralizing the 
enemy forces was now unachievable through a single battle but controlling large 
formations over long chains of operations became feasible. Hence, the conditions 
were established for developing and orchestrating cascades of battles, engagements 
and manoeuvres.  
Historians nevertheless disagree about when this new operational thinking and 
practice emerged, and theorists also dispute the nature of operational art and 
whether it is useful. The author would argue that the first conflict of opinion was 
born out of the second. 
If “operational” is taken to mean everything above battle and below strategy, then 
operational art has clearly appeared since the rise of Napoleon who mastered 
moving combined army  corps formations along parallel pathways, using them, 
thanks to his innovative administrative approach, as “hammer and anvil“ to 
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annihilate the enemy in  battle.38  Similarly, von Moltke benefited from the 
development of railways which transferred large armies by unprecedented paths of 
space and time to achieve the same outcome of “single point strategy”.39 Also, the 
German Blitzkrieg, understood as waves of tactical high tempo breakthroughs, can 
be considered to have operational elements in terms of the required logistics, 
offensive doctrine, speed, combined arms, reach and exploitation.40  
However, if we consider operational art as a specific conceptual and practical 
framework for exploiting tactical breakthroughs in depth, with tempo and reach -- in 
order to achieve moral or psychological shock, as  perceived by J.C Fuller in the 
interwar period, or annihilation as  perceived in “deep operation” theory by 
Tukhachuvesky in the same period --41 then operational art was only made feasible 
by the practical issues faced during WWI and the emergent technological 
developments in air, armour, artillery and radio. 
 Western militaries were to a large extent blind to operational art up to the late 1970s, 
at least as a theoretical formulation. Interestingly, the new trend was catalysed by 
the events of the Arab-Israeli 1973 War, as Mann indicated, in addition to the lessons 
of the Vietnam War. 42 It started in the United States, which adopted active defence, 
and then in 1982 the concept of “air-land battle”. In 1986, there was the first 
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indication of “operational art”. The British formulated their concept of “Manoeuvrist 
approach” in 1989 on similar grounds.43 
The real dilemma of operational art and level of war is multifocal: 
Firstly, operational art may ossify over specific operational and strategic objectives. 
The version that was advanced by operational art advocates concentrated on 
neutralizing the enemy forces; some adopted annihilation and some adopted 
paralysis. But what if this target, as Clausewitz indicated, is not a necessity for 
winning a war or is unachievable? Also, as chapter six indicates, what if the military 
is to be used against irregular forces that do not have depth or regular defence lines 
and logistics, and military actions only represent no more than 20% of the actions 
needed to defeat the insurgency and had multiple operational objectives?44 This is 
specifically what led Kelly and Brennan to go to the extreme in stating that 
operational art, by which they meant a specific formula of it, “devoured” strategy.45   
What if the military target was first occupying a territory, then shifting to defence, as 
in the case of the 1973 War, or if the centre of gravity was outside the battlefield 
occupied by the enemy‟s major armed formations, such as the capital, the alliance, or 
any other target whose capture or destruction would cause what Clausewitz called a 
“political percussion”?  
Secondly, the operational art may ignore contextual variances in geography, 
technology, culture and military balance which necessitate modification, adaptation 
and even invention. As indicated, the pre-WWII German reliance on human 
selection, the creation of a healthy and innovative command, made their tactical 
excellence a golden key to reaching operational supremacy, in contrast to the Red 
Army‟s social make-up, poor mechanisation and centralized command which 
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required the development of the theory of deep operation.46 Even in the Russian 
case, the events of the war showed how Svechin‟s claim that Russia should adopt an 
attrition strategy benefiting from swapping space for time  was more important than 
Tukhachovisky‟s deep operation of annihilation.47  
Thirdly, the operational art formula is mostly land operations based, with other 
arms secondary at best. However, this ignores the growing literature on operational 
practices, albeit in its infancy, in air and sea, not to mention Special Forces, cyber 
warfare and space. John Warden‟s writing on Planning and Air Combat that aims at 
attaining air supremacy first in order to move to wider offensive, defensive, 
interdiction and air support options that were proven in the Gulf War, was an 
example if its narrow concentration on a specific service is acknowledged.48 Geoffrey 
Till described operational thinking in the naval dimension, where new concepts such 
as Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea (OMFS) and Ship to Objective Manoeuvre 
(STOM) were tried in practice in attempts to affect the course of campaigns.49 
Corbett and Mahan had much operational thinking linked to strategic utilities, as  in 
sea control, sea denial, and exploitation (for blockade, offence and defence, naval 
diplomacy and maritime protection).50 Nevertheless, as all recent doctrines have 
agreed, jointness is the essential concept behind modern warfare, and the operational 
theory that is restricted to one arm is self-defeating. 
For the last points, chapter four on the 1973 War is especially illustrative on how 
operational art should be moulded to strategic guidance and contextual characters, 
and how military means (for instance, use of  SAM for air-denial by the Egyptians, 
and Israeli armoured battalions and gunboats attacking SAMs to regain air 
supremacy) were compensated for and synergised by each other. Hence, operational 
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art should be conceived as a very flexible form compliant to strategic requirement 
and compatible with contextual variances. Its aim is to orchestrate tactical actions in 
high tempo sequencing and/or accumulative patterns in order to achieve 
operational objectives, mostly tangible and quantifiable, which lead in turn to 
strategic effects related to the opponent‟s will-change. 
Fourthly, the operational level is not a fixed level of command nor is it independent 
of strategic guidance. Because of the political requirements of isolating the military 
from politics, not policy, and the professionalization of military operations, 
operational thinking and practice require us to conceive of a level between tactics 
and strategy. Nevertheless, as the US doctrinal document of 2011 stated, the 
administrative structure of this level is specific and mission dependent.51 Also, as e 
operational planning and execution serves specific strategic ends, it should be 
overseen by strategy, bearing in mind the previous remark on the fusionist character 
of levels of war. 
 
To sum up, strategic logic is a set of principles that govern the utility of military, 
primarily in war, and non-military means to achieve policy aims by affecting the 
enemy‟s will. Strategy attempts to bridge operations to policy by formulating 
detailed ways of using the military means and shaping the operational art and 
capabilities. 
Strategic logic, in its abstract form, should be the same for all types of wars. 
However, its contextualization varies according to the age, type of war, and specific 
strategic context.  The next question concerns the continuity and variation of 
strategic logic in irregular wars. 
 
Strategic Logic in Irregular Wars 
Terminology Ordeal 
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The range of terminology for this type of war is endless, although there has  usually 
been a predominant term in each period: “small wars” during the colonial period, 
“revolutionary war” after WWII, “low intensity wars” in the 1970s and  “asymmetric 
war”, “irregular war” and “hybrid wars” after 1989. Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, 
humanitarian and peace operations, and organised crime have also been terms 
widely used.  
If the moral and legal factors are acknowledged, the picture becomes even more 
complicated, as those who are considered terrorists, insurgents, or “no-hopers” by 
one side may be considered resistance and freedom fighters by another. In such 
conflicts, more than other wars, the terminology is a part of the protracted battle 
over the narratives, and the awareness of the belligerents and wider public 
opinion.52 
The main focus in this thesis is on the strategic level, but other levels should be 
delineated in order to explain it.  Politically speaking, an irregular war may be said 
to occur when one of the two belligerents is a non-state actor. From a strategic point 
of view, irregulars do not have direct access to state military and non-military 
means, including domestic and international legitimacy; hence they aim primarily to 
run a conflict in order to enrich themselves with a part of these means in order to be 
able to bleed the regular and stronger opponent for political concessions. Irregularity 
in the operational and tactical senses is identical to guerrilla warfare.   
Asymmetry can be an empty term if it means confronting strategies in details as, in 
order to succeed, any strategy should be asymmetric to the opponent‟s and not 
merely its mirror image53, but it may be a useful term if taken to mean a different 
“type” of strategy where a military victory is not the main intermediary strategic 
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goal; hence those strategies of regular actors, such as Fabian strategy, could be 
asymmetric too.54 In the case of irregular wars, there is asymmetry also in the need 
for military victory as a prerequisite for winning or, as Gray explains, “Insurgents 
can lose the warfare, but still win the war. In contrast, if the political incumbents lose 
the warfare, they lose the war.”55 
Guerrilla warfare is a tactical and operational way of fighting, not a strategy, which 
can be adopted by both regular Special Forces, and irregular forces to fight  regular 
forces by using small formations without a formal logistical system in order to 
harass the opponent, or by attacking highly valuable objects, but not holding 
territories or keeping formidable defensive lines.  
Terrorism is a tactical and operational method of attacking civilians by non-state 
actors to produce terror for a political purpose. It can also be a strategy if it is the sole 
means in the arsenal of the non-state actor.56 Terrorism uses “signalling” such as 
killing a domestic opponent, to achieve either operational or strategic objectives, 
rarely tactical. Operationally, it usually aims at gaining legitimacy, enhancing 
recruitment, or attracting the government‟s harsh response for the previous 
purposes. 
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At a more strategic level, it may aim to disorient the regime and society to lay the 
ground for a revolutionary option57, to send a message of strategic and military 
resilience (especially by suicide attacks)58 or to force a political compromise. 
This study does not delegitimize the term of “state terrorism”59, which could be 
reasonable both legally and politically, but does not see its utility in describing 
strategy.   
Notwithstanding these explanations, it has to be acknowledged that these terms 
were always arbitrary and hence they were generally accepted provided that they 
conveyed a clear concept to the audience, and that especially for our purposes they 
do not confuse strategy with operations and tactics or the ends with the means; nor 
should they mingle legal and moral claims within the strategic analysis apart from 
examining how both sides mobilized such claims. Also, this neologism should be 
restricted to the essentials; otherwise, as Gray warned, “the plethora of adjectivally 
modified concepts of contemporary war and warfare has driven older and simpler 
concepts and theory almost into hiding.”60 Hence, a proper theoretical insight is 
needed. 
 
The Evolution of Theory 
Practice in this area preceded theorizing, whether in the historical tribal wars against 
formidable colonial formations, or what  Clausewitz called “Peoples in Arms”  in 
Book Six of “On War” after experiencing the Spanish “guerrillas” (little war)61 
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against Napoleon which were  part  of  a regular coalition  strategy.62 This was 
followed in the 19th century by theorizing on political subversion and terrorism as 
part of revolutionary strategy, and was extended at the turn of the century by 
Lenin‟s writings.63 Callwell also discussed “small war”64 which he said required 
different formations and tactics from the imperial army but would still be decided 
by tactical victories.    Early French advocated  a “civilian centric approach”  to win 
over the hearts and minds of the domestic population with a nationalist spirit in 
order to defeat the insurgents  militarily and politically65, as  the US “small war” 
doctrine  of 1940 proposed.66 
However, four treatises, two by proponents of insurgency and two by opponents, 
paved the way for a better and more modern, understanding of this type of war. On 
the insurgency side were Chairman Mao‟s writings, especially “On Guerrilla War” 
and “On Protracted War”, and Che Guevara‟s “Guerrilla Warfare”. On the 
opponents‟ side were David Galula‟s “Counterinsurgency Warfare” and Sir Robert 
Thompson‟s “Defeating Communist Insurgency”.67 
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These treatises, interestingly, highlight two points in common: there are specific 
principles in these wars which may be different to those in regular wars, and these 
principles themselves should be applied differently accordingly to different contexts. 
All these works acknowledged the complexity of theorizing and the hard journey 
from theory to practice.  
Both Mao and Guevara envisioned irregular wars as protracted conflict in which the 
socialist movement initially uses subversion and terrorism to delegitimize the 
government and weaken its rule while expanding the insurgency movement‟s 
political and military power. Guerrilla warfare is then adopted to bleed the 
government and enrich the movement‟s ability, leading to the last stage in which a 
war of position decides the outcome militarily. Both acknowledged that the means to 
avoid defeat and reach victory is for the insurgents to live among the population like 
“a fish swims in the sea”, enabling them to recruit, hide, and mobilize.   
However, Guevara adopted two modifications in line with Latin America‟s isolated 
topography and weak central governments: military force can be used from the start 
by establishing “foci” from which the guerrilla bands expand gradually. Contrary to 
Mao, he said this stage need not be deferred until the political campaign provides 
the means for the movement to survive. Also, the movement may not reach the final 
stage of a war of position as the collapse of a weak government may be catalysed 
earlier by guerrilla warfare. 
Thompson and Galula had personal experiences which informed their theories:  
Malaya and Vietnam for the former, and Algeria for the latter. Thompson faced the 
Maoist version of irregular war and Galula faced a modification of Guevara‟s 
version, which he called the “bourgeois-nationalist form” that launches terrorism 
and subversion earlier in its campaign.68  
Both acknowledged the basic principles in counter-insurgency: that the population is 
the centre of gravity and should be segregated and protected from insurgents, the 
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necessity for political supremacy over military means to keep its use conservative, 
building viable and functioning governance to win hearts and minds, and the 
priority of destroying not only the enemy‟s military forces but their political cells 
and public support. Both Thompson and Galula adopted the strategic phases of 
clearing, holding, winning (establishing governance) and won (neutralizing and 
tracing the remnants); to be implemented in a specific area and then to move to 
another. 69 
However, each had an area of emphasis and scope arising from his experience. 
Thompson highlighted the need for clear political aims, given the dilemma of a 
foreign force aiming to create and assist a pro-nationalist government, and the 
establishing of secured hamlets in rural areas of Malaya and Vietnam.70  
Galula, writing from experience gained within an inhabiting occupation, focussed 
on: establishing political structure and organisations, not merely functioning 
governance, seniority of civilian and regional commands, and the transformation 
required for military forces and doctrine to fulfil these tasks, with an emphasis on 
infantry and tactical air-support formations. When facing regular elements he said 
more direct and overwhelming force should be applied.71   
After the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, the United States and its allies 
found themselves facing a situation where swift regular victories were followed by 
protracted and bloody irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The strategic 
literature was re-examined in order to answer the new challenges and benefited 
from what was called the “cultural turn”.72 Based on Galula‟s study, with some 
acknowledgment of Thompson‟s, the US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 
adopted the principles described above in an operationalized manner and praised 
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the use of anthropological works to decode local cultures and structures for a better 
approach.73 The British counterinsurgency doctrine also developed in a similar 
way.74  
A trend of iconizing counterinsurgency and raising it to the level of a distinctive type 
of war which needs a specific formula, strategy, civil-military relations, force 
structure and tactics has invaded the strategic literature during the last decade. 
While some adopted an approach focusing on reviving the classic rules in 
counterinsurgency, whether commending or discrediting the British way of doing 
it,75 others emphasised the distinctiveness of the current terroristic insurgency which 
is globalised and enriched by information networks and jihadist ideology.76 
A critical school soon emerged around three components. The first, “enemy-centric”, 
was a denial of the specificity of counterinsurgency and similar conflicts; they are, it 
was argued, simply another war and need to be decided, like all wars, by tactical 
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victories rather than by restricting the military power by a formula of winning hearts 
and minds.77  
Another view, represented by Porch, suggested that even successful 
counterinsurgency campaigns have rarely abided by the “golden principles” of 
counterinsurgency (winning hearts and minds and a restrained use of force) and 
indicated instead that tactical innovations such as small troop tactics and flexible 
force structure with Special Operations and tactical air support, are achievable by 
any competent military institution regardless of any doctrine of counterinsurgency. 
However, Porch also acknowledged current legal and political constraints, both 
domestically and internationally, on winning counterinsurgency campaigns, and 
suggests that they are better respected.78 
A third component was critical of raising a specific formula (based on the experience 
of an individual case) to the level of a fixed strategy which would then be considered 
a panacea. Hew Strachan explicitly criticized the vacuum of policy and strategy in 
both the Afghanistan and the Iraq wars and he considered counterinsurgency not as 
a strategy in itself but as an operation that should meticulously serve  a specific 
strategy for specific political aims.79 Colin Gray was also critical of wars in which 
sophisticated strategy-making was reduced to a specific formula. He was sceptical 
that viable policy ends could be achieved in the long run in these wars by any 
strategy given the structural preferences and characteristics of the American 
military.80  
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The complexities that are found here can be rooted in both the theoretical and 
practical spheres.  
Theoretically, counterinsurgency theory was almost victim to the conceptual deficits 
which are addressed earlier in this study: confusion over levels of theory and levels 
of war.  
Theoretical principles in strategy are eternal in any war if dealing with general 
theory. However, a group of wars has usually been categorised as a result of 
periodic changes in socio-political or technological settings; hence it was 
Clausewitz‟s emphasis that each age has its own war. When contextualizing theory 
further to a specific war or conflict, more differentiation is apparent. As Gray 
indicated, at the supreme general level there is a Strategy, but there are different 
strategies working in different wars.81 The best way to describe this descending 
cascade in theorizing on strategy, and in this kind of war specifically, is summarized 
in Mao‟s maxim:  
The laws of war are a problem that anyone directing a war must study 
and solve. The laws of revolutionary war are a problem that anyone 
directing a revolutionary war must study and solve. The laws of China‟s 
revolutionary war are a problem that anyone directing China‟s 
revolutionary war must study and solve.82 
Brett Friedman cleverly touched the heart of the subject: both the “enemy-centric” 
and the “population centric” school adopted a solid strategic formula that perceived 
the centre of gravity in a mechanical way, although it is a dynamic and could be a 
multidimensional concept when applied to different cases.83  
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The other theoretical problem is related to the levels and utility of war. Strachan was 
right when he spoke of the current void in Western policy and strategy, and that 
many of the counterinsurgency formulae, as laid out, for example, in the British 
Army Field Manual, lie in the operational, even tactical and technical levels.84  But 
his claim that counterinsurgency is merely an operational concept and not a strategy, 
is not totally accurate.  
Post September 11, wars were devoid of clear and achievable aims, and no dedicated 
strategies were looked at thoroughly and this was obvious in the extreme changes in 
strategy in Afghanistan, shifting from regime decapitation to a proxy war to destroy 
the Taliban regime to counterinsurgency and nation building after 2006.85 However, 
if counterinsurgency is adopted as a strategic means to specific political aims its 
layout is a part of the strategy making. The problem in these wars has not been that 
counterinsurgency has been raised to the level of strategy but that there was no 
viable policy aim in accordance with which a viable strategy could incorporate 
counterinsurgency, whether as a main or secondary effort. 
 In practice, as Tuck indicated, even if counterinsurgency strategic and operational 
principles are acknowledged as important they are difficult to implement. Many 
analysts have shown the institutional and cultural complexities which face the 
military in adapting to these wars with different measures of success, different force 
structure and tactical methods, restricted use of force, and heterogeneous means in 
which the military does not represent the larger proportion.86 Even if lessons were 
there, institutional amnesia concerning this kind of war remains unpopular within 
the military, as in the case of the US military when the lessons of Vietnam were lost 
after Gulf War I.87  
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In conclusion, , the theoretical confusion has originated from missing how general 
strategic logic may be contextualized in specific forms of war to lead to a specific 
strategic theory that should guide the adopted strategies in a particular case. This 
will be apparent in the case of the PLO discussed later in this chapter. 
Strategic Logic Emphasised 
The primary feature of an irregular war is that it is a war, and war is in essence a 
duel. Polarity, as it was called by Emile Thompson, is the basic nature of war. 88  If 
this polarity is absent, then it is a conflict other than war, where force is utilised for 
destruction and to create pervasive conditions for policy.  
The second feature in irregular war is that it is irregular. There is a non-state actor 
fighting a mighty state actor, domestic or foreign, for total or partial dominance over 
a political domain. However, as the balance of power is hugely against it, the 
irregular movement formulates a strategy with two directives: to bleed its enemy in 
order to challenge its political will, and to use the war and its dynamism to enhance 
its own capabilities.  
It needs the population for its essential tasks and outcome in order to survive, hide, 
recruit and win acceptance of its political legitimacy and deprive the government of 
political legitimacy.89 It uses all means possible: political propaganda directed to all 
sides, external patronage for support, intelligence and terrorist actions, guerrilla 
methods when appropriate and, later, more regular military methods for attacking 
government capacity and enhancing the psychological feeling that victory is 
unachievable without high losses to the government.  If the government wants to 
use brute force, it will not find any organised and obvious formations to use it on 
(since the irregular forces are within the people as fish are within the sea); only the 
people against whom the use of force only produces grievances which can be helpful 
for the insurgency to utilize. 
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The population here is the centre of gravity target for strategic effect. However, as 
Friedman indicated, it is not the only centre of gravity if the latter was interpreted as 
the hub the opponent‟s trinity relied upon.90 The centre of gravity is mostly the 
population in this type of conflict, but it could also be the irregular military 
capabilities, external support, incendiary ideology or local domestic population all 
together with flexible proportionality that varies between conflicts and between the 
phases of the same conflict.  
No fixed formula is offered as every context has its own character and 
proportionalities, but the end result is to modify the opponent‟s political will.91 
From the counterinsurgency perspective, the government needs to achieve a political 
stability which the insurgent movement seems to threaten or stand against. In order 
to neutralize it, the government needs to attack the insurgency‟s capabilities: its 
political cause by alleviating grievances, offering the population a better life, and a 
popular narrative to inspire it instead of the insurgents‟ narrative; the leadership, 
structure, recruitment ability and propaganda by combined intelligence and security 
methods and propaganda; its military power by mixed offensive and defensive 
operations, and its external support by diplomacy, intelligence and military fencing. 
The population here also is the centre of gravity of the enemy, with the insurgents 
as a target for the strategic effect.  
Can this kind of war be characterised as either a total or a limited war as our 
proposed model suggests? It can be total or limited for both sides depending on the 
context, the balance of power and resolve between the two sides, and the nature of 
the end status acceptable for both sides.  
Insurgency usually has total aims, for example overthrowing the government, but it 
may content itself, either by design or as the conflict goes on, with limited 
geographical dominance or power sharing. Counterinsurgency starts almost with 
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total aims also, but it may concede to geographical concessions, sharing power or, in 
the case of foreign occupation, a scheduled departure with or without post-conflict 
political conditions.  
To sum up, strategic logic in irregular wars is not different from general strategic 
logic in the abstract, using force and other means in a duel to achieve a political end 
state by overcoming the opposing will in a reasonable means-ways-end. But because 
of the peculiarities mentioned, it has more specific characteristics: the population is 
generally the centre of gravity but other centres of gravity may exist also, for 
insurgency is a bleeding strategy while building its own capacity, and for 
counterinsurgency it is a combined strategy to deprive the insurgency of its cause, 
and the chance to survive and build itself. Any further concepts and dimensions in 
insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies and operations are contextual and it is 
hazardous to raise the lessons of a specific case to the level of theory.  
For example, the principle has been outlined above that the population is the centre 
of gravity and that it should therefore be isolated from the insurgency and made 
submissive, if not supportive, to the government. Winning hearts and minds has 
been described as the essence of counterinsurgency. However, as Tuck indicated, if 
the insurgency is weak in cause and capability, and with limited support, or the 
public base for insurgency is alien to the general population, or it cannot be 
accommodated by the government, and the media coverage is censored and the state 
does not care about a legal and moral code of practice, the insurgency can be 
crushed militarily and its public base expelled or humiliated as was the case  of the 
successful counterinsurgency in Chechnya and East Turkestan.92   
As shown below, Israel winning and losing in irregular wars was not merely a result 
of the balance of power, which was always massively in her favour, but was due to 
the strategic ability of each side to perceive the strategic logic, general and specific, 
and behave strategically in a competent institutional and practical manner.  
However, there was no one single winning strategic formula as strategies were very 
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dependent on contexts that create facilitating or obstructing conditions for both 
insurgency and counterinsurgency.  The more able side was the one which was 
sensitive to these contextual conditions and adapted its strategy in accordance to 
them. There is no fixed operational art or tactical method in this type of war but as a 
rule they should follow strategic insight.  
Strategic performance in these wars should not be a victim of excessive specification 
that reduces strategy to a solid formula depending on historical or recent practices 
while neglecting basic strategic theory, nor of excessive generalization that ignores 
the characteristic features of irregular wars, which require special consideration of 
strategic logic and its practicalities in operational art, force structures and measures 
of success.  
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THE 1948 WAR 
Going to War 
Once the partition plan was endorsed by the UN on 17 November 1947, authorising 
the partition of Palestine into two states, -- one for the Arabs with 45% of mandated 
Palestine land and one for the Jews with 53% – with Jerusalem under international 
control, Palestine was plunged into violence and chaos.   
Inter-communal war erupted in December 1947 and continued until May 1948. In the 
first stage from December till March, the Jews were in defensive mode or 
“aggressive defence” as Ben-Gurion called it.1 Arab forces failed to occupy the 
Jewish settlements but succeeded in cutting the main roads, especially the Tel Aviv - 
Jerusalem corridor, in spite of attempts by Haganah to keep the roads open by a 
“convoy war” in which home-made trucks guarded by armed small contingents 
aimed to open the blocked roads.   
In the second stage (April and May 1948) the Haganah went on the offensive after 
completing military preparations and repulsing a disorganised Arab offensive.   
In April 1948 the Haganah HQ secured the permission of the political leadership to 
adopt and apply Plan D, Dalet. This had three goals: strengthening the defences of 
settlements, securing the borders of the Jewish state as outlined in the UN resolution 
(except for Jerusalem which was to be included in the new state) and, finally, the 
most controversial goal:  occupying critical points which could form bases for enemy 
attacks. The end result was more than 700,000 refugees. 2 
Before May 1948 barely any sign can be found of concrete action by Arab states to 
support going to war apart from the traditional rhetoric at consecutive Arab League 
meetings, particularly at Alia (Lebanon) in October 1947 and Cairo in December 1947 
                                                          
1
 David Tal, War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Routledge 2004) p. 61. 
2
 Ilan Pappe’, The Making of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014) pp. 87-102; Benny 
Morris, 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009) pp.116-120. 
94 
 
when decisions were taken to support the irregular military action in Palestine and 
prepare for collective regular action if this failed.  
Arab states suffered from three major structural issues which aborted serious 
preparation for war: social and political instability in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, the 
question of national independence in Egypt and Iraq, and malignant inter-Arab 
relations especially between the Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq and the anti-
Hashemite in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.  
The issue of Palestine aggravated these tensions and precluded healthy coalition 
formation. The reasons and manifestations of coalition failures will be discussed in 
the practical strategy section below, but the outline of the situation of the belligerent 
Arab states which follows will give an understanding of their structural problems. 
The Israeli Strategic Ability (Ben-Gurion’s Legacy)  
Israeli strategy-making during the1948 War and the preceding years centred on 
David Ben-Gurion who had high standards of conceptual and institutional abilities. 
Conceptual 
Ben-Gurion‟s war diaries3 show that he was certainly familiar with components of 
strategic logic and specially its institutional requirements. Although he had sketchy 
military experience during WWI, he was a heavy and encyclopaedic reader with a 
library of 12,000 books, including many volumes on military history. 4 
His main struggle in 1947 was to transform Haganah from a paramilitary 
organization into a professional army able to win the war with the locals, and 
confront an Arab invasion. He always looked for the relationship between tactical 
and operational engagements, the requirements for achieving political aims, and the 
general course of events. 
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Ben-Gurion was deeply convinced that 1948 War should be decided by force and all 
other means should serve the military operations, and the target of the war should 
be controlling as much terrain as possible to enhance Israel‟s political and strategic 
position after the war.5  
However, he did not aim to use military force and victories to modify the Arabs‟ 
political will to create a more stable post-war political landscape. Was this a sign of 
conceptual inefficiency in looking at war and strategy? This is a possibility. 
However, his attitude was more a result of his ideological views and his perception 
of the nature of the Arabs whom he believed could not be accommodated within the 
political agenda he wanted. His idea of the “indefinite battle” between Arabs and 
Jews is indicative of this.6 
Nevertheless he showed some awareness of the political sensitivities of military 
actions. Many tactical or operational moves were shaped or even called off because 
of expected or actual negative political effects.7  
In reply to Yigal Yadin‟s argument that “matters of war are separated into two parts: 
one part strategic decisions, the highest politics of war, but the army has the second 
part – the actual operational part… Tell me what to do not how to do it”, Ben-Gurion 
explained that he had the authority to examine all the details concerning the war 
because war matters are connected, and the military were not wholly obedient to his 
orders. 8 
He fought frustrating battles to unify the various military forces and the political 
leadership and to keep absolute political supremacy, as he saw unity as an essential 
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requirement of policy and strategy making.9 He also had the flexibility to modify the 
command system to maintain unity and adapt to the unfolding strategic, operational 
and technological realities. 10 Crucial to his success was his ability to articulate, 
defend and circulate the thinking behind his moves in private and public.  
Ben-Gurion had a genuine interest in upgrading the conceptual base of the IDF as 
shown by his early battles with Haganah‟s leadership to introduce formal military 
education for company commanders and above. 11 This is also evident in his harsh 
statement -- which was neglected by his following supreme commanders -- that “The 
most dangerous enemy to Israel‟s security is the intellectual inertia of those who are 
responsible for security.”12 
This marks Israel‟s conceptual ability as generally high. 
Institutional 
Israeli practice was institutionalized to a high grade considering the limitations of 
the period, and it demonstrated maturity at all levels: political, grand strategic, 
military strategic and below.  
As a political leadership with a wide democratic base, the Jewish Agency enjoyed 
the legitimacy and influence, at least among the majority of the Yishuv population, 
required for state building and mobilization.  
Ben-Gurion used the platform of marathon meetings to discuss the important issues 
and increase his awareness of minute details, building trust and enhancing the 
atmosphere of free and critical debate with the Haganah was familiar since before 
the war.  
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 But he still kept the line of command clear.  A critical example of this was the 
“seminar” he led in March-May 1947 at which he personally questioned Haganah 
members of all ranks on all details of thought: command and control, training and 
education, materiel and planning.  He thus built a clear image of the Haganah‟s 
actual abilities and internal environment. This information sharing, which he would 
use to formulate defence policy and strategy, won the trust of the Haganah High 
Command by showing his willingness and ability to grasp the full picture of the 
Haganah‟s situation and capacities. 13   
Ben-Gurion‟s principal conviction, to the point of obsession,14 was the achievement 
of real and total political control over the military and using it freely as an 
instrument of policy.15  
He faced three main problems in this sphere: 
The first was to emphasise his full authority with regard to strategic command. In 
1947, the Haganah was headed  by a National Command composed of 
representatives of various political parties headed by Israel Galilee, a military 
headquarter (HQ) headed by the Chief of Staff Yaacov Dori, and Ben-Gurion at the 
top as head of the Defence Department in the executive Jewish Agency. By the end 
of the year with the thrust to transform Yishuv institutions into a state, Ben-Gurion 
established a defence portfolio in the new cabinet, and a smaller war cabinet, similar 
to the British model from WWI. This was opposed strongly but in vain by Galilee 
and Haganah HQ.16 Even then, Ben-Gurion attempted to dissolve the position of the 
head of National Command as he saw it as an insulating layer between himself and 
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the military rather than a bridge. He tried to fire Galilee at the beginning of war, 
giving the failure of the convoys as his reason. Faced with strong opposition from 
the cabinet and military he threatened to resign and got his way with a marginal 
compromise that allowed Galilee to stay but with no real authority.17 
The second problem was to include the dissident and terrorist groups (IZL and Lehi) 
in the IDF which involved the very bloody confrontation of the Altlena18 incident in 
June 1948.  
The third issue was dissolving Palmach (Haganah‟s elite and independent Special 
Forces) and incorporating it entirely in the IDF. Ben-Gurion took a gradualist 
approach, forcing it to accept his political and strategic rule by May 1948, and 
dissolving its general command under Yigal Allon, the southern front commander. 
Ben-Gurion finally dissolved the force after a series of power struggles in January 
1949.19 
His attitude to the Palmach was motivated by two factors: his antipathy to exclusive 
military domains within the IDF, and the politicization of its senior cadres, most of 
whom were linked to Ahdut HaAvoda, the major component of the leftist political 
party Mapam.20 Even after the war, he kept Palmach commanders away from the 
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position of COS until his resignation when Yitzhak Rabin, Palmach‟s former chief of 
operations, was selected by Eshkol, his successor as PM. 21 
Ben-Gurion was sensitive to the frictions in his relations with the military and war 
cabinet, and he could detect when to stop and not push too far, either by abandoning 
his proposal22, altering it or achieving it in stages, or when to push ahead and accept 
an amount of friction, depending on how critical he felt his proposal was for the 
higher political or strategic leadership of the war.  
He adopted compromises and middle-way policies on other issues. He was always 
very critical of the Haganah‟s spirit and command ethos and preferred more 
intellectual British-minded commanders and formal military discipline. As the 
Haganah HQ became hostile in 1947 to his proposal of employing British and other 
western veterans in high command such as Haim Laskov, a former commander of 
the British-affiliated Jewish Legion he insisted on using them for planning and 
education.  
Although there was no institution bridging the military and political layers in order 
to articulate strategic formulae in a balanced means-way-ends, Ben-Gurion himself 
had the determination to take up this burden and lead the discussions in both 
camps, in the cabinet and HQ, by representing the other side of the strategic bridge 
in these discussions.  
Ben-Gurion enforced model of control by all means, but it was far from the absolute 
control claimed by Cohen.23 He managed a high degree of delegation of operational 
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and tactical issues which sometimes went against his strategic considerations to the 
extent that he had to modify them.24   
All relational and functional parameters of the institutional strategic ability 
(information sharing, critical assessment, and formidable position of Military) were 
played out almost perfectly with a slight weakness in clear authorization and 
strategic intervention of politicians. This marks Israel‟s institutional ability very 
high. 
Practical 
Israeli policy was clear enough at any single point in time, but it had multiple 
ceilings. The highest was set by ideological imperatives, but the adopted policy at 
any point was based on strategic calculations, albeit shaped by rigid assumptions.   
At the Baltimore conference in 1942, the policy of the Jewish Agency (JA) was 
formalized along with its takeover of supreme policy-making from the World 
Zionist Organisation (WZO). Policy was set as “establishing a Jewish state in the 
whole of mandated Palestine”.25  
Nevertheless, the JA clearly accepted the UN partition plan, apart from the 
international governance of Jerusalem, and stated its contentment with the 
apportioning of land and the detailed areas allotted to the proposed Jewish state - 
the heavily populated Jewish central section on the coast and Sharon area, the fertile 
eastern and western Galilee; and the Negev with its pathway to the Red Sea and 
potential capacity to accommodate huge immigration waves.    
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However, when the war erupted and the Israelis withstood the ordeal of the early 
days before the first truce, Ben-Gurion raised the level of policy ends to match what 
he could achieve militarily. 
Grand Strategy 
Ben-Gurion envisioned that his policy of the greatest possible territorial expansion 
besides preserving the political legitimacy of the state would have to be imposed 
on the ground. And because the sole means to achieve such a grand strategy is 
military, the scale of this policy is tied by what the military means could achieve, 
with other available means mostly serving it. 
The major pitfall in such a strategy is that the enemy does not have a vote in the 
political conclusion. The enemy could not be accommodated within the expansionist 
policy, but his will had not been destroyed decisively in a total war. 
But was Ben-Gurion right to assume that the war of 1948 was not resolvable, taking 
into account the apparent Arab position? The Arab states did not accept the UN 
Resolution on Palestine, and apart from Abdullah, they rejected also Bernadotte‟s 
scheme for bringing the conflict to an end. They supported the irregular war in 
Palestine, and then launched an invasion from four directions to avert the 
implementation of Partition by force. They openly rejected until the end any 
peaceful conclusion.  
First, we may point to the half-hearted political “will” in support of invasion and the 
flaring up of inter-state rivalry during its execution. Crucially, the actual deployment 
of Egyptian, Jordanian and Iraqi forces aimed to stay inside the Arab portion of the 
partition scheme. In the case of Transjordan, this was agreed upon clearly in a secret 
understanding with Britain and to some extent, with the JA. 26 
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Second, many signs indicated the openness of Arab actors to political initiatives, 
which might or might not have led to peaceful agreements, but could definitely have 
led  to a more stable post-war environment with much less enmity between the 
former belligerents. A clear example of this susceptibility is the case of Transjordan. 
Even the Egyptians were open to Bernadotte‟s proposals in August as their 
ambassador to the US stated through informal channels, and after October they were 
even content to see the Palestinian Arab land in the south reduced to the Gaza Strip 
with an honourable evacuation of the Fallujah pocket.27 Syria and Iraq, the most 
vocally hawkish in the Arab camp, avoided fighting during the last three-quarters of 
the war, and even the new Syrian regime in Husni Zaiem after the coup of 1949 was 
open to peace proposals.28  
Hence, there was definitely a pathway for political resolution which Israeli policy 
and grand strategy could have exploited. This pathway was not only illuminated by 
Moshe Sharett, but even by the hawkish cabinet adviser on Arab affairs, Eliahu 
Sasson, who formulated a proposal with the secretary of the political department of 
the Jewish Agency in March 1947, stating that the best policy to deal with the Arab 
threat was “to defeat them militarily and then give them an outlet for honourable 
retreat”.29 
The Israeli grand strategy in the sense of orchestrating all means was excellent in 
view of the ability of the new state to mobilize internal and external resources to 
build a modern army of 20,000 in early 1948 and expand it to more than 100,000 by 
the end of the year. In addition to massive expansion in its weaponry systems and 
maturing socio-political structures, these were the enablers of the war outcome.  
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But in the long-term sense, grand strategy was victim to Ben-Gurion‟s hard 
assumptions, as his maxim was illustrative; “Negev without peace is better than 
peace without Negev”.30  
Military Strategy 
The strategic guidance in the 1948 War was to set a generic framework and broad 
mission objectives, which the operational discourse would strive to achieve in the 
unfolding military events.   
The regular war was composed of four stages: defensive from 15 May till the first 
truce of 11 June, then the Ten Days Offensive in July on the northern and central 
fronts, then the offensive of October in the Negev and the north, and finally the 
thrust to expel the Egyptians from the Negev in December.  
In the first stage, The Iraqi and Syrian thrusts were halted by settlement defences 
and the Arab armies‟ poor logistical capacity. The Arab Legion succeeded in 
expelling the Israelis from the Old City of Jerusalem and cutting the route to Tel 
Aviv at Latrun. The main Egyptian column succeeded in reaching Ashdod, only 
thirty miles south of Tel Aviv. The Givati brigade with tactical air support aimed to 
defeat these forces in operation Plechet, but was repulsed by Egyptian defences. But 
it succeeded in holding the Egyptians there and exploding the bridge that would 
have enabled them to push on north.31  
The first truce was imposed by UN on 11 of June for one month and was accepted 
eagerly by both sides. The second stage of fighting commenced one day before the 
formal end of the truce which the Arabs refused to extend. It lasted ten days and 
opened with a reversed military balance in numbers (since the Israelis had 
strengthened the existing nine IDF brigades, and added two more (the 7th and the 
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light armoured 8th brigades), and enhanced equipment platforms for the Israelis. The 
IDF now had artillery, and greatly extended its arsenal of small arms, fighter planes, 
armoured cars, and even a few tanks.  
The Ten Days offensive represented the beginning of a long Israeli offensive lasting 
from the 11 July till the armistices in the spring of 1949. It was interrupted by 
another arranged truce on the19th of July which was observed by UN but never fully 
respected by either side.   
During this stage the southern front was kept in active defence, but other fronts were 
busy and it ended with Israeli victory on the northern and eastern fronts and the 
securing of a new route to West Jerusalem after the failure to expel the Arab Legion 
from Latrun which would have unblocked the main road to Tel Aviv.  
The main operation in this stage was Danny, which aimed to occupy Lydda and 
Ramle and then open the central corridor. Lydda and Ramle were outside the area 
allotted to Israel in the UN Partition Plan but were needed for three reasons: firstly 
the area was close to the densely populated Jewish centre and was also the base of 
the corridor. Subjugating it should neutralize the potential threat and enable easier 
operations to open the corridor. Secondly, Lydda airport was the main one in 
Palestine. Thirdly, the psychological effect of success on the Arab states would be 
considerable as these were the first “Palestinian” portions of the partition to fall into 
the hands of Israelis in spite of being guarded by the Arab Legion, the most able 
Arab force.  
The third stage occurred in October with the activation of the southern front and a 
lesser effort in the north. The basic political purpose of this stage was to deliver a 
blow to Egyptian forces in the south sufficient to expel them from the Negev, and to 
clear ALA from the northern Galilee. 
Operation Hoav entailed three steps; firstly to break through the Ashdod-Hebron 
corridor from the eastern side at Iraq Al-Menshyya. This failed but Allon shifted his 
forces quickly to the western site around Iraq Swidan, where they made a 
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breakthrough at Hulikat. The Egyptian forces in the corridor were reduced and 
encircled in the Fallujah Pocket. The second successful step was a quick drive to 
occupy Beersheba, the main hub of the Negev and also for the Egyptian forces at 
Hebron.  
The third step did not meet the same success. The Yeftach brigade transferred to 
Negev was to thrust west between Gaza and Beit-Hanoun to cut the retreating lines 
of the Egyptian forces at Ashdod. This would have led to isolating the main 
Egyptian forces and ending the war. However, Egyptian engineers created an 
innovative wooden path for retreat to the Gaza coast.32  
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Operation Hoav33 
The Fourth Stage came in December when the IDF planned operation Horev to expel 
the Egyptian forces permanently from the Negev and Gaza.34 
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The invading forces in Sinai occupied Al-Arish airport but were kept outside the city 
by strong defences and were exhausted and overstretched. An ultimatum from the 
British to evacuate the Sinai or face a British intervention was issued.  Britain and 
Egypt were having tough negotiations at the time on whether to retain their 1936 
Treaty so Britain found it an opportunity to appease and pressure the Egyptians. In 
response to the ultimatum, Ben-Gurion called back the operation. 
 
Operation Horev35 
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To assess the Israeli military strategic options that shaped operational art and 
capability, two positive remarks and one negative can be made: 
First, strategic guidance was successful in in withstanding the initial invasion and 
providing a window for building and enriching the army36 by keeping it in defensive 
mode. It also manipulated the operations to respect the political sensitivities of 
Transjordan in the later stages and of Britain, and achieved operational security and 
space by reaching a political understanding with Transjordan. This understanding 
freed up six brigades during Operation Horev to attack three Egyptian brigades, one 
of which was isolated and the others exhausted.  
Second, as weaponry and tactics were mostly infantry-based, the IDF depended on 
piecemeal operational bites made feasible by a mobile and indirect approach. This 
approach was a necessity because of a shortage of artillery and armour for a war of 
attrition or high tempo operations, and also because of the poor record of IDF 
offensives against formidable defences as in Latrun, Jenin and Fallujah. The 
operational approach was helped by shifting forces between fronts to create higher 
concentration of forces, using the short internal lines, and night/mobile tactics 
perfected during Haganah‟s irregular operations.  
Third, the negative elements were in the area of tacticization of strategy. An 
obvious example of this was Operation Horev, in which Allon‟s moves were not 
under the control even of the General Staff and proved unproductive. The Israeli 
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military strategy also played a part in creating the tragedy of the war by increasing 
the refugee problem by a formal policy of expelling the local Arab population and 
destroying villages, which would preclude the possibility for a future political 
conclusion, as discussed earlier.  
With very competent military strategy, enhancing operational capabilities and 
shaping the operational art, the Israeli strategic practical ability is marked as high  
in spite of moderate grade in the domains of having a clear policy and grand 
strategy. 
 
The Strategic Ability of the Arabs (Coalition Failure) 
Conceptual 
Despite not having a formal military or strategic education, King Abdullah had rich 
political and military experience gained during his long struggle for power during 
the Arab Revolution and his conflict with the Saudis.37 Abdullah was very sensitive.  
He often spoke of the limitations of force and of not overloading the military with 
tasks exceeding their ability.38 He also benefited from the advice of his closest 
general, Glubb Pasha, who kept a close liaison with him during the war. 
In Egypt, King Farouk hardly had any strategic knowledge39 in spite of his military 
uniforms and stars. His war minister Mohamed Haider Pasha was no better and 
spent a large portion of his career running the prisons, and Nukrashi Pasha and 
other cabinet members were kept segregated from the military area.   
Few accounts of Farouk‟s vision are available and all are very disappointing as when 
he emphasised when meeting with the military before the war that much of the work 
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would be done by the Arab Legion, and the Egyptians were only aiming at Tel Aviv 
as a “military demonstration”.40 
Iraq had a more knowledgeable political and military leadership in spite of its lack of 
experience and confidence, given that their only military experience was defeat 
during Rashid Keilani‟s upheaval in 1941. Prince Abdul-Ilah, the Regent of Iraq, was 
an undistinguished member of the Hashemite dynasty with little experience or 
ideas. But Nuri Al-Said had a much more developed political and military ability; 
both conceptual and political. He graduated from the Turkish military academy and 
after serving in the Ottoman Army before WWI became a prominent figure in the 
Arab revolution.41 
Despite the generally moderate conceptual ability, the totally bankrupted 
institutional layer at the coalition level obstructed all possibilities of improving 
practical strategy. 
Institutional 
Two major difficulties undermined the Arab strategic ability in the1948 war. The 
first was the inability to form a coalition and the second was the poor state capacity 
in general. 
The Arab war efforts cannot accurately be considered as participation in a 
“coalition”. Within the so-called “coalition” of Arab states, there was neither unity of 
political purposes or strategy, nor a platform to create, facilitate and review such 
essential strategic unity.   
Politically, as the Arab states and non-state actors worked essentially for their own 
self-benefitting agendas, the common stake in rescuing Palestine was relegated to a 
mere rhetorical device.42   
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The other factor undermining the Arabs‟ strategic ability, which also narrows our 
scope for analysis of their strategy, is the general theme of the immaturity of Arab 
states’ political and especially military infrastructures. Egypt had a comparatively 
long modern political history, although it suffered from political fragmentation, but 
Iraq, Syria and Transjordan were comparative newcomers to governance and party 
politics. Only Syria was independent while the others were under some form of 
foreign hegemony. Militarily, their armies represented a form of constabulary or at 
best undertook limited duties related to specific missions. The Arab Legion was 
officered mainly by British officers and was based on the British Army in terms of its 
logistics, medical services and combat support    
Although the Political Committee of the Arab League, comprising the political 
leaders of the member countries or their representatives, succeeded in taking specific 
decisions such as embarking on the regular war, accepting the First and Second 
Truces, and resuming fighting after the First Truce, it failed to establish an 
organisational platform to discuss  the policy and strategy options effectively. 
Another much graver problem existed: each state was working towards its 
individual political end and strategy, which were mostly not even clear to 
themselves.  
At the national level there was a lack of a permanent or temporary platform at the 
political-military interface for reviewing environments, deciding upon policy or 
grand strategy or critically discussing strategic military options.  
Information sharing worked well from the military to the political layer, with a time 
lag due to problematic communications, but it did not work well the other way 
around. This was a general complaint raised in the meeting of Arab General Staffs in 
Cairo in October 1947. The Chiefs complained that they were kept in dark regarding 
diplomatic moves and developments. 43 
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The real problem, at coalition and national levels, was that the opinion of the 
military was neither sought nor accounted for in decision making. This neglect 
originated in the underdeveloped state system in which the military was largely 
under the personalized rule of the political leader.  
Military commands in the four countries provided proposals44 to increase resources 
and military development or asked for tasks matching their capabilities, or at least 
for greater clarification of the political aim, but their proposals were turned down 
repeatedly.  
In Transjordan alone, King Abdullah the prime decision-maker kept in close 
consultation with his Prime Minister, Tawfeeq Abul-Huda, and the military leader 
General Glubb. He kept smooth information sharing generally apart from his covert 
negotiations with Israel to avoid offending the nationalist spirit.45 Although the 
decision-making process was fairly personalized, there was a degree of 
comprehensive and critical debate on  policy and the best serving strategy (grand 
and military) within the uneven triangle, evidenced by the correspondences between 
Abdullah and Glubb at different stages of the war  discussing the finest details of the 
political and military consequences of important moves on the battlefield.46  
The structural weakness of the “coalition”, however, plagued all five parameters of 
political-military relations in the war: the ability to keep a productive dialogue in 
theory and practice between policy and operations. Clear authorization was 
maintained at national level, but not at the coalition level. In the case of Transjordan 
however, there was competent critical assessment, clear authorization and strategic 
intervention of politicians, but information sharing and the formidable position of 
the military were moderate. This marks the coalition‟s institutional ability as a 
complete failure, and Transjordan‟s as high. 
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Practical 
Policy and Grand Strategy 
Can strategy be assessed by any form of measurements in the absence of clear 
political aims? Political aims – to avert the partition militarily -- were stated just after 
the UN resolution, by the Arab League summit in Aalya, Lebanon, in 1947.  
However, the king of Transjordan, the formal Supreme Commander of all the 
armies and the strategist for the most formidable force, the Arab Legion, had a 
different and contradicting policy: bringing the West Bank and Jerusalem directly 
under his rule, with the Negev or any other territory that might fall into his hands, 
and accepting the partition if military events favoured the Jewish side. His ultimate 
aim was the project of “Greater Syria” where Syria, Palestine and Transjordan would 
form a strong kingdom under his rule. 47 
Also, The Arab leadership, especially in Syria and Iraq had a two- faced policy -- one 
for declaration in front of their peoples and outsiders to satisfy public demands, and 
an unstated agenda to use their military participation to combat the Hashemite 
Greater Syria plan.   
But how did these political leaderships plan to survive the moment when their 
people faced reality? They aimed at limited military achievements and to be able to 
blame each other for losing the war.48 
In Egypt, policy making was more complex and opaque. The young King was too 
immersed in his private life to see what others, including his Prime Minister and the 
military, regarding the imbalance of power with Israel and the lack of Arab unity. 
Although Nukrashi was dragged into the war by wishful thinking that victory could 
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be achieved by the efforts of the other states, with a lesser role for the Egyptian 
Army, he was forced to confront reality just before the First Truce. He then imitated 
the other Arab leaders, aiming for any achievement that would appease his people 
and then using the diplomatic pathway to pave the way for a respectable exit. He 
made this point explicitly in his speech to Parliament in December 1948.49  
Simply speaking, the Arab side undertook the war of 1948 with very minimal effort 
at the grand strategic level50 to achieve their ultimate total aim: averting Partition 
and destroying the new state of Israel. 
Policy is not a pure diktat on strategy, as the political aim is not tyrannical.51 Policy 
originates from cultural, historical, geopolitical, geo-economical and ideological 
roots, and is formulated through a complex process. Yet it should be brought to 
match what strategy considers achievable. Hence, although strategy does not decide 
which policy should be adopted -- accepting Israel or destroying it -- its role during 
the stage of policy formulation is to decide which political option is achievable and 
which is not.  
For the Arab states in 1947 there were three major political options: accepting 
Partition and trying to help the new Arab state of Palestine become viable, 
preventing Partition by military means, or choosing something in between – 
reshaping the planned Partition to achieve a solution more favourable to the Arab 
side. 
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The first grand strategic option was feasible as it did not require any extensive 
military action beyond securing the agreed borders of the Arab portion of Palestine.    
Even if the Jewish pre-state had had aggressive wishes to expand, it was still in its 
infancy trying hard to set up its political and military machinery. 
The second option, averting partition militarily, could also have been feasible if the 
Arabs had mobilized their resources and used a comprehensive grand strategic 
approach early on. From the summit of 1946, when partition was on the horizon as 
the American-British Committee obviously supported it, there were good ideas on 
the table presented mainly by the Iraqis for mobilizing Arab resources, preparing for 
military intervention by increasing their armies‟ capacities, organisation, weaponry 
and combined command, and applying economic/oil pressure on the US and Britain 
to weaken their support for partition. 
In fact, the US and Britain were not fully committed to partition as a policy. After the 
First Truce, the US presented a proposal to rescind the UN Partition Plan in favour 
of international guardianship of Palestine until a reasonable diplomatic option could 
be formed. Britain, in addition to its earlier abstention during the UN vote on 
Partition, endorsed Bernadotte‟s plan.52 
However, all these proposals were turned down, even by the Iraqis53, because of the 
lack of political will among the Arab states as discussed above.    
Given the failure to initiate collective action before the war, could such a 
comprehensive grand strategy and mobilisation have been workable just before the 
14 May, after the First Truce or even in October or December 1948? 
Generally, as a conflict escalates, the window for strategic manoeuvre becomes more 
limited; there is less time for the complex tasks of mobilization, restructuring the 
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military and coalition means vis-à-vis those of the enemy which are simultaneously 
growing.  
In military terms, the initial Arab position during the First Truce was advantageous 
and if they had maintained it and not responded to Israeli provocation, had dealt 
seriously with the tasks of mobilization, organisation and grand strategy; there was a 
possibility of achieving their policy aims. But once the Truce ended new military and 
state power in Israel meant the opportunity was irrevocably lost.  
The third option of achieving a more viable and advantageous partition on a 
permanent or temporary basis was also potentially feasible by different strategies 
and at different times. 
It could have been achieved by Arab engagement in positive diplomacy before the 
UN Resolution on partition was voted upon. However, the Arab states did not do so 
and the boycott of UNSCOP by both the Arab Palestinian representatives and the 
Arab states was particularly damaging.54 Some adaptation of the Partition Plan 
which was more favourable to the Arab side could have been achieved through an 
irregular military strategy of support for irregular militias acting in opposition to the  
plan if such a strategy had been properly developed, supported and overseen.   
A modified partition was also feasible by regular or combined military means, either by 
maintaining the truce and manipulating the diplomatic options.  But even in 
September when they were in a grave military situation the Arabs harshly rejected 
Bernadotte‟s proposal as well as large-scale military mobilisation and a build-up of 
coalition forces before the Egyptian defences were broken and their military 
deployment was fragmented. 
 Military Strategy 
The League‟s Military Committee did formulate a plan for the invasion, but it 
amounted to little more than a general idea. It envisaged simultaneous and 
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orchestrated thrusts from four directions -- the Egyptian army from the south, the 
Lebanese from the north, the Syrians from the north-east, and the Iraqis and 
Jordanians from the east to meet up with one of the Arab Legion brigades stationed 
in Mandatory Palestine with the British forces. These four thrusts would then 
converge towards the centre of gravity of the Jewish settlement in Palestine –- Tel 
Aviv and the coastal strip where the heaviest areas of population, industry and 
infrastructure were situated.55  
The first problem of the comprehensive plan was, as the Egyptian contingent to the 
Committee pointed out, that it mistook its initial target, slowing the path towards 
the centre of gravity and wasting the armies‟ efforts and resources in minor tasks. 
Also, with the limited resources available and the basic deficiency of the Arab armies 
in fluid offensive operations, the only window for victory was the first few weeks of 
the invasion before the Jews were able expand their manpower and weaponry 
through a massive influx from abroad and  impose mobile operations on the Arabs 
in disadvantageous terrain.   
The main problem, however, was the limited resources allotted to the plan. The 
Egyptian delegation told the meeting at least four divisions would be needed.56 Even 
if they had been well equipped and trained, the forces that invaded Palestine in the 
first stage were much fewer in number and inadequate. They totalled one and half 
divisions (one and half Egyptian brigades, two underpowered Jordanian brigades, 
one and half Syrian, one and half Iraqi, and one Lebanese battalion)57. The Jewish 
forces, in contrast, were able to deploy six brigades and more numerous forces for 
settlement defences.58 
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Third, the plan did not envisage any proper role for irregular forces. 
After acknowledging all the chaos facing the policy and grand strategy, were there 
still any alternative approaches for military strategy available to the Arab armies? I 
assume there were regular or combined options. 
The regular military strategies could serve a total or limited policy. For total policy, 
the plan of the League‟s Military Committee was fairly reasonable provided the 
Arab states adopted its requirement at both grand and military strategic levels as 
indicated earlier. 
However, more limited approaches were also available which would have involved 
much less work at the grand strategic/coalition levels.  
Firstly, the Arab armies might have chosen a multi-front approach from the 
beginning but kept their forces far less dispersed which would have enabled them to 
use the resulting reserve forces for active defence duties or even counteroffensives.  
For the Egyptian forces, in particular, a more focused approach would have enabled 
them to strengthen the advance to Ashdod and to avoid the lateral thrust to Hebron 
instead of clinging to the Negev with insufficient forces. Alternatively, they could 
have confined themselves to the Gaza area and southern Negev while using the 
irregular Palestinian forces for harassing operations towards the settlements. This 
would have dragged the advancing Jewish brigades into confrontations in which 
they would have been at a disadvantage while the Egyptians would have 
maintained strong defences. It is notable that this is a mode of warfare the Arabs had 
previously mastered and its potential was demonstrated by the losses sustained by 
the IDF at Latrun and Fallujah.  
Second, The Arabs might have chosen to keep limited forces for defending the 
peripheries while using external lines, including from Egypt, for a much more 
developed approach in the central axis of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv corridor. 
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A third way was the adoption of a salvage strategy to make up for their initial faulty 
approach. They could have accepted the first truce and subsequently not responded 
to Israeli temptations to fight and then left the rest to diplomacy.  
Or, in an alternative salvage strategy, the Arabs could have consolidated their forces 
and used them in a more combined and aggressive way. After the IDF‟s grave losses 
at Latrun it was clear that the Jews were not going to fall into this trap again as they 
created the Burma Road to ensure secure access to Jerusalem.  The Arab Legion 
would have been better employed in a pincer operation, either with the Egyptians to 
clear the southern belt and threaten Tel Aviv, or with Iraqis to do the same in the 
north collar, but in any case, the Burma Road should have been closed.  
All these military moves could have repaired the grave mistakes that resulted in 
dangerously dispersed Egyptian forces in the south and immobile deployments of 
Jordanian, Iraqis and Syrians until the end of war. More importantly, it would have 
applied tremendous political, military and human pressure on the Jewish presence 
in Palestine which would in turn have convinced the international community to 
push more equitable peace proposals (such as those drawn up by the Americans and 
Bernadotte after the First Truce). Such pressure may well have raised the chances of 
leadership accepting such peace plans and would also have provided some 
protection to the remaining Arab communities in Jewish occupied areas.    
An even more potentially effective approach would have been a combined military 
strategy using the irregular forces, the volunteers and ALA for specific roles such as 
holding the routes of advance especially at the settlements, or undertaking guerrilla 
fighting in the difficult terrain of Samaria and Galilee in order to slow and drain the 
Yishuv military capacity. In order to accomplish this, the Arab irregular forces 
would have had to become truly irregular, both tactically and in composition. This 
combined strategy was used by the Chinese in both the war against nationalists and 
in the Korean War.59  
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By tracing then the five practical parameters at the coalition level, the Arabs 
achieved a moderate grade in holding a clear policy and enhancing operational 
capability, but failed totally in formulating sound grand and military strategies and 
shaping the operational art strategically. So, the overall estimate of the practical tier 
is low. 
In Transjordan, Abdullah and Glubb managed carefully to have a professional army 
first attuned to regular warfare and expanded it after the first truce. They succeeded 
in mobilizing these forces quickly at the beginning of war to evict the Jews from 
Jerusalem and achieved a tangible battlefield success by severing the main strategic 
communication line. The decision to defect strategically from the war effort would 
leave them alone facing the galvanised victorious Israeli army and more vulnerable 
to coercion to surrender the “little triangle”60 an turn a blind eye to the occupation of 
Eilat. 61 In addition, Abdullah lost much political prestige in the Arab world which 
had been a primary objective. With clear policy but moderate ability in formulating 
grand and military strategies, and enhancing the operational capability and the 
appropriateness of the operational art to strategic context, the overall marking of 
Transjordanian practical ability is moderate. 
Outcome 
A conclusion to the of 1948 War was attempted through two UN-mediated 
pathways; ending hostilities by armistice agreements which was successful, and  
searching for a political conclusion for the whole conflict through the UN 
Conciliatory Commission for Palestine – UNCCP which was established in 
November 1948 to replace Bernadotte after his assassination which was a sign of 
failure. 
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In estimating the outcome of war for all sides, Israel achieved the lion‟s share as it 
was enabled to build its state with defensible borders, at least temporarily, and to 
extend its territory from the 53% of Mandatory Palestine allotted to it by the UN 
resolution to around 78 %. However, no political peace was achieved and the war 
left many seeds for forthcoming wars. The strategic pathway in the 1948 War, albeit 
with short-term successes, planted more seeds for the next wars and only aggravated 
the political will of Israel‟s opponents by the addition of animosity.  
Transjordan achieved much of what it aimed for as an individual nation in terms of: 
gaining the West Bank with the exception of Lydda, Ramlah, the Little Triangle and 
Eilat. It annexed the West Bank to form with Transjordan the Kingdom of Jordan in 
1950. Nevertheless, King Abdullah‟s interest in securing the position of leading the 
Arab League or using his Palestinian gains to advance his Greater Jordan project was 
crippled. Actually, he lost his reputation among the Arabs by the end of the war, and 
lost his life in 1951 when he was assassinated in East Jerusalem.  
The causal link tracing in this war follows the presumed theory to a large extent. The 
strategic practical ability was high advantageous for Israel (high) facing the Arabs 
(low), and low advantageous vis-à-vis Jordan (high Israeli ability versus moderate 
Transjordanian). This led to the strategic success of Israel in the first (general) war, 
and strategic advantage in the second.  
Generally, the practical strategic ability for both Arabs and Israel reflected the 
combined effect of conceptual and institutional abilities, with more emphasis on the 
latter. Only Transjordan was outmanoeuvred by the strategic imbalance favouring 
Israel massively after the general Arab defeat. Not many strategic options were left 
at this late stage.  
To conclude, one of the unintended effects of the 1948 War for all sides was the 
catalysis for a political earthquake in the Arab region, especially in Egypt where the 
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humiliating defeat of 1948 became a major factor behind the Military Coup of 1952 
and the rise of Nasserism.62 
 
 THE 1967 WAR 
Political Backgrounds 
After the 1956 war that was perceived and proclaimed by Nasser‟s regime, and 
accepted by most Arabs, as a political victory, a new era of Nasserism erupted in 
Egypt and the region, the pillars of which were first, charismatic leadership with a 
radical political ideology mixing Arab nationalism and socialism and, second, a 
policy with a sense of adventurism.63  
Nasser intended to portray himself as representing the “Arab Nation”, at that time a 
new identity or rather an aspiration to be the new Saladin who would unite the 
artificially divided Arab states in order to free the Arab World from western 
imperialism and its regional stakeholder - Israel.64  
Within Egypt, Nasser launched a promising process of development based on 
industrialization and social reform, starting with land re-distribution and 
accelerating with the nationalization of the banks in the late 1950s and corporations 
in the early 1960s. Accompanying these policies was a programme of political 
indoctrination.  
Regionally, Nasser played an active role in accelerating the independence 
movements in Algeria and other Arab countries, especially in the Arab peninsula, 
Iraq and the Levant. He also encouraged the founding of the Palestine Liberation 
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Organisation (PLO) in 1964. However, these moves were seen by the traditional 
kings and presidents of the region as threats directly aimed at overthrowing their 
regimes.  
In 1958, the year of the union with Syria, two major attempts at changing regimes 
took place in Jordan and Lebanon which required the deployment and intervention 
of foreign troops, British and American respectively.  
 Poor relations with the Saudi Arabian regime were exacerbated by Egypt‟s 
involvement with the 1962 republican “revolution” in North Yemen which Riyadh 
viewed as a direct threat.  
Outside the Arab world, Nasserite Egypt achieved a high place in the political 
discourse as Nasser took a major role in the establishment of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Despite the Movement‟s professed neutrality between the protagonists 
of the Cold War, Nasser invented a policy of “positive non-alignment” which 
brought him closer to the USSR in terms of rhetoric and practical action.  
Until 1962, he maintained some balance, if not equality, in dealing with the two 
major powers. Egypt received regular economic aid from the United States,   and the 
US tone towards it was not very critical until the Yemen War erupted.  
 Nasser‟s non-alignment policy was not much welcomed by Khrushchev, but the 
Soviet leadership was forced to maintain its relationship with Egypt to gain greater 
influence in the Middle East, especially in view of the change of Soviet doctrine in 
the 1960s towards having military bases in the ME to assist its “external function”.65 
During his visit to Egypt in 1965, Khrushchev underlined the generous nature of the 
Soviet relationship with Egypt – highlighting the scale of military and economic aid 
which exceeded its aid for any other state outside the USSR.66 
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Nevertheless, by 1967 the outcomes of Nasserite policy were not great from all 
perspectives. Domestically, in spite of a growth rate reaching 7% and expanding 
education, the domestic economy had been facing severe problems since 1964. High 
inflation, deteriorating productivity of the newly nationalized industrial system, and 
the grave shortage of wheat reserves due to US reluctance to continue its aid,  were 
failures that forced Nasser to impose a policy of austerity that affected even the 
military budget.67 Meanwhile, the costs of the war in Yemen were rocketing up.68  
Politically, Egypt was an autocratic state in which political parties were forbidden, 
including the Egyptian Communist Party, whose outlawing raised tensions with the 
USSR. Freedom of speech and travel was very restricted, and the state suffered a 
serious, albeit hidden, confrontation between two big institutions, the political 
organisation of the Arab Socialist Union which was rallied behind Nasser, and the 
army led by Abdul-Hakim „Amer.  
Regionally, the Arab Cold War69 was at its peak during the Yemen War in which a 
propaganda war and externally supported attempts at political subversion were 
dominant. However, Nasser was still the undisputed leader of the Arab World. He 
succeeded in halting the introduction of any Western-oriented security alliance such 
as the Baghdad Pact. However, he suffered a decline in his image during the first 
half of the 1960s after the failed union with Syria and the problematic war in Yemen. 
His opponents were not confined to traditionalists or “reactionaries as he called 
them, but included the progressive axis in Syria and Iraq which sought to overbid 
him in appealing to popular aspirations. He was even accused of failing in the core 
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task of confronting Israel by „hiding‟ behind the UN Emergency Forces in Sinai 
which had been stationed there since the 1956 war. 
Internationally, Egypt‟s position was exceeding its true capacities and this led to real 
confrontations with the US over the war in Yemen, the Soviet role in the region and 
events in the Republic of Congo. Eisenhower‟s doctrine had sought to use economic 
and arms aid to receptive Arab states, and military intervention to protect regional 
territorial integrity with the explicit logic of preventing the USSR‟s encroachment in 
the region; but implicitly it carried antipathy towards Nasser‟s Egypt.70 This reached 
the point of planning to subvert Nasser politically and physically if it proved 
necessary.71 After a short break under Kennedy, US policy under Johnson became 
even more antagonistic in tone and action towards what was perceived as Egyptian 
regional encroachment. Hence the idea of “unleashing Israel” to undermine Nasser‟s 
regional status was born in some circles close to Johnson.72 
In Israel, the developmental and economic parameters were remarkably good in 
spite of the economic depression which began in 1966. The 1956 War was viewed as 
a military victory which encouraged the self-confidence of the new state. Although 
Israel had to relinquish all the territory she occupied in Sinai, in return, she received 
the opportunity of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba which was guaranteed by 
the US after the war.   
A new “Jewish identity” which stressed the importance of militarism came to 
predominate in Israeli society.73 State institutions were developed and the economic 
growth rate reached 10% per year from 1957 to 1965. The disparity between Israel 
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and the Arab states accelerated; the per capita income ratio of Egypt and Israel was 
1:3 in 1951 and 1:7 in 1966. GNP showed a similar divide. While the 1951 GNP ratio 
between Egypt and Israel was 4:1; the gap had shrunk to 1.6:1 by 1966.74 Israel‟s 
industrial infrastructure increased nine-fold between 1953 and 1967 and the 
industrial sector‟s share of exports rose from 61% to 81%.75  
Politically, Mapai was the major political party and was predominant in many social, 
bureaucratic and economic spheres. David Ben-Gurion left office in 1963, either due 
to personal reasons as he claimed or to intra-party and governmental strife as others 
suggested.76 Then, the postponed aftershocks of the Lavon scandal and its effect on 
Israeli-Egyptian relations between 1954 and 1965 divided the Mapai, and Ben-
Gurion created an opposition party, Rafi. Levi Eshkol, an uncharismatic man lacking 
military knowledge but expert in organisation and finance and, according to Ben-
Gurion holding a nationalist “non-sectarian” ideology took over the Mapai party.  
The Israeli military expanded its influence on political decision-making in the 
absence of Ben-Gurion, although he still maintained informal relations with the 
army. Internationally, Israel‟s relations with France cooled with the re-emergence of 
de Gaulle. However, although relations with the US improved with Kennedy, they 
had a robust push under Johnson with his clearly pro-Israeli attitude and staff. This 
attitude was fuelled also by the US conflict with Nasserite Egypt. Improved relations 
with Western Germany resulted in it extending and expanding reparations 
payments by more than 10 times, and to the Bonn government channelling many of 
the weapon systems (mainly M-48 tanks) which the US could not provide to Israel 
directly due to regional calculations.77  
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After the 1956 War, the southern front was calm with the deployment of UNEF. 
Israel had the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba to its only port in the 
Red Sea at Eilat. This right was endorsed by a formal US-British-French 
understanding in 1957.  
Sinai was practically devoid of large-scale Egyptian military forces, in part because 
of tacit recognition of pacification, and also because of the Egyptian involvement in 
Yemeni affairs since 1962. This norm was breached only in 1960 during what was 
known as the ‟Rotem crisis‟, and this had a grave effect later on Nasser‟s strategy in 
1967. With a similar heating up of the guerrilla attacks on the Syrian front in 1960, at 
the time Syria was in union with Egypt, the IDF undertook a partial mobilization 
with explicit threats against Syria. Nasser, who was the leader of the United 
Republic, had to respond. One division was ordered in complete secrecy to move to 
Sinai and Israel responded by reducing the tension.78 
Guerrilla operations persisted on the Syrian and Jordanian borders during the 1960s.  
They should not have had a great impact on Israeli security due to the low human 
and economic losses inflicted, but Israel perceived them as a direct blow to its ability 
to deter Arab attacks. This perception was linked to IDF activism and a low 
threshold for retaliations on a disproportionate scale. The tension was only 
worsened by Nasser‟s gross miscalculation and the situation escalated to open war 
in 1967. 
The mounting tension in the region was aggravated by the Arab Cold War and the 
wider international confrontation between Egypt and the US. Israel was caught in 
the propaganda of the Progressive Arab Front against those it characterised as 
reactionaries. There was an intentional escalation of guerrilla warfare by the Syrian 
pro-Soviet regimes to outbid Nasser who was keeping his front silent. 
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Two other matters contributed to the escalation: the war for water which invited 
confrontation between Israel and its neighbours, and the efforts to establish a united 
Arab military command which irritated Israel, although they ultimately failed.  
Israel launched a major project to transfer the water of the Jordan River to the Negev 
and aimed to drain the Haula Lake for the use of fertilized land. As a result, the first 
Arab Summit in October 1964 took a decision to undertake multi-stationed projects 
in order to divert the Jordan River and to establish logistical and utility projects in 
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.  
Forecasting an Israeli military response, the summit decided to establish a United 
Military Command which aimed initially to strengthen the defences of the three 
states to withstand the expected Israeli retaliatory actions. However, the UMC 
turned out to be useless and a victim of inter-Arab rivalries. The formal report of its 
command (headed by Egyptian General Ali Ali Amer) stated clearly the failure of its 
mission.79 Nevertheless, it contributed to a rising tension in Israel‟s perception of its 
own security.  
Over 1956, 1966, and 1967, Israel‟s eastern and northern borders experienced military 
exchanges ranging from guerrillas or special operations to tanks and artillery battles 
and, less frequently, aerial exchanges. Two episodes had devastating results in 
increasing animosity and pushed all states‟ calculations to a more belligerent status.  
The first was Samau in the West Bank in November 1966 where a Jordanian battalion 
was ambushed in an Israeli trap with military and civilian losses. Samau attracted 
international condemnation of Israel, especially from the US whose ally, Jordan, had 
been attacked. The incident was used by Arabs to condemn Jordan as it had 
consistently refused the deployment of Iraqi or Saudi forces on its territory to avoid 
being forced into a war with Israel, and also as a defensive condemnation of Egypt 
by Jordan, and Egypt by Syria as Nasser kept hiding behind the deployment of 
UNEF in Sinai as an excuse for not taking action.  
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The second incident was when the IAF ambushed Syrian jets and downed six of 
them on the April 1967.80 In April and May, direct threats to subvert the regime in 
Damascus were common in Israeli propaganda. 
In 1967, the roots of the conflict in the Middle East reached a critical state:  Nasser‟s 
image as a “hero” obliged him to bear the responsibility to act.  The Arab Cold War 
represented a means and a result for the strife with the US. The Israeli issue was 
used by Nasser‟s regime and the nationalist regimes in Syria and Iraq to outbid each 
another in threats and promises to act. The borders and small water wars increased 
the tension. Finally, this critical situation was exacerbated by Israel‟ explicit threats 
against the Syrian regime, the credibility of which was raised by Soviet false alarms 
about IDF deployments at the Syrian border. 
The Strategic Ability of Israel 
Conceptual 
The Israeli cabinet was formed by the Mapai Party in alliance with smaller parties 
(Ahdot HaAvoda and the National Religious Party) and was headed by Levi Eshkol. 
The contrast between his strategic conceptual ability and that of Ben-Gurion was 
massive.81 Eshkol had undertaken only limited military service during WWI and had 
been isolated from the security circle in Israel since its establishment. He was 
portrayed in Israel, especially when the conflict was heated in May 1967, as a weak 
old man with stuttering speech who lacked the qualities needed for the historic 
moment.  
Although Eshkol did not have a strong grasp of military strategic issues, he 
emphasised on many occasions the need to subject military conduct and operations 
to international political sensitivities. In spite of the crisis and the continuing 
pressure from the IDF to go to war, he stated prophetically in the most serious 
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meeting with his generals, “A military victory would not end the dispute because 
the Arabs will still be there”.82  
He tried to compensate for his shortcomings in military strategy by seeking advice 
from Yigal Allon who was a great operational artist in 1948 and thoroughly 
formulated the Israeli strategic concepts in the 1950s and 1960s, at least on paper, in 
“The Making of Israel‟s Army”. Allon was a good reader, and broadcaster in Israel, 
of Liddell Hart‟s theory of an indirect approach. His account of how the 1948 
operations followed this approach, albeit in its operational and tactical senses, was 
incorporated in late editions of Hart‟s book.83 Allon referred later to the weak 
theoretical base of the IDF officers‟ corps, meaning primarily in the tactical and 
operational areas, and recommended formal theoretical education and independent 
self-development for officers.84 
In “The Making of Israel‟s Army”, Allon stressed the strategic necessity to avert war 
as far as possible, to win wars decisively and in a short time using air supremacy 
and armoured thrusts, and to transfer the war to the enemy‟s territory.85  
Due to Israeli geostrategic sensitivities (as it was surrounded by Arabs whose 
artillery range covered the sensitive areas in Galilee, and had a limited strategic 
depth of 10 miles at some points)86, he coined a new term, albeit self-contradictory as 
he was aware of this charge: “anticipatory counter-attack”. Israel should set red lines 
and be ready to attack offensively if these lines were breached. He claimed that the 
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core of the military thinking of Israel and her allies87  was defensive strategically but 
offensive operationally. These red lines, which would result in an Israeli counter-
attack, were: concentration of enemy forces with offensive intent, guerrilla wars not 
controllable by low scale retaliations, any closure of the Tiran Straits, and impending 
deep air attacks on Israeli territory.88  
Although his strategic encapsulation was offensive and tacticized, Allon grasped the 
essence of strategic thinking by looking for the strategic and political effects of the 
use of force.  
He believed in the possibility of reaching a peace agreement but, more likely, a non-
aggression agreement after both the 1948 and 1956 wars, but he did not explain what 
went wrong to prevent this. He also perceived the qualitative gap as favouring Israel 
over the Arabs in the long term, which makes a defensive strategy more reasonable, 
albeit with a low threshold for offensive actions. He favoured conventional 
deterrence over nuclear, unless Israel benefited from unilateral nuclear capability, as 
the opponent‟s actions could not be counted upon for mutual nuclear deterrence to 
work.89  
Nevertheless, Allon did not have broad access to strategy making in this war. 
Granted, he was a minister with advisory ties to Eshkol, but even Eshkol did not 
show willingness to formulate strategy on top of what was produced by the IDF. At 
one time Eshkol proposed to allot his defence portfolio to Allon, but this was not 
accepted. Only if Allon had been accepted as defence minister would he have had 
sufficient authority to guide strategy making. The only direct input he managed was 
as a minister of the minority party Ahdot HaAfoda who adopted a very active policy 
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from the beginning of the crisis, pushing the cabinet towards the decision to go to 
war, but he was not responsible for any detailed strategy. 
The IDF pressed for a political leadership change by bringing Ben-Gurion, Eshkol‟s 
rival, into the government as Minister of Defence. In the end, a compromise was 
reached by establishing a government of unity in which Dayan became defence 
minister 
Moshe Dayan, despite his legendary status in Israeli military history, had only 
modest qualities as an operational organiser90, let alone as a strategist, and he lacked 
much of the organizing ability needed for the post. Dayan‟s best quality, 
nevertheless, was the high esteem in which he was held and his ability to mobilize 
his subordinates to follow his lead.  
Dayan, who did not receive any formal higher military education, showed mixed 
strategic conceptual ability. On the one hand, he clearly appreciated the political and 
strategic consequences of military operations, for example criticising the escalatory 
policy of the IDF that led to the crisis, and the IDF‟s underestimation of Nasser‟s 
intention to go to war in response. He also gave good strategic accounts of the fall of 
Gaza once its base in Rafah- Al Arish was stripped, of the need not to reach as far as 
the Suez Canal in order to avoid international pressure, and of his opposition 
opening a Golan front to avoid the prospect of Soviet intervention.91  
On the other hand, his accounts did not show that he grasped the full strategic logic 
of using force to reach clear political aims that have to be enforced on the will of the 
enemy; neither did he demonstrate determination to impose his will on events. 
Dayan did not offer a strategic formula for the war, but only worked uncritically 
inside the well-accepted IDF strategic concepts in the Sixties.  
There had been structural anomalies in Israel‟s strategic conceptual ability from 1948 
to 1956 and then in 1967. Although extensive doctrinal discussions took place during 
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the 1950s and 1960s, there was a lack of formal means to develop and transfer 
strategic, or even operational, theory. Hence, the discussions ended up being 
practical-technical debates and did not benefit from deeper and critical thinking. 
Theory does not make doctrine, but it increases the general awareness of the subject 
and sharpens the line between important and less important issues, between what is 
changing and what is not. Strategic theory and its product, strategic assumptions, 
are essential also to give the doctrine its raison d’être and its shape and direction. As 
Avi Kober clearly identified, this “anti-intellectualism” in the IDF originated in the 
cultural bias towards practical experience that was entrenched by the cult of 
victorious offensives in the 1956 and, to an even greater extent, the 1967 wars.92  
The attempt to establish a National Defence College in 1963 was not successful. The 
college did not receive the attention of the IDF elites and became a pool for the non-
motivated senior military. It was closed shortly before 1967 to save expenses during 
an economic slowdown.93 The college was only re-established after 1973 as a 
response to the general condemnation of Israeli military practice before and during 
the 1973 war.94  
If anything had changed in 1967 from the previous wars, it was the absence of Ben-
Gurion‟s strategic input with his clear concepts of strategic logic and the political 
employment of war.95 Also, as the IDF became much more mechanised and 
professional, in tactical and technical terms, the sense of anti-intellectualism was 
strengthened not weakened. As the military elites became more specialised in 
narrow and sophisticated tasks, the influence of the wider operational talent of the 
earlier generations was weakened. Moreover, as the IDF adopted state of the art 
platforms and more emphasis was put on technical excellence, the conceptual 
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elements in thinking strategically were lost to what Handel called in describing the 
IDF: “capital-intensive warfare”96. 
The direct consequence of this loss in strategic ability was clear. No real attempt was 
made to reconsider the long-term strategic consequences of using the acts of war 
comprehensively, nor was there an overview of the pattern of military decisions. Yet, 
some strategic considerations were made, albeit not comprehensively. Although this 
can be interpreted to some extent by the anomalous institutional trend skewed to the 
military, both military and cabinet debates showed little interest in asking  strategic 
questions let alone attempting to answer them. All this gives the Israeli Conceptual 
tier low marks.              
Institutional 
With the demise of Ben-Gurion who had emphasised the instrumentalism of the 
military to policy97, the institutional structure of strategy making lost much of the 
legacy of civilian supremacy and strong political leadership. However, in spite of the 
IDF‟s strong ties with the „Old Man‟, it welcomed Eshkol as he had a much more 
relaxed grip over the military.98 
A conflict of opinions between the military and political elites peaked before the 
1967 War as the military always pushed for offensives. Firstly, they pushed for a 
military offensive against the Syrian front, ranging from wide-scale retaliatory 
attacks to overthrowing the regime, which would have required an invasion and the 
possible occupation of Damascus. The military always exceeded the limits set by 
Eshkol in retaliatory events, as in Samau in 1966 and in the aerial battle in April 
1967.99 
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Then, when the conflict with Egypt was building, the military pushed for action as 
early as 15 May 1967. Between then  and  the government‟s decision to go to war, 
both informally on 2 June1967, and formally on 4 June 1967, the military pressured 
the politicians by various means to unleash Israel‟s military might without 
investigating the political objectives thoroughly. 
Although the IDF kept itself subordinated to the political elites, even in the harshest 
rift between 24 May and 2 June 1967, when the government ordered the military to 
wait for the completion of diplomatic manoeuvres, the military pushed by legitimate 
or illegitimate means to the extent that the fear of a military coup came to Ben-
Gurion‟s infuriated notice and forced him to reconsider his opposition to  a national 
unity government, and this led to the appointment of Dayan as defence minister.100 
How could the military achieve this pressure, and how could this have affected the 
functional criteria of institutionalising strategy making? 
The military had a much stronger hold on the decision-making framework than in 
any other democracy, and it used the stream of conflict itself to strengthen its 
position. The Chief of Staff, Rabin, had semi-ministerial status until his breakdown 
on 24 May 1967, and he attended all governmental security meetings, accompanying 
mostly the heads of military intelligence and operations. This, in addition to the 
absence of any civilian-led platform for thorough discussions on strategy making, 
the absence of any civilian-led platform for collecting and developing genuine 
intelligence reports, the weakness of Eshkol and most of his cabinet members in 
military affairs (other than Allon, Carmel and later Dayan, who were strongly in 
support of IDF activism) and the stronger public base of the military in general, all 
led to more compliance with what the military wished for,  especially in the critical 
window.  
This compliance was reached by “smooth” ways of persuasion and manipulating 
intelligence reports and by harsh ways too. The aggressive speeches of the general 
staff in their meetings with Eshkol on 23 and 28 May and 1 June 1967 and with the 
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government on 2 June, which challenged the credibility of the government101, the 
furious mood of the armed forces due to the government waiting for a diplomatic 
pathway, and the military‟s participation in inflaming public feelings against the 
government, and Eshkol specifically, and their attempts to get Dayan into office 
were some examples.  
Because of this it is helpful to survey how these abnormal relational settings, in a 
generally democratic political structure, affected the functional criteria in both 
positive and negative ways. 
Information sharing was good in general, but the process had two failings which 
enabled manipulation of the flow of intelligence on the enemy‟s capabilities and 
intentions. On the other hand information on the IDF‟s capabilities was generally 
accurate.   
Firstly, all sources of intelligence were collected and reviewed by military 
intelligence which was under the Chief of Staff. This created a “legitimate” way to 
affect decision making by shaping the perception of political elites. With such a 
military-centric intelligence system, introducing military biases was inevitable and 
involuntary; however the military manipulated the intelligence reports intentionally 
to draw a more compelling picture.  
For example, Aron Yariv, the chief of military intelligence, in his meetings with 
Eshkol and the government, stressed Nasser‟s clearly offensive intentions and the 
grave outcomes if he was given time to act in Sinai without a military response from 
Israel. When these reports were shown to the Americans during the visits of both 
Aba-Eban and then Yariv, they were considered an exaggeration of Nasser‟s 
intentions and capabilities. What American and Israeli reports agreed, nevertheless, 
was the likely favourable outcome for the IDF in any future military operation 
against Arab forces, separately or combined.102  
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The second fault in the intelligence system was the trend of Israeli military 
intelligence to suggest policies and strategies based on its estimate of the enemy‟s 
intentions. Suggesting specific policy/strategy, however, is outside the capability of 
intelligence organisations and is strategically counterproductive, especially in 
democratic settings. Intelligence, specifically military intelligence, does not have the 
political legitimacy or efficiency to monitor and control all forms of state capabilities, 
diplomatic, economic, domestic, external etc. Hence, any attempt by military 
intelligence alone to formulate a policy and strategy is inefficient. Also, conveying 
the militarized inclination towards policy and strategy without it being critically 
scrutinized by a higher political judgement contradicts the logic of strategy making. 
Nevertheless, what military and other intelligence should do is to draw potential 
scenarios and modify the intelligence strategy and agenda in order to deal with these 
scenarios beforehand, by providing the available information required for decisions 
in such scenarios. 103  
If the government adopts a specific policy/strategy, intelligence may prioritize its 
agenda but should not give up completely the consideration of other scenarios.  Nor 
should it advocate a specific policy/strategy. If intelligence does push for a specific 
strategy, or having a solid strategic assumption “concept”, information can also be 
gathered in a way to consolidate these assumptions rather than challenging them. 
This meticulous process is what could draw a sharp line between policy-driven 
versus policy-relevant intelligence.104   
What happened in Israeli practice in three major events prior to May 1967, during 
the crisis window before the 1967 War, and before the 1973 War was a cognitive 
deadlock when the intelligence generated some concepts which dominated 
policy/strategy making due to their high position in the system. The intelligence 
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community then kept feeding these concepts with compatible evidences while 
distorting or ignoring other opposing evidences.105  
The second functional criterion, collective critical thinking, was severely affected. 
Although military and political meetings adopted the norm of critical thinking, they 
did that in isolation, not collectively and, in the case of the military, were cognitively 
attached to fixed strategic concept and offensive attitudes.  
There was no institutional forum to deal thoroughly with policy/strategy questions 
which could include people from both civilian and military backgrounds in a free 
critical environment.106 Although the cabinet and its ministerial security committee 
could have constituted this platform, both fell short of its requirements. The majority 
of members lacked military knowledge, apart from the IDF representatives or those 
who were aligned with them, and this made IDF assumptions immune to criticism.  
Also, neither of these bodies, whose meetings were held infrequently and were 
occupied mostly with non-policy non-strategic questions, discussed the points of the 
political aims of the war or the military strategy and operational plans. This was, in 
part, caused by the time and background limits, but it was caused also by the en 
Berra status which represented this war as a war of “no choice”; it was an aim in 
itself, and everything more than the decision to go to war was left to the military.107 
Eshkol was presented informally with the Karadom plan at his personal meeting with 
Rabin on 22 May, and Dayan only knew about the actual Nakhshonim plan when he 
came into the office.108  
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The authorization of political elites to take political and strategic decisions was 
accepted by the military with two reservations, in addition to the pressure on 
politicians by the military to go to war:109 
First, political decisions were restricted to the question of whether or not to go to 
war; neither decisions nor guidance were offered for the war‟s political objectives, its 
military strategy, or scale of operations and limitations.  
Second, decisions were applied mostly in the period leading to war, on a wider scale 
than the government authorized, as in the case of Samau and the aerial exchange.110 
The last anomaly was common in the pre-war retaliatory actions but it happened 
also in the only episode when a politician, Dayan, spoke against seizing control of 
the Gaza Strip and reaching the Suez Canal and found his reservations ignored. In 
contrast, but also an institutional defect, Dayan ordered the occupation of the Golan 
Heights on 9 June contradicting the Security Committee‟s decision on the previous 
night not to invade Syrian territory in order to avoid possible Soviet intervention.111  
Given the conflict of opinions and the balance of power skewed towards the 
military, the theoretical model created by Brooks would give the Israeli case in the 
1967 War the worst functional outcomes.112 However, in the event the Israeli civil-
military relations showed mixed functional outcomes. The conflict of opinions 
between politicians and generals in this case was not a competition over political 
power. There was still a democratic legacy preserving some functions.  
The military commitment to democracy was strong enough because of the Israeli 
politico-social architecture in which the army was a people‟s army mainly of 
reservists, and society as a whole was strongly committed to democracy. With no 
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interest in extending its political power for its own sake, the military had no interest 
in hiding information or distorting its own capability. 
The capabilities of the Arabs were also hard to hide completely because of the 
multiplicity of sources examining them, especially those from the US. What 
undermined Israeli strategic practice was its assertive and biased estimation of Arab 
intentions and its adherence to a consolidated strategic concept, pushing for a 
specific policy by whatever means, together with the military monopoly on strategy 
making. This monopoly was rather the result of the withdrawal of the politicians 
than the political activism of the military. With this monopoly, militarization and 
tacticization of strategy making were to be expected.  
These mixed functions and abnormal relational setting (competent information 
sharing and formidable position of the military; moderate grade in clear 
authorization; and low critical assessment and strategic intervention of politicians) 
give the Israeli institutional layer a grade of medium.  
 
Practical  
 Israeli policy/grand strategy in the 1967 War can be analysed from different 
perspectives: the clarity of political aims and the compatibility between them and the 
chosen grand strategy, and the grand strategic ability to orchestrate all means of 
state power to attain the end results. The decision to go to war is grand strategic and 
the decisions on the type of war will be called military strategic, although in reality 
they are mutually interdependent as described earlier. 
Israel achieved a high level of success in mobilizing the state means for the military 
effort, due to its mature governmental and social infrastructure and the compelling 
sense of necessity in the population.  From a population of 2.5 million in 1967, Israel 
could mobilize 250,000, an army which was very well served economically and 
technically. However, all other state means, such as diplomacy for example, were 
seen as auxiliary means at best to serve the military; most of the time the IDF saw 
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diplomacy as an obstacle rather than being integrated to serve higher strategy 
targets.113  
Pre-war. The overarching security concept in Israel after the 1956 War until 1967 was 
based on the pillars of conventional deterrence and preserving the military‟s ability 
to achieve successful pre-emptive offenses.114 The first of these in turn relied on an 
approach of limited retaliation that would not exceed escalatory limits and lead to 
war, and on the qualitative edge of the military over its potential enemies. 115The 
second pillar was based on the ability to have early warning and peripheral NAHAL 
(settlements)116 to give time for the military to mobilize and launch highly dynamic 
thrusts by attaining and then using air supremacy and armoured mobile offensives.  
Nuclear deterrence, for reasons of technical underdevelopment, was deferred to the 
future. However, a policy of nuclear ambiguity “Amimut” was adopted before and 
after attaining nuclear capacity to prevent international pressure and the Arabs‟ 
claiming  their own right to obtain nuclear weapons which would distort Israel‟s 
deterrence ability. It also relied on this ambiguity creating Arab fears of initiating 
conflict with an enemy possibly armed with nuclear weapons.117  
Creveld indicated that this nuclear ambiguity had prevented the Arabs before 1967 
from calculating the outcomes of using war properly and had restrained their 
escalation since they had believed that Israel possessed some nuclear capacity at the 
time. In spite of no formal evidence that Israel was nuclear-ready before 1967, 
Creveld concluded from the remark by Peres that there was a “certain proposal that 
I cannot write about for reasons of state security” and if Israel adopted it the Arabs 
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would be deterred, that he meant a nuclear trial.118 Nevertheless, given the 
personalities of Arab leaders, the regional heating up, the Cold War dynamics, and 
the Arab popular feeling in response to escalatory propaganda, it was doubtful that 
this step would calm down the escalation but heat it further.  
Although the security concept described above looked wise and productive, its 
defective  application, due to institutional aberrations discussed earlier and the 
expansionist and offensive culture in the military, led to the failure of deterrence.  
In Eshkol‟s initial meetings with the General Staff in 1963, the military expressed its 
thoughts about correcting the borders (errors), mainly in the West Bank and also of 
the Golan which represented a potential danger to Israel‟s geostrategic situation. 
Rabin acknowledged at these meetings that this area of decision making lay 
exclusively in the sphere of the politicians, but this did not allay the strong military 
concern about the issue and led to extensive retaliations. 119 This, in turn, rather than 
preserving the security status quo and strengthening deterrence, invited the crisis of 
May 1967 that preceded the war.  
These incidents were even condemned by Dayan who, as a Member of the Knesset, 
warned against pushing the region to war. This military activism was accelerated by 
Eshkol‟s, Abba Eban‟s and Rabin‟s threats of crippling the Damascus regime that 
dominated April and May 1967. Rabin met Ben Gurion, the sacred patron of the 
army, on 21 May and the latter condemned the military attitude and described it as 
playing with the country‟s fate.120  
Another sign of failure which marked the build-up to the crisis was the solid 
certainty spread by military intelligence that Nasser would never go to war or 
threaten war due to the military imbalance and his entanglement in Yemen. The 
bland acceptance of this gave the military and the political decision makers a false 
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sense of security regarding their escalatory moves and the possibility that Egypt 
would not respond.  
Grand Strategy was also problematic during the 1967 crisis, although it was better 
than before and had some excuse with the catastrophic mistakes made by Nasser. 
War aims were never set or discussed in Israeli political or military circles and no 
compatibility was meticulously sought between policy, the assumed one at least, and 
strategy.    
It could be said that the mood of “war of no choice” was facilitated by the political 
and military discourses which intentionally obscured the balance of power that 
favoured Israel in order to achieve domestic and international mobilization. 
Secondly, this was helped by the escalatory speeches of Nasser and other Arab 
leaders. Thirdly, the lack of effective international intervention in the crisis also led 
to a sense that the war should be fought without a greater strategic design. 
However, this also was precipitated by the Israeli cultural mindset. Due to the 
Holocaust and 2000 years in diaspora, there was a continuous search for absolute 
security with exaggerated and pre-emptive response.121 Shalit claimed a link 
between the two contradictory patterns of Israeli practice; fear and aggression as 
Zionism sought to replace the image of weakness and humiliation with an image of 
power and aggression.122 
Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, all internal estimates by the military, like those of 
the US123, clearly stated the wide quality gap between the IDF and the Egyptian 
Army and predicted a subsequent battle-space decision, which should normally 
work against this en barr atmosphere. 
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 The decision to go to war was made under the direct pressure of the Army to do 
“something big” militarily in response to Israel‟s deteriorating deterrent position 
and Nasser‟s miscalculated moves. There was no further detailed formulation of war 
policy and strategy.  This was obvious from the frequent and rapid shifting in Israeli 
military thinking from an offensive pattern to another with a limited strategic 
consideration. 
No meeting of the cabinet or its defence committee and no combined political-
military meeting was held specifically to discuss, let alone criticise, the political aims 
of the war or to select political-military scenarios for actions which would help to 
achieve them.124 Only within the military was there concrete discussion; the General 
Staff reviewed the military options,  but without discussing the political and 
strategic effects of each or how these effects would meet political goals set by the 
civilian government. The only vague strategic assumption held by the military from 
the early days of the crisis was that the Egyptians should receive a hammer blow in 
order to restore Israel‟s deterrence posture. Later, detailed military plans were the 
fruit of pure operational analysis of the current balance of power and the 
possibilities of offensive action. 
The offensive/militarized quasi-policy that was held by the military did not speak to 
specific political aims. Was the aim defensive against a possible Egyptian offensive, 
with or without Syrian involvement, to re-open the Tiran Straits, to restore Israel‟s 
deterrence capacity or to cripple Nasser‟s regime? This was never clearly decided.  
From 14 May, the policy tacitly adopted by the military was to punish Nasser in 
order to restore the deterrence position of Israel. This desire to deal with Egypt was 
strengthened by the withdrawal of UNEF as a buffer in the Sinai, and was confirmed 
by Cairo‟s closing of the Tiran Straits which since 1956 had been considered clearly 
and openly as a definite casus belli.  
                                                          
124
 Gluska, The Israeli Military, p.257. 
145 
 
The political circle, on the other hand, was full of ideas ranging from an extreme 
offensive policy to merely restoring the status quo and pressuring for the opening of 
the Tiran Straits by diplomatic measures.125 As a response to the 14 May Egyptian 
build-up in Sinai, the Israeli military was given an order for partial mobilization 
which was turned to full mobilization after the Tiran closure on 23 May. 
International diplomacy was seen as a failure by the Israelis as it had not prevented 
the UNEF withdrawal or stopped Nasser‟s closure of the Tiran Straits.  
When the UN Secretary General visited Egypt on 24 May, a moratorium was agreed 
whereby Israel would not send a ship with its flag and Egypt would stop military 
measures for inspecting and controlling the Strait. More importantly, the US 
promised Israel to launch a naval armada to open the Strait for Israeli shipping. 
The cabinet decided to allow a window for diplomacy to act on the Tiran Affair and 
restrained the military during the last two weeks in May. Although Eshkol did not 
turn down the military option, he and his cabinet believed that diplomatic moves 
would preserve the position of Israel as a victim of Arab aggression which would 
legitimize any later offensive. Further, the cabinet aimed to preserve relations with 
the US which were critically needed for military support during the oncoming war 
and in any post-war situation to enhance Israel‟s international position and 
transform the military gains into political ones, which had not happened in 1956.126  
The cabinet sent Abba Eban to the US on 26 May and used his visit to restrain the 
military push for offensive action. However, in the last week of May four new 
developments reduced the cabinet resistance to the military.  
Firstly, the military provided updated and consecutive strategic estimates which 
were compelling because of the alarm they raised. The estimates‟  purpose was: to 
illuminate Israel‟s deteriorated deterrence position as Nasser moved from one 
escalatory position to another if Israel did not  respond; to focus on the Egyptian 
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build-up in Sinai with arms on the ground and in the air; to show how this build-up 
would make any future Israeli offensive difficult and costly; and lastly to indicate the 
seismic regional changes that would follow Nasser‟s success as evidenced by the 
Egyptian-Jordanian military treaty which put the Jordanian forces under Egyptian 
military command and permitted the transfer of Iraqi forces  to Jordan.127  
Secondly, the formation of the National Unity Government and the allocation of the 
defence portfolio to Dayan changed the balance in the cabinet in favour of the 
decision for war.  
Thirdly, the cabinet became convinced that the US-led naval armada would be a 
failure.  
Finally, the changes in the region, especially on the Jordanian front, encouraged the 
government to make the decision. Even Eban, who more than any other minister 
was convinced of the need to maintain the status quo and leave as wide a scope for 
diplomacy as possible, changed his mind after the Egyptian-Jordanian defence 
treaty. 
On the 2 June, the Ministerial Security Committee, which now included Dayan from 
Rafi and representatives from Gahal, decided to go to war and to send Amir Amit to 
the US for a final approach to gain US support and acknowledgement. Although 
feedback from the State Department urged more patience and restraint, the message 
from the President and the US military was encouraging. 128  
Exploring the US position towards the crisis and any possible Israeli response had 
pre-occupied the cabinet for some time and was seen by the military and the public 
as a sign of incompetence. Although the US State Department had advocated 
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diplomacy throughout the crisis, the position of the President and the security 
community changed from calling for self-restraint at the beginning of the conflict to 
maintain some level of peace in the Middle East and decrease potential tension with 
the USSR, especially given the US involvement in Vietnam, to one of permitting an 
Israeli action in order to withstand a regional cascade which would leave US allies 
and interests exposed.  
Even the State Department, despite its usual modest policy tone, advised Johnson in 
a letter on 4 June from Walt Rostow that  “the moderate Arabs - and, in fact, virtually 
all Arabs who fear the rise of Nasser as a result of this crisis – would prefer to have 
him cut down by the Israelis rather than by external forces”129  
An analysis of the US role in the 1967 War shows, however, that two extreme 
positions cannot be supported by strong evidence. The war was not a US-initiated 
conspiracy but the US did, despite its protestations, play a role in paving the way to 
war by its deceitful interactions with Nasser.  
Arabs have claimed that the war was precipitated mainly by the US and even that 
the Americans participated physically in the war itself.130 In defence of their own 
conduct, „Amer and his staff tried to convince Nasser that US fighters had 
participated in the attack but later both said this was not so.131 Nasser himself for 
some time spoke publicly on this supposed participation.  
In his extensive study of the war Heikal tried hard to create a sophisticated story 
about an inner circle of the US government which conspired with a similar circle in 
Israel in order to cripple Nasser‟s regime and occupy the West Bank. He also 
claimed that the US supported the Israeli war machinery with massive weaponry 
before the war and controlled the sky over Israel during the aerial offensives.132 The 
Egyptian Chief of Staff claimed that the US technical research ship Liberty was 
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responsible for electronic and counter-electronic warfare in favour of Israel133; 
Heikal, on the other hand, claimed that the ship‟s role was to spy on the Israeli war 
effort  against the US‟s ally in the West Bank – the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  
All these claims are contradicted by long cascades of evidence showing that the US 
was reluctant until the last moment to “unleash” Israel and then  then gave only an 
“amber” light, implicitly allowing the offensive but not being involved in it. The USS 
Liberty was attacked later by the IAF by mistake as was originally claimed,134 and 
spying on the war effort against Jordan would not have necessitated this 
sophisticated tool. The IDF, although it had wished for long time to correct the 
“historical fault” in its borders by occupying the West Bank, was clearly identifying 
its main focus as the thrust into the Sinai as its deployment showed, rather than into 
the West Bank or the Golan Heights. The chance to occupy Jordanian territory came 
with the Jordanian tactical offensives launched despite conciliatory messages from 
Israel, and the IDF seized the chance. The controversial decision to occupy Golan 
was taken late in the war on 9 June 1967.   
US policy towards Nasser was at its harshest in the period preceding the war. This 
policy, which continuously shifted from attempts to contain him to covert  activities, 
as plans Alpha and Gamma showed,135 had reached its peak of confrontation under 
Johnson and in 1966 specifically. 
“Unleashing Israel” was a recognised theme in the background of US policy136, but 
during the May crisis the US was cautious about any escalation which would allow 
more Soviet penetration of the region. However, once the regional cascade was in 
the process of building up, and the USSR did not take as rigid a position as it had in 
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1956, and intelligence estimates were predicting a clear Israeli victory, Washington 
reoriented its position to permit an Israeli offensive.  
But even when the US became certain about the impending Israeli offensive, 
Washington kept advising Nasser to exercise self-restraint and scheduled a visit 
from Zakarya Mohey-Alddin, his prime minister, on 7 June one day after the 
invasion.137  
The US modified its procurement policy towards Israel in 1962 when Kennedy 
agreed to provide air defence systems – Hawks - to Israel as a response to the 
Egyptian rocket project. The US also supported Israel with M-48 tanks, though 
through Germany rather than directly, and agreed before the crisis to provide her 
directly with M-48 tanks and 40 Sky Hawks, although these failed to reach Israel in 
time for the war; however, the US turned down Israeli requests for rocket systems.138  
In conclusion, the US had a facilitating and supporting role in the war, rather than a 
precipitating one. From the Israeli strategic perspective, Ben-Gurion‟s original 
strategic speculation proved correct: that US strategic guardianship would prove 
indispensable in enhancing Israel‟s fighting power and international position.139 
However, the ultimate success in this grand strategic target was secured by his 
political opponent, Eshkol.  
On 4 June, the Israeli cabinet agreed to permit the military to proceed with 
operations to avert the encirclement of Israel, no more than that. No political aims, 
strategic objective or compatible military strategy and principles for operations were 
sanctioned.  
Post-war Israeli policy and grand strategy were no better. With an astonishing 
military victory that impressed the world, Israel found herself in an end-state that 
had neither been anticipated nor planned for.  
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Egyptian military forces received a shattering defeat with more than 15-20,000 killed 
and 4000 taken prisoner. 140 The IDF reached the Suez Canal and Nasser was badly 
humiliated. With this end-state Egypt accepted the ceasefire with reluctance on 8 
June and asked for an unconditional retreat of the IDF. On the other side, Israel 
matched this unrealistic demand with a similar one in a short-lived offer; Israel 
would retreat but as part of a general peace agreement with border changes.  
The diplomatic still-birth of the ceasefire negotiations paved the way for many 
hidden ideological and geopolitical instincts to flourish in Israel -– the Right pushed 
for an expansionist Greater Israel while others promoted holding on to the Occupied 
Territories to widen Israel‟s geostrategic space.141  
The USSR, criticised during the war for its lack of support for its regional allies, 
worked hard to restore the Egyptian Army and push for an international diplomatic 
solution based on the UN Resolution 242.142  
As a final remark on the soundness of Israeli policy/grand strategy in the war, if the 
assumed aim was to restore the deterrence position or to ensure a long period of no-
war, the result was two protracted wars: the War of Attrition and the 1973 War.  
Military Strategy 
                                                          
140
 The lower number is from Arab sources, such as Fawzy and Gamasy. The higher number is from  
Chaim Herzog, The Arab Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the 1948 War of Independence to 
the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 2005) p.165. 
141
 As Gluska indicated in The Israeli Military, the role of unity government with high weight for Dayan and the 
Right was decisive in this diplomatic deadlock especially at the Jordanian front (pp.259-260). Also, as Rabin 
indicated, after the agreement with Dayan not to attack Syria on 8 June, the latter changed his mind and 
ordered the North Commander to occupy the Golan in the early morning. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, pp.115-
116. 
142
 Nigel Ashton, The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967-73 (London: 
Routledge, 2007) pp.28-29 & p.61. 
 
151 
 
If policy and grand strategy were chaotic and simply left to the natural accumulation 
of the outcomes of military operations, military strategy was also problematic.  
The IDF aimed at defeating the Egyptian and other Arab forces by destroying their 
air and air-defence machinery first and then breaking through enemy defences, 
which were mostly static, by armoured pushes supported by Air and Special Forces. 
A direct onslaught would then follow. 
However, translating this concept into a specific strategic formula by giving it the 
scale and characters that would achieve the required strategic effects was absent.  
The IDF was the main decision-maker of strategic orientation in the conflict as 
already discussed, and if the military adopted a policy of punishing Nasser‟s army 
militarily, neither the range of punishment nor the appropriate military actions were 
discussed thoroughly with political leaders. The strategy making was upside-down.  
Eshkol, as mentioned, was aware of the risky path of using a military victory to 
reshape the political post-war structure. Despite his concerns, he and his colleagues 
were rarely involved in discussing military operations, let alone deciding on them, 
apart from expressing his fear of occupying Gaza given the likely difficulties in 
sustaining it.   
Plans. The Israeli pre-war planning was distilled in Plan Sadan which involved an 
initial ground-air defensive operation with forces transferring between the three 
potential fronts depending on where the primary thrust came from, with more 
priority given to the West Bank than the Golan Heights due to their geostrategic 
sensitivity.143    
When the crisis commenced on 14 May 1967, the General Staff proceeded to plan its 
offensive with no demarcation line between planning possible scenarios and 
adopting and pushing for a specific plan for action.  
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The first planning idea was a very limited offensive to occupy the Gaza Strip and use 
it as a bargaining chip for the Egyptian deployments in the Sinai and the re-opening 
of the Tiran Straits. This was turned down by the military leadership and Eshkol. 
 The next idea was formally incorporated in Plan Kardom (axe). This proposed 
destroying the Egyptian forces in Sinai by a major enveloping thrust from the 
southern Sinai sector composed of an armoured division/ugda, holding the middle 
sector with another ugda and using a third ugda as a functional reserve to repel any 
serious Egyptian defensive manoeuvres. The ground operation was to be preceded 
in all cases by an air operation which would destroy Egyptian air and air-defences 
capabilities; this was laid out in the IAF Plan Moked.144 
As Rabin was under pressure from the Cabinet to either wait for diplomatic 
negotiations or engage in limited military actions that would still allow for such 
manoeuvres, he ordered the staff on 20 May to prepare another limited plan for the 
occupation of the Gaza Strip and an offensive in the northern Sinai area of Rafah-Al-
Arish, preceded as usual by gaining air supremacy through Plan Moked.145 A Plan 
Atzmon was created to fulfil this scenario but was rejected outright by the military 
and the comprehensive Plan Karadom remained the main template.146 
Both proposed plans gave the green light for a deep breakthrough into the Sinai. 
Nevertheless, as a precaution, orders were issued to occupy Sharm Al-Sheikh as 
soon as possible in order to have a solid gain in case of an early ceasefire.147  
In response to the Egyptians sending their most effective armoured division (the 
Fourth) to Sinai, a combined plan was developed known as Nakhshonim. According 
to this plan, Egyptian forces would be destroyed by three thrusts; the main one in 
the northern Sinai, a  holding one in the middle, and Yoffe‟s division between them 
passing the difficult terrain of sand dunes in order to deal with any  rapid Egyptian 
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armoured thrusts  from strategic or deep operational reserves. By this big 
enveloping manoeuvre, the Egyptian forces would be annihilated. (Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1148 
The difficulty in assessing what could have been a sound Israeli strategy lies in this: 
with no clear political aims there is no strong political base from which to derive a 
strategic formula. However, there was an assumed policy, which was to open the 
Tiran Strait in the beginning and then restore Israel‟s deterrence ability in relation to 
its neighbours. But as has been shown, the meticulous bridging of operational 
planning with the expected strategic effects and political aims was defective, if not 
totally absent.   
                                                          
148
 Dayan, Story of My Life, p.289. 
154 
 
If the ultimate aim was to retain the right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and 
to restore some political balance in the region, then US sponsored military 
diplomacy would have been in all likelihood sufficient to achieve this.   
If the aim was to secure the Israeli deterrence capacity and to ensure a decisive 
solution to the conflict over the Straits of Tiran (since the military and most 
politicians were cynical about the possibility of an international process achieving 
this) then a limited military strategy was the option most likely to achieve it. There 
is a mixture of scenarios in this limited strategy ranging from low to high intensity 
depending on the degree of material and psychological punishment intended and 
the scale of assets to be secured for future bargaining.  
At the lower end of the scale, there was an option to occupy the Gaza Strip, thus 
securing a better defensive position for the future.  This would have secured a 
bargaining card with which to push for the opening of the Tiran Straits, which 
would have delivered a delicate but effective blow to Nasser‟s prestige as protector 
of the Arab Nation which could not have been blamed on foreign machinations as in 
1956. 
This option was presented at some point to Eshkol who refused it as he was not 
willing to undertake the difficulties inherent in controlling the Gaza Strip. However, 
the more probable outcome of this plan would have been Nasser‟s determination to 
regain Gaza to restore some of his wounded prestige.  
Fear of Nasser undertaking air retaliation on Israel was always present and the IDF 
was well prepared for this eventuality with the Cabinet having long since endorsed 
a plan for the destruction of Egyptian air bases in response to any attacks. If Nasser 
had attacked the Dimona nuclear reactor, which was hard to envisage given the 
weaknesses of the Egyptian Air Force, the IDF had received permission in May to 
attack Egyptian air bases in response.  Before this permission was given, the Cabinet 
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had planned for far milder responses for fear of international condemnation of its 
nuclear project.149  
If greater deterrence capacity and a more assured defensive post-war status were 
needed, especially given the Egyptian military build-up in Sinai, an option existed 
for inflicting more humiliation to Nasser‟s image and his army, and lessening its 
retaliatory capacity. This option involved a deep and comprehensive air strike 
against Egyptian air force bases, an operation the IAF was well prepared for.  
 At the upper level of limited strategy options would be a wide, but specified, 
ground operation, preceded by an aerial strike, to defeat  Egyptian military forces in 
Sinai with an escape route, but with Israeli ground forces proceeding no further than 
the Mitla and other strategic passes. Success in this plan would have destroyed 
much of Nasser‟s prestige which he could not repair and might have led to his 
resigning as leader (as indeed he did on 9 June).  
However, the destruction of armed forces, which occurred in the war, with the grave 
human and geopolitical costs it involved would have forced Nasser or his successors 
to see a further retaliatory war as indispensable for national pride.  In the event, the 
Egyptian people would not let Nasser resign after such a national trauma, as shown 
on 9 June when popular demonstrations begged him to stay and restore the honour 
of the nation. This popular attitude could have been predicted given Nasser‟s 
enormous popularity among the Egyptian masses. 
In addition, any Israeli attack which succeeded in reaching the Suez Canal would, as 
Dayan had already pointed out, result in the closing of the canal to international 
shipping and, consequently, huge pressure on Israel to withdraw. In fact, this 
pressure was never applied, partly because of Israel‟s pre-war image as victim and 
post-war image as deserving victor, and partly because of the USSR‟s unpredictable 
hesitation, but at that time Dayan‟s concerns would have been eminently reasonable.  
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Nevertheless, there were still strategic, operational and tactical dilemmas in reaching 
the Suez Canal as will be shown later. Within Israel, for example, the acquisition of 
the Sinai led to domestic political frictions as the Right adopted an expansionist, 
even an annexationist policy which secured wide public support and permanently 
increased its political weight. 
To clarify Israel‟s grand/military strategic predicament  in the 1967 War, one needs 
to look at how the military shifted from a wholly defensive plan -- Sadan, to different 
offensive plans -- Kardom, Atzmon, and finally Nakhshonim. These were not merely 
contingency plans which any army should prepare for use by the political leadership 
in possible political and strategic scenarios, as Gluska claimed, 150 but represented 
military strategic options in the hands of the military to be pressed on the politicians 
without a clear policy/strategic overview. Also, decisions on  reaching the Suez 
Canal, opening the Jordanian front and occupying Golan were never thought about 
beforehand or taken via a formal political-military channel and all represented a 
high price for Israel to pay strategically and politically.151 
Guiding the Fighting Capabilities     
If any factor in the 1967 War was decisive, it was the supreme fighting capability of 
the IDF, especially compared to the Egyptian and other Arab capabilities.  
Guiding fighting ability from the strategic perspective is composed of two tasks: 
providing strategic assumptions about the mission on which operational capability 
should be modelled, and overall guidance for the proportional military capability vis-à-vis 
the enemy. The strategic leadership may delegate much of the detail of the second 
role, albeit being politically responsible anyway, but its role in the first task is utterly 
indispensable.  
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The only strategic guidance regarding the mission was manifested in the security 
concept, which the military was primarily responsible for developing during the 
1950s and 1960s, as Allon has shown. The concept required building armed forces 
with a qualitative edge over the Arabs for deterrence and attaining decisive victory in 
battle if needed.  
Strategic leadership provided the IDF with two other elements essential for its 
maturation; domestic facilitators and external aid. Shimon Perez was the father of 
structuring the domestic and external facilitators in his long-term post as the main 
official in the Ministry of Defence from 1953 to 1963. Domestically, the IDF was 
given a generous budget which rose from $141 million in 1957 to $458 million in 
1966.152 It benefited as well from the economy and from human resources as the 
population increased due to immigration, and from industrial and educational 
developments in Israel during the period.  
External facilitators meant major arms providers and platforms for training. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, France was the main arms provider as  links were tightened 
before the 1956 war, and was also the godfather of Israel‟s nuclear project. However, 
later on de Gaulle did not share the same enthusiasm for enhancing relations.153 , 
From the early 1960s the US became involved in arms supplies to Israel, albeit 
indirectly through West Germany. With the multiplying of German reparations from 
1962 and  offers of huge arms deals to Israel, Arabs who kept strong ties with Bonn 
threatened to cut diplomatic relations or, as Nasser did, to legitimize Berlin (the 
capital of East Germany), so the US started to deal directly with Israeli arms dealers. 
Training opportunities existed in France, Britain, West Germany and the US as well. 
154  
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For the IDF itself, the security concept was manifested in all fighting capability 
dimensions; doctrinal, human, organisational and material.    
Doctrinal   
Due to geopolitical, human and strategic necessities, Israeli military doctrine 
highlighted the necessity to achieve rapid battlefield decisiveness with low human 
cost while shifting the war towards enemy territory. This rapid and decisive victory 
would require early warnings from efficient intelligence, outstanding mobilization 
techniques and scale, attaining air supremacy for the air force to be used freely to 
assist tactical victory and slow the invading forces if needed, and “armoured fists” 
for mobile offensives.  
After the 1956 War, the IDF concluded that its battlefield decisiveness could be 
achieved by relying on air power, armour -- mainly tanks – and to a lesser extent 
Special Forces. Under this general doctrinal concept, the services doctrines emerged.  
An Air Power doctrine grew under Ezer Weizman, who had previously been an RAF 
pilot, and reflected the need to attain air supremacy before using the air force for 
tactical support. This was in contrast to the era of strategic bombing, whether in the 
American version of hitting the vital centres of a war-fighting economy as proposed 
by Billy Mitchell, or the British idea of Trenchard‟s of “moral bombing” by attacking 
the soft belly of the state --  its  population -- which had its origin in Douhet‟s 
theory.155 After Weizman had attended the British Staff College, he returned with the 
conviction that what the IAF was already doing was correct.156  
In Arab theatres with less developed infrastructure, a highly motivated population 
and dictatorial regimes careless of human losses, strategic bombing would be less 
effective, and its price would be less acceptable to the nascent Israel. The centre of 
gravity, as the IDF saw it, was battlefield decisiveness and a time window for 
mobilization.  
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Weizman planned meticulously for years for attacking Arab, especially Egyptian, air 
bases deep in enemy territory. He believed in the importance of complementary 
actions – and concluded that proper air reconnaissance, not only intelligence, and 
low-flying fighters accompanied by highly able interceptors would be needed.157 
When Hawk air-defence platforms were purchased in 1962 from the US, he 
deliberately underestimated the air defence elements, fearing they would make the 
politicians reluctant to sanction pre-emptive air strikes on bases deep in enemy 
territory. He also lobbied, as did as his successor Mottie Hod, for integration of all 
air defence elements -- anti-aircraft rockets, guns and intercepting fighters -- under 
the air service. This only materialized in 1970.158  
With the lessons of the 1956 War in mind, and re-orienting the strategic and 
operational contexts, the IDF came to believe in the supremacy of tanks to provide 
the fire and protection needed in mobile battles in the desert.159 After Suez, the 
armoured corps received the finest of IDF personnel; one of them was Israel Tal who 
became the organizer/philosopher of Israeli armoured forces in the 1960s.  
Tal believed, again in contradiction with the worldwide consensus, in two pillars of 
armoured doctrine: armoured fists and heavily armoured tanks with strong 
firepower.160 After WWII, the main armoured logic was in favour of combined 
armoured/infantry formation, and rapid tanks with modest armour and firepower 
to increase battlefield mobility. Tal, in contrast, claimed that in an open desert 
theatre, the entrenched enemy infantry with anti-armour weapons posed little threat 
because of the poor means of concealment and the proportionately shorter range of 
anti-tank weapons in comparison to tank fire which reaches more than 2000 
meters.161  
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Tal also believed that what preserves ground mobility is the tank‟s sustainability in 
the face of enemy fire rather than its speed alone. Hence, two dramatic changes were 
accelerated. Firstly, the rapidly growing armoured formations became mostly tank 
formations and mechanized infantry became rudimentary. Secondly, the IDF 
depended on heavy tanks such as Pattons, M-48s, Centurions, and equipped many 
older versions with 150mm barrels (Super Sherman) for increased firepower.162  
Although Tal‟s second assumption was totally true, his first assumption generally 
worked in the 1967 War, or this was at least the well-accepted convention. In reality, 
as Creveld indicated, a meticulous operational and tactical analysis of the war 
uncovers the weakness in Tal‟s concept.  In the northern sector of Sinai, where the 
finest of armoured forces were concentrated, tank formations penetrated the weak 
and hasty defences in the Giradi Defile but were left unsupported until other forces 
joined after breaking down the whole defence line, an operation  in which tactical air 
support proved to be the major factor.163  
In the middle and most formidable defences at Umm-Qatef/Abu-Ageila, Sharon‟s 
ugda did not wait for the morning to enable tactical air support to work; instead, he 
used sophisticated and combined arms tactical techniques whereby Special Forces, 
mechanised infantry and tanks participated to overcome the Egyptian defences 
within 12 hours.  
Yoffe‟s ugda performed well, penetrating an undefended theatre and then mounting 
a surprise attack on tank columns from the Egyptian armoured 4th division at night; 
afterwards, its main role was to reach the centre of the Sinai defiles in order to 
obstruct the retreating forces, which were in a miserable condition, with the 
assistance of the now freed air support.  
Nevertheless, Tal‟s most effective role was reshaping tank formations into highly 
disciplined forces with a strong ethos, away from the lapsed mode of the IDF 
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inherited from Hagana‟s days, and to improve the quality of training, maintenance 
and control to the maximum. Tank crews were to be trained in all functions for 
better flexibility and readiness, and strict checks with log books were essential, 
including every item from the parade and uniform to maintenance and electronic 
utilities.164 
The Israeli doctrine for ground forces was developed in the light of nullifying the 
Soviet doctrine which was studied carefully. Within the concept of three layers of 
well entrenched infantry defences, with the artillery fire zone in front and the tactical 
armoured reserves behind, the role of Special Forces was enhanced to disrupt the 
infantry and artillery constellation, mostly after the armoured spearhead.165Hence, 
the IDF expanded its Special Forces element. Starting with one brigade in 1956, by 
1967 the IDF had 5 brigades and had transformed the Golani brigade into a diluted 
Special Forces (Ranger-like) brigade, at the expense of infantry, both dismounted 
and mechanised.  
The expected downside of these doctrinal and structural biases was the neglect of 
other components in ground forces, notably the artillery and infantry.  Sharon‟s ugda 
had the biggest composition of artillery in the IDF, and the payoff was high. At a 
higher strategic level, looking at air power and armoured fists as a panacea, without 
acknowledging either the strategic and operational conditions needed for them to 
work or their potential vulnerabilities, were a more difficult problem which took 
another six years to be realised. 
Human  
In terms of the human dimension, the IDF always believed in its qualitative 
supremacy in its command, soldiers, morale and training. No doubt this supremacy 
over Arab opponents was at its clearest in the 1967 War, to the extent that it was seen 
as immutable rather than contextual and open to change.   
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Many strategists attributed a major part of the military victory in the 1967 War to the 
higher social parameters in Israel. These parameters, including literacy, innovation, 
national identity, and sophisticated social infrastructures, fed the IDF with far better 
recruits more compatible with modern warfare and its human and organisational 
needs, and this contrast was strongly apparent when comparing Israel to Arab 
societies during the 1960s. Social weaknesses within Israel, such as the rift between 
immigrants of different national backgrounds, the divisions between Sephardic and 
Ashkenazi Jews, and ideological contradictions between maximalist Zionists and 
those concerned to make concessions to their neighbours were still in their infancy at 
this stage.166  
However, adding to these generically superior social conditions in Israel, special 
modalities were followed in the IDF to enhance the human dimension.  
The general theme in the IDF was to give priority to innovation, practical experience, 
and group morale rather than formal education and a bureaucratic mentality.167 This 
theme had huge payoffs but also showed inherent shortcomings.  
No formal military academy existed as in other countries, but officer selection was 
based on a practical and complex approach. Conscripts who showed high qualities 
in passing both the company leaders‟ courses would undertake further officer 
courses. Hence, the new officers were generated from the bottom of the army, 
undertaking duties and acquiring skills on their way up, with more emphasis on 
strong relations between officers and soldiers and a strong ethos of informality and 
similar living conditions. These officers would rotate through different professions 
during their service and this would loosen the bureaucratic sense and increase 
flexibility.168  
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IDF policy regarding promotion had a low threshold for redundancy and the 
retirement age was low. Officers were encouraged to study at civilian universities 
alongside their military service to establish another career to prepare for the early 
age of retirement. Around two-thirds of command officers were reservists, and the 
civilian input and multi-disciplinary mentality was very high.169All these measures 
proved themselves in creating an innovative and practical officer cadre rather than 
desk adherents, a more civilianized environment with better cohesion and 
communal trust, and a more flexible organization which were all needed for mobile 
warfare with changing conditions.  
However, the consequent decentralisation, lack of a strong theoretical base and 
ethos, and informality would prove hazardous in the future although these 
problems did not manifest themselves during the 1967 War due to the weakness of 
the enemy.  
The IDF adopted the Mission (optional) command system in which operational and 
tactical commanders were given mission objectives and left to their own resources to 
formulate and execute detailed plans and moves. Temporary command structures 
were set up to combine any amount of forces needed for a specific mission170. 
However, as Sloan indicated, to work in practice, the mission command system 
requires a well-disseminated doctrine.171 As this was not the case in the IDF, a 
degree of control was somehow applied. The military authority retained the capacity 
to follow up the tactical and operational events and decisions and intervene if 
needed. The military command did not rely only on their subordinates‟ decisions but 
had the facility to listen to their wireless communications. 172   
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This system of command was tried and improved many times before the war. One of 
the modifications ordered by Rabin after 1963 was to permit the tactical and 
operational commanders to always accompany their formations in command cars.173 
This system was flexible and innovative and also increased the cohesion of small 
units and imposed a form of leading by virtue. However, the chaotic practice in the 
northern sector of Tal‟s ugda when one brigade lost its way in the desert and the 
other was delayed on its Gaza mission resulted from a lack of proper planning. 
The IDF was motivated by different aspects of national and religious ideas and 
aimed to even out the different ethnic and social backgrounds. It succeeded in this 
mission to a large extent until 1973 at least.  
The sense of militarism and the idea of the “new” Jew (Sabra) that occupied the 
popular perception in the 1950s and 1960s, and the sense of impending 
extermination before the war brought the will to fight to a peak.174 The excellent 
mobilization was not manifested only in getting men into the army, but also in 
motivating them to fight. The strong officer-soldier relations, the civilianized corps, 
and command by example all helped to entrench this motivation.175 
Organisational   
The IDF kept its organisation flexible enough to accommodate the reservist-centred 
approach on one side and the dynamic security environment, even during 
peacetime, on the other. The IDF was divided into three services under the 
command of a Chief of General Staff, who also ruled over ground forces HQ. There 
were special departments under his command; quartermaster (organisation, 
acquisition and budgeting), manpower, operations and intelligence.  
Ground forces were divided into three fronts; northern, central and southern. ugda, 
as a divisional formation, was used temporarily as a body for command in the 1956 
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War but lacked a well formed administrative structure.  Rabin managed to impose 
the maturation of the ugda system. But still, the smaller structures, brigades, 
battalions or even companies could be transferred easily to different formations or 
independent missions.  
What differentiated the ugda from conventional divisions was that it was merely a 
functioning command for a task force with no organic elements attached to it; hence, 
it was very flexible for different formations and missions and devoid of the burden 
of controlling support elements.176 For example, some brigades under the southern 
command were used against the central front. Two brigades from Peled‟s ugda in the 
north were used centrally also, and then moved up to attack Golan on 9 June. 
The IDF focused heavily on maintenance and logistics in training, control and war 
games. The familiarity of its recruits with technical matters helped in introducing 
strong discipline in checks and repair of equipment. Graduates in the technical and 
engineering sciences formed the basic skeleton for this service as no technical 
military school existed. As Horwitz and Luttwak showed, the IDF followed a 
“pushing” approach in applying logistics. In contrast to the classical “pulling” 
system in which advance units ask for supplies, in the pushing approach, supply 
materials were sent straight through the lines of operations until they were met in 
order not to slow the pace of operations.177 
The real achievement in this area in the 1967 War was in air bases, where the highly 
professional and motivated maintenance teams were repeatedly able to get a plane 
returning from a sortie fixed and prepared to fly again in around 10 minutes.178 
Material   
The Israeli acquisition policy was highly efficient in two ways: firstly it reached the 
requirements of both the security concept in preserving a qualitative edge over the 
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combined Arab armies. It applied this doctrine by focusing on equipping the air 
power with tools for air supremacy and tactical support, and the armoured divisions 
with highly efficient medium-heavy tanks with greater firepower.  
Secondly, in the face of budgetary and producers‟ restraints, the IDF had to select 
carefully and critically among available weaponry systems to achieve its strategic 
and operational requirements and to respond to tactical difficulties at the same time. 
As indicated in the doctrinal section, the IAF sought the most modern fighters 
available and chose to purchase French Mirage jets versions I-III and 40 US 
Skyhawks, although the latter did not arrive before the war. It also had older aircraft 
types such as light bombers Vougans, Ouragans, super Mysteres and Mysteres. The 
IAF had around 250 fighters: 75 were Mirages. Weizman generally succeeded in the 
argument over whether to purchase a large and cheap air force or a much smaller 
but state of the art force. He supported the second option.179  
In contrast to the worldwide preference for air-to-air missiles for aerial combat, the 
IAF asked the producer to replace rockets with cannon which were more suitable for 
multiple functions, tactical support and air base attacks, and gave more weight for 
better ordnance. Hence, the IAF showed little interest in bombers, although it still 
possessed older types, considering them unsuitable for the envisaged short-range 
operations with the need for multiple-role aircraft. 180  
Lastly, the IAF fitted the light training Fougas produced in Israel with cannons and 
these proved highly effective during ground operations after the anti-air defence 
umbrella was broken.181 
In terms of armour, the IDF had M-48, Centurions and older types of Sherman tanks. 
Tanks absorbed the ground forces budget and the IDF could deploy on the Sinai 
front alone between 750 and 800 tanks, most of them in the first line. Even Sherman 
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tanks were modified to carry larger barrels. Mechanized carriers and artillery in 
contrast were neglected both in type and quantity. 
In comparison to the Arab forces, the high quality weapons in these two services 
were at least comparable to the combined Arab weapons altogether. If the human, 
doctrinal and organisational dimensions were added to these dimensions, the gap 
would be much wider. 
As a reflection of the doctrinal shortcomings, artillery, mechanised armour, and 
naval weapons were much neglected. This reflects the entrenched offensive tank-air 
dogma since these tools are limited to defensive or combined-arms battles. However, 
facing a weak enemy who was confused in all aspects of warfare, including 
procurement policy itself, and failed to expose and exploit the IDF‟s weaknesses, the 
above shortcomings went unnoticed until too late. 
To conclude this appraisal of the Israeli fighting capability in the 1967 war, two main 
faults are evident: the absence of strategic guidance which would necessitate some 
re-modelling of the IDF to pursue different missions, and ossification of the evolved 
operational art to be an end in itself and not a means.  
The second problem became evident to some extent in the War of Attrition and led 
to dramatic consequences in the 1973 War. The clear-cut military victory in 1967, in 
spite of some major operational and tactical problems which neither affected the 
final outcome due to the opponent‟s frailty nor were looked at carefully due to a 
euphoric and even arrogant post-war environment, led to uncoupling the 
operational art from its strategic utility, which did not show up clearly in the War of 
Attrition. This utility will need to evolve and invite modelling of the art itself, not act 
as a fixed formula for success. 
If this gap between operational art and strategy affected the Israeli performance in 
the War of Attrition, and much more so in the 1973 War as is discussed later, did it 
result in any shortcomings during 1967 war? Adding to participating in creating the 
offensive tank-air dogma, which to some extent blinded the sensitivity of the IDF to 
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strategic orientation, there was a higher but still tolerated casualty rate in attacking 
the northern sector in Sinai and Gaza where artillery and combined arms were 
ignored, in comparison for example to Sharon‟s decisive tactical victory over the 
most formidable defences without air support. 
This assessment of the Israeli practical tier would therefore give the Israeli practical 
strategic ability a lower medium mark. Israel had a moderate grand strategy but 
was very incompetent in having a clear policy and sound military strategy. Guiding 
operational domains was mixed. Israel could enhance her operational capabilities 
linearly in quantitative and qualitative areas. However, shaping the operational art 
was defective. With the absence of clear strategic guidance, and with the military 
command‟s high affinity toward a specific formula, it would be very problematic if 
the strategic contexts changed, as happened in the next wars, or if it was challenged 
by a foe more capable  in defence and working around air-armour supremacy. 
However, when the IDF faced a totally bankrupted Egyptian operational capability 
in 1967, the operational art worked and succeeded eminently. 
 This lower medium grade in the Israeli practical ability reflects to a large extent the 
combined assessment of low conceptual and medium institutional tiers. 
 
The Strategic Ability of Egypt 
 
In May 1967, Egyptian strategic ability was unfit for any war, whether defensive or 
offensive. This lack of capacity may be attributed at best to the nature of the political 
regime, which was based on totalitarianism and obsessed with security, and to the 
personal aberrations of Nasser himself which were, ironically, catalysed to a large 
extent by his leadership legacy of post 1956. To validate his legacy or fulfil its 
requirements, Nasser had to take actions contrary to cold strategic calculations he 
had made earlier. 
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Conceptual:   
Egyptian strategy-making was undertaken mainly by Nasser himself, so the 
conceptual ability shown during the war lies principally with him. However, two 
points should be acknowledged. Nasser did seek active consultations, albeit not in 
an organized or comprehensive way, from some political experts, especially Heikal, 
Mahmoud Ryadh182 and Mahmoud Sedqy183. Also, as will be shown, Amer‟s share in 
power was expanded after 1962 and he was at least number two in shaping Egypt‟s 
military strategy. 
Nasser was militarily and strategically educated. Although he left the service at the 
level of lieutenant-colonel, he had a master‟s degree from the Staff College and was a 
lecturer there afterwards.184 He kept himself intellectually updated and had the 
ability to read massive amounts of reports from all directions. He benefited from 
intimate and long conversations with his friend and adviser, Heikal, who had an 
encyclopaedic political knowledge, albeit as a journalist and public intellectual 
rather than as an academic or practitioner, but lacked military knowledge and 
experience.  
Nasser was a good reader of foreign sources in politics at least, but there is no 
indication that he read the classics of strategic thinking, although Amin Howeidi, the 
war minister just after the 1967 war and the head of General Intelligence, mentioned 
that when he asked Nasser about modifying the structure of the military and 
strategic leadership by placing the war minister above the general commander and 
to combine the latter post with that of the chief of staff (a separation that Nasser kept 
to preserve regime security) Nasser advised him to read the newly published book 
“Men of the Pentagon”185 which showed the  necessity of strengthening the 
presidential hold on the military. 
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Nasser also had a clear strategic concept with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He 
acknowledged the limitations and logic of the utility of force and what the balance of 
power and regional/international contexts could permit or not permit. He believed 
before 1967 in a rapid all-out war against Israel from all fronts, but that this should 
be deferred until developmental, strategic and regional conditions become 
favourable, and that Egypt should maintain a position of non-alignment by building 
positive relations with the various sources of arms on either side of the Cold War. 
After the dramatic events of the 1967 war, he changed his position to belief in a 
political and diplomatic path to a possible limited war and that the USSR would 
offer the best protection and support in future conflicts.186 
In his discussions during the 1956 and 1967 wars that were reported later by Heikal, 
Nasser was well aware of all topics in strategic logic, at least in its grand rather than 
its military sense, and he was able to build well-organised scenarios, strategic 
options and post-action effects. Although these formulae may look sometimes in 
Heikal‟s writings too sophisticated to match Nasser‟s way of thinking and 
articulation, and closer to Heikal‟s own mode of expression, much of their basic 
truth can also be found in contemporary documents such as the minutes of formal 
meetings and public speeches.187 
Amer, despite his charismatic and photogenic qualities, was considerably lacking in 
military knowledge and skills, not to mention strategic thought and planning. His 
self-development effectively stopped after the 1952 revolution when he was 
promoted from the rank of Colonel to Lieutenant-General, to General in 1956, and 
then to Field Marshal in 1962 without any formal education or training for these new 
roles.  
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His personal life was crowded with personal and political responsibilities which 
meant he lacked time and concentration to improve his abilities. For example, he 
never attended any higher military courses after he became a Lieutenant-General, 
and all war-games or military exercises he attended were for short periods and for 
ceremonial rather than learning purposes.188 His discussions with Nasser reported 
by Heikal, or with the military senior command that were recounted by Fawzy, 
showed a high degree of strategic illiteracy and an explosive mood.189 
For the wider military establishment in Egypt, strategic education was still in 
embryonic form. The Nasser Academy was established in 1965 with two sections, a 
Higher War College and a National Defence College. As the political-military 
relationship was problematic, many graduates were deprived of the opportunity to 
enrich military decision making as they were seen as potential threats to established 
figures within the military hierarchy. As the Nasserite system was obsessed by 
security, and Amer transformed the military into his own fiefdom where “men of 
trust” were promoted at the expense of “men of proficiency”190, there was no hope 
for the more able generals to get a place within the higher command. Even the few 
generals who received the best military education in the USSR were looked at with 
suspicion on their return191 lest they compete with Amer or his very inefficient War 
                                                          
188
 Fawzy’s memoir and Gamal Hammad’s interviews on Al-Jazeera Channel (2008). 
189
 For example: his eagerness to send forces to Sinai and close Tiran without bothering to discuss any 
consequences. He suddenly moved from ordering a limited offensive to all-out war aiming to destroy Israel. 
Also, he ordered a total withdrawal which crippled the Egyptian Army in the midday of 6 June without any 
planning or considering an organized retreat to the second defence line. Too late, he ordered the 4
th
 armoured 
division to delay the Israelis on the passes. Mohamed Fawzy, The Three Years War, pp.152-171; Mohamed Al-
Gamasy, Memoirs: the 1973 War (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1993) pp.103-109; Amin Howeidy, 
The Lost Opportunities: The Decisive Decisions in the Attrition and October Wars, (Cairo: Publishing Company, 
1992) pp.98-100. 
190
 These terms were very famous at this period and in all historical recordings afterwards. 
191
 General Gamal Hamdan, after receiving a fellowship to the High War College in the USSR, was removed 
from the army to become the governor of Kafr-Al Sheikh, a governorate in the Nile Delta! General Gamal 
Hamad’s memoir series at Al-Jazeera channel (2008). 
172 
 
Minister, Shams Badran, who had been promoted (by fiat and not by merit), from 
Lieutenant-Colonel.  
In short, there was a strong conceptual base in the Egyptian decision-making system 
centralized around Nasser, but this operated mainly in the grand strategic sense. 
Military strategic logic was left mostly to Amer who was totally incompetent in this 
area. This gives the conceptual tier a medium grade mark. 
Institutional:   
The most dysfunctional layer in Egypt‟s strategic ability was the institutional layer, a 
factor which led the whole military strategic system to bankruptcy. 
Relational 
Since 1956, Nasser and Amer had shared joint responsibility over the military, as the 
former was supreme commander and the latter was both general commander and 
the war minister.  
There was a turning point in 1962, when Nasser wanted to relieve Amer from his 
position after charging him with responsibility for the failure of the union with 
Syria. This proposal was refused aggressively by Amer who threatened Nasser with 
a coup based on his own popular support within the military. Nasser yielded and 
made an alternative proposal for controlling the military by creating a presidential 
council headed by Nasser with Amer as one of the members. Amer refused this 
move also and insisted on being the uncontested general commander. 
Astonishingly, after threatening a coup, Amer was given an even higher position as 
deputy supreme commander and general commander of the Army. After 1967 and 
Amer‟s dismissal Nasser went back to the old structure of unified posts.192 
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This structure of unifying the posts of war minister and general commander was 
prone to strategic malfunction as it did not provide the buffer zone between the 
political and operational levels of war required for a balanced strategic debate.  
Hence, in Egypt, the strategic bridge between the political vision and operational 
capabilities was held by whoever exercised power at any one time.  If the President, 
as Sadat in 1973, was pre-eminent, the political aims and strategic estimates were not 
tested meticulously against operational capabilities as the War Minister in such a 
scenario would impose his leader‟s political vision over the military rather than 
channelling the military estimate back to the political leadership. If the military 
commander was dominant, like Amer in 1967 when the war minister was under his 
authority, he would push the President to support his military estimates and aims, 
and would even conceal the real operational capabilities or provide modelled 
estimates to support the military point of view.  
Below Amer, two positions were created: a chief of staff and a war minister. Both 
positions were intended to be ratified by Nasser. However, they were kept 
powerless to the extent that Amer issued a decree in 1966 to specify the authorities of 
war minister. He divided the workload between himself and the minister, Shams 
Badr so that he would continue to oversee training and operations and Badran 
would be responsible for wider issues of military intelligence, media and moral 
guidance, running the officer corps and human affairs, material acquisition and 
budgeting, and the military judiciary.193 Such a separation of powers would always 
be problematic. For example, there was no formal department for surveillance or 
reconnaissance in direct contact with operations, but only what was affiliated to 
military intelligence.194  
This new structure, adding to the existing chaos in operational leadership and 
management of defence, as will be discussed below, increased the problems of 
strategy making, amplifying the role of Amer and reducing that of Nasser.  
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After a while Nasser asked not to be excluded from the military, hence he was given 
the right to choose the Chief of Staff, who was General Mohamed Fawzy on the eve 
of the 1967 War.  He also gained the right to chose the occupant of the new post of 
chief of ground forces, although this was left powerless by Amer,  and to agree on 
the appointment of a war minister, which was Badran, who was  Amer‟s former 
secretary whom Nasser also trusted. Functional  
As a result, all functions of the strategy institutional layer were either missing or 
ineffective.   
Information sharing was affected in quantity and quality. The political sector, apart 
from Nasser himself, was kept isolated from all military information.  Transmitted 
information was distorted, victim to either the wishes of personnel to please their 
superiors,195 or to the military‟s desire to mould the politicians‟ perceptions so that 
they would accept the military‟s preferred policy.196  
For example, when Badran visited the USSR in the critical period of May 1967 he 
returned with a much-distorted report which stressed the great support offered by 
the Soviets and their promise of protection, while the reality was a very reluctant 
Soviet leadership that warned against escalation and postponed a decision on a 
projected arms deal. Ironically, when Badran was asked during his post-war trial 
about the evidence on which he had built this significant conclusion, he said the 
Soviet War Minister had assured him at the airport before his return journey that the 
USSR would not desert Egypt by any means, a remark that as Egypt‟s efficient 
ambassador to the USSR pointed out was merely a diplomatic courtesy.197  
Since Amer was in a genuine confrontation with Nasser and held sole domination 
over the military, much of the information provided by the military, which was itself 
inaccurate and biased because of weak professionalism, was either prevented from 
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reaching Nasser or was presented in a biased way to support specific policy or what 
Nasser expected to hear. 
One example was the annual report of 1966 which assessed the actual conduct of the 
training plan of the Army in the past year. Although the report showed a dramatic 
lack of genuine training, this data was hidden within a prologue and the body and 
conclusion of the report emphasised the outstanding readiness of the Egyptian 
Army.198 
The function of critical estimation and reviewing of scenarios and counter-scenarios 
was poor if not altogether absent. Nasser permitted the discussion of strategic 
estimates and options in few meetings -- to be precise two meetings -- with the 
cabinet, and with the executive committee of the Arab Socialist Union (SAU), the 
sole permitted political organisation.199 However, some factors obstructed 
comprehensive or critical discourse in these meetings.  
Firstly, there was no stable institutional platform to deal with strategic problems 
from the beginning and follow them through the course of a conflict. Secondly, both 
the lack of proper preparations for such meetings and the overwhelming weight of 
Nasser‟s influence meant that Nasser‟s proposals remained unopposed. The events 
of May 1967 and the unfolding of the crisis was the outcome of Nasser‟s style of 
governance. When he did accept advice from these meetings‟ attendees it tended to 
be on issues of detail rather than the big ideas.200 
Authorization. In spite of Amer‟s dominance in the military sphere, all political and 
strategic decisions were kept formally in the hands of Nasser, and the problem of 
authorization showed in his lack of control and knowledge of the detailed military 
status and conduct required to make such decisions.  
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An example may be the catastrophic decision to retreat on 6 June. Later, most 
observers claimed it was a joint decision by Nasser and Amer after Nasser was given 
a hugely pessimistic report by his deputy. However, the actual conduct of retreat, 
including possibly its limits and certainly its modus operandi, was determined by 
Amer alone.201  
Brooks tried in her study to explain the puzzle of the 1967 War – that Nasser  
escalated the situation to a war he was unprepared for which then resulted in a 
decisive defeat --  by a theory of a “military dominant regime” in which all 
functional criteria of political-military assessments were affected. Her analysis ruled 
out competing theories to explain the defeat, which include the declaration of war as 
a personal aberration by Nasser as a result of his attempts to exceed his regional 
rivals in rhetoric, a deliberate plan to go to war, and the outcome of a disastrously 
misjudged bluff which was only intended for political gain.202  
Although Brooks‟ theory no doubt has a strong point in interpreting Nasser‟s 
attitude to the war, especially the way that he accepted Amer‟s over-estimation of 
the military readiness and fighting power at least for a defensive short war without 
being able to critique or question it, the other factors were important as well. In 
addition, Brooks exaggerated the role of military dominance, especially when she 
attributed the three big decisions of the war -- sending troops to Sinai, forcing the 
withdrawal of UNEF and closing the Straits of Tiran -- to Amer with Nasser merely 
dragged along by the military.203  
In fact, all three decisions were taken by Nasser, although in association with Amer. 
The decision to send troops to the Sinai was taken in a meeting between the two men 
on 13 May 1967. Brooks ignored this meeting and decision,204 but it preceded the 
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military leadership meeting on 14 May. When General Rekhye, after discussion with 
the UN Secretary-General, asked Amer to choose between maintaining the existing 
mandate of UNEF or demanding its total withdrawal in response to Amer‟s original 
request for the redeployment of UNEF to Gaza and Sharm-El Sheikh only205, Amer 
went back to Nasser and both agreed. It was not the sole opinion of Amer or 
translation errors, as Brooks indicated.  This was the case in the beginning but Amer 
and Nasser agreed later on full withdrawal of UNEF to preserve Egypt‟s deterrence 
credibility.206 
Finally, closing the Tiran Straits was expected after the UNEF withdrawal from 
Sharm El-Sheikh, but the decision was clearly taken by Nasser after consultation 
with the executive committee of the SAU on 22 May and was announced by Nasser 
himself on 23 May at Abu-Sweir Air Base.207  
In conclusion, the abnormal political-military relations with military dominance by 
Amer subverted the functions of strategic ability in the institutional layer. 
Information sharing and critical thinking were almost entirely absent. There was 
defective authority, although it manifested itself in keeping control over conduct 
rather than on decisions, except in the matter of the withdrawal of 6 June. The 
military‟s position was preserved vis-à-vis the President, if not expanded, but they 
gave way only in one situation due to their eagerness for war. Hence, the Egyptian 
institutional tier receives very low marks in this war (moderate clear authorization 
and formidable position of the military but bankrupted information sharing, 
critical assessment and strategic intervention of politicians). 
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The Practical Tier:   
Detailed strategy 
Given the humiliating defeat in Sinai, any retrospective analysis of the soundness of 
Egyptian strategy may look redundant. Of the major analysts of the war, only 
Pollack attributed this defeat to the tactical incompetence of the Arabs caused by 
cultural aberrations, maintaining this to be the cause in all the examples in his book. 
208 As was stated in the theoretical discussion, and will be shown below, this 
widespread tactical incompetence is a strategic matter, but even tactical 
incompetence was not sufficient on its own to explain the defeat of 1967.   
Clearly, Egypt escalated to war with ill-defined war aims and with political aims 
mismatched to operational capabilities, with a misunderstood fighting capability 
which had severe structural deficiencies, and managed the whole conflict and 
military operations with the worst strategy her fighting power could permit.  
Political aims and grand strategy 
Nasser‟s political aims changed as the conflict escalated. When he took the decision 
on 14 May to mobilize in Sinai and ask for partial withdrawal of UN forces he was 
merely aiming to deter Israel from attacking Syria and to restore his reputation 
damaged by the charge of hiding behind UNEF. However, once he became sure that 
war was coming e aimed also to restore the credibility of deterrence and his 
reputation by coercing Israel into a military operation, or at least withstanding an 
offensive until international diplomacy intervened as it had in 1956, so that he could 
come up again with a political victory. There were grave miscalculations in Nasser‟s 
formula.  
Firstly, although his political aims were defensive and this was very clear to his 
political and military elites, his public statements and propaganda adopted very 
offensive aims –- including the destruction of Israel. He may have thought such 
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rhetoric would serve to deter Israel from further action but it led only to the draining 
away of international support for his position and to strengthen Israeli public 
opinion in favour of mobilisation, although the Israeli leadership was perfectly 
aware of the true balance of power.  
Secondly, the reason that his manoeuvres did not succeed in deterring Israel was 
that deterrence needs threat credibility in order to work. Neither Israel nor the US, as 
explained earlier, had any doubt that the outcome of any military confrontation 
between Egypt and Israel would be the destruction of Egypt‟s forces. 
Thirdly, when Nasser, trapped by his own manoeuvres, realised by looking at the 
Israeli preparations and political will that war was imminent and inevitable (his  
estimates of the likelihood of war rose from 50% to 75%, to 100% on 2 June209) he had 
two options to deal with the conflict after the huge military concentrations and 
aggressive political propaganda: to face  a massive loss in deterrence position and 
reputation by de-escalating or to wait and prepare for a defensive battle in imitation 
of his approach in 1956. With the expectation that the results of a defensive war 
would be similar to those of 1956, he chose the second option.  
Here, Nasser fell into the last-war syndrome which he had previously warned 
against.210 Neither the military balance between Egypt and Israel nor the 
international political situation was similar to 1956. In 1956, there was a scramble for 
influence in a new Middle East where old empires had been gradually replaced by 
new ones; the USSR was under the strong leadership of Khrushchev, and the US was 
at least not overtly hostile to Nasser‟s regime.  
In 1967, the context was almost completely reversed: the US was in a harsh 
confrontation with Nasser and was eager to unleash Israel or at the least to accept it 
unleashing itself. In addition, many neutral countries were alarmed by Nasser‟s 
aggressive policy and Israel‟s expressions of a sense of impending destruction, and 
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the USSR was under a chaotic tripartite leadership which chose to follow a very 
cautious and cooling policy towards the US.  
Nasser was hoping also for a repeat of the outcome of the Rotem crisis.211 However, 
he ignored what he was told by many sources -- that the IDF was looking for a war 
with him, and he had undertaken Rotem in a silent and covert way not in the present 
furious and overt manner. Also, he had now closed the Straits of Tiran, which was a 
red line agreed by Israel and the US after the 1956 War which Israel frequently 
referred to as a potential casus belli. The closing of the Straits, and the ongoing 
rhetoric left little space in which Israel could wait without its deterrence position 
being seriously damaged.  
Finally, due to institutional anomalies, Nasser was convinced by overestimates of the 
fighting capabilities of his Army that it could withstand an Israeli offensive for the 
time required for the international diplomatic machinery to work and impose a 
solution. Also, due to his eagerness to maintain and even restore his heroic image, he 
was cognitively biased towards ignoring more cautious calculations and expressions 
of alarm, and adopted an escalating position even when he knew for certain that 
Soviet warnings about the Syrian invasion turned out to be wrong.   
Military strategy 
There was a total dichotomy between policy/grand strategy on the one hand and 
military strategy on the other as a result of the separated and contested decision-
making systems. Amer was motivated to go for war to prove himself212 and his 
army, and believed Israel had two choices: either to swallow a political defeat in 
order to avoid a confrontation with the Egyptian Army or to seek a confrontation in 
which case an Egyptian offensive would be reasonable. 
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During the first half of the crisis, Amer chose the deterring option. He was 
committed to mobilizing huge forces and throwing them into the Sinai regardless of 
their preparation or training. He actually imagined at some point that he was able to 
mobilize two million soldiers.213 Although this was totally impractical given the state 
capacity and the population‟s willingness, he believed that mobilizing huge forces 
would necessarily lead to enhancing the army‟s fighting capability regardless of the 
new recruits‟ fighting qualities or the ability of the army to accommodate such 
numbers. These forces, on the contrary, would prove to be “hollow forces” that 
undermined the Army‟s capability rather than enhancing it.  
Would such a large-scale mobilisation have worked as a deterrent to Israel? The 
answer was almost certainly the opposite. Even if Amer was convinced by the 
fictional internal estimates of the (active) Army capability, he knew for certain the 
poor status of the mobilized reserves which accounted for 75% of the Sinai forces, to 
the extent that he gave orders on 3 May for drills on how to shoot a gun.214  
During the second half of the crisis, Amer started to plan for an offensive but then 
was ordered by Nasser to stay on the defensive. However, he kept changing the 
deployment of his forces in a manic way to suit his swinging military mood with 
haphazard paper plans.  
On 25 May he even gave orders to launch an aerial offensive which was cancelled by 
Nasser. At this meeting attended by the supreme military command he had a private 
conversation with Nasser and then announced to his fellow officers that Egypt 
should not undertake any offensive operation. 215  
Plans 
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The traditional defensive plan for Sinai was Plan Qaher (compelling). It involved 
defensive positions in Sinai following the Soviet doctrine of deep defensive 
operations with light forward defences, triple entrenched infantry defences with 
tactical and operational armoured reserves, and strategic mobile armour for active 
defence or exploitation. Hence, one division was to deploy in the forward sector, 
mainly Umm Qatef/Abu Ageila, and two infantry and mechanised infantry 
divisions in the Bir Lahfan/Thamad sector, with the operational reserve in the 
Defiles. The strategic reserve was ready to move to Sinai and was composed of the 
4th Armoured Division at least.216  
What Amer did in the three weeks from 14 May to 5 June exceeded what Israel could 
have achieved in terms of demoralizing and confusing the Egyptian  Army which 
was already composed mainly of hollow forces.   
Firstly, Amer diverged from the agreed plans in Qaher by ordering the entrenchment 
of the forward line by three divisions, fearing an Israeli encroachment on Gaza and 
the border area.  
He then started to plan offensive operations against Eilat and Northern Negev, and 
moved the weight of his forces to the north and then to the south and hastily formed 
an armoured/mechanised infantry task force under Saad Al-Shazly.  
Lately, after cancelling his planned offensives, Amer thought the Israeli thrust would 
be towards the south so he formed a “curtain of tanks” in the southern axis area, 
further depriving much of the northern forces of armoured capacity. (Fig. 1) 
As we saw in the description of Operation Kardom, the Israeli thrust was in the 
south, but once they understood the Egyptian deployment, they shifted their main 
thrust to the north but kept some forces near the Kontilla southern axis to act as a 
distraction and intensify the Egyptian misperception.  
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As Fawzy indicated, Amer developed four offensive ground plans217 and two aerial 
plans, one for deep operations against air bases and the Dimona nuclear reactor, and 
the other for tactical support for a projected Eilat thrust.  
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Figure 2218 
In these plans, firstly Amer had no clear political aim to serve, not that he was 
authorized to serve one, apart from harassing Israel in response to the “impending” 
military invasion of Syria.  
Secondly, he used to change the deployment of forces continuously based on 
premature operational planning ideas. These plans were merely generic guidelines 
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to forces and commanders who had been educated to be prepared and trained for 
each step in order to fight.  
Thirdly, adding to the miserable situation of the mobilized forces in Sinai, Amer‟s 
orders only helped grind them down morally and physically because:  they had 
never been trained for offensive operations and their defensive formations on the 
eve of 5 June were tactically loose and forwardly displaced in a form of static 
defence with limited space for operational manoeuvres.  
Most critically, when Nasser ordered the army on 2 June to withstand the first Israeli 
air strike which was predicted within 48 to 72 hours, Amer accepted this strategy 
and claimed the army was prepared, and his Air Chief predicted a tolerable air loss 
of 10-20%.  
At this critical moment, the military leadership committed two mistakes from the 
strategic perspective. Firstly, it gave grossly miscalculated preparedness estimates 
while knowledge of the army‟s real capability would have made Nasser‟s defensive 
strategy unworkable. If Nasser had known the army‟s real capability he might have 
chosen an offensive strategy or sought to end the conflict at whatever political price.   
Secondly, even with the serious warnings about an impending air strike, the air 
defences system was bankrupt in all components and nothing was done to rectify its 
shortcomings. When the Israeli air strike came on 5 June, lack of surveillance, 
communication, integration of air defence components and the exposure of Egyptian 
fighters left on the runways without shelters all showed the reckless attitude of the 
military leadership despite the warnings of imminent attack. 
All these factors combined to severely weaken Egyptian fighting capabilities, and 
no comprehensible strategy existed to consolidate and direct military plans and 
moves.  
Military Strategy during the War 
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On the morning of June, Amer was caught by the Israeli attack while he was in an 
aeroplane heading to Sinai and he could find no suitable base to land, so he landed 
at Cairo‟s civilian airport and had to go back to his Headquarter by taxi. Once there, 
false reports were further distorted by his wishful thinking. He only started to 
understand the truth gradually, and began to lose his nerve and become bad-
tempered. He overrode the HQ and operational commanders to order tactical moves 
to the smallest units without formulating any general plan.219 
It is unclear exactly when he gave the order for a general non-organized retreat 
which turned into a rout, but it must have been at some point during daytime on 6 
June when he heard of the fall of Al-Arish.220 This general order for retreat without 
heavy weapons or organized routes was given to forces which were totally 
demoralized. Most of their commanding officers had already fled and they were 
under fire and facing combined Israeli ground-air forces obstructing the Passes.  This 
transformed the Egyptian Army in the Sinai into a ruined mass which theorists of an 
“indirect approach” could not have bettered. This ruin as achieved mainly by its 
own leadership.  
Amer was shattered first by the total loss of his air power and thought that he would 
be unable to fight on the ground without air support, and when he learned of the fall 
of Al-Arish he panicked and ordered the retreat with no discipline. He was then 
told, correctly, that he could pull his forces back to the line of passes where the 
geography would make a defensible line. He tried to do this but too late.  
The only good decision in the campaign was the order of General Mourtaga, the 
commander of the Sinai front, to the 4th Armoured Division, to defer its retreat to 
the morning of 7 June in order to protect the rear of the retreating forces and slow 
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the pace of the Israelis. The division‟s third brigade and another relieving brigade 
from Ismailia fought well and inflicted tangible losses on the Israeli armoured 
advance, and did so without air support.221 
Would an alternative military strategy involving a well-organized retreat to the 
passes, rather than a general shapeless retreat under fire, have been able to make a 
difference to the ultimate outcome of the war?  
Some accounts may rule out this possibility given the weak morale of the Egyptian 
forces and their poor quality in fighting methods. However, four factors should be 
considered in deciding whether a better strategy could have led to a better result.  
Firstly, the morale of the Egyptian forces was not inherently weak but was made so 
by external actions. Many soldiers and officers fought to the death with desperate 
courage and, as Pollack rightly indicated, the only forces that disintegrated were 
those ordered to retreat under fire or which found themselves without command as 
their officers fled.222  
Secondly, those Egyptian divisions which were the best prepared -- most of the 4th 
armoured division, the third mechanized division and Shazly‟s task forces -- did not 
face the first Israeli thrust and did not fight at all apart from limited clashes in 
hopeless conditions during the retreat. It is therefore not clear what a well-trained 
and well-commanded Egyptian force could have achieved given the opportunity.  
Thirdly, the geographically impassable Sinai mountain defiles (the Mitla Pass and 
the other Passes) undermined the key Israeli tactics of armoured enveloping and 
tactical air support. Post-mortem analysis showed clearly that the damage done by 
the IAF on Egyptian ground forces was much less than proclaimed and mostly 
affected the soft elements of infantry and combat support but not tanks (2-3% of the  
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tanks were damaged).223 The weak command/control ability of IAF in 1967, its low 
profile air-to-surface equipment and lack of the right plane (low and slow-flying 
straight-winged)224 would have made Israeli close air support operations very 
difficult if the Egyptian armour had  quickly resorted to engaging Israeli ground 
forces. Fourthly, and more importantly, although the final victory in any battle at the 
Passes would probably have gone to the Israelis, it would have cost them lives and 
time. Given the international pressure for a ceasefire, the pressure on the USSR to 
restore some losses to its broken pride, and the Israeli recovery  after the great 
achievement of the first round of fighting when they had anticipated annihilation, 
plus Nasser‟s growing realisation of the facts on the ground, a ceasefire could have 
been achieved with better human and political results for  Egypt  and, paradoxically, 
for  Israel too, as Nasser would have been  in a better position to negotiate, as he did 
eventually three years later with the US-proposed Roger‟s Plan.  
Nevertheless, given Egypt‟s atypical political-military structure and defective 
military system, could the actual scenario have been changed, and could historical 
fate have been reversible in reality? Manipulating strategy dimensions, especially for 
political system and society/culture, would require vision, political will and more 
crucially, time. This is what simplistic anti-factual scenarios do not acknowledge.  
Guiding fighting power 
 Guiding the Army infrastructure to suit a specific strategic mission, was defective 
for two reasons: the lack of involvement by the political leadership with weak 
military command under Amer, and the lack of proper and sufficient information 
about the enemy. Hence, even the purely operational guidance for fighting 
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capability to match let alone surpass the enemy (counter-operational capability) 
was defective as well.  
Doctrinal  
Although not many resources are available on doctrinal issues in the Egyptian 
Army, and it did not undertake sufficient actual fighting during the war to enable 
the extraction of inferences from its mode of fighting, there is evidence of a doctrinal 
conflict. In contrast to what might be expected in armies run in imitation of the 
Soviet army, there was not much focus on doctrine in the Egyptian army. The 
Soviets did not increase their role anyway in the Egyptian military until after 1967. 
The Soviet scholarships offered to Egyptian senior officers were limited, and many 
of the officers who did receive them were not put in commanding positions after 
return, as indicated earlier.   
In addition, the impact of the war in the Yemen in diluting the regular fighting 
methods of the army225 led the Egyptian army, if indeed it did try to imitate Soviet 
military doctrine, to do it in a way that showed poor comprehension of the original. 
The Soviet emphasis on hard training, sophisticated planning, strong centralization, 
- although with tactical flexibility, and the importance of deep operations and 
combined arms, were all ignored in practice. It seems that these results stemmed not 
only from poor application but also poor understanding, as the lessons from the 
Soviet experience were ignored utterly by the higher military leadership. For 
example, when the concept of deep operations was disregarded by Amer from the 
early stage of the crisis, no comment was ever raised against him, even in a non-
confrontational way.  
Apparently, many doctrinal points were simply not decided upon: no roles for the 
major elements -- armour, air, navies and Special Operations -- were identified in 
defensive or offensive operations vis-à-vis the IDF, in part because of ignorance of 
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the IDF‟s modus operandi, but also because there was a lack of doctrinal sources and 
enablers in terms of command, education and system to generate and utilize lessons.  
For example, when Egypt lost its air ability on the 5 June, no detailed discussion was 
held on how to respond to this: were the ground forces able to perform any holding 
operations by profiting from terrain and quick engagement with enemy, or even to 
retreat to the passes with a new set line of defences in spite of Israeli air supremacy?  
Amer had a provisional answer, most probably from the air commander, so he gave 
the order for a general retreat. He changed his mind after a discussion with Fawzy, 
but most of the ground commanders were sceptical about the possibility of 
continuing to fight. The retreat itself, in the way that it was ordered by Amer and 
carried out in the field, was an indication that Amer lacked even a basic 
understanding of the process and its essential prerequisites.  
Human  
The human dimension was the worst of all in Egypt‟s fighting capability. The 
general trend in Amer‟s military policy was to promote those who showed a high 
degree of loyalty to him regardless of their professional ability. He created a form of 
patronage in the military. He was very generous with money, promotions and 
civilian prerogatives to the military in general, and to “his” men in particular, so the 
great loyalty he enjoyed in the military was personal to him and not based on 
nationalist sentiment, professionalism or discipline.  
This artificial loyalty was harmful because it consumed the attention of the high 
command, and the officer corps in general, and put unprofessional me in positions 
with a high level of responsibility for long periods. Amer himself was a good 
example of this. Nasser kept him in position voluntarily, at least until 1962, in spite 
of his poor performance in 1956 and in Syria. General Sedqy Mahmoud, the air and 
air defence commander, was kept on from the war of 1956 to that of 1967 when his 
air bases were destroyed in an almost identical manner to the earlier war.   
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The command function was further undermined by the rigid and highly centralised 
chain of command, due to the political obsession with security, which prevented the 
tactical and operational leadership from taking initiatives. Even the most obvious 
and normal procedures226 caused a long lag in communication between actions on 
the ground and reactions needed from the command structure. For example, reports 
had to be sent all the way to HQ, not to the army or front command, and answers 
were sent back in the same way.  
If communications were attacked, as on 5 June, or reports were fabricated227, as was 
often the case, orders for battlefield moves would be delayed until they were no 
longer relevant or bore no relation to reality on the ground.   
The officer corps had become a “social class” with an arrogant and aggressive aura, 
and a distinctive and privileged way of life. This transformed the officer-soldier 
relationship to a form of subjection, a relationship whose negativity was increased 
by the fact that most conscripts were illiterates who were forcibly taken from their 
lands to live in the harshest possible atmosphere.228 Hence, unit cohesion and trust in 
leadership vanished entirely in the turmoil of the opening of the war, when most 
commanding officers quickly fled.  
Egyptian soldiers, coming from poor, socially conservative and religious strata, were 
capable of great stamina and courage in fixed defences. But with the declining 
morale in the Army and no apparent valid goal to die for, individual and group 
morale soon collapsed229 even where there was minimal danger from unexpected 
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directions230, a situation which would be transformed during the Wars of Attrition 
and in 1973. Illiteracy231 also profoundly affected the capacity of Army recruits to 
handle the new warfare technology, especially tanks, regardless of the intensity of 
training. 
Anthony Pascal and et al. studied how the low societal parameters (modernity, 
social transformation and economic growth) were responsible for the drop in the 
Arab military effectiveness in using new weaponry systems. Based on macro-
competence (the ability to manage military organizations) and micro-competence 
(individual skills), the authors indicated that an increase in the army‟s size and 
technology intensify existing inadequate macro-competence. 232 
Egyptian mobilization was generally inefficient but for all the 20 million population 
it could mobilize fewer than 180,000 men. On the eve of the war, around two 
divisions were in Yemen, and 40,000 were used in central security duties, so 100,000 
were in Sinai. Two thirds of the men were either new conscripts or old reservists 
with no recent training, and they were facing an army of 70,000 very well trained 
Israelis. The problems with the mobilization lay on the shoulders of the political 
leadership and general policy in Egypt, but poor mobilization techniques, the lack of 
regular recalls and training, and the haphazard organisation of reservists233 were 
primarily the military leadership‟s responsibility. 
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Due to economic difficulties, even the reservist rota was shortened in 1967 and 
training was cut generally to save on budget. The problem of training was grave. A 
pre-war report indicated, for example, that no tank shells were used in training, and 
only 11% of the fuel that was earmarked for training purposes was actually used.234 
Ironically, this was the report that lauded the high preparedness of the Egyptian 
Army to achieve its national goals!235 Also, just before the 1967 War, the shortage of 
manpower reached 40% of the wartime order of battle.236 
Organisation   
The chaotic organisation of the Egyptian Army was also a serious problem with the 
division of forces between Amer and Badran which disconnected military operations 
from instant reconnaissance, and the insertion into the command structure of a 
ground forces commander (General Salah Mohsen) at the behest of Nasser so that he 
should not feel marginalised in allocation of military honours. Then in May the 
insertion of the Sinai Front Command previously occupied by an expert officer of 
General Mortagy was a late attempt to repair the politicized command positions.  
These intervening layers of command with no clear responsibilities were totally 
ignored by Amer who even contacted individual battalions directly once the war 
erupted. For example, the Sinai and Eastern commanders only heard about the order 
for retreat when fleeing forces reached the Canal.237 
The force structure was also unhealthy. In addition to diluting active formations 
with untrained reservists, the balance of offensive/defensive, mobile/firepower 
components was totally skewed to the defensive and firepower (infantry and 
artillery). In armies used to holding political legitimacy, the infantry component 
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expands.238 Also, the lack of interest in mobile forces, which need skilled socio-
technological characters, flexible control and an innovative environment, put more 
emphasis on static defences occupied mainly by infantry and artillery.  
Material   
Gross weaponry capability was the best of the Egyptian fighting capabilities. Alas, 
weapons do not make war by themselves. Nevertheless, whereas the IDF chose 
weapons selectively to serve strategic and doctrinal concepts, and on a tailored 
assessment of the enemy and the parameters of the operational theatre, such 
orientation was almost entirely absent in the Egyptian Army before the 1967 war.  
In fact, on 14 May there was also a generalized shortage of weapons,  a deficit of 30% 
in small arms, 24% in artillery, 45% in tanks, and 70% in vehicles.239  
Egyptians sought important advances in tanks and fighters/bombers first, and then 
in artillery, for the navy and for mechanised infantry. Egypt had around 200 first line 
fighters: MiG 21, 30 supersonic TU-16 bombers, and another 200 older versions; MiG 
17, a few supersonic MiG 19, and in-stock Su-7 for tactical support which were never 
used.240 This was comparable technically to Israel, but the pilot to plane ratio was 
0.8:1 in comparison to 2-3:1 in Israel.  
Tanks were mainly T-34, T-44, and the new version of T-55 which can be compared 
to the Israeli Centurion but had less armour and firepower. Nasser could field in 
Sinai 950 tanks, 1000 artillery pieces, and 1100 APCs. The Egyptian Navy was more 
advanced than the Israeli navy, with Osa and Komar missile boats in addition to the 
old destroyers and submarines.241 These ratios were higher than those enjoyed by 
the Israelis in artillery, the navy and APCs. However, they were much more 
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comparable in air power and tanks,242 especially if technical quality is incorporated 
in the analysis, let alone the qualitative human and doctrinal measures.  
The point here is that Egypt could never attain air supremacy in the near future due 
to the lack of qualified pilots, poor doctrine and inefficient operational management. 
The navy would not achieve its goals unless some form of air denial was attained. If 
Egypt could not make structural changes in many dimensions in order to attain air 
supremacy, then more investment would be necessary for air defence measures 
which in practice suffered from a devastating lack of integration and planning.  Air 
bases were vulnerable and planes were left without shelters until the last moment.  
The Army had no idea until after the war how to focus on air defences elements in 
order to attain air denial for its ground operations and deep areas. Only after the 
War did the Egyptian air defence organisation mature. By separating it from air 
power and forming an independent service with new training, personnel, weapons 
and, most importantly, doctrine it could then serve in a new strategic role.243 
Given Nasser‟s strategic concept that relied on a postponed battle of annihilation, 
Egypt needed an interim means to achieve both an effective defensive position and 
deterrence. Much of this effect would have been reached by multi-task grand 
strategy. But from the military side there needed to be the provision of tools that 
ensure defence and deterrence. These tools were chosen correctly by Nasser -- 
missiles and a nuclear project.  
Sirrs indicated that poor technical capacity, the economic crisis in the first half of the 
1960s, and Israeli coercive actions in attacking the German scientists together with 
diplomatic pressure on West Germany all contributed to the failure of these 
projects.244 However, if a more serious political leadership had secured its control 
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over the military or, at least, could have invited healthy strategic debates, much of 
the military, diplomatic and budgetary assets, which were not insignificant, could 
have been diverted to these essential projects. 
As detailed strategies (clear policy, grand strategy and military strategy) and 
guiding operational components (enhancing capabilities and shaping the operational 
art) were very defective, the practical layer was very low. This grade does not 
reflect the combined moderate conceptual and low institutional ability as it is less 
than expected. Two reasons can be identified for this phenomenon: 
First, the personal aberration of the two strategic commanders (Nasser and Amer) 
massively reduced the quality of strategy-making in practice. Nasser‟s obsession 
with his image as the Arab hero and guardian pushed him to a strategic course of 
actions that was in total opposition to his perceived theory of victory. Amer, in 
addition of his massive lack of professional qualities as a military commander, and 
also because of that, lost his temper totally in the critical moment of the war. 
Secondly, Israel‟s outstanding operational decisiveness quite early in the war, 
especially in the air, was a strategic leverage for further Israeli strategic advantage, 
and limited the strategic options available to the Egyptians. 
If the practical strategic abilities of Egypt and Israel are put together; Israel‟s was 
lower medium and Egypt‟s was the lowest grade. This indicates a low advantageous 
ability for Israel. 
The Outcome of the War 
In six days of war, four of them fought on the Egyptian front, Israel achieved a 
decisive military victory. The IDF reached Suez and completed its mopping up 
operations to secure its hold on Sinai, and the Egyptian army was annihilated with 
most of its formations crippled, and it lost between 10,000 and 15,000 men killed and 
more than 4,000 men captured. Egypt lost 90% of its air power (100% of its long 
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range bombers), 65% of its tanks and suffered large losses in other components.245 A 
ceasefire was declared on the Egyptian front on 8 June. 
After the war, Egypt underwent a transitional period of political turmoil with the 
half-hearted resignation of Nasser, the forced resignation of the heads of military 
services, and bitter recriminations between Nasser and Amer which ended with the 
announcement of Amer‟s suicide and installation of a new military command. 
Despite these chaotic events, Egypt took military and political measures to lessen the 
effects of defeat. 
Militarily, a new policy of restoring its lost fighting power was adopted, but the 
urgent task was to restore much of the lost equipment as soon as possible, especially 
in the field of air power, to re-organize the collapsed ground formations and form a 
hasty defence line west of the Suez Canal. Low scale active defence operations began 
as early as 1 July in Ras-Al Esh near the only Egyptian pocket east of Suez in Port 
Fuad. Another small air battle occurred on 14 and 15 July.  
However, the most important military encounter was naval. On 21October, the 
Israeli destroyer “Eilat”, which had entered Egyptian territorial waters, was attacked 
and sunk by two Egyptian rocket boats.246 These operations, albeit very limited 
militarily and started by Israeli initiatives, had a strong effect, especially with the 
magnifying effect of propaganda, in restoring some of the morale among the army 
and the population. 
Politically, Nasser used the defeat to rally Arab support. Although he lost much of 
his prestige, he gained more Arab support than expected and his ordeal in Yemen, as 
well as the serious enmity with Faisal, the King of Saudi Arabia, was ended at the 
Khartoum Conference, of the League of Arab States. The conference sanctioned the 
famous “Three Nos” declaration: no legitimizing Israel, no direct negotiation with it, 
and no peace with it. It also sanctioned extensive military and financial aid to Egypt.  
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Relations with the US were formally cut, and Egypt moved totally into the Soviet 
camp. An early visit after the defeat by some of the Soviet political and military 
leadership set the scene for a new era in which military aid was expanded in all 
aspects: weapons, organisation, education and training, and advisory roles.247 Only a 
few months after the war, Egypt had restored its armed forces.   
In terms of the outcome of the war, however, Egypt had not achieved any of its 
policy aims and had experienced huge damage politically, militarily, economically 
and in terms of human life. Nevertheless, it did not yield its political will to Israel‟s 
political aims whether in security and restoring deterrence, or in accepting a 
disadvantageous peace, or even an interim agreement for non-aggression. 
On the Israeli side, three scales of political aims and the ability to achieve them 
should be acknowledged.  
The political motivation for launching the war was restoring the power of deterrence 
and security, avoiding another war soon, and this aim underpinned all political and 
military discussions before the decision to go to war. This aim clearly was not 
achieved as two major wars were to follow the 1967 War and the front was never 
silent.248 Although Israel‟s post-war policy, solidifying her occupation of Sinai and 
other territories and the annexation of Jerusalem, played a role in this escalation, the 
military outcome and its scale, as discussed earlier, left no choice for the Egyptians. 
Secondly, a further political aim mentioned in the government decision to go to war 
was to “release the tightening pressure which was forming around Israel”. Hence, 
this aim was just to avert the exterminating offensive against Israel and it was clearly 
achieved. However, as has been explained, this aim was a product of the feeling of 
existential danger which suffused both the people and the propaganda and was 
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helped intentionally by the government and the military for mobilization and 
diplomatic purposes. All contemporary Israeli and US estimates though predicted a 
clear military victory in any military exchange with Arab forces. The new and 
intensified Egyptian deployments in Sinai and the Egyptian-Jordanian pact were 
indications of a heavier potential price to be paid for any future Israeli offensive. But 
they could never have been seen as an existential threat.  
Thirdly, there was a set of desired, and possible, political end states for the war 
which ranged from crippling Nasser‟s regime, an aim perhaps shared by the US, 
reaching an interim agreement for non-aggression or even a comprehensive regional 
peace as the Israeli leadership seems to have expected naively after the decisive 
military outcome -- as illustrated by Dayan‟s famous comment “we are expecting a 
phone call from Arabs.”249 These aims were not, it should be stressed, formally 
adopted before launching the war and, obviously, they were not achieved by this 
war. 
To conclude, Egypt did not achieve any political aim and, while it managed to 
prevent Israel attaining many of the political aims it had hoped to achieve, it paid an 
enormous price. Israel, on the other hand, did not achieve the motivating political 
aim of the war or its theoretically and implicitly political resolution aims. On the 
other hand, she achieved two aims: relieving the existential danger, and preserving 
the right of navigation in Aqaba. This outcome would count as low strategic 
advantage for Israel. 
The causal link tracing results in a slightly diverted link. Low advantageous 
ability for Israel (lower medium Israeli practical ability versus low Egyptian) 
would give her a relative superiority but she had low strategic advantage. This 
resulted, as we indicated earlier, from the strategic leverage of early operational 
decisiveness favouring Israel. But weak strategic ability itself prevented Israel from 
translating this exceptional decisiveness on the battlefield, into a political winning. 
Rather, it even invited another two wars of a major scale. 
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Origins and Background 
The Attrition War 
The origins of the 1973 War (known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel, and the 
Ramadan War and the 6th October War in Egypt) go back to the humiliating Arab 
defeat in 1967 and the subsequent stasis of all diplomatic endeavours. The War of 
Attrition lasted from March 1968 to July 1970 and was ended by a cease-fire 
agreement negotiated through William Rogers1 in July 1970. It affected both sides‟ 
thinking about the next war in different ways.  
The first phase of this war started in September 1968, when Nasser felt that his army 
had restored its main fighting ability, with extended artillery barrages across the 
Suez Canal. The IDF, which did not have strong defences yet in place, or matching 
artillery capabilities, aimed to coerce the Egyptians by air strikes targeting oil 
refineries and civilian targets in the Canal cities, and deep strikes against the Nag‟a 
Hammadi Dam in Upper Egypt. The IDF also decided to build a strong forward 
defence line known as the Bar-Lev line. Nasser halted this phase and took 
preparatory measures: evacuating the population of the Canal cities, transferring the 
oil refineries, establishing an air-defence curtain of SAM-2 missiles, and creating 
local militias from the domestic population with air guns to guard vital 
infrastructure.2  
The second phase started more aggressively in March 1969 with extensive Egyptian 
artillery barrages and commando operations mainly against the forward Bar-Lev 
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line but also reaching deep into Sinai, albeit with less success. The most daring 
operation was the Shadwan Island battle in January 1970 and the detonation of three 
platforms in Eilat port in December 1969.3  
The Egyptian strategy aimed, politically, to force Israel to make diplomatic 
concessions and to destabilize the situation in the Middle East to force the super 
powers to intervene with diplomatic initiatives. Strategically, Egypt aimed to launch 
wearing-down operations targeting Israel‟s strategic vulnerabilities: casualty 
sensitivities and a lack of tolerance for long and onerous mobilization. However, 
Israel searched for and exploited Nasser‟s regime sensitivities too.4  
After a period of Israeli commando operations aiming at demoralizing Nasser‟s 
army, such as the operation at Al Jazeera al Khadraa in July where local radar had 
been detected, an operation at Ras-Gharib where sophisticated Russian radar (P21) 
was captured, and other harassing operations in Za‟afrana and the Red Sea zone, 
Israel moved to an air strikes campaign in July 1969. The campaign sought to destroy 
the SAM curtain first, which was achieved by October 1969, then to launch strategic 
bombing attacks on Egyptian civilian and industrial nerve-centres in the Delta, 
which represented the third phase of the War of Attrition. Israel‟s intention was to 
delegitimize Nasser as protector of the population and undermine Egypt‟s strategy 
to force her to stop the war, so that no diplomatic solutions would be imposed on 
Israel against her wishes.5  
Nasser went to the USSR in January 1970 and asked the Kremlin to take over his air 
defence until Egypt could establish a modernized SAM curtain, and to provide him 
with long-range bombers to retaliate against Israel for her deep bombing campaign.  
The USSR turned down the second request but acquiesced to the first. It provided 
Egypt with around 80 SAM-3s and thousands of portable SAM-7 batteries. It also 
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transferred the modern version of the MiG 21 and its supporting technology. In July, 
Israel was shocked by the vulnerability of her Phantoms to the newly- developed air 
defences. However, she shot down five MiGs with their Soviet pilots. The US 
intervened with a plan developed by the Secretary of State which was accepted by 
both sides for different reasons.6  
Israel was eager to stop the costly attrition and did not wish to confront the Russians 
directly. Nasser also doubted the long-term viability of his strategy of attrition and 
aimed to use the interim period before the ceasefire secretly to move his anti-defence 
layer forward to cover the western side of Sinai; 7 a prerequisite for any future 
crossing. 
While the War of Attrition was ongoing, another version of “security concept” was 
developed in Israel which proposed that Egypt would not embark on a major 
confrontation before she had a superior or at least matching air power capacity (or 
long-range bomber capacity since they needed better intercepting facilities8). The 
lessons of the War of Attrition War caused a rapid maturing in the Egyptian 
political-military leadership at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical, as will be 
discussed below.  
Waiting 
The cease-fire in July 1970 was for 3 months.  Nasser died at the end of September 
and the cease-fire was then renewed by the new President Anwar Sadat for another 
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period and was continually renewed till August 1971. Sadat made several 
announcements during 1971 and 1972 about embarking upon a liberation war as a 
result of Israel‟s rejection of his diplomatic initiatives in February 1971. He had 
proposed an interim measure of mutual withdrawal, the opening of the Canal, and 
an initiative for a full peace agreement based on a total Israeli retreat.9  
As his deadlines for re-igniting the conflict passed without action, his excuses were 
seen as disingenuous by his domestic audience and the wider Arab world which had 
become a major source of funding for Egypt after the 1967 Khartoum Conference. 
Anger among the Egyptian people, especially university students, rose. 
 Sadat had major difficulties in taking the decision to go to war, notably the inability 
of the army to execute a major plan for liberating Sinai given its structural weakness 
in airpower and, to a lesser extent, its armoured capability. This weakness was 
recognised by the military leaders, mainly General Sadeq, the General Commander 
and War Minister, but he also did not believe in the fruitfulness of more limited 
operations as the political achievement would be in the hands of an untrustworthy 
diplomatic process.10  
Sadat was frustrated also by the USSR‟s refusal to supply weapons the Egyptians 
considered essential for a major offensive, mainly long-range bombers or surface-
surface missiles to deter Israel from repeating the strategic air operations which had 
crippled the Egyptian tempo in the War of Attrition. In these circumstances, his 
theory of a limited war but at a higher scale and of a shorter duration than the War 
of Attrition would be used to ignite a diplomatic process.11 As Lieberman indicated, 
it was a creative discovery which acknowledged the limits of successful deterrence 
that had been achieved by the end of the War of Attrition and the inherent 
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vulnerabilities of the Egyptian Army, but then aimed to “design around” these by 
building another strategy.12 
On 12 October 1972, Sadat informed the Supreme Military Council of his decision to 
fight “a limited war aiming to move [the] diplomatic process by restoring the 
military initiative, regaining Egyptian honour and enhancing Israeli losses”. He said 
this could be achieved by a limited offensive aiming to cross the Suez Canal and 
advance as far as the fighting capabilities of the army would allow. The next day he 
relieved General Sadeq of his command as he had shown some reluctance, together 
with other military leaders, and appointed General Ahmed Ismail to achieve this 
mission.  
Early in 1971, General Shazly was appointed Chief of Staff responsible for 
regenerating and restructuring the Egyptian Army, and General Gamasy was 
appointed head of the operations section in 1972 to be more directly involved with 
the planning and execution of actual operations. Both generals were under the 
orders of Ismail, the General Commander and War Minister, who took office in 
October 1972.  
Relations with US President Nixon improved in the last days of Nasser, and moved 
even further forward with Sadat. The latter had positive diplomatic exchanges with 
Nixon in 1971-2 although they did not result in any positive outcome. In fact, as 
Sadat later argued, the statement made by Kissinger early in 1973 that diplomatic 
relations could not reasonably be resumed while the situation was static was one of 
the strongest motivations for Egypt to contemplate re-starting the war.13  
In July 1972, Sadat made a serious change in Egypt‟s strategic orientation by 
expelling almost all the Soviet advisers, who by then numbered some 12,000, as a 
direct response to the USSR‟s refusal to supply requested armaments. The move also 
sought implicitly to pave the way for more positive relations with the US which 
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Sadat considered the only player which could lead the diplomatic process he hoped 
would result from his proposed limited war. 
In Israel, the parties of the medium left, Mapai, Ahdot HaAvoda and Ravi, united in 
1968 to form the Labour Party and formed a new government in a coalition with the 
far Left Mapam. After the death of Prime Minister Eshkol in 1969, Golda Meir 
became head of the government. With the new developments in 1970, a national 
unity government was proposed but the right-wing party Gahal withdrew in protest 
at the consideration of Rogers‟s initiative for acknowledging Egyptian sovereignty 
over Sinai.14   
The Labour government had since 1969 developed an unwritten but agreed policy 
(known as Tora Shebe’al Peh) to determine the principles governing the political fate 
of the occupied territories in the future. This policy stated that in the case of the 
Egyptian front, Sharm Al-Sheikh should be kept in Israeli hands, with a supply 
corridor at the western bank of Aqaba Gulf linking it to Eilat in any future peace 
agreement with Egypt. Nevertheless, some differences of opinion existed, ranging 
from Gahal which demanded control of East Sinai plus Sharm, to Mapam‟s vision of 
a total withdrawal from Sinai in return for peace.15 In any case, Israel, which was 
relieved by the death of Nasser, turned down all peace proposals from Sadat.  
The initial Egyptian war plan was completed in January 1973, and two time-scale 
options were given -- for the war to start either in May or October 1973. The decision 
was taken in April for the second date, for reasons discussed below. Sadat issued the 
strategic directive in September and the war erupted at 2pm Cairo time on 6 October 
1973, with short and massive air strikes followed by artillery bombardments to cover 
the waves of Egyptian commandos crossing the Suez Canal.16  
In Israel, early warnings and suspicions in the political-military leadership were put 
aside until Meir confirmed the Egyptian intention to fight early on the morning of 6 
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October. A pre-emptive attack was ruled out, as well as full mobilization in favour of 
a more limited attack. However, a few hours later a decision was taken for total 
mobilization of the army, which depends mostly on reservists; a step that was too 
late and restricted by the nature of Yom Kippur when all forms of public 
communication and broadcasting were out of service. 
The Strategic Ability of Egypt 
The Conceptual Layer 
In the Egyptian strategic leadership responsible for the 1973 War, three figures were 
engaged with variable importance in the strategic layout of war; President Anwar 
Sadat, the War Minister and General Commander Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail and 
the Chief of Staff General Sa‟ad-Addin el-Shazly.  
Sadat was the uncontested strategist responsible for determining the political aims 
and strategic routes, as he frequently claimed publicly and in private debates. In 
addition to his book “In Search of Identity”, Sadat‟s ideas were dispersed in public 
speeches, interviews,17 and remarks and observations, as well as others attributed to 
him in his meetings, especially with military leaders.  
Sadat had the military with the rank of major and hardly attended any higher 
military education, but in 1950 he resumed his military career for a short time until 
the 1952 revolution when he became a member of the Revolutionary Command 
Council. During his political career until October 1970, when he became President 
after Nasser‟s death, he was a prominent figure who held a number of civilian 
positions in Nasser‟s regime, including Head of the Legislative Council “The 
Nation‟s Council”, and General Secretary of the Islamic Conference Organization, 
and he maintained close relations with Nasser until his death, partly due to his 
apparent lack of political ambition.  
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Reviewing Sadat‟s writing and his expressed opinions shows he was well 
acquainted with basic strategic ideas: war as a tool in the hands of policy, the nature 
of strategic effect needed to shape the enemy‟s calculations and perception, the 
difference between a war with total aims which requires the eradication of the 
enemy‟s military power and a war with limited aims which requires a meticulous 
combination of battlefield achievements and diplomatic moves.   His strategy for the 
1973 war, which aimed to demolish the Israeli “national security theory” and then 
set up a diplomatic process, was strong evidence of his strategic competency.18  
However, he also showed signs of misunderstanding the nature of strategy. These 
misconceptions should not be ascribed to his personality aberrations (as he 
consistently overestimated his skills and ability which led him to impose awkward 
orders on the military command) nor to his practical mistakes in strategic moves 
(which will be reviewed below) as will be shown. The point here is that Sadat 
indicated many times his total and exclusive responsibility to run strategy in 
contrast to his military that (he averred) should run operations and emphasised 
many times that the military should not even be kept aware of diplomatic activity.19 
Also, Sadat did not share Nasser‟s affinity for reading strategic treatises; rather, 
given his artistic background, he was interested in more cultural western works. 20 
Field Marshal Ismail, the Chief of Staff, was fired after the Israeli bombing of Ras 
Za‟farana in 1969. He was then called by Sadat to head the General Intelligence 
section in 1971. After Sadeq was fired, Ismail was appointed by Sadat as War 
Minister and General Commander. Ismail was a disciplined commander but he was 
not known as a theorist or planner. He left two major documents conveying his 
ideas: an extended interview with Heikal21 and unedited memoirs directed mainly to 
                                                          
18
 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.31-39; Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs, pp.278-279. 
19
 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, p.180; Gamasy, The October War: Memoirs, p.393. 
20
 Mohamed H. Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Story of the Beginning and End of Sadat’s Era (Cairo: Al-Ahram, 
1988, Arabic) pp.65-67. 
21
 Al-Ahram newspaper on 18
 
November 1973. 
209 
 
the general public. In his interview he conveyed the same ideas as Sadat regarding 
the strategic rationale behind the conduct of the war. However, the quality of his 
strategic leadership, including his weak theoretical background, remains 
controversial, discredited by Shazly and moderately praised by Gamasy.22  
Researchers have supported both positions.23 
Saad el-Shazly was the most enlightened Egyptian military leader of the period. He 
was the founder of the paratrooper brigade and held several high-ranking military 
positions including command of the combined paratrooper and commando forces 
and the Red Sea regional command. He had completed his higher military education 
at the Nasser Academy and the High War College course in the USSR.  
In his account of the war, „The Crossing of the Suez”, Shazly gave clear explanations 
of how all defence policies for regenerating the military‟s fighting power and 
military planning were chosen to match the proportional Egyptian capability vis-à-
vis the Israeli while attaining the operational outcome required by a war with 
limited strategic scope.24  
However, Shazly‟s ideas showed two conceptual shortcomings. The first was the 
inability to link operational outcomes to a higher strategic effect which would be 
compatible with Egypt‟s explicit policy aims.  
In his treatise, he only touched on this strategic area once when he gave his own 
proposal on the strategic rationale for how a competent war with limited aims could 
suit the policy of liberating the Arab territories occupied in 1967. He proposed that 
the Israelis would suffer huge losses, and also be forced to keep their soldiers 
mobilized for a long time: this would, he argued, be sufficient to achieve a “decisive” 
victory.25 But he did not provide evidence that this proposal was even known to the 
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Egyptian high command before and during the war, let alone adopted. Further, 
Shazly did not examine the applicability of this proposal to the situation in 1973 
given the experience of the War of Attrition and the Israeli dependence on external 
support.  
The other shortcoming was his claim, when he criticized Sadat‟s decisions during the 
war, that the political leadership‟s intervention in the course of operations was 
catastrophic and should never be allowed on principle. This could have been, in 
part, a reaction to Sadat‟s over-interventions that ignored military expertise and 
capabilities but, as Howeidy clearly indicated, the claim that politicians should not 
interfere in operations missed the strategic wisdom. The problem in this case was in 
the manner of political intervention rather than in its principle.26  
Regarding strategic education, Egypt did not have a formal structure for educating 
strategists before 1966, when the National Defence College was established as a part 
of the Nasser Higher Military Academy.  It operated from 1967, but the High War 
College, the other part of the Nasser Academy, did not run courses until the 1973 
war. However, the National Defence College did not attract many political and 
military commanders who tended only to have exposure to the High War College 
which focused on tactical and operational affairs.27  Most of the educational missions 
to the USSR also focussed mainly on the operational and even tactical levels.  
To conclude, the strategic leadership in Egypt by 1973 was much closer to what is 
strategic and had a good understanding of strategic principles and could build up 
strategic proposals. However, shortcomings and lack of acquaintance with strategic 
theories also existed. This mixed ability manifested itself in the generally good 
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strategic concept of the 1973 war, the weakness of the links between operational 
practice and strategic needs, and lack of clarity in political aims, as will be shown. 
The grade of this tier is medium. 
 
Institutional Layer 
Relational 
 Civil-military relations in the 1973 War were an extension of the transformation 
Nasser fostered after the 1967 war. The Pre-1967 system, as has been discussed, was 
odd as it made Amer the General Commander while both the Chief of Staff, who had 
limited responsibilities, and the War Minister were subordinate to him. This system 
together with the military‟s tutelage over defence as well as many civilian files had 
grave strategic consequences. 
The first War Minister after the 1967 War, Amin Howeidy, recommended a more 
democratic, but still strategically useful, structure with the War Minister, 
subordinate to the President and overseen by the legislature, managing the armed 
forces to achieve government policy. The General Commander in this system should 
have been the Chief of Staff, with responsibility for planning and commanding the 
armed forces under the direct supervision of the War Minister.28  
However, Nasser wanted more control over the armed forces because of his 
obsession with the security of the regime, so he refused Howeidy‟s proposal. 
Howeidy resigned and Nasser appointed Fawzy, the Chief of Staff, to be War 
Minister at the same time; an arrangement that had been in force before 1962.  
Fawzy‟s proposal in 1968 was accepted by Nasser who sanctioned Law No.4 on “The 
Command and Control of Armed Forces”. The law emphasised the roles of the War 
Minister and General Commander, the two posts which would be held by the same 
person. Below him, the Chief of Staff is responsible for developing and training the 
armed forces and the Chief of Operations manages planning and helps the higher 
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command in commanding operations. The law also acknowledged the role of the 
National Defence Council composed of the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs, Justice 
and the Economy, as responsible for orchestrating state resources for defence and 
developing a national security strategy.29 
Although the new system put an end to chaos in political-military relations and the 
military command, it created different structural problems. Firstly, there was no real 
and critical supervision over the armed forces except from the President who had 
limited time and possibly skills. Second, it gave the President unprecedented and 
exclusive powers over the military which paved the way to the promotion of people 
likely to placate rather than challenge him, although not as egregiously as in Amer‟s 
era. However, both Nasser and Sadat realized the necessity of more professional and 
able military commanders.30  
Third, a core problem, as discussed in the previous chapter, was that combining the 
military command and political oversight in the single post of War Minister meant 
that if he was more powerful than the President, as was the case before 1967, 
strategy would be militarized and not critically assessed.  
But if the War Minister was much weaker than the President, as in 1973, the military 
stance in strategy dialogue is weakened and the strategic proposals do not match the 
political aims to the operational capabilities, which add to the problem of over-
involvement of politicians in military decisions.  
Fourth, as the law permitted many of the responsibilities of the National Defence 
Council to be delegated to the President, the council became rudimentary and 
responsible only for mobilization and rubber-stamping the President‟s decisions, 
rather than a comprehensive platform for strategy- making. 
In the 1973 War all these abnormalities existed, with Sadat as Supreme Commander, 
Ismail the War Minister and General Commander, and Shazly the Chief of Staff, and 
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the National Defence Committee a rudimentary body. Sadat appointed Hafez Ismail 
as his National Security Adviser, which turned out in reality to be merely the 
President‟s international messenger and secretary for information.31  
After overcoming internal turmoil in 1971, when pro-Nasser power centres 
including Fawzy planned a coup, Sadat replaced Fawzy with General Sadeq and 
became the uncontested ruler of the country.  
After this victory Sadat would not tolerate any sign of opposition, or even opinions 
that challenged his intentions. He fired General Sadeq and two functional 
commanders in the famous meeting of October 1972 when the two expressed 
scepticism about his proposal of limited war. He launched a stormy attack on Sadeq 
at the meeting, and two other commanders who tried to mediate the difference in 
opinions were also fired.32 This meeting and its results hardened the position of 
Sadat further, and created an attitude in the military command of accepting Sadat‟s 
orders without discussion or reservations. 
Functional 
The functional criteria of the Egyptian strategic institutional layers in the 1973 War 
were definitely much better than those in the 1967 War, albeit with some problems 
which gravely affected the strategy making.  
Information sharing was much improved but had limitations. Passing information 
from the military to the President became smooth and professional. The 
professionalization of the intelligence sectors, both Military Intelligence and General 
Intelligence, and their exclusion from politics helped in improving the quality of all 
intelligence tasks; information gathering, analysis, counter-intelligence and covert 
operations. However, as Sadat excluded all other figures, military and civilians, from 
strategy making due to his conviction that the strategic task was his exclusive 
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prerogative, there was no information sharing between different departments unless 
personally conveyed by Sadat himself.  
For example, during his meetings with the Supreme Military Council during the 
war, he kept them ignorant of some of the diplomatic moves then underway, and 
their motivations and consequences.33  
Comprehensive and critical debates were also mostly absent due to Sadat‟s 
exclusive control of strategy making and the absence of a serious platform for 
strategy making which combined the resources of all departments. The National 
Defence Council was put aside and became inactive.34 Also, Sadat‟s tight control 
over the military, his intolerance of criticism and his use of a war minister with a 
weak personality35 made his orders impossible to critique or question. 
The authority of political leadership over the military was clear and strong but it 
was extreme and jeopardized the other necessary function, the formidable stand of 
the military.   
Interestingly, when Brooks analysed the civil-military relations in the 1973 War, she 
rightly identified the balance of power, the improved functions in information 
sharing, military competency in assessing own capability and clear authorization.36 
She also indicated weak comprehensive and critical analysis, but she did not put her 
finger on the negative element of Sadat‟s encroachment on the military standing and 
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expertise and his over-involvement in operational, even tactical, details. This 
element was actually missed in her theoretical model as mentioned earlier. Hence, 
she overestimated both the quality of civil military relations and the strategic outcome 
of the war.  
Brooks provided a major justification for Sadat‟s military over-involvement and 
exclusive strategy making by saying it was needed to enable the imposition of his 
overarching political-strategic agenda of a limited war to be followed by a peace 
initiative.37 However, there are two fallacies in this claim: 
Firstly, Sadat had already become the real ruler of the country with clear authority 
over the military. Not one of his military commanders was looking to advance a 
contesting political/strategic agenda. For example, Shazly‟s vigorous opposition to 
Sadat‟s decisions in the second half of the war was based only on operational 
calculations that mismatched the military orders. Shazly himself was silent after 
being marginalised and replaced. He even accepted a diplomatic position that was 
offered by Sadat and kept silent until he was attacked by Sadat‟s regime which 
sought to blame him for the not brilliant military outcome.  
Second, as is discussed later, Sadat‟s attitude in giving military orders that were not 
operationally reasonable, and his inefficiency in maintaining a clear policy were 
solely responsible for the military dilemma at the end of the war. Sadat himself 
acknowledged the sub-optimum outcome as he was compelled to accept a war 
outcome lower than he aimed for.  
These mixed features (clear authorization, suboptimum information sharing, 
moderate critical assessment and weakness in the domains of formidable position 
of military and the strategic intervention of politicians) give the Egyptian 
institutional layer a lower medium grade. 
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The Practical Layer 
Detailed Strategies 
Generating detailed strategies not only dictates how each side is  able to formulate 
planning at the grand and military strategic level but, as the nature of strategy 
requires, how each side is able to adapt its strategies to the evolving opportunities, 
blunders or changing contexts of the war.   
Policy and Grand Strategy 
Identifying war aims for a state sometimes becomes a complex task as was discussed 
in the Introduction. There is a possibility of change under the dynamic nature of war 
events, and a possible change of the political ideology or agenda of the leaders,  and 
change can be a result of a disorganized decision-making system which can present 
contested or obscure representations of the war aims.  
As changing the political aims in the 1973 War will be discussed later, it is important 
to identify which war aims the military events opened with.  
Here too, there are two conceptual questions that need to be addressed which relate 
in part to political analysis of the Arab-Israeli Wars, the nature of domestic politics, 
and to the strategic level of analysis.  
The first question is: shall Egypt be considered an initiator and therefore be seen as 
having positive aims, and Israel as a responder in which case her aims should be 
considered as negative (to keep the status quo)?  
This is obviously not totally accurate as Egypt‟s territories had been occupied since 
1967, so 1973 war efforts may be recognized offensive operations under a defensive 
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strategy if we use Michael Handel‟s nomenclature.38 Israel may claim also that, prior 
to 5 June 1967, Egypt pursued positive aims, namely the destruction of Israel, and 
therefore its occupation of land was a defensive strategy. However, as explained in 
the last chapter, the real Israeli political aim in 1967 was to restore its deterrent 
ability and open the Tiran Strait rather than to abort an Egyptian war of 
extermination which the latter was never able to achieve. 
This research is not intended to trace the legal or moral roots behind each war, or to 
support a specific position; rather, it focuses on answering the strategic question: 
how each side used its power, mainly military, to achieve its political aims and this 
may touch on each side‟s ability to use the moral or legal claims in their strategy.  
Egypt launched the war under the umbrella of her acceptance of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 (1967), which required “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict”.39 Egypt accepted UN resolution 242 and 
Rogers‟ initiative. Sadat announced that any war would be used to “liberate the 
occupied territories in 1967 and look for a „just‟ solution for Palestinians”. Hence, 
Egypt covered herself legally in the international arena in this war, regardless of its 
real political aims, in contrast to Israel which was considered an aggressor; the 
reverse of the 1967 status when the Israeli offensive was considered a reaction to an 
existential threat by the international community -- apart from the Eastern Bloc and 
France. 
Second, to assess the real intentions of Sadat in launching the 1973 war, we need to 
look at Egyptian domestic politics and political ideology.   
Nationalists and Nasserites in Egypt, headed by Heikal, claimed that Sadat changed 
Egypt‟s vision of its international and regional role and launched the war only with 
the aim of liberating Sinai and positioning Egypt within a regional order, promoted 
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by the US to form a strategic “triangle”40 of US-Egypt-Israel which could reach a 
unilateral peaceful resolution at the expense of the wider Arab cause.  
Sadat‟s advocates claim that he wanted peace with Israel on condition of returning 
to the 4 June 1967 borders and a just solution for Palestinian refugees, which was 
what Nasser envisioned, at least formally, when he accepted Resolution 242 and the 
Rogers initiative.  
A third interpretation was adopted by Israeli hawks including Mordechai Gur, the 
COS between 1974-1978, and was echoed by Harkabi when he claimed that Sadat 
really aimed at destroying Israel but followed Tunisian President Habib Bourquiba‟s 
piecemeal strategy.41 Gur raised the same concern in 1978.42 
Obviously, Sadat accepted in the end a unilateral peace with Israel in a newly 
formed strategic triangle; actually he aspired to replace Israel in maintaining US 
interests in the region as he did in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict in the late 1970s.43 
This was the main objective of Kissinger‟s strategy in dealing with the war: to secure 
a partial victory for Israel to preserve US‟ credibility without humiliating the Arabs, 
so that they could be sure they had to join the US to achieve any political gains.44   
The question remains whether Sadat, when he changed the policy aims of Egypt and 
her vision of her regional and international role, was acting on a different political 
ideology to the modified Nasserite one after 1967, or whether he just continued on 
Nasser‟s trajectory and then responded to the hard political and strategic effects of the 
1973 War. It is difficult to provide a definitive answer, although it is arguable that it 
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was a mixture of ideology and pragmatism and that the change in policy was 
apparent only after the military operations ended.  
Sadat prescribed “specific” political aims based on Nasser‟s modified approach of a 
common solution based on Resolution 242 which required strategic needs to be 
accomplished by the military forces in the opening of the war. This was mentioned 
clearly in the Strategic Directive: “The force should be used to smash the security 
concept and to increase its heavy losses, within the capabilities of the armed forces”, 
and this was generally conceived to be used to establish a more favourable 
diplomatic process 
The strategy also targeted the superpowers, especially the US, to push Israel towards 
a more compliant attitude, since within the prevailing Cold War dynamic of détente 
both Superpowers would intervene in favour of de-escalation. .  
Sadat used the war as a gamble to increase the diplomatic potential depending on 
the scale of military achievements. If the war proved successful he would press for 
higher policy aims, but if it was modest or mixed (as it turned out to be), he would 
be content with achieving lesser policy aims which would be achievable by 
incorporating himself within the US regional alliance and totally jettisoning the 
USSR. Nevertheless, the eagerness with which he was looking for this change45 and 
the level of compliance he showed diplomatically, or as Golan illustrated, was high: 
To strengthen his argument, Kissinger told the Israelis that he was amazed 
by Sadat‟s behaviour. The Egyptian president was so far not using his full 
political power created by the new international situation in negotiating an 
agreement. Indeed, Kissinger thought that Sadat could have used the 
international situation to achieve an overall agreement on his terms. At the 
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most, said Kissinger, Sadat would have risked a new war, which the whole 
world would blame on Israel anyway.46 
But Sadat sought peace and excluded further use of force too early for a 
comprehensive settlement and too late for a ceasefire with an advantageous 
operational position.   
He quit the USSR patronage and submitted to Kissinger‟s “shuttle diplomacy”. 
Although this was very profitable for the American strategy in the war, which 
sought to uproot the USSR from the region and become the sole game decider, the 
change worked very badly for Egypt as the US could not be a genuine and objective 
mediator, and the loss of Soviet support reduced Egypt‟s military and political 
status.  
Also, Kissinger‟s step by step diplomacy, which separated short-term and long-term 
settlements,47 deprived Egypt of much of her right to delegitimize important Israeli 
gains such as the encirclement of Third Army, which resulted from Israel ignoring 
UNSC resolutions 238/9. Egypt accepted Kissinger‟s proposal to deal with the 
military situation as de-facto and to devote the first phase of negotiations to 
relieving this encirclement (Six Principles in November 1973) in the hope of a better 
peace under US direction.48  
In addition to the concessions made in the First Disengagement, this was puzzling 
for both Kissinger and Meir and indicated that personal and ideological elements 
facilitated this policy transformation rather than mere strategic calculations. 49    
                                                          
46
 Matti Golan, Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step by Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (Colchester: 
The Book Service Ltd, 1976) p.152 (my emphasis).   
47
 Mathew Ferraro, Tough Going: Anglo-American Relations and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 (New York: 
iUniverse, 2007), pp113-114. 
48
 Kissinger’s tactics to reach this were revealed in his memoir, Years of Upheaval, pp.639-640. 
49
 Sadat was very compliant to Kissinger’s and Israeli proposals as in “the six points” before the First 
Disengagement when he accepted deploying forces with only 8000 manpower on the East Bank with 30 tanks 
and distancing the air defence 30 km west of the Canal, Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 833-845. 
221 
 
The question of what were the Egyptian war aims raises another concern related to 
the strategic level of analysis.  
From the military strategic perspective, what policy required the military means to 
accomplish was almost clear in the short run: demolishing Israel‟s security concept 
in order to warm up the regional atmosphere to promote a diplomatic process and 
coerce Israel to accept this and yield some occupied territory. However, there was no 
consensus or even discussion on the scale of this coercion.  
But from a grand strategic perspective, ambiguities prevailed, very similar to the 
Israeli case in 1967, as to how the war would be strategically managed for long-term 
effects. As stated before, grand strategy has two tasks, the orchestration of the means 
of power to achieve policy ends, and to plan for the future. 
For the first task of grand strategy Sadat planned and executed an efficient 
mobilization of all state resources of power to serve the military effort.50 He also 
planned an astonishing campaign of deception/surprise, benefiting from his 
previous unkept promises and the strong belief in Israel and much of the world that 
Egypt was not able or willing to fight.51 
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Sadat succeeded in involving Syria in his war to orchestrate an offensive against 
Israel across two fronts, the strategic concept that had been dreamed of since the 
Arab endeavours for military coalitions in 1948 and in the failed attempt to establish 
an Arab Military Command in1964.  
The planning with the Syrians for the war occupied the year of 1973 and the secret 
visit of the Syrian High Command in September finalized the arrangements. 
Although the strategic logic of such a war on two fronts was no doubt beneficial for 
Egypt, its conditions and application produced negative results for both Egypt and 
Syria.  
Syria had a more sensitive geostrategic situation. The IDF presence on the Golan 
Heights gave it an unprecedented defensive advantage over the Syrians who would 
be forced to attack upwards, making the Syrian offensive more difficult. Due to the 
critical importance of this front to Israel as its geographical proximity and height put 
the Israeli nodes of power under heavy and swift enemy air fire and armoured 
thrusts,52 it was expected that the IDF would concentrate its major efforts to the 
Northern front unless it faced a continuous and serious pressure from the Southern 
front, since the Sinai constituted a wide buffer zone for any attack. 
Such a war on two fronts necessitated coordinated grand and military strategies, and 
even operational ones, between Egypt and Syria, which did not happen to the best 
extent possible. Sadat‟s political aims were unclear but proved to be different to 
those of the Syrians, which led to the long-lasting enmity between the two countries 
after the war. Sadat‟s strategic concept was a limited war in scale and aims, as will be 
shown, which contradicted the strategic needs of the Syrians, who required 
continuous and serious pressure from the South until the Golan could be secured.  
Egypt‟s covert strategic concept was served militarily by plans to establish a stable 
bridgehead (of some 10-12 km) on the east bank of the Suez Canal protected by air 
defence, and the army would not be allowed to move further unless aerial and 
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armoured superiority, or denial, had been secured. This concept was what the army 
actually trained for. However, Sadat agreed with the Syrians to advance to the 
Defiles (a set of narrow passes) at a point 50-70 km east of Suez, which would give 
the Egyptians control of the road to the Israeli border unprotected by natural 
obstacles. Such an advance would, if executed, keep the IDF totally mobilized in the 
South and leave the way clear for the Syrian advance in the North or at least to 
preserve its holding of the Golan.  
We can now look at how this dishonest coalition policy between Sadat and Syria, 
which at the least could be characterised as confused, affected the war strategy and 
outcome for both, especially for the Egyptians. 
Sadat was under direct pressure from Syria after 8 October 1973 to extend his 
offensive to the Defiles which was the mission that the army was not prepared for. 
He was reluctant in the beginning, but when the Syrian front deteriorated on 10 and 
11 October he ordered the army to move on 12 or 13 October but it only did so on the 
14th.   
When the Egyptians commenced their offensive on the 14th, the Syrian front was 
already quiet as three Iraqi armoured divisions defended the road to Damascus and 
the IDF was content with its achievement in retaining most of the Golan.53  
Although the Syrian secret appeal for a cease-fire would not affect the Egyptian 
achievements that were already stabilized by 8 October, once it became known to 
Sadat it spoilt the coalition atmosphere further54 and encouraged him to undertake 
unilateral and secret initiatives during and after the war. 
Regionally, Sadat succeeded in catalysing the first effective example of Arab 
countries working collectively towards a unified cause. This Arab strategy was 
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based on three pillars: a war of oil to pressure the US and other supporters of Israel, 
orchestrating Arab diplomatic pressure in the UN and globally, and military efforts 
of states outside the confrontation zone.  
The first pillar succeeded in co-ordinating an oil production boycott despite the 
existence of parochial economic interests and different oil production policies.55 The 
unified Arab diplomatic efforts were also successful. The military efforts consisted of 
financial support for weaponry, especially from the Gulf States and Algeria, 
hardware such as the Saudis Lightning fighters serving on the Egyptian front as well 
as some Iraqi Hawker Hunters in Egypt and Syria, and forces (Kuwaiti and 
Palestinian battalions and Algerian and Libyan brigades) although these were 
merely symbolic presences on the Egyptian front and were more effective on the 
Syrian.56  
Sadat‟s grand strategy for war was simple. He aimed to use a limited war and hold 
a piece of land east of the Canal to launch an advantageous diplomatic negotiation 
through which he could regain Sinai, at least. As Israel thought that occupying 
territory was the basis of her security and a means of preventing war, launching this 
war would push her to comply with diplomatic moves. Hence, he called this war 
“the spark”.57  
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It remains unclear and contested what longer term post-war conditions Sadat aimed 
for, to get the Sinai back only, or to liberate all Arab territories occupied in 1967, and 
what strategic logic or effect he aimed to achieve, other than coercing Israel into 
diplomacy. It is striking that these issues had never been clearly delineated or agreed 
upon by the Egyptian civil and military leaderships.   
Military strategy 
Sadat ordered the military to prepare for war with the weaponry they possessed at 
the time. As Israel held air and armoured supremacy, a decisive military victory or 
securing the whole of Sinai in one step was obviously ruled out. However, a new 
strategic concept evolved backed by a rationale starting with operational analysis 
and ending with strategic assumption.   
Operationally, Egyptian forces were not able to win armoured battles given the 
Israeli air supremacy and the IDF‟s edge in armoured weaponry, doctrine and 
tactics.58 Also, the Egyptians were not able to match the Israeli ability to launch air 
campaigns in depth using either long range bombers or surface to surface missiles.  
Strategically, due to operational limitations, decisive military victory would not be 
attainable. Even a “limited war” option to bleed Israel over the long term had been 
tried with limited success in the War of Attrition as Egypt could not sustain the 
required coercion on Israel while avoiding attacks deep into its own territory.   
Instead, the Egyptian Army would launch a limited offensive, but on a much wider 
scale than the War of Attrition and involving crossing and holding a strip of territory 
east of the Canal, covered by an air-denial umbrella of SAM missiles. It was 
proposed that if the crossing forces quickly moved to static defence by establishing 
and consolidating bridgeheads, armoured mobile battles (which the Egyptians 
would probably lose) would become unnecessary. In fact, by using their anti-
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armoured capabilities in bridgeheads and with an air defence umbrella, the 
Egyptians hoped that the expected Israeli counter-offensives would be very costly in 
air and armour - the main Israeli strength.  
Strategically also, these costs adding to the actual military achievement of the 
crossing, and the psychological shattering of the Israeli leadership due to the 
widespread feeling of insecurity, especially after the previous sense of invincibility, 
would force Israel to engage with the diplomatic process and even be at a 
disadvantage within it.   
This strategy was called by Asher “all-out war of limited dimension”,59 which was 
a good description, albeit questionable in part. 1973 was neither a total war in Erich 
Ludendorff‟s pattern.60 Despite the full mobilization of all resources, it aimed for a 
limited military victory to precipitate a diplomatic process for achieving limited 
political aims, and it did not obscure the line between combatants and non-
combatants. It was neither an attrition (bleeding) strategy, which does not aim for an 
advantageous operational end-state, either territorial or force related, to be 
transferred to the negotiation table as in the 1973 War,  but only to bleed the enemy 
and make him revise his calculation, without achieving lasting operational  
advantage. 
A matured version of Sadat‟s strategy was expressed in retrospect in Gamasy‟s 
memoirs, when he analysed what “the strategic directive” issued by Sadat on 5 
October 1973 meant about using the limited offensive in order to “smash the Israeli 
security concept”. The concept, as explained by the Egyptian Military Intelligence 
analysis,61 was built upon a chain of parameters at different levels which are inter-
connected and interdependent. Israel saw the IDF as its main security tool and 
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thought retaining the occupied territories would enhance its security. So she turned 
down all diplomatic initiatives, apart from the immediate element in Rogers‟ plan, 
which might involve giving up territory.  The IDF depends on air and armoured 
supremacy and was sensitive to casualties. 
As Sadat explained in a speech in September 1974, “when we planned the war and 
defined its objectives, we assumed that the number of kilometres of the occupied 
land [that we recaptured] was not as important to us as crossing the Canal and 
seizing the Bar-Lev line”; he defined the main aim as “to smash the Israeli security 
concept: dealing with the Israeli security doctrine and destroying it”.62  
The Egyptian strategic concept for the 1973 War represented the essence of strategic 
logic; it aimed to modify the Israeli political will to accept a diplomatic solution 
favouring the Egyptian war aims. This could be done by making her feel insecure 
with great losses and losing confidence in the IDF‟s pre-eminence.  
General Sadeq, the War Minister whom Sadat fired in October 1972, criticized 
Sadat‟s proposal from two aspects, and favoured waiting till the ability for a war 
with total aims was secured. If the Egyptian Army failed in its operational objective, 
or in defeating the Israeli counter-attacks, grave operational and strategic outcomes 
would follow. Also, it would leave the final outcome in the hands of diplomatic 
machinery and Superpower politics.63  
The first reservation was subject to how the operational capability for a limited 
offensive would be assessed and whether Egypt could employ strategic and 
operational solutions to work around its disadvantageous fighting ability especially 
in air and armoured warfare. These measures included:  the air-denial curtain of air 
defence, the anti-armoured belt, the strategic and operational surprise, and the 
natural strength of the Egyptian army in defence.  
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The second reservation was also flawed. Superpower dynamics were no doubt 
inevitable in the bipolar world where lines of procurement and regional balance of 
power were monopolies of the US or the USSR. However with these dynamics, only 
wars with limited aims were permitted, even if the capability existed for wider 
offensives.   
With a war of limited aims, the strategic effect of modifying the will of the enemy is 
the best that is aimed for, and then diplomacy has to follow. The real reservation that 
Sadeq should have raised instead, if he could have predicted the future, was how 
stable and clear Sadat‟s strategic guidance would be in preserving the advantageous 
operational position on one side, and allowing a sound bridging of this operational 
outcome to a competent diplomatic pathway on the other. 
On the other hand, why was Sadat‟s strategy for limited war more effective than a 
strategy of attrition? 
After Rogers‟ initiative, which the Egyptians used by spending its interim period to 
optimize their air-defence curtain and move it forward, the option of limited war 
became once more possible as this umbrella would weaken the retaliatory strategy of 
the IDF to a large extent. Also, Egypt started to get Frogs and a few Scud missiles 
from 1972, and TU-22 bombers in 1973 to optimize its long-range conventional 
deterrence. So, both options were operationally feasible, but the difference was in the 
strategic utility of each. 
Both aimed to bleed Israel and to resolve or shift the regional deadlock, but Sadat‟s 
option on top of that promised a territorial gain, even if only a symbolic one.  
No discussion was recorded regarding the preference of one option over another. As 
Lieberman indicated, although the formal Egyptian history of the war acknowledged 
the shift of Sadat‟s strategy to the more limited option, it neither gives a clear 
indication of the strategic thinking cascade that led to this new strategy or why it 
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was preferred over attrition.64Sadat moved smoothly from one option to another 
without explicit explanation.  
Lieberman did not provide any explanation for the preference of “all-out limited 
war” over “attrition war” apart from indicating the failed outcome of the attrition 
strategy before in 1970 and the fear of extensive Israeli retaliation.65 However, the 
situation regarding capabilities and limitations to withstand the Israeli response was 
changed by the strengthening of Egypt‟s air-defence umbrella and the arrival, albeit 
in small quantities and at a slow pace, of surface-to-surface missiles and a few long 
range bombers. 
Sadat himself did not rule out completely far less limited options than his 1973 
strategy. At the end of 1972, he envisioned a wide scale commando operation at 
Sharm el Sheikh. However in April 1973, he sanctioned the extended plan of a wide 
scale crossing and holding a bridgehead.66 Three possible reasons might have 
convinced him to make this shift and he explicitly mentioned them, albeit in 
different contexts.  
Firstly, such an operation would enable him to have a solid territorial gain (even a few 
centimetres as he illustrated) east of Suez which would be helpful to symbolize the 
Egyptian achievement politically and might constitute a base for future operations if 
needed. 
Second, there was a necessity to restore the injured honour of the Egyptian Army and 
the people in general by a big and challenging operation in which Egyptian soldiers 
would confront and overcome the Israelis.  
Third, the psychologically shattering effect on the Israeli leadership of both smashing 
the parameters of its security concept and suddenly ending the post-1967 euphoria 
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and sense of invincibility, in addition to high losses, would affect the Israeli 
calculations dramatically and impose a feeling of insecurity and lack of trust in 
victory. This psychological effect turned out to be huge to the extent that the Israeli 
leadership lost control for the first few days and even Dayan proposed a full or 
partial withdrawal from Sinai to more defendable positions.67     
However, in spite of the excellence in setting the strategic concept for the 1973 war, 
practical deficits existed which resulted largely from conceptual and institutional 
problems.  
The deficits were:  the political aims and scope were less than clear, as was the 
question of how the war was to be used to achieve the liberating agenda over the 
long term, and the disharmony between military and non-military means in practice.  
In addition, the strategic concept was not equally clear to members of the political-
military leadership.  
Hence, these weak points manifested themselves at the crucial junctures of the war 
when a full grasp of the strategic formula was needed. As a result, the real time 
application of the strategic concept and its adaptation to events was dysfunctional, 
as will be shown below. Even at the military planning stage this logic was not clear 
enough to guide the discussion before and during the war. 
The plan 
Sadat claimed in his memoirs that Nasser died without leaving any form of offensive 
plans.68 Nevertheless, the Egyptian army had provisional planning ideas which were 
guided by General Abdul-Mone‟em Riadh who had been killed by an artillery 
barrage in 1969.  
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The general plan for this offensive was called Plan 200 and the troops undertook two 
war games based on its principles in 1968 and 1969. General Fawzy and Heikal, in 
contrast to Sadat, said that this plan, and the detailed plans for armies and services, 
was offered to Nasser in September 1970 when Fawzy thought it had become 
applicable, and he agreed verbally for it to be executed in the spring of 1971, but 
Nasser‟s sudden death halted this and Sadat subsequently rejected it. Plan 200 
envisioned three steps: the crossing of five infantry divisions at night time to destroy 
the Bar-Lev Line and build bridgeheads, then two armoured and three mechanized 
divisions would thrust to the passes in the middle of Sinai, and reach the Israeli 
border in 10-12 days.69 
All accounts of the pre-war period, even Sadat‟s, agreed on the existence of Plan 200. 
However, they differ on whether it was a defensive plan, as Sadat and Shazly 
claimed, or offensive as Fawzy and Gamal Hammad claimed.  Hammad doubted its 
applicability and said, “General Fawzy freed Sinai only on the map”.70 If the 
Egyptian Army after three years of training, sophisticated planning, intelligence 
work-ups and strategic surprise, receiving new hardware -- especially tanks and 
fighters, maturing the doctrine and inventing solutions to major tactical problems 
could only complete the first step of Plan 200, it is unlikely that it could have been 
fully implemented two years earlier.  
The first step of Plan 200 was renamed Granite 1 in 1971 and, after maturing its 
details and assumptions, was called Granite 2,71which became the basis of the plan 
of 1973.   
Shazly indicated that another plan (High Minarets) was formulated to involve only 
the crossing and building five divisional bridgeheads which would be amalgamated 
into two army bridgeheads 10-12 km east of the Canal to be under the air-defence 
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umbrella which was mostly static (SAM 3) with a smaller number of SAM 6 (around 
12 batteries).72 This operation would be preceded by a series of disrupting short air 
strikes at the operational and command centres in Sinai, and included naval littoral 
operations.  
Operation Badr; the formal plan of the war that was agreed upon with the Syrians, is 
the modified Granite 2 (where the advance proceeds to the Sinai Passes), and its first 
stage would be the crossing and bridgeheads (High Minaret). It contained also plans 
for special operations east of the Passes to delay the Israeli counter-offensive until 
the bridgeheads could be formed and the second echelon of the Egyptian Army 
(armoured and mechanised divisions) would cross to form the operational 
spearhead for the Passes. The operation set an interim turning point between its first 
and second stages as an operational pause. (Map 1)73  
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Egyptian Operational Plan74 
There was a central ambiguity in the plan of the Badr Operation which challenged 
the strategic concept of the war, and gravely affected its strategy and outcome. The 
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question arises whether the second step of the plan was ever meant by Egyptian 
leadership to be implemented, or represented an option in the event of an Israeli 
breakdown in Sinai, or was only a ruse to entice the Syrians to enter the war. This 
raises the question of what Egyptians meant by the operational pause and how was 
it strategically significant. 
The operational pause is a term borrowed from Soviet doctrine and practice in 
WWII. As the invading armoured divisions penetrate deep in the enemy territories 
they get closer to the culminating point of offence -- exhausting forces and over-
extending logistics. Therefore, they should stop the thrust until other echelons join 
with reinforcements and support. It may also be used to describe the mutual fighting 
inertia at the front.75  
American military doctrines used the term in a similar way to mean stopping an 
offensive before its culminating point for further logistical and intelligence 
preparations for sequential moves. John Cohn offered another application of the 
concept as a “war termination tool” in order to press the enemy for negotiation. For 
this to work it needed some pre-conditions in place: gaining a strategic negotiating 
card, not letting the enemy build his strength, and retaining full self-protection 
operationally against any counter-offensive.76 
Within all definitions, this concept is not applicable at the peak of an offensive when 
the second echelon prepares itself for striking deep into the enemy‟s operational 
base. Hence, the term was used inaccurately in the war plan if it really aimed to 
build another thrust as Granite 2 explicitly stated. In this case, exploitation of the 
advantage of the crossing by the second echelon would be what the Soviet doctrine 
necessitates rather than spending the time in consolidating the bridgehead. 
Also, if the pause was to be used politically, as Cohen indicated, none of the pre-
conditions were applied; negotiations were abandoned by Sadat at this stage as he 
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refused the British proposals for a cease-fire,77 a time lag was given to the IDF to 
recover, and protection was defective as both bridgeheads consolidated their base 
but left a gap in between. He literally missed the point where his outstanding 
operational success could be transformed into an advantageous position at the 
negotiating table. 
 In a further indication of this strategic confusion, the conditions for ending the 
operational pause were interpreted differently by the Egyptian commanders. Shazly 
saw as being almost between two separate wars and understood that the pause 
should continue even for years until massive developments in forces and equipment, 
even on a regional scale, could occur to enable the defeat of Israel.78 Gamasy, 
however, understood it as a very short pause until the maturation of the bridgeheads 
and the crossing of the second echelon were achieved, so he was very critical of the 
delay of the thrust to the Passes, but his suggestion was turned down by both Ismail 
and Shazly due to Israeli air supremacy and the limitation of the Egyptian air 
defence.79  
With the two higher commanders not seeing the second stage as feasible in the short 
term, did the Egyptian leadership conceive the plan as two consecutive stages in the 
same war? Or was it the case, as Shazly claimed, that the second stage formally was 
merely an option, and in reality it was a means for securing Syrian involvement in 
the war that Sadat later ordered to go ahead, in a clumsy way, under pressure from 
his ally? 
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Gamasy, Heikal, and the formal Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli military historians 
support the first interpretation for different reasons, but Shazly, Asher and Pollack 
support the second. Shazly clearly stated, and all the evidence supports him, that no 
detailed planning, training or orders of battle were made in advance for the 
implementation of the second step.  
Also, if we accept the authenticity of the second stage, Egypt‟s war plan would be in 
contradiction to the strategic war concept that aimed to bridge the operational 
capability and limitations with the strategic effect required. This concept aimed to 
weaken or at least bypass the Israeli operational superiority (in air and armour) in 
order to reach a solid operational objective. Israeli air supremacy would be 
confronted by air defence and the protected Egyptian ground advances under it. 
Israeli advantage in mobile armoured battles would be met with by different layers 
of anti-armour, and the shifting of Egyptian forces quickly to consolidated defence 
after crossing the Canal.80 
Shazly was right when he stressed that moving beyond the air-defence curtain was 
outside this logic and operationally damaging. But what was not mentioned by him 
is that the Egyptian army was even far inferior to its opponent in armoured 
manoeuvring operations, in weapons, doctrine, training and tactical leadership, and 
was only able to work to a pre-existing plan. Pollack made a sharp contrast between 
the very delicate planning and training of the Egyptian army for the first part of 
operations in comparison to the clumsy and hurried planning, and execution, with 
no training for the second.81  
Asher also emphasised this point, and his research on the military orders of battle 
and planning documents of the war found hardly any indication of a concrete 
intention to extend the offensive. For example, his research shows the delay in 
transferring the second echelon armour, the cancelling of the disrupting Special 
Operations in the middle of Sinai and he reveals the modus operandi that the 
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operation of 14 October followed as hesitating, harassing moves and at a brigade 
level from four sectors.82 (Map 2)83 
 
Gamasy claimed that if the second stage had been initiated as early as 9 October it 
would have been operationally applicable and strategically fruitful. He indicated to 
Ismail on that day that the Israeli air supremacy could be confronted by certain 
measures: the mobile SAM-6 and portable Sam-7, attacking at night, and that the 
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collision between the two armies would lessen the impact of air strikes. Shazly 
offered a counter-argument that the mobile SAM-6 batteries were few in number 
and not sufficient to provide a cover, and the collision between forces would only 
occur after travelling 45 km through the open desert.84  
This researcher would argue that Gamasy‟s proposal might be applicable as a daring 
high-risk operation to exploit the chaotic atmosphere inside the Israeli strategic and 
operational leaderships and formations, especially if the forces advanced at night 
and if the movement of air defence/artillery formations and the second echelons had 
occurred earlier. However, two unsolvable obstacles remain.   
Firstly, Egypt did not have enough forces to complete the task and at the same time 
keep her strategic defence in place to defend in depth against any Israeli attempt to 
break through the forward static defence, a move which had always been foreseen 
by the Egyptian leadership before the war.  
Second, as the operation of 14 October showed, the real enemy of the advancing 
forces was not air power; it was the bad organisational planning and command, and 
the limited capability to launch a large scale mobile armoured offensive. In truth, the 
Egyptian army did not have the requirements for such operations, either in doctrine, 
training or tactical command abilities.85 
Adapting Strategy  
Crossing and Sustaining the Israeli Counter-offensive (6– 13 October 1973) 
Up to 14 October, the Egyptian war performance was very effective and in 
accordance with the operational plans and had a better than expected outcome. The 
operations achieved their primary and secondary military objectives -- the crossing 
itself and the consolidation of the bridgeheads. The Egyptians succeeded also in 
repulsing the Israeli counter-offensive on the 8th, and inflicted unprecedented losses 
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on the IDF in terms of personnel, hardware and confidence with fewer Egyptian 
losses.86 The crossing operation, for example, despite its complexity at the tactical 
and operational levels, left around 280 Egyptian casualties in comparison to the pre-
war estimation of up to 10,000.87 
On 6 October 1973, the war was launched at 2.00 pm with short air strikes on the 
Israeli command and communications centres in the western and middle Sinai. Then 
bombardment commenced which followed the pattern of interlocking firing. Under 
this cover waves of Egyptian commandos and infantry crossed the Canal and 
stabilized a foothold on the eastern bank, benefiting from combined arms, air 
defence, anti-armour and artillery. Dealing with the IDF strongholds was delayed 
until the first Egyptian operational echelon (five infantry divisions each reinforced 
by an armoured brigade) overwhelmed the Israeli first echelon reserves.  
On the same day the Bab Al-Mandab strait in the opening of the Red Sea was 
blocked efficiently against Israeli shipping by two Egyptian destroyers that had been 
sent to Aden and were given a sealed envelope including the orders for their mission 
to be opened only a short period before the outbreak of the war so as not to give an 
early warning to Israel. 88  
All Bar-Lev strongholds were seized at a later stage, most after being encircled from 
behind. Then the second stage of operations, the final operational objective, 
commenced which was creating and fortifying the bridgeheads. It started by forming 
a bridgehead for each infantry division, then for the two field armies. The second 
army was responsible for the north of Sinai, and the third army was responsible for 
the south, and were bisected at Defressoir.  
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The stability and resilience of the strongholds were crucial for the strategic plan. 
First, this was a solidified territorial achievement as a condition for an advantage in 
a future diplomatic process. Second, it represented the pillar of the defensive layout 
in front of the expected Israeli counter-offensives aiming not only to expel the 
Egyptians from the eastern Bank, but to counter-cross. If this happened it would 
upset the strategic balance in any diplomatic process. Third, strong bridgeheads 
would force the Israelis to launch offensives in vain and incur more losses as the IDF 
did on the 8 October when three armoured divisions experienced significant 
casualties. As air/armoured supremacy and sensitivity to human losses were basic 
layers of Israel‟s security concept, it would be severely challenged as the Egyptians 
expected. 
Sadat refused peremptorily proposals as early as 7 October and also on 12 October 
for a cease-fire and he reiterated his determination to continue the war until the 
Israelis agreed to a withdrawal from the Sinai and to participate in peace 
negotiations.89  He commenced communication with the US on 7 October with a 
letter to Kissinger explaining the Egyptian point of view, that the conflict could be 
solved by comprehensive agreement which would include an Israeli withdrawal, 
free passage through Tiran and Suez, which could be supervised temporarily by the 
UN, and searching for a just solution for the Palestinians. However, he also assured 
Kissinger that Egypt would not “deepen or extend the scale of operations”.90 
Although Sadat‟s Adviser for National Security attempted to advocate this by 
clarifying that Sadat meant that the Egyptians did not intend to attack Israeli civilian 
centres, what Kissinger clearly understood from this sentence was that the Egyptians 
would stay on the defensive and would not rush to the Passes as Israel 
                                                          
89
 He informed the British Ambassador on 7 October his refusal of any premature ceasefire until his war 
objectives were achieved. (Cairo -Adams to FCO, 1300z, 7October 1973, FCO 93/254, National Archives – UK). 
The second occasion was when the British, at Kissinger’s request because Israel was performing highly on the 
Syrian front, explored the Egyptian response to the British proposal for a ceasefire. Again, Sadat’s answer was 
a big No. “Bridges to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Message #6, No 10 to 
Blackpool, 12 October 1973, PREM 15/1765. National Archives –UK”.  
90
 Hafiz Ismail, Egyptian National Security, pp.317-319 ; Kissinger, The Years of Upheaval, p.482. 
241 
 
expected.91This was a grave mistake strategically as it gave Israel breathing space to 
focus on the Syrian front after the failure of its counter-offensive of the 8th in Sinai. 
The situation in Syria was extremely serious as Israel started to attack economic and 
military infrastructures on 9 October, and Damascus on the 10th. On the same day, 
the IDF broke through the Syrian formations in the northern Golan and threatened 
Damascus on 11 October. Iraq committed an armoured division to the Syrian front 
which arrived on the 12th together with a Jordanian armoured brigade, and the 
situation stabilized. 
The American diplomatic strategy contained three elements, as Kissinger later 
explained: supporting the position of Israel by half-hearted cease-fire initiatives to 
convince the Egyptians to halt their progress; trying to postpone the cease-fire to 
give Israel a window to restore the situation or to achieve a military advantage at 
least on one front; and convincing Jordan not to comply with  Arab pressure to go to 
war or to permit the stationing of Arab forces on its territory even if Hussein  had to 
send a brigade to Syria in response to that regional  pressure.92 
Under Syrian pressure on the 11th, Sadat ordered his command to resume the thrust 
by racing to the Passes; the next step laid out in the formal plan of war. The decision 
was taken to launch the offensives on the 13th and then was postponed to 14th 
October. 
Sadat‟s strategy at this stage of the war was mixed. On the one hand he used military 
developments strategically to the maximum benefit by refusing the initial cease-fire 
proposals in order to increase the feeling of Israeli insecurity and fear of further 
Egyptian offensives. On the other hand, he reassured the Americans regarding his 
ultimate intentions. The way that he dealt with the American directly, ignoring the 
Soviets and emphasising that any international proposal should be directed to him 
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and not to Moscow, were the early signs of his reoriented policy/grand strategic 
preference.   
Ultimately, he believed that the US was the only power with the capacity to push 
Israel into diplomatic concessions and was convinced of the need to re-orientate 
Egypt towards the United States. He did not acknowledge, however, that  a 
diplomatic process sponsored by the US would not be even-handed, as would be 
demonstrated by Kissinger‟s attitude both at this stage of the war and thereafter.  
Breakthrough and Aftermath (14 – 25 October 1973) 
Things began to go badly for Egypt on 14 October when the price for the weak points 
in Egyptian policy/strategy had to be paid. Although the Syrian front had become 
fairly quiet by 13 October, Sadat ordered the military to mount an offensive, with 
explicit objections only from Shazly.  
Shazly maintained that the plan the army had trained for and was capable of 
implementing had, as explained above, already been achieved. Any further offensive 
now outside the air-defence umbrella would, he argued, be catastrophic. One event 
emphasised Shazly‟s point when Brigade 21 faced a shattering air strike on the 13th 
when it was given a mistaken order to move south.   
Although Gamasy supported the proposed offensive, he grossly denied its 
operational applicability on 14 October since the operational tempo had been lost 
and the IDF had recovered from its initial paralysis and was enhancing its defensive 
layout.93 Hafez Assad, the Syrian President, and Heikal also shared Gamasy‟s 
estimate in retrospect.94   
 The poor and hesitant modus operandi of the Egyptian offensive on the 14th left 
more than 400 tanks lost.  Division 21, the main armoured reserve of the second 
army, and one brigade of the Fourth Division, the armoured reserve of the third 
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army, specifically were wrecked. The Egyptian public narrative claimed that an 
American R-71 was recorded flying beyond the Egyptian air-defences reaches on the 
13th and that this plane detected the movement of Division 21 and conveyed the 
news to the IDF.95  
In any case, this information would not have made much difference as the Israelis 
were expecting, and indeed hoping, for the Egyptian defences to weaken after their 
offensive had been repulsed and delayed their counter-offensive until after breaking 
the offensive, as will be shown.   
On the night of the 15/16 October, Sharon‟s and Dan‟s divisions commenced the 
breakthrough, in which the second division would move down the western bank at 
the third army sector, and the first division would form and maintain a corridor for a 
counter-crossing. Despite the bloodiest fighting in the war (what became known as 
the “Chinese Farm Battle”) the Egyptian 16th Division was pushed back and Sharon 
was able to send a battalion of tanks to the western front. The first task was to attack 
as many SAM sites as possible. On the 17th-21st, three Israeli divisions were 
transferred, including most of Magan‟s division apart from the corridor guardian 
forces, while Sharon‟s raced north towards Ismailia, and Dan and Magan‟s forces 
moved west and south towards Suez and the Suez-Cairo main road. 
Only on the 17th did the Egyptians realize how severe the situation was and 
discussed within the military high command the best option in response. There were 
two options: either to try to close the corridor from the east or to withdraw their 
armoured brigades from the east to destroy the Israeli forces in the west. Ismail, 
under the direction of Sadat, supported the first, and Shazly supported the second. 
Sadat and Ismail were obsessively against any “withdrawal” of the Egyptian forces 
from the east bank.  
Shazly tried hard to explain that almost two divisions in the west could not be 
contained by half of the 4th armoured division and a paratrooper brigade given the 
                                                          
95
 Gamasy, The October War, p.401. 
244 
 
quality of the Israeli armoured forces and the gaps in the air defence umbrella which 
permitted IAF air tactical support. He stressed the force imbalance in the Egyptian 
layout on the two banks; seven armoured brigades and five infantry divisions in the 
east facing only three armoured Israeli brigades, and a completely opposite picture 
in the west.  
Lastly, he explained how a horizontal counter-offensive from the east aiming to close 
the corridor would be less effective than from the west. However, the nature of 
political-military relations made Sadat‟s order non-contestable and two brigades in 
the east were ordered to push in a pincer movement to close the gap. However, this 
operation ended with one brigade destroyed and the other failing to achieve its aim.  
Another meeting was held on the 20th, when Shazly returned from the front and 
insisted on his previous proposal as the situation in the west had become 
significantly worse for the Egyptians. He asked Ismail to call Sadat in order to 
resolve the tension in the high command. When Sadat came he rejected Shazly‟s 
proposal in a harsh way and ordered that no change be made to the previous orders. 
The only move he took was diplomatic. He agreed to a cease-fire. 96   
The first cease-fire was sanctioned by the UN on 21 October (Resolution 338) and 
came into force on the 22nd. Israel formally accepted the decision, but her three 
divisions kept operating. A second cease-fire was sanctioned on the 22nd (Resolution 
339) and had the same fate; Israel formally accepted but did not implement it. Dan‟s 
division tried to seize Suez city to attain a massive political gain, but was repulsed 
by the people‟s guerrilla resistance supported by an attachment from the 19th 
Division. However, he succeeded in destroying all SAM positions working in the 
Third Army sector and attacking all its managerial and logistical posts;97 now the 
Egyptian Third Army became totally encircled from east and west with no air 
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defence to protect it from Israeli air power. Israeli forces succeeded also in blocking 
the Suez-Cairo road and encircling Suez City itself. 
On the 25 October, the UN proposed a third cease-fire (Resolution 340) to be 
enforced by UN Emergency Forces. The mutual atrocities stopped on 28 October. By 
that time Sadat had ordered three armoured brigades to move west which made the 
force weight more balanced with that of the Israelis, and plan “Shamel” was forged 
to deal with the Israeli pocket but was never implemented.98 Three SCUD missiles 
were launched on the pocket a few minutes before the cease-fire as a symbolic 
gesture.99  
 
Disengagement (25 October 1973 – January 1974)   
This ending led to UN-supported military negotiations in order to apply the cease-
fire and disengage forces. This was known as the “100 km negotiations” but they 
ended without conclusion. A peace conference in Geneva also failed to reach any 
political or military resolution. However, Kissinger, who visited Egypt in November 
and December, brought about a conclusion through his piecemeal “shuttle” 
diplomacy. Egypt and Israel agreed on “six points” that included stabilizing the 
cease-fire, channelling non-military supplies to the Third army and Suez under UN 
supervision, negotiating disengagement, and returning POWs and bodies of Israeli 
KIA which was vital domestically for Meir‟s government.100 
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The first Agreement of Disengagement was reached in January 1974. It stated that 
Israeli forces would return to Sinai with a buffer zone occupied by UN emergency 
forces, and only 7000 Egyptian forces and 30 tanks. SAM missiles were to be 
withdrawn 30 km to the west and symbolic artillery pieces were to be permitted to 
stay on the east bank of Sinai. For Gamasy, now COS after Shazly was fired in 
December 1973, it was shocking. Gamasy described, with Ismail Fahmy, the acting 
Foreign Minister, how Sadat interacted exclusively with Kissinger and kept both of 
them in the dark and then imposed the agreement on them. 101 
Sadat’s strategy at this stage was paradoxical. On one hand he publicly 
underestimated the Israeli military gains and overestimated the Egyptian gains. On 
the other hand, he made serious concessions that even the problematic operational 
outcome could not justify. But, as mentioned earlier, another reason may account for 
these concessions (which were astonishing to both Kissinger and the Israelis) which 
was his bidding for a regional re-orientation with the US and his personal eagerness 
for a political victory, even a symbolic one. 
Guiding the fighting power  
The strategic guidance of fighting power in the preparations for the 1973 War by the 
Egyptian command was of a near excellent standard, especially if compared to 1967. 
It had understood what type of war it was going to fight and its strategic logic. The 
parameters of this strategic logic governed all layers of guiding the fighting ability. 
Also, the Egyptian command identified the strategic, operational and tactical 
obstacles in the impending war and invented, or adapted, competent solutions.  
Hence, Egypt did not merely succeed in enhancing its fighting capabilities linearly in 
quality and quantity, or merely in counter-balancing the IDF operationally and 
tactically, but it did that in line with its strategic concept of the 1973 War. 
Doctrinal 
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The Egyptian military did not recognise the value of writing a doctrine. While some 
formulae were in existence, mostly copying Soviet models, they were mostly tactical-
technical and to a lesser extent operational.  
However, there was an increasing Egyptian engagement with the issue of 
operational thinking and doctrine after 1967, and because of the operational and 
tactical dilemmas faced during the War of Attrition. The army was encouraged to 
look for solutions to these problems and to improve its professional conduct at 
operational and tactical levels.   
Two big decisions were taken by the Egyptian strategic command.  
The first was to attach the Egyptian military system strongly to the Soviets starting 
from 1967. This was obviously a strategic decision and was motivated by political 
issues. Nasser‟s new policy of dependence on the USSR which had been the main 
weaponry provider before 1967 anyway, with an accessible military educational 
system, meant that almost all officers above the rank of lieutenant-colonel had 
training/education in the USSR on tactical and operational issues.102 The linguistic 
barrier was eased by massive translations into English and Arabic. 
The second decision, which is more interesting here, was modifying the Soviet 
doctrine to suit the Egyptian theatre and strategy. Heikal indicated the wide 
difference in the scope of the operational theatre for which the Soviet doctrines were 
prepared; distances of 1000 kilometres for example in the western European front 
compared with Egyptian plans for the Sinai which measured only 170 by 250 km. 
But it was not just a matter of minimizing the geometric parameters of Soviet 
doctrine. As Asher showed clearly, most of the Soviet doctrinal recommendations 
for building tactical/operational defensive and offensive operations were modified 
to suit the context.103  
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More interesting was that these modifications related to the strategic mission that 
included an assessment of Israeli strategic, operational and tactical strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Dani Asher‟s well documented study on “The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur 
War” benefited from searching Egyptian military documents captured during the 
Israeli counter-crossing. It mainly focused on the operational level of war by linking 
it to Egyptian operational education and doctrine and, while tracing the roots of this 
doctrine in Soviet doctrine, showed how the Egyptians adapted it to both the theatre 
dimensions and peculiarities of Sinai and to the characteristics of the strategic 
mission in the 1973 War.  
The military strategic concept in this war was that Egyptian Army would bypass the 
Israeli supremacy in air and armour by establishing extensive curtains of air-
defences and anti-armour layers. Also, since they risked being outmanoeuvred in 
mobile armoured operations in the desert where the IDF was talented with 
armoured fists and air tactical support, Egyptian defensive/offensive operations 
would be pursued under the curtains with prior planning and training in minute 
detail and with rapid turning to defensive action.104 
In air doctrine, while the Soviet doctrine indicated preparatory deep air operations, 
both interdiction to disrupt the operational reserve and strategic to attain air 
supremacy, Egypt‟s capability did not allow it to pursue this step to the end and 
Egyptian doctrine replaced this requirement with reliance on an extensive umbrella 
of SAM 2/3 supported by anti-aircraft guns, mobile SAM6 and portable SAM7 
(Strella). It also aimed to shorten the operational depth to the limits of this umbrella. 
Dog fighting, since the bad experience of the War of Attrition when the ratio of 
Egyptian to Israeli losses in planes were 4-8:1, was restricted to essential missions  in 
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which planes could remain under the air-defence curtain as far as possible and 
operated in concentrated groups of fighters.105  
For ground forces, while the Soviet doctrine relied heavily on mobile in-depth 
offence and defence, and considered the offensive breakthrough by second echelon 
armour106 as the “golden key” for victory and attaining operational objectives, the 
Egyptian doctrine, adopted another pattern, acknowledging limitations in armoured 
mobile warfare and considering the strategic effects that were needed at the political 
level (limited war with modest operational advantage).   
This focused on creating stable bridgeheads and using fortified static defence anti-
armoured missiles, mortars, mines, and tactical reserve tanks in a complementary 
fashion as the golden key for the operation. The anti-armour Egyptian defence 
layout was fascinating; it began with an artillery zone (4000-5000 m), then a Saggers‟  
zone (1000-3000 m), followed by cannon and RPGs 7. These forward defensive zones 
were complemented by tank regiments in the second echelon of tactical formations. 
107 
Naval doctrine acknowledged the vulnerability of the Egyptian navy in undertaking 
operations outside the air-defence umbrella, whether blockade, littoral offensive or 
amphibious. Hence it confined the navy‟s mission to littoral defence, limited naval 
barrages on the northern Sinai coast, a few commandos, but mainly to enforce a 
strategic blockade at Bab-Al Mandab which was not reachable by the IAF.  
At a more tactical level, the Egyptians were very concerned with easing the tactical 
problems of the crossing, mainly overcoming the IDF strongholds, the dust ramp 
and the fire system, and they succeeded admirably in this, as failure would have cost 
heavily at the operational and strategic levels. 
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Regarding the strongholds, the doctrine which was applied meticulously in practice 
envisioned dealing with them in three stages: silencing their intervening fire during 
the crossing with heavy artillery barrages supported by tanks, anti-tank weapons 
and tactical air support; bypassing them by choosing landing spots between them or 
avoiding fighting them if that could not be achieved, and taking them in later stages 
from behind after cutting their lines of logistic support and retreat. 108  
Regarding the dust ramp which reached 15-20 meters height at a steep angle, the 
Egyptians found a solution by creating up to 70 breaks in it using pressured water 
pumps.109 
Regarding the fire system (Ot Yarmoe in Hebrew), this was a controversial issue that 
was generally emphasised in all Egyptian military writings and it consumed a 
significant part of resources and concentration in operational and tactical efforts. The 
Egyptians identified the openings by intelligence/surveillance and blocked them a 
few hours before the operation.110   
In contrast, the formal Israeli narrative states that most of the project was not 
completed and was non-functioning at the time of crossing.111 Even the Egyptian 
military intelligence report of September 1972 that was published in Asher‟s study 
clearly supported the Israeli claim as it indicated that only 2 stations were 
working.112 
However, given the highly cautious Egyptian attitude, which may be said to have 
reached a degree of obsessive perfectionism in the details of the crossing, as shown 
in Shazly‟s account of the operation, these reports may be looked at as the worst case 
scenario being considered, and unnecessary effort was expended on it. But generally, 
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the way the doctrine conceived the preventative measures for this tactical problem, 
as the Egyptians perceived it, was illustrative of the progress they had made.   
Another interesting example to show how the strategic concept of operations would 
infiltrate even  minute details was the fighting load of the infantry soldier which 
worldwide doctrines at the time recommended to be up to 22 kg in order to have a 
balanced exchange between mobility and sustainment.113 However, as the logic of 
the Egyptian offensive at the crossing was not looking for swift advances, but rather 
to build stable defences with the ability of the infantryman to face the Israeli 
armoured formations with his anti-armour weapons, the load for infantrymen 
crossing the Canal and infiltrating the first echelon tactical defence of the enemy 
reached 35 kg for equipment, and the Egyptians used hand pushed carriers for 
heavier elements.114 
On the other hand, the structural weakness of the Egyptian armed forces in the 
operational art and manoeuvring in warfare persisted. This anomaly, however, was 
related to the deep cultural, societal and political dimensions which persisted: an 
obsession with political security, lack of familiarity with modern technology and 
information, limited tactical leadership and cohesion and lack of flexible patterns of 
command organization, although some measures to improve these were taken.115  
The Egyptians might have sought earlier to restructure their general military 
capabilities by having a strong air power and armoured forces capable of sustaining 
and deciding the mobile armoured battles, In fact, however, tanks were used in most 
parts of the war as artillery with very limited mobile utility.  
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Obviously, they chose the easier solution of accepting their operational structural 
weakness and getting round them by developing special strategic-operational 
formulae as has been indicated. For an objective assessment of the responsibility of 
the military leadership for restructuring the army, two points should be considered. 
Firstly, this mission is related to handling conditioning strategic dimensions 
(political, cultural, economic, and socio-technological) which were almost outside 
the reach of military strategic command. 
Second, it is very dangerous nevertheless to aim to modify the deep layers in any 
army‟s institutional, doctrinal and leadership structures in a short period prior to an 
imminent war as these modifications may lead to a temporary period of weak 
functioning, unless the military formation is unusually adaptable.116   
Human   
Egypt, as a result of its underdeveloped system of governance, always suffered a 
deficient system of mobilization. However, since the 1967 war, enlistment was 
extended to university graduates who had previously been exempt, and all forces 
were kept in the active system. This step, however, created dramatic social and 
developmental problems which pushed the Army to transfer some forces to the 
reserve from 1970.117  
The leadership faced two types of problems in preparation for war; how to expand 
the forces‟ manpower, and especially the officer corps which was under strength by 
about 40%, and how to improve the mobilization system for general expansion and 
utility. The Egyptian Army after the War of Attrition numbered around 800,000 and 
it was planned to reach around 1.2 million to cover both active duties at the front 
and deep defences in the rear.  
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The Egyptian population, as Shazly indicated, was not capable of providing the 
armed forces with their yearly needs of 160,000 healthy and mentally capable 
individuals; in fact, the number only reached 120,000. As a result, the military 
leadership had to reduce the high level requirements for enlisting. The problem of 
the officer class was more devastating as the military academies were supplying a 
rate of 3,000 per year, and the armed forces needed at least 30,000 extra officers. 
Hence, leadership came up with a new invention; the professionally limited officers 
who were selected from graduated NCOs and soldiers and were then given limited 
tactical education in a specific service with a severely limited inter-service training. 
This technique covered the shortage.118   
Morale. After 1967, the morale of the Egyptian Army was at its lowest and 
membership even had a social stigma. Whatever the initial political and strategic 
aims of the War of Attrition, it resulted in the military forces regaining much of their 
self-confidence and trust in their commanders.119 The increased intellectual and 
leadership qualities of the officer corps and the reduction of officer arrogance after 
1967 narrowed much of the gap between officers and men.   
Soldiers also enjoyed improved environmental and logistical conditions. The 
readiness of officers and commanders for self-sacrifice during the War of Attrition 
and the 1973 war helped them win trust in the armed forces.  
Also, although the humiliating defeat of 1967 and the sufferings of the Egyptians in 
the following six years negatively affected morale at first, they led ultimately to 
improved armed forces morale when better training and achievements brought 
increased confidence. 120  
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The strategic command also recognised and used the influence of religion to speed 
up the improvement in the forces‟ morale and encourage self-sacrifice.121  
The morale factor was extensively manifested during the fighting and was highly 
remarked upon by the Israeli forces.122  In clear contrast to the experiences of the 
1967 war, no apparent incidents of forces fleeing combat were recorded.  
Education/Training. The Egyptian military academy was established in 1922 and the 
Army Staff College in 1939, but further developments in educational techniques 
were introduced after 1967; mainly the military missions to the Soviet Union. The 
Naval War College was established in 1946, the Air Academy in 1956 and the 
Military Technical College for graduating military engineers in 1957. However, some 
more specializations were lacking and were not established until after the 1973 war. 
In addition to the formal military education at tactical and operational levels, the 
staff system headed by Shazly formulated and broadcast many of the professional 
directives dealing with the evolving tactical and operational problems.123 Also, more 
than one hundred military research projects were undertaken with varying 
success.124  
Command. The Egyptian Army Staff achieved real improvements in the field of 
military command and communication. As Shazly described in detail, he established 
the tradition of monthly command conferences at which 40 generals from the staff 
system met around 50 of their operational counterparts, and around 14 military 
commands and their deputies met and discussed tactical and operational themes. 
                                                          
121
 For example, through increasing the military missionary service in the army, planning the use of vocal 
religious mobilisation during operations by repeating “Allah Akbar – Allah is Almighty” and equipping the 
crossing forces with microphones for this purpose and also handing them a portable booklet (1.2 million copies 
published) and entitled; ”Our Religious Doctrine is The Way for Victory”, Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, pp. 
84-87 & p.223 (Arabic version: pp.25-26 & p.243). 
122
 Sharon, Warrior: An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001) p.304; Moshe Dayan, Story of My 
Life (New York: Warner Books, 1977) pp.434 - 435.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
123
 Examples of these directives were mentioned in Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.44-46. 
124
 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.44-46. 
255 
 
Adding to the much improved officer corps and officer-soldier relations, which 
enhanced morale and tactical cohesion125 and increased general control, the tradition 
of field visits was a norm that peaked in the Egyptian army after the 1967 War;.  
On the negative side, however, existing shortcomings continued to affect the armed 
forces‟ performance. Firstly, the command system was still much centralised and this 
affected the quality of tactical and operational leadership, a strict prerequisite for 
mobile warfare. Centralization caused a time lag in carrying out operational and 
tactical developments on the battlefield and further delays in formulating and 
distributing orders for action. Orders were usually out-dated by the time they were 
received and so did not fit with operational and tactical needs to enable a unified 
response. This was the case clearly in the Egyptian measures to contain the Israeli 
counter-crossing. The GHQ took two days (from 15-17 October) to realize the actual 
depth and scale of the breakthrough which had been evolving during that time and 
never responded to subsequent developments on time.  
This prevented the Egyptians from making rapid responses or taking initiatives at 
the time that the breakthrough was limited. The problem of centralization even 
reached levels unprecedented since 1967, as Sadat and GHQ were sending specific 
orders to tactical commands, bypassing the operational and divisional commands, 
and many of the tactical commanders complained later that they received conflicting 
orders and their missions kept changing.126   
The second problem was sensitivity to criticism and rejecting critical approaches 
which restricted information sharing and comprehensive debate in the command 
chain. The actual depth and criticality of the Israeli breakthrough were kept secret by 
Sadat‟s orders not only from the Egyptian domestic audience but from tactical and 
operational commanders as well. SAM battalions stationed on the Eastern bank of 
the Canal were taken by surprise by Israeli forces and they initially thought the latter 
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were friendly forces as they had been kept in the dark regarding the presence of 
Israeli troops on the west bank of Suez.127  
Organisational     
Organizational capability was improved after 1967 both in formal and informal 
norms. More professionalism in selection and promotions replaced the highly 
politicised system run by Amer in 1967. However, as is often the case in a security 
obsessed regime, full loyalty of the senior command to Sadat was essential. Even 
operational and tactical decisions were affected by this necessity. For example, the 
new T-62 tanks (whose 135 mm guns had better fire power than the 105mm of the 
best Israeli tanks) were distributed among units against the wishes of Shazly who 
planned to build a mighty armoured division for offensive exploitation. The motive 
for the wider distribution was a lack of trust in the head of this armoured division.128  
The ratio between armoured (mobility) and artillery/infantry (firepower) elements 
was still skewed, as described earlier. Due to doctrinal and human factors, tanks 
were used mostly as static artillery.  
Positive elements did exist, mainly in air-defence and logistics, while the balance 
was mixed in military intelligence and Special Forces. 
The organisation of air-defence as an independent service was decided in 1968 to 
ensure better control and defence against Israeli deep aerial operations rather than 
better utility in offensive aerial and ground operations. It was a sign of the 
adaptability of the Egyptian Army, although contrary to general military thinking, 
and it paid off in the 1973 war.129 The leadership kept strong organisational ties at 
                                                          
127
  Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, p.297, (Arabic version).  
128
 Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, pp.122-123 (Arabic Version). 
129
 Maarof Bekhit, two times Jordanian Prime Minister and Army Major General described in his unpublished 
PhD thesis, The Evolution of Egyptian Air Defence Strategy (Kings College London, 1990) in detail the hard-
evolutionary course of creating a central air-defence and developing its doctrinal, technical and command 
requirements. 
257 
 
the central level between the new service and air power.  One positive result was the 
avoidance of tangible losses from friendly fire. However, as a general rule of 
Egyptian practice in 1973, this centrally-structured liaison negatively affected the 
management of aerial battles, and any battles requiring combined arms. Hence, only 
operations pre-planned in minute detail or static defensive battles were feasible.   
Logistic/engineering/maintenance systems were much improved in 1973 as a result 
of better planning and control. The military engineers‟ regiments, in particular, 
whether in central formations or attached to divisions, showed high morale and 
innovative ability in both the Attrition and 1973 wars.130 They were responsible for 
building SAMs shelters in 1969-70, building very sophisticated logistical roads and 
supply chains before the 1973 war, and carrying out the technical requirements of 
the crossing operation.  
Military intelligence and surveillance were mixed. They functioned very well if 
they were sufficiently prepared for their mission, as in the pre-war stage, and they 
gave valuable and detailed information on IDF formations in Sinai. Deceptive 
capability was high at a strategic level and was very spectacular, and leaks were also 
prevented before the war. But hardly any operational or tactical measures were 
taken during the course of the war itself, apart from decoy light bridges and smoke 
during the crossing.131 Also, military intelligence was very weak in gathering real 
time details of IDF advances. This may have been the result of IAF attacks on radar 
systems, the technological imbalance favouring Israel in electronic warfare, and 
interception by new US fine art technology that reached Israel after 11 October, as 
well as the fundamental cultural and political reasons described by Pollack. 132   
The Special Forces element featured in the Order of Battle as 34 battalions of 
“Sa‟sqa” (Thunderbolt). The two paratrooper brigades may be considered as 
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Rangers rather than real Special Forces. These forces received the best training in the 
Egyptian Army and had high morale and self-confidence, especially after the 
experience of the War of Attrition. As Finlan indicated, the utility of Special Forces 
can be strategic (decapitation) or, most commonly, operational (disrupting the 
advancing echelons or occupying critical territory) or, less preferably, tactical.133 
Egyptian Special Forces were used mostly for tactical tasks, but those that required 
daring capability. Their operational use under the original plan was abandoned 
because the lack of aerial protection led to huge losses during air lifting, and was 
ultimately considered unnecessary as the preference was against pushing the 
offensive beyond the bridgeheads. 
Nevertheless, in some cases tactical utility proved operationally effective as the 
paratrooper brigade, under the command of Ibrahim Al-Rifa‟ei who was killed in 
action, and a Sa‟aqa battalion halted the progress of Sharon‟s forces to the north. But 
generally, the cautious attitude of the Egyptian leadership prevented the proper 
exploitation of Special Forces, apart from the operation at the Ras-Sedr oil sites.134  
Material   
The memoirs of Egyptian political and military leaders show a clear and accurate 
understanding of the comparative imbalance with Israel and the domestic and 
external factors aggravating it in the long run, especially in air power. Howeidy and 
Shazly detail the impact of Cold War dynamics and the procurement policies of the 
US versus the USSR towards their clients. While the United States provided Israel 
with the latest versions of equipment (as in the airlift from 11 October) the USSR 
provided Egypt with two generations lower, despite the generally higher quality of 
US equipment, especially in air power135 (for example, only a few MiG23s were 
permitted to arrive before the war and the same applied to tanks and air defences). 
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Nevertheless, the Egyptian Army did develop its arsenal in quantity and quality. 
With 2100 tanks, mainly T45, T55 and a few T62s, 400 fighters (250 Mig 21, 19, 17) 
and medium and long range bombers in Ilyushin 18 and Tu16, 1000 artillery pieces 
and moderate naval power (4 destroyers, 15 missile boats and other variants),136  
Egypt‟s weaponry was at least comparable to that of the IDF in quantity and quality, 
except in air power where the F-4 was much superior to the Mig-21 in avionics and 
armaments.137  
The only problem which affected the operational capability and outcome was the 
grade of air defences SAM. Egypt had around 150 batteries but mostly of the static 
SAM 2 and 3 and only a few pieces of the mobile SAM 6, many fewer than the 
Syrians. This limited capability would make any mobile offensive after the crossing 
very difficult, unless it was rectified by sufficient change in the Soviet procurement 
policy before the war. 
 Another obstacle was the military industrial infrastructure which was still in the 
stage of small arms and ammunition.  
The above detailed assessment shows that Egypt‟s detailed strategies were high 
quality at the beginning but deteriorated massively with the decision to extend the 
operational scope and suffered till the end in both military and diplomatic domains. 
Guiding operational art and capability was outstanding as Egypt‟s strategic 
command moulded art and capability to reflect the strategic requirement while 
avoiding the structural weakness rooted in strategy dimensions, as explained in 
Chapter two. Unfortunately, from 14 October this operational component became 
incompatible with the new strategic situation.  
To sum up, with the absence of clear policy, with moderate grand and military 
strategies and very competent enhancement of operational capability and strategic 
shaping of the operational art, the overall assessment of Egypt’s practical layer 
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should be considered moderate. This was almost reflective of its moderate 
conceptual and institutional strategic abilities.   
 
The Strategic Ability of Israel 
The Conceptual Layer 
In the Israeli case, due to the previous history of Haganah irregular warfare and the 
achievements of the 1948 war, practical orientation was favoured at the expense of 
theory, which Kober called “anti-intellectualism” and Adamsky “the lack of 
intellectual tradition”.138 This trend was traced in the previous chapter and the 
appendix, but it was at its strongest in the period leading up to the 1973 War as the 
outstanding military victory of 1967 seemed to emphasise the basic assumption of 
the rightness of the IDF‟s stand together with a sense of invincibility.  
This anti-intellectualism can be understood through social and cultural factors, as in 
Kober and Adamsky‟s analysis. It further entrenched the Israeli trend towards a 
“tacticization of strategy”. Strategy is a theoretical and practical task, of course, but its 
theoretical element is vital. This trend of considering pragmatic solutions and 
tacticized responses at the expense of the theoretical and adaptable elements of 
strategy was also dependent on other factors, including Israel‟s geostrategic 
perception, its economic situation, and political-military relations within the 
leadership of the country. All these favoured a rapid resort to offensive operations 
that seek a decisive victory on the battlefield.139 
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Clausewitz was not initially read in Israeli strategic institutions, and a limited 
Hebrew translation only became available in the 1980s.140 Liddell Hart was thought 
to have had a greater impact on Israeli strategy141 than was actually the case, and 
Allon‟s grasp of Hart‟s theory was mainly at the operational level.142 In the 1950s and 
1960s some theoretical discussions, strategic but mostly operational and doctrinal, 
occurred as discussed earlier, but after the 1967 War the tone and content of 
theoretical discussion was kept to a minimum.  
At the grand strategic level, Ben-Gurion‟s theory of “infinite battle” between Arabs 
and Jews still prevailed, a theory that proposed that Israel should fight and win 
battles on an indefinite timescale as peaceful conditions with the Arabs were not 
possible, and Israel could not survive a  single defeat while the Arabs could.143  
According to this theory, successive victories would enhance conventional 
deterrence and lengthen the periods of non-belligerency between wars to give Israel 
time for further preparation and state building (absorbing new immigrants and 
enhancing the socio-eco-technological layers for a better army). 144 
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At the military strategic level, this theory entrenched the “tacticization of strategy” 
indirectly. Since the military tool was not going to be used to modify the will of the 
enemy, or destroy it in a war with total aims in order to create the conditions for an 
advantageous peace, but was to be used merely to achieve a cascade of military 
victories, strategic thinking was surrendered voluntarily to operational or even 
tactical practice. 
There was, in addition, a growing conviction after 1967 that the Arabs could not 
attack, due to their permanent social and cultural deficiency, and that therefore 
Israel was naturally invincible.145  
With such thinking in place, a new strategic “concept” was evolved which 
maintained the emphasis on the centrality of decisive battles by using air power and 
armoured fists but denied the perception of the possibility of the next war based on 
the Israeli understanding of the outcomes of the 1967 and Attrition Wars.  Arabs 
were, it was thought, by nature unfit to launch a modern war on a large scale, 
especially using air and armoured forces, and the Egyptian Army, specifically, 
would need to obtain long-range bombers and fighters to confront the Israeli 
retaliatory and coercive deep strategic bombing if they sought to resume large-scale 
fighting.146  
The conceptual bias towards operational and tactical issues was present in the 
evolution of Israeli military education up to the 1970s. After 1948, a school for officer 
corps‟ education and training was established with more emphasis on duty training. 
One of the shortcomings of these courses was their single-branch orientation which 
decreased the ability to launch combined warfare,147 an approach that was only 
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strengthened by the total armoured doctrine and force structure as will be discussed 
below. Staff officer education only began during the early 1960s and never moved 
beyond the operational sciences, and even then, not in a combined form. Chapter 
Three describes the attempt to establish a National Defence College in 1962 which 
was closed in 1966. 
Despite this domestic lack of training, Israel sent many of her military cadre abroad, 
mainly to France, the UK and the US, for tactical training and a few were sent  for 
operational and higher education, such as Ezer Weizman, the future head of the IAF,  
who went to the British Staff College.  
The decision makers in the 1973 War were a very limited group; Golda Meir, the 
prime minister, and her “kitchen cabinet” composed of Meir herself, Dayan, Israel 
Galili and Allon. All except Meir had a strong military background and Allon 
particularly had a strong strategic conceptual ability, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
The military echelon was headed by David Elazar and his deputy, Israel Tal, the 
father of the Israeli armoured corps who advanced the “all armoured” operational 
concept, and the head of military intelligence, Zeira. However, their grasp of 
strategy was heavily tacticized and focused on reaching for operational decisiveness 
as an end goal through a fixed operational formula. 
This marks the Israeli conceptual ability as low in this war. 
The Institutional Layer 
Relational 
The settings for civil-military relations in Israel, whether formal or informal, have 
been the subject of a complex debate. As Yoram Peri showed, there are different 
schools in describing them  and their impacts.  
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The conservative school emphasises the formal subordination of the army to the 
political leadership in spite of some discrete frictions from time to time.148  
The critical school has three sections; historical, social and political. This school 
adopts the position of considering that the military effectively hijacked the political 
and social environment, transforming Israel into a “garrison state”.149  
Another school mentioned but not named by Peri, may be called the “revisionist” 
school and includes Peri himself, with a strong foundation by Moshe Lissak further 
developed by Ben-Meir.150 This school explored the Israeli paradox; although the 
IDF was clearly rooted in civilian life and enjoyed incontestable social high esteem, it 
kept itself away generally from domestic politics. This phenomenon is explained by 
the strong democratic trend, at least among the Jews themselves, rooted in the long 
history of the Jewish Diaspora. 
 Also important was the grave security status of Israel and the determined political 
leadership, especially at the beginning under Ben-Gurion who showed a strong 
resistance to any politicization of the armed forces by dissolving all politico-military 
factions and amalgamating them into the IDF, which consolidated the trend of non-
politicized armed forces. As Sam Finer has indicated, military intervention in politics 
needs the officer corps to be in a special social stratum and isolated from the wider 
society and with high self-esteem.151 Three factors within the IDF prevented such a 
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process: reservists form the majority of the IDF and they are tangible forces, not 
“hollow” as in the case of the Arab armies; the double career and early retirement 
system which forced senior commanders to keep open relations with society; and the 
way the officer corps is generated from the conscripts not through unique 
educational and social backgrounds.152 Since the days of the Haganah, when the 
practical qualities gained through experience of war were more appreciated than 
theoretical knowledge when socialist ideas enhanced the sense of equality, Israel did 
not recognise or permit the establishment of a special class of the military, or even to 
acknowledge the necessity for a formal military academy.153  
However, this political isolation of the IDF was only one side of the coin; the other 
side is manifested in the area of national security and defence policy/strategy, the 
main interest here, in which the IDF enjoyed a status of political-military partnership 
rather than complete subordination to the political layer in order to achieve the 
policy-strategy ends required by politicians.  
Although the IDF was truly instrumental in the hands of Ben Gurion, he did not 
press for constitutionalizing or institutionalizing the relationship; actually, he was 
very fond of the constitutional ambiguity that left room for his political manoeuvres, 
domestically and in the foreign policy of Israel which was not keen to define her 
borders.154  
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The formal settings for civil-military relations in Israel, laid out by laws promulgated 
in 1953 and 1954, emphasised the political subordination of the IDF to the cabinet 
through the role of the minister of defence and gave the latter the right to order 
mobilization which the Knesset could cancel within 14 days of its announcement. 
The Chief of Staff was considered the supreme military command of the army, and 
performed a variety of roles: general chief of staff for all services, commander of all 
services, chief of staff of ground forces, and commander of all ground forces.155  
The formal settings were opaque in defining the detailed relationship between the 
Prime Minister, Cabinet, Minister of Defence, and Chief of Staff. Only after the 
difficult experiences of 1973 did Israel seek to define these relations more clearly 
through issuing the Basic Laws in 1974156 after the Agranat Commission, formed to 
investigate the functioning of the political-military leadership during the war, found 
serious faults in this area.  
 Informal relations, however, were more complex and ambiguous. As there was a 
lack of political guidance at the strategic level and in defence policy, the military 
imposed itself in this area, as Gonen, who would command the southern front in 
1973, explained in a lecture in 1970:  
As a rule, logic requires that in a democratic country, like the State of 
Israel…the strategic objectives of the state be determined by the political 
authority since it is generally accepted that the military authority is the 
executive authority and not the authority that determines or should 
determine the country‟s political goals… In our case the order was generally 
reversed. The army made up its own operational plans and made its own 
political assumptions as to those plans. In each of the operational files and 
operational plans, the first page contained basic hypothesis which the army, 
in practice, accepted as political hypothesis. In general, once a year the 
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General Staff presented its plans to the political echelon and received its 
approval and sometimes its comments. 157 
Despite the presence of such basic hypotheses, given both its structural weakness 
and professional bias, the political statements were really an expression of the IDF‟s 
operational and tactical drives.  
The IDF also created institutional platforms that in practice could obstruct the 
politicians‟ control over defence/policy strategy even if they wished to exert it. 
Many of the departments of the Ministry of Defence, especially procurement, the 
budgetary and, more importantly, the Planning and Policy Directorate were heavily 
militarized,158 except in the case of Shimon Perez whose approach was strongly 
influenced by Ben-Gurion.159 
 As a general trend, with the lack of a complete formal setting for political-military 
relations, the true functioning of these relations  was left to the crude balance of 
power, which could fluctuate over time and was skewed towards the IDF after the 
departure of Ben-Gurion, and to the interaction of specific personalities. 
Nevertheless, the military role in policy-strategy making fell just short of tutelage 
and closer to “partnership”160 during this period.  
In addition to the informal ways the IDF influenced politicians, as in the 1967 War, it 
had three formal means: the unique status of the COS, the role of military 
intelligence, and the General Staff‟s department of planning. 
Before 1967, as has been shown, the COS was permitted to attend the cabinet, but 
after the defence portfolio was created he became a formal attendee. Chiefs of Staff 
after the 1967 War enjoyed vast public and military support. Although the Prime 
Minister selected the COS from candidates presented by the Minister of Defence, the 
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appointment almost always reflected the will of the army. No incident of a dismissal 
of a COS took place; General Yarif resigned when Ben Gurion forced budgetary cuts 
upon him in 1953, and General Elazar resigned after the 1973 war in response to the 
Agranat Commission‟s report. While variations in personal relations existed, the will 
of the COS usually prevailed, especially over a Prime Minister who lacked a strong 
military background such as Eshkol and Meir or with unstable leadership characters 
such as Dayan in 1973.161  
The trend of military strategic decisions, even decisions to go to war, in 1956, 1967 
and 1973 showed the high influence of the COS on Israeli cabinets, although 
exceptions exist.162  
Paradoxically, on some occasions there was an over-involvement of the political 
leadership in the purely operational, even tactical details which did not have direct 
strategic significance. Dayan‟s attitude in 1967-1974 was an example of this as he 
even intervened in, for example, how many shells should be assigned to the artillery 
counter-attacks barrages against Egyptian during the War of Attrition! And this 
situation was repeated many times in the 1973 war, and Sharon himself used his 
special relations with Dayan to impose his ideas from above on the southern 
commanders, Bar-Lev and Gonen.163  
Ironically, Dayan himself called in his memoir for the non-interference of the 
Defence Minister in purely operational details when he was informed of the air 
strategy at the opening of the 1973 War, which aimed to concentrate its actions 
against the SAMs. Dayan thought it was an impossible task and would lead to air 
losses and permit invading Egyptian tanks to mass east of Suez. In fact, this example 
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does not fit with the principle definition of over-involvement as the decision had a 
strong strategic significance.164 
The second tool for military influence was Military Intelligence (Aman). The Director 
of Aman was responsible for the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and for 
directing civilian intelligence bodies - Mossad (external intelligence) and Shin-Bet 
(domestic security intelligence). The NIE was not confined to analysing adversaries‟ 
military capabilities or even intentions for war, but also proposed policy and 
strategy to deal with them. 165 
Paradoxically, when the Agranat Commission threw the lion‟s share of responsibility 
in 1973 on the Aman director, Zeira, for his frequent assertions that Egypt would not 
launch a war in the near future, he stated that his responsibility was to inform on 
capabilities and dispositions, not intentions, which should be deciphered by Israel‟s 
political leaders.166 His claim was respected by many military commentators. 
However, some, such as Herzog and Shalev, even in a sympathetic study of Aman, 
believed that it is a shared responsibility.167 Zeira‟s problem was not only the 
paradox of over-involving himself in strategy making and at the same time claiming 
less responsibility after the war, but he was guilty of intentionally obstructing some 
vital information before the war from being channelled to the strategic leadership, 
information which he thought incompatible with the “concept”, a common cognitive 
malady.168  
The “concept” created by Aman stated that Egypt would not fight before she had 
obtained air supremacy. This was later modified to suggest that Egypt might fight a 
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limited or war of attrition if she could obtain long-range bombers and surface-to-
surface missiles to deter Israeli deep aerial operations. This concept was strongly 
held, if not indoctrinated, and the minds of both political and military Israeli 
echelons were imprisoned in its parameters. As Herzog bitterly commented, this 
concept was not revised at any time.169  
Moreover, although Egypt actually started to receive a few TU-16s and Scud missiles 
in the middle of 1973170, the implications were not recognised as the Israeli 
leadership was addicted to its psychological belief that the Arabs would not dare to 
fight after their disaster in 1967. When alarms concerning the possibility of war were 
presented to the political leadership in May, Aman discredited them. When war did 
not erupt, as Sadat had postponed it for political and preparation reasons, Aman‟s 
conviction was reinforced.171   
During the war, Egypt only used TU16s on the first day and fired two Kellet rockets 
at Tel Aviv; one was downed by the IAF and the other lost its way. Egypt also fired 
three Scuds on the last day at the breakthrough area west of Suez, just before the 
cease-fire, as symbolic actions.172 None of these had any significant outcome as the 
Aman concept would predict; rather Egypt‟s strategy devalue them by concentrating 
on limited offensives under its air-denial umbrella. 
The third tool for influencing political decision-making was the planning division 
under the Chief of Staff. The planning branch before 1973 was the only body in Israel 
to provide any form of strategic or quasi-strategic planning. As has been shown, in 
1967 the planning branch was responsible for formulating IDF proposals for 
policy/strategic options to be sent to the cabinet. After the 1973 war, the Agranat 
Commission identified this structural problem and recommended transforming the 
branch into “The Planning and Policy Directorate” in the MOD; despite the change 
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in nomenclature, the new directorate was formed by the cadre of the planning 
branch.173 
To conclude the examination of the impact of the institutional settings on the ability 
for strategy making it is necessary to trace these effects on the functional parameters. 
Functional 
Information sharing was generally smooth. However, due to Aman‟s obsession 
with its concept and its monopoly on intelligence reports, some information was 
either delayed, dropped or its analysis was flawed.  
For example, two war alerts from highly reliable Mossad sources on 30 September 
and 4 October reached Zeira, who delayed the first, and delivered the second 
without telling Meir of the source. This was considered by the intelligence 
community as a most reliable source, so Meir was used to reading its “raw” 
materials. If the cabinet had known on the morning of 5 October who the source was 
it would have taken the alert seriously. Also, the information regarding the Soviet 
evacuation of their experts‟ families from Cairo and Damascus on 4 and 5 October, 
led Aman to formulate an emergency report linking this step with a war alert.174 If 
these pieces of information had reached the cabinet properly a decision of early 
mobilization would have been possible.  
Critical comprehension. There was almost an absence of a formidable body for 
strategy making. The lack of a political initiative to fill this area enabled the IDF to 
assume semi-strategic propositions which were mostly expressions of its actual 
tactical and operational indoctrination.  
More seriously even than 1967, there was a lack of comprehensive and critical debate 
on strategic options. This institutional blindness, combined with a conceptual deficit, 
deprived Israel of the chance to repair the actual fallacies of its practice in the 1967 
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and Attrition Wars, and to reorient its strategy making to the new developments in 
Egyptian ability, which were only acknowledged in retrospect. 
Regarding authorization, there was no formal attempt to challenge the 
government‟s right of decision making, and the IDF showed a very high degree of 
obedience even in the most crucial  moments when it enjoyed a recognizable boost to 
its prestige, as after the 1967 War. For example, on the morning of 6 October 1973, 
the IDF accepted Meir‟s decision against launching a pre-emptive attack, even an 
aerial one against the Syrian front. 
The random over-involvement of the political elites in operational, tactical and 
defence policies has long been a source of friction in the Israeli civil-military 
relations. The very existence of this point may cause many observers to 
underestimate the IDF‟s influence on policy and strategy making. However, as has 
been shown, this is the Israeli paradox in this area; the military retains control of the 
strategic area whereas the political level shows an extraordinary level of interference 
in military fine details. As Ben-Meir stated, this over-involvement happened usually 
in cases when the Ministers of Defence had huge military experience and prestige 
from their role before their political life, as was the case with Dayan and Rabin.175  
The few incidents of over-involvement did not affect strategic practice but they 
certainly elevated the level of friction between the IDF and the politicians which 
might motivate the IDF generally to encroach in the other area with negative 
consequences.   
As a general conclusion, the institutional layer of Israeli strategic ability showed 
lower medium grade (Israel was good in clear authorization and the formidable 
position of military, but had moderate information sharing and its totally defective 
critical assessment and the strategic intervention of politicians). The main result of 
this was the enhancement of the trend of tacticization of strategy. It should also be 
noted that these defective relations did not result in tangible negatives from the 
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democratic political perspective as the military advanced to fill in the strategic-
policy vacuum rather than violently annexing it, and usually enjoyed wide public 
support and political approval.   
 
The Practical Layer 
Detailed Strategies 
Policy and Grand Strategy 
The complexity of delineating Israel‟s political aims in the 1973 War, as in 1967, 
originated in Ben-Gurion‟s belief in the improbability of peace and infinite battle.176 
Israel, according to this vision, should seek security by generating deterrence using 
decisive battles and its quality edge as the means. Israel‟s borders had been seen, 
since the 1948 war and afterwards, as a transitional concept whose delineation 
depended only on what military ability and political imposition could achieve. Israel 
should seek “secured borders” which entailed a widening of the geostrategic depth 
that would facilitate any offensive or defensive operations in the future.  
These new “occupied territories” after 1967 were infiltrated by military presence and 
civilian settlements not only as a sign of consolidating their formal annexation, as in 
East Jerusalem in 1967 177 and Golan in 1981, or informal as in the case of the rest, but 
as a means for development too. With the widening of geostrategic depth in the 
south specifically, settlements were not expected to behave as the former NAHAL, 
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but in the West Bank and Golan they could act as early warning and satellite security 
posts against irregular threats despite their security burden. 178 
Political resolution?  
Any impetus towards a political resolution was prevented by the euphoria of victory 
and the conviction that new territories could enhance security and development. In a 
meeting on 28 August 1973 that was described by David Elazar, Nahom Goldman, 
who was called the fourth father of Israel despite his deep criticism of Israeli policy 
towards the Arabs, stated that Israel should think of diplomatic processes to build a 
peace or at least a status of non-aggression, otherwise war would be imminent and 
inevitable. Dayan blatantly said the peace that Israel was looking for had actually 
been achieved in 1967 with secured borders and a show of deterrent military 
might.179 Dayan was famous for his maxim; “No peace with Sharm-Al Sheikh is 
better than a peace without it”.180  
Dayan envisioned a plan for further territorial expansion, “the black belt” where 
further Syrian and Lebanese territories could be gained but which could only take 
place through war, which he believed would be impossible before 1974 at the earliest 
due to Egyptian unpreparedness politically, militarily and economically.181  
Dayan presented another formal plan for annexing the West Bank, Golan and areas 
in Sinai, which included establishing a new permanent settlement at the borders. His 
rationale was that peace might be possible in 10-15 years, and this Israeli move 
would either push the Arabs to accept an unconditional peace or, at least boost 
Israeli security. His colleagues in the Labour party, however, considered this 
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proposal likely to escalate the conflict and adopted a milder plan, as Yisrael Galili 
mentioned, which proposed only that settlements be built.182 
In a meeting of the Knesset in July 1973, an American proposal regarding a partial 
withdrawal of the IDF from Sinai and Golan, and a return to international control 
over the Passes was rejected, not only from the Right but from others also, including 
Bar-Lev who furiously warned against abandoning his defence line which was the 
most formidable Israel had and had already cost over $ 5,000,000.183 
The pertinent political aim of Israel in 1973, once the war erupted, was to maintain 
the status quo, and what this policy needed from the military strategy was to reverse 
the Egyptian military achievements and expel them from Sinai with a heavy price to 
pay in order to preserve deterrence.  
Only after the war, when shattering military and political discourses challenged the 
basic Israeli assumptions, and both sides, according to Kissinger‟s theory, were in a 
better position to consider or at least, in the case of Israel, to think of a political 
resolution, was there an atmosphere inside Israel conducive to debating the long-
term political aims and conditions. 
Despite its weak grand strategy making, as discussed earlier, Israel still was able to 
set a grand strategic inclination to direct all means to serve the military mission, 
rather than incorporating it into a higher wisdom.184 With a grand strategy looking 
to achieve decisive military victories for deterrence and modifying the geopolitical 
landscape by force, all other state means; diplomatic, domestic, economic, 
intelligence, and technological, were well orchestrated towards this end.  
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Domestically, Israel had a period of economic expansion after 1967 and the military 
budget was increased as a result. However, after the War of Attrition, the economy 
was under stress that led to cuts in the military budget; after 1971, the portion of 
GNP devoted to defence declined from 24.1% to 16.3%185. Socially, Israel became 
more developed, which affected the maturity of the military industrial infrastructure 
and the quality of recruits. However, the social tensions between eastern and 
western Jews started to erupt, albeit not on a large scale, as one accident in Golan 
before the war may show.186 Once the war started, Israel could fully mobilize 
rapidly, which became decisive as will be shown. 
Regionally, Israel aimed to keep Arab opponents busy with compelling security 
spearheads. Grand strategy in this area kept the same preferences as discussed 
earlier; a strategy aimed at securing understandings with the peripheral regions of 
the Greater Middle East and aggravating the Arabs‟ domestic tensions, as was the 
case when helping Iraqi Kurds and Lebanese Maronites.187  
Internationally, Israel suffered a period of isolation after 1967 due to its post-war 
policy and Arab diplomacy which sought to pursue their economic benefits 
internationally. Nevertheless, Israel had always adopted a principle of linking to a 
superpower to give her both diplomatic protection and military support. 
This dependence, encouraged by the US since the 1967 war, had shown Israel‟s 
utility to the US. It paid off in enhancing Israeli military power, especially in the 
darkest times of the 1973 War. However, it obliged Israel to take US concerns into 
consideration to a degree that the fathers of the state saw as unacceptable,188 and to 
be more compliant to US pressures after the war.   
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As Safran indicated, US post-1967 policy shared Israel‟s requirement for the Arabs to 
accept an unconditional peace with border modifications. However, the US did not 
include Israel in the detailed post-peace territorial arrangements required or the 
diplomatic strategy to be followed.  The main US interests, together with preserving 
the security and functionality of Israel, were to preserve some degree of conciliation 
with the Arab states to lessen their inclination towards the Soviets and to maintain 
the flow of oil. It was also interested over the long run in resolving the conflict since 
this remained the main door for Soviet steps in the region, and after the 1972 détente 
it was interested in setting limits on escalation if war erupted in order to prevent a 
major confrontation with the USSR.189 
The political and intelligence community in the US disregarded the possibility of an 
Egyptian (plus or minus Syrian) offensive before the war. Once it erupted, Kissinger 
took the lead in American policy and strategy. He was very convinced that Israel 
would have a swift victory and aimed to give her a chance to achieve this partially, 
as if the Arabs were humiliated they would not accept the US as the main broker and 
an Arab victory would hurt American credibility in the region and globally vis-à-vis 
the Soviets.190 
Kissinger did not support an open and full-scale airlift to Israel but as it faced 
drawbacks on the Egyptian front (losing 500 tanks and 250 fighters after the failed 
counter-offensive on the 8th) he was pushed by Nixon towards a fully-fledged airlift 
which was considered helpful in pressuring Israel for post-war concessions. 191His 
aim was still to permit Israel a marginal victory but things moved quickly away 
from his plan. With his equivocal consent for Israel not to follow fully the ceasefire 
of the 22nd, and with the encirclement of Third Army, the Soviets issued an 
ultimatum; demanding the deployment on the battlefield of combined American-
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Soviet forces to oversee the implementation of the UN resolution or the USSR would 
act unilaterally. 
Kissinger, who sees the war through the lens of Cold War geopolitical rivalry, 
overacted by putting international US strategic and conventional forces, on the 
highest peace time alert without consulting with allies.192 The conflict was de-
escalated after forming UN emergency forces from countries outside the permanent 
members of UNSC to implement the third ceasefire resolution on the 28th. 
The role of the nuclear dimension in the 1973 War has generated two contradictory 
narratives. The first relates that Israel alerted her limited nuclear arsenal, supposedly 
around 13 bombs, and her means of delivery: Jericho I missiles with a few assigned 
Mirages, to send a “Nuclear Blackmail” to both the US and the Arabs in order to 
encourage the former to undertake a swift airlift of needed material and deter the 
latter from escalating their offensive. In the second narrative, the nuclear option was 
hidden and did not have a real impact on either player.  
The first claim was supported heavily by Hersh193 and others, including Creveld, 
who interpreted the controversial Syrian retreat from the southern Golan on the 9th 
as a response to this signalling,194 although no strong evidence was supplied apart 
from scattered signs of alerting the nuclear formations.  
However, extensive research was undertaken by Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen et al.  
Based on credible historical evidence it suggested that Dayan proposed a 
preparation for a “nuclear test” to deter the Arabs in the darkest times on 7 October 
when he was in a very desperate mood, seeing the threat as one which would lead to 
“the destruction of the third temple”, that is the destruction of Israel as an 
independent state. But this proposal was harshly rebuffed by Meir and the other 
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members of the war cabinet. Dayan more likely sanctioned unilateral orders for 
enhancing the preparatory status of Israel‟s limited nuclear arsenal. Claims of 
alerting Jericho missiles may be unrelated given their low operational capability at 
the time.195 
By reviewing the account of William Quant that the US was neither concerned nor 
even looked at this issue, Cohen ruled out the claim that Israel had attempted 
nuclear blackmail. Adding to this, Sadat‟s intention not to extend his offensive was 
conveyed very early to the US, and there is no evidence that the Egyptians ever 
received a signal concerning a possible nuclear threat. 
Although Cohen‟s interpretation is convincing, Sadat‟s perception in the pre-war 
era, and Nasser‟s before him, certainly included a nuclear element. This compelled 
both to adopt a limited policy in the case of Sadat, and a limited strategy in the case 
of Nasser. Nonetheless, both Sadat and Nasser were more compelled by the 
conventional deterrence originating from the imbalance in capability.   
The Israeli strategy of keeping their nuclear capacity entirely secret was proved 
correct as the situation stabilized after 9 October, and turned in Israel‟s favour after 
the 14th. Any explicit use or test would have been extremely counter-productive 
during the war and afterwards; it would probably have led to a direct Soviet 
intervention with an accompanying threat of international nuclear war, and also a 
post-war acceleration of the regional nuclear arms race.196 
Military Strategy 
Policy/grand strategy required a task from the IDF: operational decisiveness and 
defending the occupied territories. The same structural problems between 
policy/grand strategy and military strategy/operations that were discussed in 1967 
applied – that is the absence of an overriding logic to manage military conduct in 
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order to modify the will of the enemy, and the lack of a specific formula to decide 
comprehensively upon the scale and nature of such military tasks. 
The IDF had consolidated its strategic orientation that Israel should keep its 
defensive and deterring postures through sequential and complementary layers.  As 
discussed earlier, these required an early warning 24-48 hours before the war, an air 
campaign to attain supremacy, benefiting from a wider geostrategic scale and with 
impending air power as delaying mean in order to complete the mobilization of 
reserves. Then a high tempo armoured operation should follow to annihilate the 
enemy armies with a Blitzkrieg-style approach.  
However, this military strategy had been indoctrinated in the IDF a long time before 
1967, and subsequent geostrategic and operational changes after the 1967 and 
Attrition Wars provided opportunities and challenges for Israeli military strategists.  
It is a highly complex task to assess the military strategy practical tier given its weak 
policy/grand strategy which had surrendered its logic to operational formula. 
However, we still can get a clue by looking at two areas: how the IDF perceived 
post-1967 changes, and their implications for its theory of victory and how to cope 
with it; and how it adapted its military strategy once the war had erupted.  
Pre-War 
As the Israeli defensible space tripled in 1967, the IDF found itself in a new and 
unaccustomed geostrategic position. The warning time was extended and there was 
much less urgency to transfer the battles to the enemy‟s territory. However, the new 
situation also presented serious challenges.  
Firstly, by maintaining the occupation after a decisive and humiliating military 
victory followed by a period of diplomatic stagnation, Israel was somewhat isolated 
internationally. This served to harden the political requirements needed before 
launching pre-emptive air strikes if enemy offensives were impending. This is 
exactly what happened in 1973 and it forced the cabinet to reject Elazar‟s proposal 
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for such an attack if only by air power and only in the Syrian theatre.197Hence, air 
supremacy could not be attained early in the war, keeping in the mind the extensive 
Egyptian/Syrian air defences too. 
Secondly, the expanded geostrategic space decreased the IDF‟s ability to use internal 
lines to mass forces on one front and shift them instantly between fronts as the 
situation required. Given the possibility of war on more than one front, an option 
used by Egypt and Syria in the 1973 War when the IDF feared that the Jordanians 
would join to form a third front, the IDF was forced to accept the bitter option of 
focusing on the most critical front until the situation stabilized and then move to the 
other front, an approach which offers to the opponent on the other front a wide 
window of opportunity to be exploited. 
Thirdly, the political decision to retain the Occupied Territories forced the IDF to 
seek a modus operandi for which it had little skill or interest – the construction and 
maintenance of static defences.  
After 1967, the traditional proposal for mobile defence on both fronts was rejected on 
the basis of denying the Arabs any foothold, even temporarily, if they launched 
limited attacks. When Bar-Lev took the office of GOS in 1968, he adopted very strict 
and substantial defence systems in both Sinai and Golan in response to the War of 
Attrition. Both systems entailed a network of connected strongholds, meozims, which 
were served with an advanced network in the rear to facilitate the combination of 
static and mobile defence operations.198  
This static defence meant the IDF was torn between the political requirement and its 
doctrinal settings, and led to compromise solutions which required the capability to 
undertake both static and mobile defences. Strategically, these political decisions 
were faulty. A short-lived Egyptian foothold would not have led to political gains if 
it was thrown back swiftly and retaliation followed. Such a scenario had already 
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occurred during the War of Attrition and did not lead to any strategic turn. Only if 
this foothold was entrenched due to weak IDF operational capability would it have a 
strategic effect. 
Finally, the decisive military victory in 1967 and what was considered at least an 
advantage in the War of Attrition created a status of blinding arrogance among 
Israeli strategists. The IDF looked at the Arabs as inferior and overestimated its own 
ability, so it disregarded any possibility of an Arab ability to go to war.  
For example, the IDF formulated a plan, Goshen, for developing force structure and 
acquisition which entailed the formation of 22 divisions and enhancing naval and 
ground ability, other than tanks. This plan was rejected on the grounds of its cost 
and the fact that an Arab offensive was judged to be improbable. Even the plan‟s 
more modest version, Ofek, was not applied to a large extent.199 The lack of 
preparedness to apply the defensive plan of Shovach Yonim was related to this factor 
too. The underlying assumption of the Ofek Plan was that the Arabs would only be 
able to launch a war after 1976.  
Plans 
The main defensive plan in Sinai was “Shovach Yonim” which offered an extensive, 
yet flexible, exploitation of the Bar-Lev line.  This defensive line in Sinai has been the 
subject of the two belligerents‟ contested claims either underestimating or 
overestimating it in retrospect.  
All Egyptian historians and leaders highly overestimated the value of this line in 
order to highlight the scale of their achievement and used the pre-war Israeli 
accounts as evidence of its centrality to Israel‟s defence. In return, most Israelis 
underestimated the line in retrospective accounts of the 1973 War by indicating the 
shift that occurred with Sharon‟s appointment to the Southern Command which 
aimed to decrease the static defence element by abandoning one third of the 
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strongholds (reducing them from 31 to 22).200 Since these strongholds were separated 
by gaps of between 7 and 10 miles, this made the front easily penetrable.  
However, as Herzog indicated, the Bar-Lev line was more than simply a strong static 
defence line; rather, it was a sophisticated defence system which Bar-Lev declared 
unbreakable when he said in August 1973 that it would need the engineering corps 
of both the American and the Soviet armies to overcome it.201  
Behind the strongholds, which were each guarded by an infantry brigade, there were 
two defence lines, 10 km and 25 km behind. One armoured brigade was stationed in 
the first line and two in the second. Once the war alert was received, the first echelon 
would move to the front line and the second echelon brigades would detect the main 
Egyptian threats in order to launch a counter-offensive. Shovach Yonim (Dove-Cote) 
acknowledged these preparatory steps and stated that the Bar Lev Line was 
intended to bear the tension until reserve forces could be called in; a mobilisation of 
three armoured divisions at least, for counter-crossing the Canal and annihilation of 
the enemy.202  
The plan addressed the strategic objectives: defending the occupied territory and 
enabling the annihilation of the enemy. However, it did not address the scenario of a 
warning being received so late that the reserve build-up would be delayed, or what 
to do with the strongholds if they were already overrun by Egyptian forces. This 
planning defect led to confusion once the war erupted.  
Adaptable 
Repulsing the Crossing and the Counter-Offensive (6 – 14 October 1973) 
Strategic Ordeal. The cabinet meeting on the morning of 6 October, after sensibly 
refusing the pre-emptive strike proposal, ordered a partial mobilization. Dayan, still 
caught by his underestimation of the Arab armies, proposed mobilizing two 
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divisions only. Golda Meir however accepted Elazar‟s request to mobilize four. He 
then acted independently to exceed these limits. Israel sent strong messages for the 
US to convey to the Russians and Egyptians that Israel did not have any intention to 
launch an offensive and to warn Egypt against initiating one.203 
In two days, the 6th and 7th, all Israeli defences in the Sinai and Golan were shattered, 
and the Arab armies destroyed most of the pre-war standing forces on both fronts. In 
Sinai, of specific concern here, the IDF lost two-thirds of its armour, 200 tanks out of  
300, all strongholds except two, of which one would fall later, and had 100 planes 
downed. Deterrence, the core of the Israeli security policy, had failed.   Despite her 
control of Sharm, Israel was blockaded at Bab-Al Mandab, there was not enough 
warning to have the mobilization ready on time, air and armoured superiority was  
cancelled out by counter-measures, and the Egyptian army exhibited a high degree 
of motivation and training. 
Catastrophe overshadowed the next cabinet meeting on 7 October. Here Dayan was 
at the other extreme and became totally desperate.204 In addition to the controversial 
nuclear alert discussed earlier, he advocated abandoning the first line of defence, 
and forming more stable defences at the second (in the Passes of Sinai). This advice, 
despite its soundness given the grave imbalance at the front, was rejected.  
The same day, Sadat rejected the American and Soviet cease-fire request. The cabinet 
still had a guarded optimism, as mobilization was underway on schedule and three 
armoured divisions were already in Sinai, two of reservists under Dan and Sharon 
and the third led by Mandler. The Cabinet therefore ordered the IDF to launch a 
theatre counter-offensive in the Sinai. 
This counter-offensive on the 8th to uproot the Egyptian bridgeheads turned out to 
be a mess. The chaos in the southern command, where many competing generals 
were under the weak command of Gonen, resulted in poor planning and confusion. 
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The plan stated that Dan‟s ugda would attack the northern sector, facing the 
Egyptian 2nd Army, with a thrust from north to south keeping his division just out of 
the range of the artillery. Based on Israel‟s 1967 war image of the Egyptian forces, 
this vertical offensive was thought to be enough to uproot the consolidated 
bridgeheads. Dan‟s ugda was in fact rather largely decimated. Mandler was meant 
to attack the southern sector facing the Egyptian 3rd Army but this was a failure and 
Sharon was asked first to relieve Mandler, and then was called back to the north and 
ended his day without fighting.205 
The impact of this defeat, which disclosed the reality that the Israeli leadership had 
been trying to ignore for the first two days, was heavy. Israel was facing a totally 
different type of war and opponents from 1967. The cabinet meeting on the 9th still 
had some hope based on two factors: an appeal to the US for an airlift to replace the 
huge hardware losses which Aman estimated would be total within 48-72 hours206, 
and to formulate a salvage strategy. 
Salvage Strategy.  The Cabinet‟s salvage strategy entailed focusing on the Syrian 
front, due to its geostrategic criticality, by sending three armoured divisions exerting 
IAF pressure on it, while keeping the forces in the south strictly on the defensive. 
The Israeli command recognised by now the uselessness of repeating a frontal or 
horizontal offensive on the Egyptian bridgeheads, especially when the Egyptians 
were now in a defensive posture, and it gambled on waiting for the Egyptian 
offensive to be broken before preparing for a counter-crossing or at least securing a 
future Israeli thrust with forces from the Syrian front. With this counter-crossing, the 
dramatic political and military losses could be at least lessened if not partially 
reversed. 
This was a reasonable military strategy which the southern command had difficulty 
in imposing on its generals, especially Sharon. Dayan and Elazar sent Bar-Lev to 
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impose order and to be the real commander under the nominal command of Gonen. 
Things were stabilized. 
Repulsing Egyptian Offensive, Counter-crossing and Exploitation (14 – 28 October) 
Once the Syrian front was stabilized by the 13th, the focus could be directed to the 
south. The main proposal was a counter-crossing of the Suez Canal. Counter-
crossing was seen as more than simply an operational enabler to encircle, cut the 
managerial/logistic supplies and then annihilate the Egyptian forces on the eastern 
bank. It performed two more functions: to use the ground forces as a mean to attain 
air supremacy by attacking the SAM batteries on the western bank, and to obtain a 
future negotiating card by seizing as much territory on the western bank of the 
Canal as possible and/or seizing a vital political target such as a major city like 
Ismailia or Suez, or one of the field armies.  
On the night of 15-16 October the counter-crossing commenced, and by the day of 
the 19th, three armoured divisions were in the west opposed only by three Egyptian 
brigades: one armoured, one mechanised and one paratrooper, and Sa‟aqa 
battalions. An initial thrust to the north and Ismailia was repulsed, but in the south, 
Adan, after his failure to seize Suez, succeeded in destroying the SAM umbrella and 
the 3rd Army supply lines in this sector. (Map 3)207 
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Israeli Counteroffensive on the 8th 
Regardless of the contested claims as to who breached the first ceasefire on 22nd, the 
second ceasefire was ignored by the IDF so as to widen its gains in the west and 
extend its reach to the Suez-Cairo road and the north-western coast of the Red Sea. 
208 
The most effective elements in this strategy, adding to its competent logic of counter-
crossing, was leashing the military conduct and exploiting the awkward Egyptian moves. In 
                                                          
208
 Avraham Adan, On the Banks of Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War (English 
Edition, New York: Presidio Press, 1991); Gamasy, The October War Memoirs, pp.426-431. 
288 
 
contrast to the previous war, the three military divisions were prevented from 
repeating assaults on the big cities, planning to advance on the Cairo road, or 
moving to annihilate the Egyptian 3rd Army.  
If the IDF had undertaken any of these three possibilities, provided that it succeeded, 
which is doubtful given the IDF experience in the 1982 assault on Beirut (which was 
much smaller, militarily weaker, and internally divided), the operational and 
strategic environment would have been extremely hostile. There would have been a 
significant risk of failure and decimation, the Russians would have directly 
intervened militarily, and the Egyptians‟ will to resist would have been greatly 
accelerated.  
Nevertheless, the deciding factor in abandoning more aggressive moves was the 
Cold War dynamic which created a paradox; both superpowers were on nuclear 
alert and, as a result, each pushed her ally for de-escalation. The US, moreover, 
realized the opportunity offered by Sadat‟s shift in policy and decided to exploit it. 
Disengagement (28th October – January 1974) 
Israel‟s strategy at this stage was generally dependent on the US, but with signs of 
recalcitrance too, which aimed to enhance the Egyptian perception of its military 
dilemma which would be beneficial to Israel at the negotiation table as the Egyptians 
would become more eager for a cease-fire. Here the political will is dependent on 
perceiving the political and military outcomes and feeling greater compulsion to 
stop fighting. 
Israel used diplomacy to stall and frustrate her opponents, whether in Kilometre-10 
negotiations, the Geneva conference or Kissinger‟s piecemeal diplomacy. However, 
Israeli vulnerabilities were difficult to hide too; the narrow and unstable extension of 
their forces in the west which were now surrounded by comparable forces, with 
regenerated weapons through the Soviet air/sea lift; the Bab Al-Mandab blockade; 
and also -- of great importance to Meir‟s cabinet in the middle of a post-war 
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investigation and public fury in Israel -- the human cost including returning the 
bodies of casualties and prisoners of war.       
To conclude, Israel‟s practical detailed strategy proved bankrupt in the first half of 
the war, but recovered quickly helped by the Egyptians‟ and Syrians‟ grave 
mistakes, the massive American support and airlift, and the real courage and 
innovation of the IDF tactical commanders on the ground both operationally and 
strategically. 
Guiding fighting power 
Strategic leadership should provide the guiding strategic formula under which 
fighting ability is developed and modulated. However, while generating detailed 
strategies is the “software” of any military strategy (utility), guiding the fighting 
power is its “hardware” (assets). 
The strategic command‟s responsibility for guiding fighting power is dual, as 
indicated before: to mould the fighting power for a specific strategic concept and to 
act as the general guide for linear build-up and counter-balancing the enemy 
operationally in a specific context. Pre-war guidance should be discussed first, and 
then its adaptation during the war, which proved highly crucial in the Israeli case of 
1973.  
Pre-War 
The general pattern in the area is the continuity between before and after the 1967 
War, except for a few changes in response to the new geostrategic landscape.  
Doctrinal 
After 1967, the IDF was indoctrinated to undertake two missions - some form of 
defence, the nature of which was contested till the end, and highly offensive 
missions depending totally on air power and armoured strength.   
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Generally, the IDF was not ready for proper defensive missions and the cult of the 
offensive had been emphasised for a long time.209 As Kober indicated, factors had 
changed after 1967 which had necessitated a review of the basic assumptions of the 
Israeli operational art, a review that never took place. These factors were the 
changing trend in dominant weapon systems in the 1956 and 1967 Wars which had 
favoured mobility over firepower and offence over defence but did not recognise 
that their antidotes in air and armoured power were available, the sense of a weak 
and unsophisticated enemy which was becoming stronger, and the transition from 
“artificial” strategic depth which could assist manoeuvring to defending the 
extended area of the occupied territories.210 
The IDF was not prepared for a type of war in which air power and armour were 
turned around, either because the enemy worked to oppose them to some extent 
and/or to evade them in his military strategic planning (counter-operation, or 
counter-planning). Moreover, in considering air force and tanks as a panacea, the 
logic of combined arms was neglected.  
IDF doctrine was a two-arm doctrine with other forces playing rudimentary roles. 
At the operational level doctrine, the air force and armour inherited the 
longstanding battle of ideas in which the outcome was decided not by positive 
strategic input but rather by misconceiving the lessons of 1967 and Attrition Wars 
together with some domestic factors. 
For the air force, as before 1967, the doctrine was in favour of two missions; obtaining 
air supremacy first and undertaking tactical support with some interdiction to 
follow. In the War of Attrition there were three phases. In the first phase (September 
1968 – July 1969), the IAF had to launch limited retaliatory strikes against military 
and economic targets close to the front; acting as “flying artillery” and lifting Special 
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Operations forces to the rear. During the second phase (July 1969 - January 1970), the 
mission was mainly against SAM batteries, and once the Egyptian air defences had 
fallen by January 1970, in the third phase strategic air attacks followed, which caused 
direct Soviet intervention, both political and military.    
After the conclusion of the War of Attrition, the IAF returned to its supremacy 
seeking/tactical support doctrine. However, it did not appreciate the technological 
and doctrinal advances of the Egyptian, and to some extent the Syrian, air defences. 
On the Egyptian front, the main air defences were SAM3 and lesser numbers of 
modified SAM2. The mobile multi-range SAM6 were beginning to arrive, supported 
by plenty of AA guns for low levels, and some SA7 which were much more accurate 
for low level.  Although the IAF was aware of the existence of these elements and 
even had ECM to work against the SAM2 and 3, it was not aware of the 
technological features of SAM6, let alone active in inventing technological or tactical 
counter-measures.211 Also, the IAF underestimated the Egyptian air defence doctrine 
which fused these elements in a comprehensive and complementary way. The result 
was grave; the loss of 104 first line fighters in the first half of the war.  
Support for the armoured role had a massive push from the success of the 1967 War 
which enhanced Tal‟s idea of armoured fists (using large concentrations of tanks to 
crack the opponent‟s defences or the opponent in a mobile tank battle benefiting 
from efficient tactical-technical training for crews and unmatched tactical leadership, 
and an element of air support) to reach a status of “tank-mania”. 212Also, this trend 
was emphasised by the general Israeli sensitivity towards human losses in battle 
which was encountered more with infantry missions than tank operations.213  
                                                          
211
 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility, : Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield (Redwood 
City CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) pp.170-171. 
212
 Sharon, The Warrior, p.304. 
213
 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume 1: The Arab Israeli 
Conflict (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). 
292 
 
As indicated in the last chapter, Israeli planners did not consider their own problems 
in running the 1967 battles themselves, especially in the Rafah sector, or that the 
poor performance of their opponents resulted mainly from contextual variables - 
problems with the political-military system, socio-technological and doctrinal  issues 
– and that these could be resolved , at least partially.  
Many accounts of 1973, from Egyptian, Israeli and worldwide analysts, 
overestimated the role of anti-armour missiles in the war. The Egyptian use of this 
shield did not entail primarily a new technology, as anti-armour missiles were not 
unfamiliar to the IDF when they encountered them; the older version (Shmel) just 
after the 1967 War destroyed one tank from the eastern side of the Canal, and 
Saggers guided missiles themselves, more accurate and penetrating, were launched 
at the Israelis in 1971 on the Syrian front. In fact, as most of the effects were because 
of short RPG-7 and mortars; tank losses were mostly due to these weapons rather 
than the guided missiles.214 
As Finkel indicated, the source of surprise was not the weapons themselves but the 
Egyptian modus operandi in using them - in large quantities in the hands of well-
trained forces and in complementary fashion to extend and consolidate the zone of 
lethality.215  
With all armoured forces lacking significant mechanized infantry and artillery, 
Egyptian infantry equipped with RPG-7s, on the flanks, and supported by mortars, 
tanks and guided missiles from both tactical and operational reserves (west of the 
Canal) were able to withstand the armoured fists and wreak havoc on the advancing 
Israeli armoured forces equipped with fast mobile tanks with 105 mm turrets 
(Centurions, M-40 modified, and M-60). The IDF lost 200 tanks in the first two days, 
and another hundred in the failed counter-attacks on 8th October. 
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These flawed doctrinal settings had grave impacts at the upper operational and 
military strategic levels, putting the ground forces at a grave disadvantage which 
amounted to a failure of the defence system.  
However, the real impact of this technological, but mainly doctrinal, surprise was 
psychological at the level of political-military leadership.216 
Human 
The Mobilisation ability of Israel enables her to generate a full army in 48-72 hours, a 
mobilisation which had been achieved many times before the 1973 War. However, 
there were two developments occurring after the 1967 War which undermined this 
capacity.  
The first development was increasing the period of conscription and reservists‟ 
training to meet the expansion of the defence lines after 1967 and the constant alerts 
of the War of Attrition. The conscription period was increased by 6 months for men 
and women, becoming three and two years respectively, the recall periods for 
reservists were increased by two months, and the reserve age limits were raised. 
However, after the front became quiet after the cease-fire in 1970 and with the 
consolidation of the “concept” which entrenched Israeli disregard of the Arabs‟ 
ability and intention to fight, socio-economic constraints forced the politico-military 
leadership to relax the parameters of mobilization and conscription and return to 
pre-1967 levels.217 
This relaxation was not in quantity only, but in quality as well. For example, when 
war exploded on 6 October, the infantry brigade on an important front was an 
undermanned reserve brigade from Jerusalem.218 
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Morale. Despite the desperate mood that infected the entire Israeli population and 
the cabinet, the IDF kept a moderate standard of morale after the initial drop.  
The decline in morale was mainly due to the shocking results of the first half of the 
War, in which the entrenched sense of invincibility and the thinking that considered 
Arab soldiers as “flocks of coward mice” who would run away once Israeli forces 
and fire approached, faced the hard reality of the Arab achievement and Israeli 
logistic and command incompetence. For the first time in Israeli military history a 
new type of casualty occurred, soldiers suffering from combat shock, an eventuality 
that the medical corps was not prepared for.219 
However, the Egyptians‟ setback on 14 October, and the Syrians‟ before it, restored 
much of the morale. What really boosted IDF morale, especially on the Egyptian 
front, was the tactical leadership which showed a high degree of sacrifice to the 
extent that Adan‟s battalion commanders, during the hard days of the 15th and 16th, 
were killed and replaced twice over.220 Sharon‟s forces as well paid heavy price 
which affected whole families fighting close to each other, an aspect of the reservist 
system which maintained the social structures of normal life.221 
Education/training and command criteria were similar also to pre-1967. Enhanced 
practical training and field education rather than building institutions for theoretical 
platforms was still the norm. The IDF still adopted the concept of “mission 
command” without being preceded by extensive theoretical and doctrinal formulas, 
based instead on, and invited by, practical necessities.222 
However, within the command structure of 1973, the dual system of reservists at the 
senior level led to the existence of a large pool of talented generals with 1967 fame 
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and who were eager to give a hand in planning and command.  Their extensive and 
often contradictory advice caused confusion in the command environment. Sharon 
himself was accused of jeopardising his forces by pushing for risky and 
unauthorized operations regardless of the strategic logic or safety of his troops, both 
before the 15th and after, in order to enhance his fame as a hero for political utility. 
He responded with the same accusation against his superiors, as mentioned before.  
Another command deficit that was exposed by Sharon was the reluctance of the 
upper middle operational commanders to oversee operations closely in order to 
obtain a real picture of the unfolding operations. Gonen in the beginning was 
content to remain in the Negev, and then he moved to Bir-Gafgafa.223 During the 
most challenging days of the counter-crossing, neither he nor Elazar cared to visit 
the operational area; only Dayan and Bar-Lev did so.224  
Organisational 
The Logistical system suffered a degree of confusion and inefficiency in the standstill 
period before the 1973 War although it kept in good shape generally.  
After the first round of the War of Attrition, the IDF under the directive of COS Bar-
Lev constructed a heavy defensive line with an extensive network of lateral and 
longitudinal roads serving it from the rear. The plan involved creating a rampart 
which initially reached 20 m but was then lowered on purpose at some points 
during Sharon‟s time in southern command to facilitate a possible counter-crossing, 
including one used in Sharon‟s crossing at Defressoir that was called “yard”.225 The 
road network proved to be helpful for mobile defence and offence especially in the 
second half of the war.  
As the IDF was indoctrinated to use internal lines of the pre-1967 War period for 
both operational and tactical benefits, the tripled distance was a strong challenge to 
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the logistical ability of an army based on heavy tanks which were either transferred 
on carriers with more time wasted in allocation and assembly or were transferred on 
their own power with a high degree of maintenance required. This logistical strain 
which was aggravated by the delayed warning deprived the IDF of its famous ability 
to move through the reserve armoured divisions on battlefields in good order and 
well equipped. Dan‟s division for example went to war with only three artillery 
pieces and most forces suffered a grave problem in preparedness and 
maintenance.226  
Force structure was similar to pre-1967, with more bias towards the tank 
components to the extent that a proposal to have pure tank divisions devoid of 
artillery was considered at some point.227  
Material   
Understandably, weaponry policy followed doctrinal orientation, as before 1967. 
There is a dual relationship and interdependence between both but some conditional 
variables may exist too.  
For example, shifting the main military supplier from France to the US after 1967 
enhanced the hardware in options and quality. On the other hand, economic 
constraints and military cuts after 1970 forced the IDF to cancel many of its 
development programmes in the navy and the mechanised infantry.    
Negatively, the influx of US weaponry, with its high quality in air and armour, 
emphasised the offensive doctrine and obscured any insightful attempts to revisit it. 
The IAF now had 358 first line fighters, F-4s with tripled ordnance capacity and 
better avionics and electronic counter measures in comparison to the Mirage III. 
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Armoured brigades were developed as well to reach 2100 tanks, mostly advanced 
Centurion, Leopard, M-40 and M-60.228  
In line with the biased doctrine towards the air and armoured forces, all other 
services or ground elements were neglected.  
The Israeli navy had formerly possessed two destroyers and a few missile and 
torpedo boats and no submarines. Two naval incidents deprived it of a destroyer 
and a submarine. The destroyer was sunk in the Eilat operation by two Egyptian 
komar missile boats, which fired strixs missiles, and a British-built submarine was 
lost on its way to Israel. 229  
The Israeli navy chose to focus on missile boats for economic and counter-capability 
reasons, coastal defence and limited littoral operations. Israel bought a few missile 
boats and commenced building its own Rechef boats, but only a handful were ready 
before the 1973 war. Israeli industry also developed Gabriel missiles with an 
extended range of 20-30 miles and better accuracy;230 these developments helped 
Israel in the limited naval operations during the war but could not provide any help 
in relieving the Egyptian blockade of Bab-Al-Mandeb strait. 
Artillery and air-defences were far inferior to those of the Arabs in quantity and 
quality as they were seen merely as auxiliary forces, most of whose functions could 
be taken over by the air force as “flying artillery”. As for air defences, it was thought 
that   “the best way to fight against the plane is the plane”.231  
The IDF also had air-defence capability with the Hawks system, and a few Jericho 
surface-to-surface missiles; a project that was launched with French co-operation in 
1962.  
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Adapting Fighting Power 
In contrast to Israel‟s low quality in guiding the fighting power pre-war, the IDF 
showed a moderate, but effective degree of adaptability and recovery. 
Meir Finkel developed a fascinating theory of flexibility which enhances the ability 
to recover from tactical, doctrinal and technical surprises. Finkel‟s study focused on 
the tactical/technical surprises on the battlefields and not the strategic, but he did 
not make the link clear between both types of surprise and recovery. It is important 
however to clarify this link. 232 
For example, if a war like the 1973 War has both types of surprises, they will have a 
combined effect. But recovery depends on the strategic ability to mobilize quickly 
and to formulate salvage or retarding strategy to give the IDF a breathing space to 
reorient the military situation and generate a counter-strategy on one side, and 
operational and tactical solutions on the other. These solutions may involve 
changing the hardware of the army; its fighting power as well as its operational 
planning and execution, and its software. Although the first task is harder and very 
risky, it is not feasible unless the military system is intrinsically adaptable and a 
learning institution.  
Remodelling fighting ability may result from the change of strategic orientation; 
Nagel‟s study on counter-insurgency233, or the operational and tactical; Finkel. In the 
Israeli case, both were needed and were achieved to some extent, but here we need 
to address the second issue of operational and tactical flexibility. 
 Finkel formulated four pillars234 needed for adaptability to recover from doctrinal 
and technical shock. The first is conceptual and doctrinal which entails flexible 
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doctrines open to critical analysis and review with readiness to learn from foreign 
doctrine, and multi-dimensional in nature; this was the major failing of the IDF.235  
The second is organisational and technological and involves generating forces with 
balanced structure and flexible weaponry systems. The balance of forces is achieved 
by creating and maintaining a balance between fighting and manoeuvre elements, a 
balance between offensive and defensive elements and fighting and support 
elements. Flexible weaponry is achieved by having a diverse and flexible industrial 
complex. Again, this was another negative point for the IDF due to its doctrinal 
biases, but the Israeli industrial complex played a positive role by keeping a close 
eye on the evolving requirements of battlefields, deciphering the technical 
parameters of SAMs and providing some solutions.236 
The third pillar was command decentralization and innovation; in which the IDF 
achieved a highly successful record. Tactical commanders quickly identified the 
dangerous order of battle biased to armour and sought more balanced forms.237 
Also, tactical air commanders developed invading and hitting techniques to deal 
with SAM-6s, especially on the Syrian front.238 
The fourth pillar is a mechanism of generating and disseminating lessons learned, 
and the IDF showed a modest ability in this area due to the lack of organised 
platforms for this role.239 
With such a moderate adaptability of the IDF, the ability to recover from the early 
shock was feasible, albeit over a longer than desirable time frame. Also, the Egyptian 
mistakes in strategy and operational art in the second half of the war helped the 
recovery by giving a wider window and accelerating its operational and strategic 
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effect. For example, Dan‟s ugda in the west, which were joined later by Magan and 
Sharon‟s, were fighting in open theatre mostly against the managerial and logistical 
sites of 3rd Army and loosely defendable SAM battalions.  
The overall assessment of the Israeli practical layer may be characterised as 
showing lower moderate ability overall. Unclear policy and poor pre-war strategy 
formulation and guiding fighting power contrast with excellent adaptability in both, 
benefiting from unintended external and internal factors.  
This grade of practical tier is higher than expected from a low conceptual and lower 
medium institutional.  Two possible reasons for this phenomenon may be identified. 
Firstly, as the discussion above showed, Israel commenced the war with poor 
strategy; more reflective to her conceptual and institutional abilities. However, only 
with the Egyptian strategic awkwardness, a window for reviewing and exploitation 
arose. Secondly, US intervention in the war leashing the “natural” Israeli high 
obsession of operational decisiveness played very positive role at the strategic level.  
The Outcome of War 
The question of what political gains emerged from the ending of the 1973 War is 
complex and has been prone to partisan manipulation, competing estimates and 
heterogeneous levels of analysis for more than four decades.  
Sources of complexity include what was forecast in the Introduction in addition to 
the specific peculiarities of the 1973 War. 
Firstly, as has been described, there were vague political, long and short, aims for 
both sides, contested proposals for political resolution inside the Israeli cabinet, not 
to mention the rise to power of the Right. However, by utilising our methodological 
solution, the formal political aims of Egypt were to regain the Arab occupied 
territories lost in 1967 and reach a “just” solution for Palestinian refugees, and for 
Israel keeping the status quo for the short term which could entail annexing the 
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occupied territory or, less likely, achieving an advantageous peace over the long 
term with dramatic border changes on all fronts, including Sinai. 
Political leaders asked the military to achieve specific strategic objectives; for the 
Egyptian Army to smash the “national security doctrine” of Israel and to occupy and 
consolidate a strip on the East Bank of the Suez Canal to act as an advantage in 
future negotiations, and for Israel to defend occupied territory, keep its qualitative 
military edge and annihilate any and all advancing Arabs forces with further 
occupation of territory in order to deter  any subsequent  offensive and consolidate 
its  territorial successes. 
Secondly, we may judge the outcome from the perspective of strategic objectives:  
both armies achieved their objectives in part with perhaps a greater success enjoyed 
by the Egyptians.  
The foundations of the Israeli security concept anchored on arrogance and disdain 
for the Arab ability to fight were undermined but not completely destroyed due to 
the ultimate operational outcome and the successful counter-crossing. Nevertheless, 
the honour of the Arabs was restored six years after a humiliating defeat. 
On the other hand, Sadat felt more compelled to peace, or disengagement, than 
Israel partly because of the nature of the personal and regional gamble he had taken, 
but also due to the encirclement of Suez City and the 3rd Army which might destroy 
his publicized image of victor.  
However, Israel also was compelled to peace; pressure from the US as a payoff for 
Israeli dependence on it which had bolstered her battlefield superiority,240 the sense 
that escalation would be useless and only invite a Soviet intervention, and 
operational necessity.  
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With the Cold War dynamics (USSR ultimatum and US strategic alert), both powers 
were interested in de-escalation in addition to the point that encircling the 3rd Army 
was seen internationally as illegal as it was done after violating 3 UN resolutions for 
ceasefire, the last two ordering the belligerent forces explicitly to go back to 22 
October positions.  
Militarily, IDF operational superiority was far from being determined. The corridor 
to its 3 armoured divisions in the west bank of Suez (enemy territory) was narrow 
and not viable for long. The shift from encirclement to annihilating the Egyptian 3rd 
Army was no doubt achievable but only at an unacceptable cost, according to Israeli 
parameters, in human losses, especially with Egyptian deployment of 2 armoured 
divisions to the west of Israeli forces by 28 October.241 To sum up: the coercive 
power of the Israeli operational advantage, the currency convertor of operational 
superiority to the enemy‟s calculation and sense of security, was much less than 
expected in the absence of the aforementioned political and operational restrictions. 
However, the most compelling factor for Israeli de-escalation and openness to 
negotiation was the psychological shattering in the opening of war and the failure of the 
security concept both of which convinced the Israeli cabinet that the pre-war strategic 
orientation would neither lead to deterrence nor security.  
The Israeli leadership did not recover completely from these effects even with the 
subsequent operational achievements. As Meir said in her memoirs, “the war was a 
near disaster, a nightmare that I myself experienced, and which will always be with 
me…I found myself as Prime Minister in a position of ultimate responsibility at a 
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time when the state faced the greatest threat it had known”.242 The feeling of insecurity 
and improbable victory, adding to the losses that they were sensitive to, were the 
strategic effects that Egyptians aimed to achieve, and these they did, if only in part.  
This relative superiority for Egypt, was visible in the Disengagement I in 
comparison to the pre-war deployment, whereby Israeli forces withdrew from the 
west bank of the Suez Canal and Egypt reduced its presence on the east bank to 
nominal forces and drew back her SAMs. This situation was clearly more 
advantageous to Egypt than that before the war. Much of this advantage, however, 
was lost during the subsequent negotiations due to Sadat‟s poor diplomacy which 
yielded more concessions than Kissinger and the Israelis expected.  
However, in the long run, Israel achieved a grand-strategic advantage; she could 
not achieve border changes in Sinai, but Sinai became mostly de-militarized; and, 
more importantly, Egyptians, the core enemy for nearly three decades, were out of the 
conflict militarily through a peace, albeit a cold one. Egypt also achieved some 
political gains by regaining Sinai. However, this long term political outcome should 
not be considered directly here. Although its materialization was helped off course 
by the war and the perception of players of its outcomes, it was more shaped by the 
diplomatic marathon between 1974 and 1982 and the accompanying rifts between 
Sadat and his followers.    
Thirdly, another source of complexity was related to the dynamics of limited wars 
that are followed by exhausting diplomatic processes where the perceptions of the 
military outcomes and the strategic assumptions of possible re-escalation are 
manipulated by all players including the belligerents and the mediators.  
Therefore, there should be no astonishment in finding how dissimilar were the 
military and political assessments between players, and even inside the same camp, 
as such differences were motivated not only by differing conceptions of the  national 
agenda but also acted as a platform to advance, or defend, personal, ideological and 
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institutional positions domestically.243These “subjective” inputs may be minimized 
by applying more rigorous and critical methods and respecting the level of analysis 
and the time frames mentioned above, but they will never be avoided as long as 
humans are involved in the process. 
Also, comparing the post-war national images and domestic consequences shows 
illustrative points. In Egypt, the “October Victory” was iconized in the national 
discourse and memory. “Sinai was returned” became a slogan devoid of any 
complex or deep understanding in the education, social and media discourses. 
Nevertheless, generally the injured honour of Egypt was restored both inside the 
country and in the wider Arab world, albeit at the cost of significant casualties (5000 
killed and 12000 injured)244.  
Any criticism of the war or even meaningful investigation of its political and military 
processes were condemned and marginalized. For example, the great hero of the 
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war, General Shazly, was sentenced to three years imprisonment, after a period of 
political enmity and slanderous accusations by Sadat‟s regime, on the charge of 
“revealing national security information” in his account of “the crossing”. His 
repeated requests for an inquiry into the war to establish who was responsible for its 
setbacks were ignored.245 
In Israel, the situation was different. Although the standard narrative claimed a 
military victory which was limited only by American pressure, in retrospect there 
was satisfaction with its peaceful outcome, Israel suffered psychological and human 
costs unprecedented since 1948 (2527 killed and 5596 wounded)246. The Knesset 
investigated the war seriously to find the origins of the government‟s mistakes. The 
Agranat Commission was established even before Disengagement I, and performed 
a very thorough estimate of all aspects. Its “open” conclusion put the responsibility 
of the first day‟s nightmare on the shoulders of the military, especially Aman, and 
skipped the politicians. 247 
To comply with the Agranat recommendations regarding rationalising civil-military 
relations, the Basic Laws were sanctioned in 1974 to put the military formally under 
the direct scrutiny of both the executive and legislative branches.   
Causal link tracing for this war presents a low advantageous practical ability for 
Egypt (medium Egyptian ability versus lower medium Israeli ability) that resulted in 
low relative Superiority for Egypt.  This relative superiority is derived from a 
moderate achievement of Egypt‟s strategic objectives (but not its political aims) 
versus low Israeli achievement. Also, Egypt restored its honour and had a privileged 
post-war military deployment in comparison to before the war. Although Israel 
achieved a grand strategic success on the long run versus low Egyptian achievement, 
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this wasn‟t planned for and was a fruit of an almost disconnected long post-war 
diplomatic pathway. For the purpose of this research, as was explained in the 
introduction, the long-term grand strategic achievement is not considered a primary 
measure of war winning, but only as a secondary measure as the military outcome of 
1973 War, or rather its perception, was still a working factor in the diplomatic 
pathway preceding the 1979 Peace Accords. 
With a slightly higher comparative strategic practical ability (upper medium for 
Egypt and lower medium for Israel), this is almost congruent with the presumed 
causal link. 
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The Milestones of the Arab-Israeli Irregular Wars 
The Search for Identity: Fatah-led PLO 
As early as 1958, Fatah (The Palestinian Nationalist Liberation Movement) was 
founded by a small of group of young Palestinian nationalists and Islamists led by 
Yasser Arafat, who was a graduate of the Cairo Faculty of Engineering who was 
subsequently commissioned in the Palestine Liberation Organization in Egypt. Fatah 
promoted two principles in contrast to other Palestinian nationalist movements: the 
priority of the Palestinian liberation agenda over any other political or ideological 
affiliation, and not rallying behind any single Arab regime or participating in the 
regional rivalry.1 
Before 1967, Fatah, and its military wing Al-Asifa (storm), participated only 
modestly in guerrilla warfare and regional politics. Its preferred strategy was 
utilizing border guerrilla war to instigate an Arab-Israeli war2, which was expected 
to end in a decisive victory for the Arabs, by promoting a cycle of escalation and 
retaliation. In 1967, the war came but resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Arabs. 
After 1967, Fatah benefited from the widespread desperation that filled both Arab 
and Palestinian communities and the rising popular mistrust of the role of Arab 
regimes in seeking the liberation of Palestine, after they had lost the rest of Palestine 
and large portions of their own territories. Fatah expanded in all directions: 
recruitment, new sources of funds, especially from the Gulf, military professionalism 
that was provided by the Syrians, and the establishment of military bases and 
operations on the Jordanian front.3 
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Just after the 1967 War, when the Gaza strip and the West Bank came under Israeli 
rule, Fatah attempted to imitate the Algerian model of insurgency but failed, as will 
be shown in the following section. It went back to the model of small border wars 
but with a much more mature structure, stronger and more frequent operations, and 
widely disseminated propaganda that exaggerated success stories.4  
But the turning point, when Fatah became the accepted representative of the 
Palestinian military movements, was the Battle of Karameh (dignity) in July 1969. 
After successful attacks on civilian and military targets close to the Dead Sea, Israel 
sent two armoured brigades to neutralize a series of Fatah camps in Jordan. 
However, half of the armour was captured by the Jordanian army, and the rest faced 
heavy resistance from around 200 well-trained Fatah guerrillas, while up to 2,000 
trainee recruits escaped. Israeli forces had to retreat with political, human and 
material losses5. Although Fatah fighters also suffered grave losses, the propaganda 
value was immense to the extent that Fatah’s rival, King Hussein, praised it in his 
famous speech, “We are now becoming Fedayeen (guerrilla fighters)”.6 
Fatah utilized this success to gain control of the PLO, which by then had disposed of 
its first leader Ahmed Shukeiry.  Fatah also fostered the formulation of the 
Palestinian National Covenant of 1968 which announced the necessity for the 
liberation of the whole of Mandate Palestine to establish a bi-national state without 
recognising Israel. It won the acceptance of Nasser and other Arab leaders, and 
widened influence in Jordan to an unprecedented extent.   
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However, conflict soon erupted in Jordan with small Syrian-supported movements 
that led to Black September in 1970 when the Jordanian Army attacked Palestinian 
military bases and camps until an agreement orchestrated by Nasser   a few days 
before his death secured a mass PLO evacuation to Lebanon where in the south and 
the Beqa’a valley a new Palestinian stronghold known as Fatahland was established. 
Black September was a significant setback for the PLO, not only because of the 3,000 
deaths and a greater number of wounded in a humiliating defeat, but also because of 
the loss of access to the longest viable front with Israel, and the inoperability of the 
Sinai front which it could have used to launch guerrilla operations or link with 
operations in the West Bank. 
In the Lebanon era, three developments occurred: political, organisational and 
strategic. Politically, the Fatah-led PLO became the formal representative for the 
Palestinian cause regionally and to a large extent in the international arena, a status 
iconized by Arafat’s speech to the UN in 1974. However, the PLO’s attempts to 
benefit from the diplomatic surge after 1973 were halted mainly by the Kissinger-
orchestrated US dismissal of their role and peace negotiations between Egypt and 
Israel. As Israel aggressively opposed any US-PLO rapprochement7 and was not 
prepared at all to compromise over the Palestinian issue, the formal US policy of 
boycotting the PLO unless it agreed to recognise Israel was not genuinely revisited 
in spite of frequent signals from the PLO that it would be willing to compromise.8  
These offers of compromise included shifting the stated PLO political aims from 
destroying Israel to establishing a bi-national state for Arabs and Jews, to accepting a 
Palestinian authority on any de-occupied territory as laid out in the Ten Point 
Programme in 1974, to ultimately accepting the principle of an independent state in 
                                                          
7
 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp.235-238. 
8
 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999) pp.356-365. 
311 
 
the de-occupied territory in the early 1980s.9 However, these compromises failed to 
gain traction within the ongoing diplomatic processes.  
Fatah also became a major player within Lebanon which suffered a civil war from 
1975 onwards. Initially, Fatah sought to remain apart from the evolving savagery 
between the Maronites, as represented by the Lebanese Front, on one side and the 
Leftists, nationalists, Muslims, Druze and some PLO components such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on the other. However, after the 
massacre of Tal Al-Za’ater in 1976 and the fall of other Palestinians camps, Fatah 
entered the civil war but sought to play a mediating role such as when it played 
down the confrontations between the national movement and the Syrians who were 
seeking to control them.10  
Organisationally, the PLO was widened to accommodate the leftist movements, 
including the PFLP which was the military wing of George Habash’s Arab 
Nationalist Movement and was behind the terrorist hijacking campaign from 1968 to 
1972. The PLO also developed its organisational structure to the status of a quasi-
state and its funding was expanded to around $280 million annually. It aimed to 
establish a quasi-state status and capacity. Not only did it gain recognition from the 
UN as an observing member in 1974, but established sophisticated networks 
imitating an established state in military, security, economic, education and foreign 
policy.11  
Fatah enhanced its leadership  position in the PLO decision-making platforms  such 
as the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the Executive Committee, but it was 
also  forced to accommodate the views and actions of the PLO’s other components as 
in the case of Black September and the Lebanese Civil War. Further, Fatah 
encountered stiff resistance to its diplomatic concessions and, in 1974, in response to 
                                                          
9
 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp. 256-257; Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for 
State, pp.683-686.  
10
 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp.67-77. 
11
 More details in Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp.447-495.  
312 
 
the Ten Point Programme’s gradualist approach, the PFLP and some smaller 
organisations formed what was called the Rejection Front which competed with 
Fatah’s positions and preferences within the PLO until it was mostly exhausted in 
the civil war. 
Strategically, the PLO was in a deadlock. It was embroiled in the dilemma of civil 
war which required commitments for static defences and was faced by 
disproportionate Israeli retaliation in response to border activities. Attempts at 
involvement in the diplomatic process were largely fruitless. Later, the Palestinian 
cause experienced a shocking blow with Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli 
conflict after separate peace with Israel which hugely tilted the balance of power 
towards Israel. With fractured and weak Arab states, and an organisation comprised 
of only 15,000 guerrillas, isolated from its natural popular base within Palestine, 
there was little room for strategic manoeuvre. The PLO military was transformed 
into a quasi-regular army with regular formations and weaponry, but it combined its 
bombardments/rocket firing campaigns with terrorist and commando raids inside 
Israel in addition to aiding the anti-Maronite military effort in Lebanon as part of the 
Joint Command. 
In 1978, a commando group led by an 18-year-old girl, Dalal Maghrabi, undertook 
an amphibious operation near the Tel Aviv–Haifa Road, hijacking a civilian bus in 
order to negotiate the release of PLO prisoners. The failed Israeli operation to free 
the hostages led to 37 dead, including the six Palestinians. As a result, the IAF 
replied with massive air strikes on military and civilian targets in South Lebanon 
with 70 killed.  A few days later, an air-land-sea invasion on South Lebanon aimed 
to widen the buffer zone northwards up to the Litani River. An international deal 
sanctioned a ceasefire and deployed UN emergency troops (UNIFIL) to pacify the 
area and assist the government in the exercise of its authority in the area, although 
this did not effectively happen until the 1990s.12 
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Cycles of minor escalations and reprisals followed in 1979 and 1980. But in 1981, a 
crisis erupted due to a Maronite attempt to threaten the rear of the Syrian 
deployment in Beqa’a. Syria deployed batteries of SAM-6 missiles which Israel 
considered as threatening its intelligence and retaliatory capability over Lebanon. 
Mediation by the US- envoy Philip Habib calmed the situation but tensions rose 
again after Israeli air strikes on South Lebanon PLO military installations and 
UNRWA refugee camps in south Lebanon. For the first time, the PLO replied with 
severe bombardment and rocket attacks rained down on northern Galilee which 
Israel could not stop until a formal ceasefire was reached.  
This was the first time that such a formal deal had been made between Israel and the 
PLO and it was seen as a clear sign of deterioration in the Israeli deterrent 
capability.13 As a result, the PLO began to be recognised as a more legitimate 
international player, and the possibility of its integration into future peace processes 
was very alarming to the Israelis.14 Plans were forged for a military intervention 
aiming to clear the PLO strongholds in south Lebanon. 
In 1982, after a terrorist attack that wounded the Israeli ambassador in London, for 
which the PLO denied responsibility, the time came for such an operation, especially 
with the election of a triumphant Likud government headed by Menachem Begin 
and the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt. However, the limited retaliatory 
operation announced initially that aimed to clear around 25 km, the range of 
Palestinian Katyusha rockets north of the Lebanese border, was transformed by 
Sharon’s aggressive and careless calculation into a major war and the occupation of 
Beirut. A new phase in the Arab-Israeli conflict commenced.15 
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The Israeli plan envisioned an attack by six divisions supported by a seaborne 
brigade. Two invaded Lebanon and rushed up the coast to Sidon. Another two 
converged on Sidon from the central zone. The last two divisions invaded the Beqa’a 
valley to neutralize the PLO hub there, but with ambiguous orders whether to 
engage the Syrian army stationed there.16 In contrast to the 1978 campaign, the IDF 
was not merely pushing the frontal PLO defences backwards, but was aiming for a 
penetrating blitzkrieg campaign where bypassing and exploitation, then mobbing 
out, was the part of the plan.17  
But what was anticipated as a swift thrust to encircle Beirut, applying a surprising 
shock to the PLO after securing the coastal road, the only possible route to sustain 
the heavy logistics of encircling Beirut, ended in a protracted campaign. The coastal 
thrust succeeded in reaching Sidon and converged with the amphibious land at the 
Awali River, but the nearby Ein Al-Helwe camp was too much of a threat to the 
logistical supply line to be left alone. Five days of heavy urban fighting and 
bombardment had to take place before it was pacified with serious civilian and 
military casualties.18 
The central thrust was also delayed at the stronghold of Arqoub, and then converged 
at Sidon. The combined forces thrust to the northwards but were held for more than 
a week at the Khaledya–Daroum junction south of Beirut. Only the eastern thrust 
achieved its mission easily and reached the Shouf Mountains overlooking the Beqa’a 
valley as there were no PLO forces but Druze there. Although the thrust failed to 
encircle the Syrians to push them into retreat, an air-land battle in Beqa’a ended in a 
Syrian defeat with the loss of 100 planes over two days and was followed by the 
Syrian forces’ withdrawal.19 
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In Beirut, protracted urban irregular warfare began with Israeli forces supported by 
moral bombing which led to huge casualties, mostly civilians, but the IDF was 
conceptually and materially challenged too. After seven weeks of siege and 
air/ground raids, the PLO still held territory, although reduced to an eight-mile 
pocket in East Beirut. In contrast to the awkward strategy and military preparation 
in south Lebanon, Beirut was well prepared with mine fields, strong points and 
command and logistical networks. The delays in the IDF advance had also given 
time for the PLO to accumulate reserves, including a large portion of its overrun 
southern fighters. 20   
A political resolution was reached under which the PLO quit Lebanon with its arms 
for safe haven in Tunisia and Lebanon held early presidential elections. A formal 
international and American guarantee of the safety of civilians after the PLO 
withdrawal was issued.  Tragically, as the horrible massacres in Sabra and Shatila 
camps showed, this guarantee was not respected by the IDF’s allies, the Christian 
Lebanese Forces led by Samir Ga’ga’, with disputed IDF collusion. 21 
Multinational forces from the US, France and Italy were stationed in Lebanon to 
guard the implementation of the deal. Bashir Gemayel, who led the Phalangist 
(Kataeb) Party, won the presidential election but was assassinated soon after.  
After leaving Lebanon for Tunisia the PLO spent the following years in more 
political and organisational works, especially by extending its networks in the 
Occupied Territories and supporting the Intifada uprising in 1987. After losing some 
of its hardliners in Israeli commando and covert campaigns, and facing the dilemma 
of being a resistance movement without a front, the PLO began diplomatic initiatives 
to translate the outcomes of the Intifada into political assets. At the same time, as the 
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Intifada reached its culminating point in 1988, the PLO changed the Palestinian 
National Charter to recognise Israel and permit negotiation of a two-state solution.22  
The PLO had lost  a great deal of its funding from the Gulf after it supported  
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the collapse of the USSR also 
meant the loss of its major political and military support. In response to these 
dramatic changes, the PLO became more open to peace initiatives through reaching 
a rapprochement with the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Israel was also ready to 
negotiate in order to get rid of the burden of the Intifada and widen normalization of 
relations with the Arabs.23   
The Oslo Accords signed in 1993 permitted a temporary platform for a Palestinian 
Autonomous Authority in the West Bank and Gaza while the conditions for solid 
peace were negotiated and built. The Wadi Araba peace agreement was also signed 
with Jordan in 1994. From that date, the PLO was effectively subordinate to the 
Palestinian Authority led by Fatah, and only represented a secondary platform for 
political manoeuvring domestically and regionally. 
 
Born with Invasion and Shia Revival: Hezbollah 
Guerrilla warfare against Israel did not end after the PLO retreat from Lebanon but 
was continued by new Sunni and Shia organisations in Lebanon.24 The most 
important and effective of these was Hezbollah. Faced with increasing losses in 
Lebanon from 1982 to 1985, which reached 670 casualties, Israel withdrew from the 
environs of Beirut to a southern “security zone”, an area in the south the depth of 12 
km at Hamra in the west and 15-40 km wide. The zone was ruled nominally by the 
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forces of a puppet ally, the Christian South Lebanese Army (SLA) led by Saad 
Haddad with the IDF as the real ruler.  
Although Hezbollah’s birth was primarily a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 
two other factors were influential: the Lebanese Shia revival and the Islamic Iranian 
Revolution.  
Lebanese Shiites had been neglected politically and socially since the establishment 
of greater Lebanon in 1920. However, in the 1960s a major social and political revival 
commenced, led by Musa as--Sadr, a Shiite high jurist from a prominent Iraqi family. 
He established the Mahromoon (Movement of the Disinherited) as a social platform, 
and then created Amal (Lebanese Resistance Detachments) in response to the 
frequent Israeli border incursions. However, after Musa as-Sadr’s mysterious 
disappearance in 1978 while visiting Libya, rifts appeared in Amal.25  
 A Shiite Islamist trend separated from Amal in 1982 in response to the involvement 
of Nabih Berri, Amal’s new leader, in Lebanon’s transitional political agreement. 
Amal was the main source of the emerging Hezbollah leadership and provided the 
new group with political and military training. 26 Among those who switched to 
Hezbollah was Hassan Nasrallah, who led Amal’s south Lebanon sector. 
The islamization of Lebanese Shia was enhanced from the second half of the 1970s 
by two major Ayatollahs, the highest Shiite jurist, Mohamed Hussein Fadlullah and 
Mohamed Shamsuddin. Religious relations were enhanced with Najaf and Qom, the 
major religious Shiite cities in Iraq and Iran, and with Ayatollah Khomeini’s spiritual 
leadership. Once the Islamic Revolution erupted in Iran, the sense of revival and 
solidarity became stronger among religious Shiite elites in Lebanon.  
With the Israeli invasion of Lebanon a group of Nine (3 from Islamic Amal, 3 from 
the followers of the two Ayatollahs, and 3 from the Da’awa party, the Shiite version 
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of the Moslem Brotherhood) went to Tehran and received its blessing for 
establishing Hezbollah, and its military arm, the Islamic Resistance.27 Syria 
permitted several thousand Iranian Republican Guards (the Iran state army) to be 
stationed at the Lebanese-Syrian border in case the war spread.   
However, once the war was settled, most of these forces went back to Iran apart 
from one or two thousand men who moved to Lebanon to build and train the new 
organisation. This hard nucleus oversaw the development of Hezbollah’s military 
capabilities and command structure, and participated in military operations until 
1989.28 
Hezbollah broadcast its agenda in 1983, which was purely radical Islamist 
originating from Shiite ideology and strongly linked to Khomeini’s Welayat Al-
Faqih. It envisioned importing the Iranian Islamic Revolution to Lebanon to establish 
an Islamic state and participate in jihad against the Tyrants as represented by the 
Americans and the Israelis.29 Nearly 25 years later it formulated a new agenda which 
kept the same pillars of Iranian and Shiite affiliation and resistance against Israel, but 
adopted a much milder formula in describing Lebanese politics and international 
relations, stating that its role was to foster creation of a multi-religious national and 
independent state with strong relations with Arab and Islamic nations.30  
Hezbollah’s relations with other Lebanese political groups were very heated in the 
early period. It considered the Maronites   its enemy and Israel’s allies, and was 
hostile towards the Sunnis and competed with Amal for supremacy within the Shiite 
community. However, supported by Iranian resources, Hezbollah widened its base 
and structure extensively as the struggle continued to an extent that  open war 
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erupted with Amal, which was supported by the Syrians, who were concerned  by 
Hezbollah’s swift rise from  the late 1980s until 1991. However, Hezbollah’s stance 
softened over time and after the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, it 
refrained from revenge attacks against the Maronites in the south, and in 2008 even 
signed an alliance with General Michel Aoun, a Maronite leader.31  
In 1992, Hezbollah’s new leadership took the decision to participate in Lebanese 
political life which had resumed after the Ta’ef agreement ended Lebanon’s civil 
war. This decision produced a  rift among its leadership which was only relieved by 
the intervention of Ali Khamenei, the new Iranian Supreme Leader (Morshid).32     
During this period, Hezbollah applied the classic strategy of insurgency in the south 
Lebanon “Security Zone”. It gradually developed guerrilla warfare techniques 
ranging from shootings, improvised explosions and suicide attacks to more 
sophisticated operations against the SLA and Israeli strongholds. It undertook nearly 
35 big operations and around 230 medium-sized operations in this period.33 It 
simultaneously extended its recruitment base inside the Security Zone, but mainly 
outside it. It developed its social warfare and propaganda, and enhanced its 
intelligence links within the Shiite community in the zone though coercion, 
accommodation and indoctrination.  
In 1992, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Abbas Mussawi was assassinated by an 
Apache strike with his family and was replaced by Hassan Nasrallah. It responded 
to the assassination with a series of terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish 
interests in Latin America and Europe.34 
The Israeli response came with Operation Accountability which lasted seven days 
from July 1993, and involved air-land-sea attacks on southern Lebanon to neutralize 
Hezbollah’s military bases and command structure. However, Hezbollah launched 
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thousands of katyusha rockets against Israel which paralysed Northern Galilee. An 
informal agreement was reached with American and Syrian intervention which 
entailed redrawing red lines against hitting civilian targets.35 
 Only three years after this agreement Israel attempted to crush Hezbollah with the 
massive Operation Grapes of Wrath. But Hezbollah launched more katyushas and 
the operation was halted after a UN safe haven for civilian refugees was attacked in 
the south Lebanon town of Qana.  The two sides signed a formal agreement after the 
massacre.36 After that, medium-range guerrilla and retaliatory actions persisted until 
Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. 
In addition to retaliatory measures Israel had attempted to establish competent 
governance in the security zone by enhancing the military and administrative 
capabilities of the SLA and isolating the population from Hezbollah’s reach by 
accommodation, but principally by coercive measures.37 Nevertheless, the drain of 
blood and treasure caused great resentment among Israeli population and political 
campaigns such as the Four Mothers Movement38, were launched to press for 
quitting the Lebanese quagmire. Ehud Barak, leader of the Labour Party, put 
withdrawal from Lebanon at the top of his manifesto. Against the wishes of his 
military leadership, who requested delaying the withdrawal or waiting until a 
political agreement was signed with the Syrians, he ordered a unilateral and sudden 
withdrawal which Hezbollah portrayed as a holy victory. 
The Israeli-Lebanese border became quiet from 2000 till 2006, when Hezbollah 
launched a kidnapping operation to seize hostages to be exchanged for its prisoners 
in Israel. Small Hezbollah units managed to infiltrate the laser-electronic border and 
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blow up two Humvees; a Merkava tank that rushed to help was ambushed and two 
soldiers were kidnapped. The Israeli response was unprecedented -- a major war. 
Over 33 days, aiming to finally disarm Hezbollah, Israel launched a massive 
strategic air campaign against its leadership, command chains, logistical lines, social 
base and Lebanese infrastructure. The air attacks covered all Lebanon in an attempt 
to turn the government and population against Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah replied on an unprecedented scale, launching hundreds of small to 
medium rockets daily that reached as far as Haifa and Tel Aviv. Its stubborn 
defensive holding operations prevented the frequent Israeli commando raids from 
occupying the resistance pockets, and its use of sophisticated weaponry such as 
Cornet laser-guided double-headed anti-tank missiles wrought havoc on the state-
of-the-art Merkava tanks, destroying 34, while anti-ship C308 missiles destroyed the 
Israeli missile ship Saer off Sidon.39  
The massive psychological effects of Hezbollah’s actions on the Israeli leadership 
and population and regional and international opposition to the Israeli attacks on 
civilians and Lebanese infrastructure led toa deal being arranged before the build-up 
of ground operations. Both sided agreed to UN resolution 1701 which ordered a 
ceasefire and the positioning of UN forces up to the Litani River.  
The war resulted in around 1071 Lebanese killed (a third of whom were children) 
and 4000 wounded and 157 Israelis killed (40 civilians) and around 5000 wounded, 
with huge economic costs for both sides ($2 billion and $5 billion respectively).40 
Hezbollah was again able to portray itself as the holy victor and the guardian of 
Lebanon, and became highly popular among the wider Arab population, although it 
was criticized to some extent among Lebanese Sunnis and Christians for inciting the 
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war and continuing to build its rocket arsenal. 41 A formal Israeli committee of 
investigation (the Winograd Commission) called the war a failure.42   
 
Born with Two Intifadas: Hamas 
The origins of Hamas go back to the establishment of the Moslem Brotherhood in 
Gaza in 1945.43 Under Nasser’s regime, the group’s activities were repressed in Gaza 
but were generally eased in the West Bank under the Jordanians who were in 
alliance with the Moslem Brotherhood. Members of the group were among the early 
founders of Fatah (known as the Gulf Group), and wider participation of Moslem 
Brotherhood members was arranged in PLO camps in Jordan after 1967 in what 
were known as Scholars Camps.44  
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of Hamas, was exposed to 
Moslem Brotherhood ideology while studying in Cairo in the 1960s. After returning 
to Gaza, he launched missionary (da’awa) and social works and was critical of 
participating in an armed struggle against Israel from outside, and without building 
a solid social base in the Occupied Territories.45 
During the late 1970s, Yassin exploited the Israeli relaxation towards Islamic 
missionary work in the Occupied Territories as the Shin Bet was convinced that 
Islamists would compete with Fatah for support among the population. He 
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established a system of social networks while continuing his efforts to develop the 
secret organisational networks of the Moslem Brotherhood in Gaza.46  
The MB got stronger and, as was expected, frequently quarrelled with the PLO over 
control of social and educational organisations in Gaza and the West Bank. 
However, two leaders, Dr Fathi Al-Sheqaqi and Sheikh Abdul-Malik Auda, who 
were critical of the organisation’s policy of delaying armed struggle to allow for the 
purification of society, established Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)47 as an offshoot of 
the organisation.48  
The PIJ was influenced by the Iranian Islamic Revolution and competed with the MB 
in the same social strata. But when the 1987 Intifada erupted, the MB leadership 
realised how dangerous lack of active participation49 would be to its survival, and 
established Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine) and published its 
charter in 1988. 
The charter adopted the ideology of the MB and considered Hamas its resistance 
wing in Palestine. It reiterated the aims of establishing an Islamic state from the 
Jordan River to the Sea as a part of the Islamic khelafa (Caliphate). However, it also 
highlighted the national agenda and was very accommodating to the other secular 
and Islamic organisations in Palestine, including the PLO and the PIJ.50  
In 1991, Hamas founded its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. It carried out a 
few minor attacks in what it called the knives campaign and some kidnappings. 51 It 
used this watershed period to develop its internal structures and external and 
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internal relations. In contrast to the PLO, which lost much of its Gulf support with 
the Kuwait War, Hamas, together with the wider MB movement, condemned 
Hussein’s invasion as well as the Western intervention in Kuwait. Hence, most of the 
Gulf resources shifted after the war from the PLO to Hamas.  
Hamas also established good relations with Iran in 1992 and opened an office in 
Tehran a year later.  Iranian funding reached around $30 million annually.52 With 
these resources Hamas could extend and develop its social networks which included 
mosques, hospitals, social welfare and educational institutions, including a 
university. 
Hamas and the PIJ, as well as the radical leftists such as the PFLP, did not recognize 
the Oslo Accords and so did not participate in the ongoing negotiations. After the 
massacre at the Ibrahaimi Mosque (Cave of the Patriarch) in Hebron in 1994 by an 
Israeli terrorist which left 70 victims among the worshippers, Hamas launched a 
suicide bombing campaign against Israeli civilian targets. After the assassination of 
this campaign’s organiser, Yehia Ayyash, by Israel, another campaign followed in 
1995. Between 1995 and 2000, relations between Hamas and the new Palestinian 
Authority led by Fatah deteriorated and many Hamas cadres were arrested. 
However, Hamas orchestrated its terrorist attacks inside Israel carefully to precede 
and spoil the negotiating steps that were to follow the Oslo Accords.  
After the failure of the Camp David negotiations between Arafat and Netanyahu 
over the issue of Jerusalem in July 2000, the situation became tenser. Three months 
later after a planned visit by Sharon to the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, the 
Second Intifada erupted. While the first Intifada was mostly civilian in nature and 
not organised until late, the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 was heavily militarized and 
was organised by a handful of Palestinian military organisations, including Hamas, 
the PIJ, PFLP and new Fatah offshoots: the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Popular 
Resistance Committees. Yasser Arafat was unable to restrain the Palestinian actions, 
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especially in the face of the extensive Israeli incursions against civilians in addition 
to its attacks on the militants.53  
Israeli public opinion was shifting to the right during this period, partly in response 
to a new wave of suicide attacks in Israeli cities. Faced with better fighters with 
better training and morale, the IDF adopted unrestrained techniques during 
Operation Defensive Wall in 2002 to avoid heavy losses among its own soldiers; 
these included “hollowing explosion” techniques and aerial strategic bombing.54  
Another result was the destruction of the Palestinian Authority infrastructure and 
Arafat’s detention in his Moqata’a until his controversial death in 2004, since Israel 
accused him of being a funder and organiser of the second Intifada in spite of his 
condemnation of many of its actions. Sheikh Yassin, the quadriplegic spiritual leader 
of Hamas, was also killed in an Apache attack in 2005, which increased public 
support for Hamas. Hence, Hamas’s power was increasing vis-à-vis Fatah due to the 
above factors and also because of what was considered its successful reading of the 
situation, and a sense of the inferiority of Fatah’s negotiation pathway in comparison 
to the Muqawama (armed resistance) model taken by Hamas. 
When Ariel Sharon came to power in 2005, he proposed unilateral disengagement 
with Gaza, which included decommissioning its few settlements, emphasising the 
maintenance of a security grip in the West Bank (in contravention of the Oslo 
Accords), and building a Separation Wall which would isolate Palestinian 
population areas to safeguard Israelis against terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, Hamas 
and other Palestinian groups considered the Israeli withdrawal a victory. 
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In 2006, Egypt’s Mubarak and Mahmoud Abbas, the new Fatah, PLO and PA leader, 
attempted to convince Israel, with American pressure, to permit Hamas’s 
participation in Palestinian General Elections as a way to moderate the 
organisation’s behaviour. However, Hamas won a surprise victory and established a 
Government. The enmity between Hamas and Fatah exploded and ended with the 
Hamas military taking over the Gaza Strip in 2007. Both sides in Gaza and the West 
Bank applied extensive repression against the other side’s infrastructure and 
affiliation. Attempts to broker reconciliation in Mekka, Sana’a, Cairo, and Doha 
repeatedly failed. 
As Hamas became responsible for almost 2 million people in the Gaza Strip and was 
keen to keep its rule going, it developed a new strategic behaviour.  Internationally, 
Hamas had to align itself with the regional axis of Iran and Syria for finance and 
military aid, and to keep a viable relationship with Egypt in spite of its attitude in 
closing the tunnelling networks between Gaza and Sinai.  
However, with the emergence of popular uprisings during the “Arab Spring” in 
which Hamas supported moves towards a new regional order controlled by Moslem 
Brotherhood sections in power, it shifted its policy against Syria and became more 
involved with Egyptian affairs. The short-lived nature of the Moslem Brotherhood’s 
uprising meant Hamas had to face seriously negative consequences, especially 
facing an increasingly hostile Egyptian regime. 
Domestically, Hamas had to face the same challenges as Fatah in ruling a truncated 
and isolated area. It wielded a harsh hand to prevent dissent and although it quickly 
reversed its early attitude towards the islamization of social life, it was not tolerant 
of any political or military organisations, especially Fatah. Of the other Islamic 
organisations such as the PIJ and Salafist Jihadists, the former were critical of 
Hamas’s self-restraint towards Israel and aggressive attitude towards Fatah, and the 
latter were upset by Hamas’s moderation towards both Israel and social 
islamization. Both organisations were kept under strict control. 
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The armed struggle with Israel became limited to cyclic escalation and extended 
intervals of calm. The first big campaign after 2008-9 was operation Cast Lead55, as 
Hamas did not accept a renewal of the ceasefire with Israel unless it was extended to 
the West Bank and Israel lifted the maritime and ground blockade in place since 
2006 when the Hamas government rejected the conditions of the Quartet56.  
The Israeli cabinet, with Ehud Olmert as Prime Minister, Tsibi Livney as Foreign 
Minister and Ehud Barak as Defence Minister, proclaimed an over-optimistic aim of 
disarming Hamas, and the IDF launched a massive air-sea-ground campaign. Much 
of the Gaza Strip infrastructure was demolished and some Hamas high officials were 
killed or attacked before the Israelis withdrew. However, the ground operation faced 
unexpected resistance, similar to the 2006 Hezbollah model, and rockets were 
launched against Israeli territory until the end. An Egyptian-mediated agreement re-
established the ceasefire in Gaza and mildly relaxed the blockade. 
Another escalation occurred in 2012 with Israel’s operation Pillar of Defence57 after it 
assassinated the Hamas military leader in Gaza, Ahmed Ja’bary, who was 
considered responsible for kidnapping Shalit and firing rockets.  This time the Israeli 
cabinet set the modest aim of repairing deterrence. An aerial campaign of 
destruction was answered by Hamas firing rockets, which were now capable of 
reaching Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. However, an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire was 
reached again before ground operation got underway and both sides claimed 
victory. 
A similar episode58 occurred in 2014 with Israel assassinating Hamas leaders and 
retaliatory rocket firing that was more extensive in range and quantity. The IDF 
ordered partial mobilization and a limited ground operation occurred on the Gaza 
periphery to prevent Palestinian tunnel attacks against Negev settlements. The 
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campaign left 2,190 Palestinians killed (1523 were believed to be civilians, including 
519 children)59 and 72 Israelis killed (6 were civilians)60.  
After a painstaking negotiation process, a similar deal to 2012 was reached. Both 
sides, especially Hamas, claimed victory, but the Israeli domestic population was 
highly disturbed as it had expected a more decisive result, especially since an 
operation proclaimed as repairing deterrence led to extensive evacuation of Israeli 
settlements in the Negev within range of Gaza rockets. In Gaza, the Hamas victory 
demonstrations also failed to conceal popular bitterness over the massive civilian 
losses.  
Remarks on the Arab Irregular Strategic Ability 
As the above concise narrative might show, the wars between Israel and Arab 
irregulars were uneven due to geography, socio-political, regional and international, 
ideologies, military strategies and outcomes. But were they also uneven in the ability 
of irregular forces to identify these characteristics and mould their strategic structure 
and conduct to reach their policy end?  
Conceptual 
The PLO, and its members, had the greatest ability to identify the nature of their 
struggle and its required strategy in a theoretical, if not sophisticated, manner. This 
can be seen in the dozens of central research groups, strategy and planning centres, 
regular and special periodicals for each movement. The ideological background of 
the PLO movement affected this theorizing capability and the adopted theories. 
Ideological factions, both leftist and, to a lesser extent, nationalist, were generally 
more focused on theory in comparison to Fatah which described itself mostly in 
more pragmatic and narrow nationalist terms.  
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However, two maladies infected PLO theorizing and aggravated each other. All 
movements were influenced to some extent, even Fatah, by Mao’s and Guevara’s 
theories. Fatah was closer to the Algerian model as it was based on simple 
nationalism rather than ideological social reformations. However, there was a lack of 
thoroughness in generating a theoretical model respecting Mao’s descending 
generality: theory of war, theory of peoples’ war and theory of Palestinian peoples’ 
war.  
Although most acknowledged to some extent the contextual variances61, they did not 
appreciate how massive these differences were, or their impacts. They had no solid 
base inside the occupied territory, no stable and genuine regional support. They 
shared the radical political aim of destroying Israel, at least until 1974, but this was 
beyond the scope of irregular warfare as explained in chapter four. The military and 
political imbalance between Israel and the Arab regional state system, and the 
almost universal international support for the viability of Israel, even from the 
Eastern Bloc, were also important factors. 
The second problem was that the generation of theory was subject to its use as 
propaganda and to intra-PLO rivalries. As Sayigh indicated, the PLO movements, 
especially before 1970, kept shifting the utility of their theoretical arsenal62 to make 
grandiose claims regarding their practical achievements without describing the 
reality of their situation or achievements. 
The previous deficiency may be more attributed to the inability to formulate a 
practical strategy matching ends, means, and ways, but it lay also in the use of ill-
defined concepts. For example, the border skirmishes were hailed by the PLO as the 
core of their people’s war but in fact the models they used did not apply in cases 
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where the guerrilla movement seeks bases in states that are hostile to them; a 
theoretical fallacy noted by Harkabi.63  
Addressing the utility of force in a more generic model and trying to build their 
theory of victory might have been more fruitful. Hence, externally generated 
theoretical models of a people’s war or guerrilla war may have hindered the 
strategic development of a fresh PLO contribution to the general theory of war and 
strategy and applying it to the specific context.   
Hezbollah had a more modest approach to theory. Although its founders were 
familiar with the strategic theories of a people’s war and guerrilla war, since many 
were former members of Amal and some were even PLO cadres, the general trend 
was inherited from the Iranian theory which favoured pragmatism. Hezbollah did 
not generate theories of struggle, as was the PLO, but its strategic pathways were 
mostly the product of painstaking practice.64 Nevertheless, the Hezbollah leadership 
did understand and use the basic, but highly valuable, strategic concepts such as the 
difference between strategy and tactics, how war and military actions work together 
by producing a change of will in the enemy, and how policy aims should be matched 
meticulously to military capability. But without a formal strategic education there 
are high risks in this self-educational process, and especially with the successive 
losses of experienced military and strategic leaders. Also, with highly ideological 
movements, as will be shown, it may be difficult at some point to differentiate what 
is ideological and what is “cold” strategic thinking. 
Hamas was the least developed in theory. It was deprived of a formal theorizing and 
strategic educational process, and was a slow learner and lost many of its possible 
theorists or highly experienced leaders by the long-standing Israeli policy of 
                                                          
63
 Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response (New York: Free Press, 1977). 
64
 The author visited its Centre for Strategic Studies in the “Dhahia” (the southern suburbs of Beirut) and met 
its director. Basically, this centre had a library and a translating centre and none of its employees, including the 
director, had been taught strategic studies but some had political sciences degrees. The role of the Centre, 
according to the director, was to translate the latest Western and Israeli accounts on Hezbollah rather than 
formulate policy guidance.  
331 
 
decapitation (arrest or assassination of successive leaders). Also, there was a cultural 
element in that the Moslem Brotherhood model that Hamas drew upon highlighted 
the emotional and practical elements rather than theoretical and critical, in contrast 
to other, much richer, Sunni and Shiite trends.65 Nevertheless, Hamas was quick to 
gain an understanding of tactical and technical methods after 2006.  
Institutional 
The PLO’s institutional ability was problematic but had positive elements.At the 
formal level, the PLO maintained a sophisticated and highly democratic institutional 
setting -- The Palestinian National Council with its 300 members or more 
represented the legislative and higher authority for long-term policy, and the 
Executive Committee was the executive arm and oversaw all the organisational 
bodies, including military headquarters and the security apparatus. These bodies 
were essentially similar to those of a small modern state. However, two problems 
remained for the PLO’s institutional capacity.  
Firstly, there was massive diversity among its member movements on nearly 
everything: ideology, policy and long-term strategies. Also, most of these 
movements were to some extent, separated from Fatah, and many were affiliated to 
some regional actor. Even Fatah had to align itself at some point to one state or 
another. This caused internal rivalry which hindered the healthiness of policy and 
strategy making. This occurred especially at some critical junctures such as the 
strategic decision before 1970 regarding the main locus of effort, the position 
regarding Jordan and international terrorist groups, decisions after 1974 regarding 
the Lebanese Civil War and relations with Syria, and crucial changes in policy and 
diplomacy such as the 1974 Ten Point Plan and linked diplomatic initiatives.  
The results were serious and irreparable.  These strategic and political fallacies of the 
PLO can be seen as signs of weak conceptual or practical ability and were often 
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acknowledged even by Fatah. Fatah’s dilemma was that it was more concerned to 
establish a strategic formula than to look for a healthy institutional setting more 
suitable for strategy making. 
Another problem was the paternalistic way Arafat ran the PLO and Fatah, especially 
after 1982. He became more concerned with emphasising his personal authority by 
marginalizing strong platforms inside the PLO, or by dividing them with financial 
and promotional bribery rather than building professional and uncorrupted 
structures.66 It was no surprise after the eviction from Beirut in 1982 that the PLO 
faced an extensive armed conflict with its offshoots in Lebanon and Syria, especially 
in response to Arafat’s inclination in 1983 to a diplomatic pathway.67 
After Oslo, as Fatah held power, the pool of recruits expanded in number and 
diversity as joining the movement become a way of social and career development. 
Corruption and rivalry between leaders coming back from abroad and the domestic 
leaders made centrality of command unachievable. But as Shapiro indicated, with 
the absence of security pressure on Fatah and minimal differences of opinion among 
its factions, this problem was only latent. It had to await the Second Intifada to 
explode.68 The new military was explicitly obedient to Arafat and the PA leadership 
in de-escalating or avoiding indiscriminate suicide attacks.69 
Hezbollah had the best institutional ability and was served by two exclusive 
conditions. The first was its indebtedness to Welayat Faquih ideology which 
emphasised religious obedience to the highest leadership, as represented by the 
Supreme Leader (Morshid) and the General Secretary, with the former being the 
arbiter in case of division (as when Khamenei salvaged the movement from splitting 
during the decision over whether to enter Lebanon’s parliamentary elections in 
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1992). Second, it was based in a very weak and decentralized state and within a safe 
socio-religious sanctuary in the Shiite community.  
Although Hezbollah was not entirely free of Israeli security threats, even after 2000 
as the assassination of its security chief in 2006 shows, nor was it completely free 
from military confrontations with Lebanese sections as the events of 1989 with Amal 
and 2008 with the Sunnis showed, these threats and confrontations were not 
constant as was the case for both the PLO and Hamas. 
Hence, Hezbollah was able to preserve its strong centralization and clear authority 
in the hands of the General Secretary, who was charismatic, and the Magles Shura 
Al-Qarar, the highest communal authority, while permitting formal and informal 
debate strategic and operational decision making. Hezbollah’s security and military 
apparatuses are under the control of the General Secretary70, and all other structures 
such as the political bureau and central bureau were overseen by other members in 
Magles Shura. Generally, Hezbollah was open to internal criticism provided it was 
kept within the organisation, but this toleration of dissent is stronger in the higher 
echelons.71 The security and military organisation and their cadres were secret even 
inside the organisation.72  
Hamas presents a more mixed picture in terms of institutional capacity. It has a clear 
formal political authority represented in the hegemony of its legislative body, the 
Shura Council, and an executive arm, the Political Bureau, with responsibility over 
its security, military and civilian apparatuses. Both bodies contain elements from 
within the Occupied Territories and from outside. Also, the Shura contains non-
Palestinian Moslem Brotherhood members.73  
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However, as many researchers have indicated, there was a split in the command, 
with the exterior leadership more tied to and directed by the military. This led to 
more aggressive military course of action, especially in the scope and indiscriminate 
targeting of suicide attacks, as the exterior elements were less restrained in contrast 
to the internal commands in Gaza and West Bank.74The coup of 2007 and the 
subsequent escalations with Israel were attributed also to the external leadership 
because of its regional affiliation, not to the internal with its more modest policies 
since they are the ones who tend to face the consequences of escalation.75 
The grading of institutional strategic ability, in spite of varied internal structures and 
functionality, has slightly different combined value among the three irregular 
movements. The PLO, with moderate information sharing, central decision making 
and operational/tactical flexibility but defective critical assessment and weak 
strategic intervention by political leadership would get a grade of lower medium. 
Hezbollah has competent central decision making with decentralized operations and 
tactics, and sound strategic intervention by the political leadership, but moderate 
information sharing and critical assessment. This would give a grade of upper 
Medium. 
Hamas has moderate information sharing, critical assessment and strategic 
intervention, but a competent decentralized operations, and this would secure  lower 
medium grade. 
The Practical Tier 
The PLO, as has been described, suffered significant strategic discrepancies between 
its radical aims and inadequate means, and flawed strategic choices only aggravated 
the mismatch and increased its losses. 
The PLO’s theory of winning the conflict acknowledged the necessity for social, 
political and strategic transformation for both Palestinians and Arabs if its radical 
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aims were to be attained, but it did not describe how these transformations would be 
achieved and how the inevitable contradictions between them would be addressed 
in a coherent strategy.  
As Sayigh suggested, options for armed struggle were not carefully studied and the 
necessary conditions were not met or created, whether for a short-lived insurgency 
inside the Occupied Territories, or a border guerrilla war, or formation of a semi-
state through participation in a civil war and a regular military ability or achieving a 
balance of terror. Rather, as Sayigh indicated, these methods were used for other 
objectives: emphasising identity, which was seen as an end in itself, establishing the 
legitimacy and capability of an externally located semi-state in Lebanon, and as 
weapons in inter-movements rivalry.76  
This led the PLO to adopt a series of strategies, often with an unclear or undefined 
terminology, which tended to create more trouble than solutions for its imminent 
objectives.  Interestingly, some genuine and critical ideas were accepted by the Fatah 
leadership but institutional deficiency and cultural and personal aberrations 
hindered their implementation.  
An insurgency (people’s war) strategy should have acknowledged the Occupied 
Territories and its population as the main strategic and operational effort. The huge 
mismatch with Israel, both militarily and demographically, should have led to 
cooperation with Jordan as a back door for human and other resources if not a 
sanctuary to act from: as with Laos if not Hanoi.77 Arab military and political 
weakness should have led to a milder political agenda from the beginning until the 
required transformation could occur. 
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Even in terms of short-term thinking and military build-up, after 1974 the PLO 
formally abandoned the principle of a popular liberation war, leaving it isolated in 
Lebanon and increasingly drawn into the civil war. The sanctuary offered by 
Lebanon could have provided some strategic gain, as it did in 1981 and to a lesser 
extent in 1978, but this would have needed a different strategic orientation and build 
up, including  positive relations with the Lebanese population through social and 
political work , smoothing the rifts with Syria, creating a guerrilla army or even a 
regular army which had a high affinity to irregular transformation with all the 
required flexibility of command and redundancy in logistical and communication 
systems, and entrenching a rocket arsenal at  the expense of heavy artillery and 
armour.   
Although Hezbollah’s long-term policy and strategy were heavily skewed to  an 
overarching Shiite eschatology --  that the role of Hezbollah and other Shiite regional 
powers was to ignite regional conflict by engaging Israel,  the imperial powers and 
the Arab regimes until the Mahdi returned and led it to total victory – its short-term 
strategy was remarkably effective. Nasrullah adopted in the late 1990s the theory of 
the “spider web” (a reference to a Qur’anic parable) referring to the internal 
weakness of Israel in societal and political terms (as a spider web), in which Israel’s 
internal destruction only requires the resistance discourse to be catalysed.  
However, as time passed with no sign of such a collapse within Israel, Hezbollah 
returned to the classic Imami theory and refocused itself to strategic defence and the 
possibility of engaging in a regional war if Israel attacked Iran or Syria for example.  
From 1982, Hezbollah launched a gradualist guerrilla war while extending its socio-
political base among the Shiite community. It succeeded in undermining Israeli 
efforts to transform the Security Zone into a buffer-zone. It combined all media, 
social welfare, political, security and military elements to bleed Israel and her 
Lebanese ally the SLAwhile amplifying its own military achievements,  with 
disproportional psychological effect on the Lebanese, Shiites, Arabs, Israelis and the 
local population in the security zone.  Hezbollah was the first movement in the 
337 
 
region which both organised suicide attacks and recorded its operations for future 
broadcasting purposes.  
In 1993, and again in 1996, it easily recognised the lesson missed by the PLO in its 
own experience, the potential for a balance of terror by using rockets to attack 
Israel’s “soft belly” and built its doctrine, force structure, command system and 
technology in accordance. The operational methods that had originally been merely 
for protection against Israeli retaliations on guerrilla fighters in the 1990s became the 
main effort in 2006 to reach Hezbollah’s desired strategic effect. 
However, what was really fascinating about the Hezbollah strategy in 2006 was its 
adoption of regular operational and tactical methods added to its traditional 
irregularity in order to enhance the strategic effect of irregular war. In 2006 it still 
maintained an irregular strategy of bleeding the enemy and psychological shock, not 
a war of position or a new type of hybrid war as claimed by Hoffman from the 
strategic point of view78, and Hezbollah used regular military methods only to 
increase the effect of its irregular strategy.  
Hezbollah explicitly aimed to generate mistrust among the Israeli population for its 
political and military leadership, mistrust for the army among the political 
leadership, a loss of belief in the possibility of victory among all of them, and a sense 
of victory among the Arabs and Lebanese. Defeating elite forces over territory, 
demolishing dozens of tanks and partially demolishing a missile ship did not count 
for much tactically, or operationally, but had great psychological impact. This does 
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not mean Hezbollah was simply manipulating the narrative on the basis of non-
existent or small achievements, but represented tactical and operational 
achievements which could then be broadcast and amplified.  
Hezbollah moulded all its operational capability for this mission; a huge arsenal of 
short and medium-range missiles, tunnel and bunker networks, separate operational 
lines for guerrilla and rocket systems, a decentralized command which could be 
connected at some points by wired network, and individual training.  
On the other hand   a “victory syndrome” affected Hezbollah after 2006. No further 
direct confrontation with Israel had so far taken place to prove or disprove it, but its 
grandiose propaganda79 is more than simply psychological warfare, as it was in the 
first intifada80, especially when considered along with Hezbollah’s ongoing regional 
ideological adventurism.  
Hamas was again in between. In a way similar to Hezbollah, it did not set out to 
resolve how its long-term policy would be achieved, apart from waiting for an 
eventual socio-political transformation on an Islamic basis. This was identical to the 
perception of Fatah in the 1960s that the armed struggle would galvanize Arab unity 
and transformation, in contrast to Arab nationalists or leftists who required 
transformation first.  
Its short-term strategy had much stronger elements than the PLO, but less strong 
than Hezbollah, and it also had weak points. 
The Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine had always recognized the Occupied 
Territories as the strategic focus and operational centre of gravity because of its 
population. It abstained from military struggle until it had built dense social and 
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organisational networks. It also benefited from both the positive effects of the PLO’s 
negotiations and achievements, the partial sanctuary offered by the Palestinian 
Authority, and the general patriotic feelings in and around the first intifada.  And 
the MB also benefitted from the PLO’s mistakes – its loss of the Gulf resources after 
picking the wrong side in 1991, and the decline of Fatah’s authority in the late 1990s 
with the failure of the Oslo Process and the corruption of the PA which began to 
undermine Fatah’s legitimacy. 
In contrast to the PIJ which focused only on military activities, Hamas’s extensive 
social network was the source of much wider recruitment and support. Hamas also 
followed the path of Hezbollah in both grand and military strategy, albeit in a fitful 
way given its shorter experience and the more hostile environment it faced.  
Hamas used the operational path of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians during 
the 1990s and thereafter, but the combined effects of Israeli counter-measures and its 
own realization of the negative messages conveyed by such attacks forced it to adopt 
other methods. From the late 1990s, Hamas gradually moved towards using rockets 
to achieve a balance of terror. In addition to the external sources obtained through 
the tunnels to Egypt, it began early to build its basic armaments industry.  
Hamas managed to run the Al-Aqsa intifada in a competent way, combining 
guerrilla, rockets and suicide attacks81, fostering operational unity with other 
                                                          
81
 Hamas and Hezbollah claim to be in accordance with Islamic teachings on the ethical way of conducting war, 
(jus in bello). However, Islamic law obligates the avoidance of non-combatants, women, children and 
worshippers of other religions during fighting and this was a point of agreement among the formal teachings 
of all jurisprudence schools, but they can still find a way around for their followers to break this law as the 
practice of suicidal attacks and rocket firing for both Hezbollah and Hamas shows. (Hamas considered all 
Israelis as occupiers and combatants. Hezbollah employs the famous justification of technical insufficiency that 
infected Europe before WWII, and a response to Israel’s attacks on civilians. See: Wahba Al-Zuhaily, The War 
Laws in Islam (Beirut, Resalah Publishing, Arabic, 2000); Alia Brahimi, Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For basic Islamic laws of war, and for Hamas’ justification see Nawwaf 
Takrory, Martyrdom Operations: A Jurisprudent Perspective (Beirut: Dar al Fikr, 2003 - Arabic). For Hezbollah 
see “Civilians Under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in 2006 War”, Human Rights Watch, 28 
August 2007. 
340 
 
movements, especially Fatah’s military wings, and using the media to turn regional 
and international opinion against Israel. 
However, its real problems started with its decision to run in the general election of 
2006. In addition to the basic contradiction this offered to its policy of not 
recognizing the Oslo Accords, put Hamas in a direct unresolvable confrontation 
with Fatah, which ended with another faulty decision, the launching of its coup. 
The strategic logic of insurgency is to retain free strategic initiative and elusiveness 
to bleed the enemy rather be intimidated by him. Hamas controlled Gaza. As it did 
not recognize the basic conditions of international politics it was open to a wide 
confrontation with Israel, a direct confrontation which it was impossible to win. By 
besieging Gaza, Israel could bring Hamas to its knees at the peak of any escalatory 
process. However, the rocket balance of terror is sufficient to maintain the status 
quo, especially given Israel’s failure to develop an effective strategic and operational 
response.    
Only in 2009, when Israel launched a military campaign with an unrealistic aim, 
could Hamas to some extent genuinely claim a degree of victory, at least in the sense 
of denying its opponent victory. However, in 2012 and 2014, no matter what the 
boldness and sacrifice of Hamas and Gaza inhabitants achieved, it had to come to an 
end in order to feed the two million inhabitants and preserve its authority.  
The operational dilemma for Hamas after 2006 in both enhancing operational 
capability and shaping operational art was secondary to its defective strategic choice. 
Hamas had to invest in rockets as the main arm in the cyclic deterrent campaigns, 
but being involved strategically in regular defence it had no room to exploit the 
strategic leverage of irregular operational art and means, and had to invest hugely in 
regular formations to maintain domestic control. 
To sum up, Hezbollah’s strategic practical ability could be ranked as high as 
having moderate clear policy and grand strategy, and competent military strategy 
and guiding operational domains. Hamas is to be set at a higher medium level 
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before 2006 and low after 2006 with its unclear policy aims, defective strategy and 
moderate guidance of operations. The PLO is in the lower rank as it had moderate 
clear policy and enhancing operational capability, but failed grand and military 
strategies, and shaping operational art. 
This to a large extent reflects the combined assessment of conceptual and 
institutional tiers. Only in the case of Hamas after 2006, when it lost some visionary 
leaders and was lured by the game of domestic power to rule Gaza, did the new 
strategic context prove very obstructive for sound strategy making. 
Remarks on Israel’s Strategic Ability 
Two points run through all layers of Israeli strategic ability in irregular wars. Firstly, 
there is continuity with most of the regular strategic elements that we described in 
the previous chapters, which is to be expected as these characteristics originated 
from common conditioning strategic dimensions. 
Secondly, the negative effects of these characteristics are doubled in the case of 
irregular war. All states and their regular armies have an inherent difficulty in 
countering insurgencies, which is known as trying to eat soup with a knife, but the 
IDF had twofold difficulties. 
The Conceptual 
Conceiving strategic theory and its contextualization is difficult, as has been shown. 
But if Israel had a normally weak conceptual strategic ability, the lack of clarity is 
aggravated in the case of irregular wars.  
Israeli theorists, at least in retrospect, have aimed to rationalize border retaliations as 
part of conventional deterrence.82 As Shimshoni said: 
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[A] Decision maker who would pursue deterrence may face a rather 
uncomfortable set of choices, not between war and peace, but rather, 
between a small war now and a larger one later, or vice versa. The latter 
kind of choice is precisely the idea of reputation, which requires violence 
now to prevent greater violence later. 83 
However, given that these retaliations were a major part of major or protracted wars, 
those of 1956 and 1967 which led to the War of Attrition, and the 1973, 1978 and 1982 
wars and the protracted war that followed, border retaliation may be seen as a 
strategy for exacerbation rather than deterrence.  
There was no place in Israeli strategic literature, which was limited anyway up to the 
1980s, for counter-insurgency. Even with the theoretical development after the 
difficulties faced in 1973, the reopening of the National Defence College in 1977, and 
the emergence of a military theorist group pioneered by Wallach, Israeli military 
literature still failed to formulate counter-insurgency theories. Even Martin Van 
Creveld in the 1990s was only able to criticize when he explored the inability of the 
IDF to use its traditional operational art for such missions, but he did not provide 
any theoretical alternative.84 
With the new century, the field of strategic studies was expanded inside Israel, as 
was obvious in the multiplicity of strategic think tanks85, the flood of good quality 
strategic and military sociological studies, and the trend inside the army for being 
“smart”. However, most of these treatises were either regularizing the irregular war 
by focusing on military decisions, tacticizing it by focusing on military and security 
countermeasures, considering it a new type of war, or being critical from political or 
social viewpoints.  
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The “smart” army project did not provide the expected benefits. Higher operational 
courses focused on managerial and information improvements rather than 
enhancing the strategic or even the operational art. The attempt by Shimon Naveh to 
establish an “operational thinking institute” inside the IDF, and the operational 
doctrine it produced were heavily criticised and even accused of liquidating the 
Israeli operational art through its post-modern language and flawed structures.86 
Given the catalogue of IDF mistakes in 2006, it is hard to believe that it was the 
responsibility of any specific doctrine, especially considering the anti-theory trend of 
the IDF. However, Naveh can be blamed for his fuzzy and imprecise language and 
for not providing any clear answer, but not for providing the wrong answer.       
Why does this hostility to theory still plague Israeli irregular strategic thinking in 
spite of the general improvement in the fields of regular strategy and operational 
art?  
I suggest the answer is threefold. Irregular war, as indicated, is not war with a 
different nature, but its character is heavily politicised and the civilian population is 
the centre of gravity. Hence, a lesser degree of tacticization and militarization of 
strategy could still limit the ability to think and perform strategically.  
Secondly, any counterinsurgency strategy needs a form of political accommodation, 
whether through a degree of political compromise to address the insurgency cause 
or to apply restraint on the use of force so as not to increase collateral damage. Israel, 
especially its strategic community, has not shown itself ready for such a 
compromise. Thirdly, it was maintained instead that “softening” military conduct 
would merely increase the human risk for the fighter, a fate that was explicitly 
warned of by some Israeli strategists.  
Hence, the eyes of Israeli strategists were not blind to counterinsurgency strategy 
but they have chosen to ignore it. For example, according to former Israeli Defence 
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Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, from his very first day in office, in mid-1996, he was 
told that “terrorism and guerrilla actions couldn’t be defeated militarily.”87 
The Institutional 
Institutional parameters were improved after 1973, as the Basic Laws of 1976 
established   political authority over the military. The Knesset’s role was to increase 
in the following years in overseeing the military budget, and even in doctrine. From 
the 1990s onwards, there was a permanent Ministerial Defence Committee to 
manage defence matters. After 2006, and with the advice of the Winograd 
Commission, the National Security Council was established for better handling and 
orchestration of strategy. 
However, as Peri indicated, the military ability to occupy the strategic vacuum left 
by the politicians was very apparent in these new conflicts, especially the aggressive 
handling of the Protective Wall campaign in 2002.88 
On the other hand, as indicated earlier, the politicians’ over-involvement was not 
new. For example, Barak ordered a swift withdrawal from Lebanon in 2002 without 
addressing the request of his military, which was later proved to be right, to wait 
until a peace agreement was reached with Syria and then to encircle Hezbollah or at 
least to phase the withdrawal over stages to make it not look like a defeat. This 
image of defeat would, it was feared, encourage an uprising in the Territories.  
Although the institutional parameters should not be considered the same over a 
large time frame 1965-2014 and in all the three wars combined, there is a general 
improvement that cannot be mistaken, especially in the critical assessment. 
However, some drop may happen temporarily as was the case in 2006 War or 2009-
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10 Gaza campaign due to chaos in domestic politics. Generally, this institutional 
ability falls in the upper medium grade. 
 
The Practical  
The IDF’s basic counterinsurgency strategy has been, since the early 1950s, based on 
two elements:  defensive measures and punitive deterrence.  
However, some elements of pacification and winning hearts and minds were 
occasionally used as during the successful counterinsurgency plan of 1967-68 in the 
West Bank. The IDF mixed intimidation of the population with economic 
advancement and facilitated the emergence of a new domestic leadership. However, 
when these attempts were tried later they failed due to the rising strength of 
nationalism among the Palestinians. When used in Lebanon, it succeeded obviously 
among the Maronites in Security Zone and some Shiites, but Hezbollah propaganda 
mixed with intimidation proved more effective. 
The real problem of containing such nationalist-based insurgency is the centrality of 
political compromise which Israel was not happy to offer genuinely. The hardest 
time for Hamas and the PIJ was the period after 1994, when the PLO’s “getting on 
the train” strategy was very effective in distancing the major part of the population 
from the insurgents, and even gave the PA legitimacy to repress them. However, the 
insurgents gained support after the Oslo Process stalled, and they began to flourish 
after their successful initiatives during the Al-Aqsa intifada. Before 2007, Palestinian 
resistance could easily utilize the Israeli incursion to enrich its recruitment and social 
base. 
Only after 2007, when Hamas was trapped in Gaza, did the situation become better 
for Israel,89  but its periodic incursions led to massive international condemnation 
and regional unrest. 
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The centre of gravity in the Israeli strategic effort was the level of security. Its 
concern could be reduced temporarily by tactical countermeasures, (of which Israel 
became a major technology provider internationally), and the threat of punitive 
retaliation. But without a wider approach looking for means of depriving the 
insurgents of their cause, isolating them from the population, advancing moderate 
elements within the target community, and separating the insurgents from their 
regional patronage networks,  a military victory and/or a retaliatory effect would 
only be short-lived, even if it could be achieved given the balance of terror.   
Shmuel Bar concluded that if there was any success to be gained by using the 
deterrence strategy it would be at the tactical level and temporary. He mentioned 
that, “Hezbollah have benefited from what is called in Israeli deterrence parlance, 
“the power of the weak”. This is the relative power that the weaker side maintains 
vis-à-vis the stronger party. It can be based on one or a combination of three 
strategies: 
1. Neutralizing key components of its opponent’s advantage. This is done: 
a. By finding a defence against the tactics that are central to that advantage, or  
b. By creating circumstances that prevent the enemy from using those capabilities 
that give it the advantage 
2. Creating an internal situation in the target society that renders acquiescence to 
pressure or to deterrent threats virtually impossible. 
3. Posing counter-threats that occupy the superior power and narrow its room for 
manoeuvre”90 
The worst record in Israeli strategy-making was in the 2006 Lebanon war. Israel 
broadcast unrealistic political aims: neutralising the military capability of 
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Hezbollah,91 which could not be achieved against an irregular movement by a short 
military campaign -- especially since the Israeli military strategy was preoccupied by 
the ideas of Dan Haluts (the Chief of Staff and former Air Chief) on the decisiveness 
of air power (strategically) -- either by decapitation or strategic bombing to coerce 
the population or through attacking the C3 and logistical systems. Deferring the 
ground operation was a problem, but even when it was brought forward, the 
operational art and force structure were defective. 
The dilemma of Israeli military strategy was exacerbated by facing an opponent who 
applied both regular and irregular operational and tactical methods competently92, 
while the Israeli operational art and force structure proved weak for both missions. 
As Naveh indicated, the longstanding urban fighting and fighting much weaker 
irregular opponents in the Al-Aqsa intifada “spoilt” Israel’s (traditionally superb) 
regular warfare capability. For example, IDF training in the preceding years did not 
go beyond brigade level, while in 2006 it had to operate at the divisional level. Hence 
chaos predominated in the operational command and control system.93 
The counter-irregular capability at the tactical and operational levels was even more 
problematic. Naveh, whose doctrine was blamed for much of the poor war-fighting 
methods in 2006, claimed that the actual doctrine, which was never widely read, 
advocated light infantry and commando operations with close air-support and 
heavy intelligence networking to deal with an irregular enemy.94 The classic Israeli 
method of armoured thrust, when armoured columns devoid of combined 
mechanized infantry break through the front and demolish its coherence, was not 
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suitable in the topography of South Lebanon, facing small irregular but well trained 
formations equipped with state-of-the-art anti-tank guided missiles (Cornets).95 
The complexity of Hezbollah in 2006; the fact that it could employ mixed operational 
and tactical activities while still having the same irregular strategy also worked 
against Israel. Hezbollah’s fighting capability can be confronted by military methods 
and structure that have the flexibility to shift between two patterns or can combine 
them in the same campaign. But this military counter-operation and counter-tactics 
is not sufficient to counter its strategy.  
It is questionable whether Israeli strategists bothered to formulate a comprehensive 
strategy, by defining clear and reasonable political aims, aiming not to alienate the 
Lebanese population but rather to isolate Hezbollah further, and to cut its external 
support by diplomatic means or by softening its own conflict with Iran in addition to 
developing a better operational art and force structure.  
Ironically, the previous mistakes were mostly repeated in Gaza in 2008-9 where 
unrealistic political aims, tactically occupied strategy, and unrestrained use of force 
were once again strongly in evidence. Had Hamas been stronger operationally, as in 
2014, for example, even with the costs it had incurred in ruling Gaza, Israel would 
have suffered the same losses as 2006. 
To sum up, Israeli practical strategy making would secure a low rank with moderate 
grand strategy, good enhancement of operational capability but defective clarity of 
policy aims, military strategy and in guiding the operational art. This does not reflect 
the combined rank of conceptual and institutional parameters as will be discussed in 
the conclusion. 
The Outcomes 
As an irregular war is usually protracted with different phases and long duration, is 
it conceivable to comment on the outcome of an ongoing conflict? 
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It may be easier in the case of the PLO, as it has been claimed by its current leader 
frequently since his presidential campaign of 2005 that he now only believes in the  
possibility of a civilian political solution, and not armed struggle, to achieve the 
rights of the Palestinian people. However, what about Hezbollah and Hamas? What 
even about Fatah, some elements of which participated in the last Gaza campaign in 
2014? What will the position of Abu Mazen’s successors be? It is hard to reach an 
analytical conclusion before the political conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the wars have been protracted and provided enough solid results to 
draw a general picture of what was achieved for all sides. 
Clearly the greatest loser was the PLO. Its aspirations have progressively descended 
from replacing Israel with a bi-national state to the acceptance of a limited territory 
with limited authority (something it had refused in 1978) to the current hopeless 
deadlock.  
On the other side, the PLO succeeded in fostering and establishing a  genuine 
Palestinian identity in the face of all odds: Arab governments that distanced 
themselves from the cause or utilized it for their own purposes,96 and Israelis,  
whose Prime Minister stated in 1969 that the Palestinian people simply did not 
exist.97 The PLO’s struggle also spread the national feeling that inspired the first 
civilian intifada which, among other things, led to the Oslo Accords. 
Even had the PLO accepted the Camp David Agreements in 1978, there was no 
guarantee that Israel would have accepted given the very weak Arab position and 
Begin’s stated desire (along with many Revisionists) to annex the West Bank just as 
Israel had annexed the Golan. During the heroic era of the PLO in the late 1960s, 
Israel did not envision any solution along the lines of the Oslo Accords, but saw the 
future in terms of the absolute subjugation of the inhabitants of the territories. 
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Hezbollah was highly successful in achieving its short-term aims. It forced Israel to 
withdraw from Lebanon, apart from the Shebaa farms (which were really only ever 
an alibi for what was in fact a forced departure98) and to return its prisoners of war. 
It enhanced its monopoly over the Shiite community, became a central arbiter in 
Lebanese politics, and preserved its military machinery. Since the success of 2006, 
Hezbollah has massive Arab popular support, even among Sunnis. The current 
setback to its regional legitimacy is not related to the conflict with Israel. Israel on 
the other hand has managed to reach a balance of terror with Hezbollah, albeit 
temporarily. But Hezbollah needs to decide how to move forward to the next phase 
of the conflict and whether to adopt an offensive strategy to find a benefit in 
breaking this balance.  
Hamas, with the PIJ, won a partial sanctuary in Gaza by forcing Sharon to adopt the 
disengagement plan and remove Israeli settlements from the area, the second set of 
settlements to be dismantled after Sinai. However, it had to sacrifice its role in the 
West Bank, a more strategic and spiritually important area for the Palestinians, and 
by being tied by its role as ruler of Gaza it was not free to escalate the conflict for fear 
of being held responsible for the ensuing retaliation. 
The causal links in these wars generally followed the presumed theory.  
Low Israeli practical ability versus high ability of Hezbollah led to the strategic 
success of the latter. However, it led to relative superiority of Israel when faced with 
the even lower PLO ability. With Hamas it was mixed: there was a relative 
superiority of Hamas before 2006 according to its moderate ability but when its 
ability dropped after 2006, Israel was relatively superior. 
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This study explores how strategy links military operations, operational art and 
objectives to the political aims pursued in war. It uses the concept of “strategic 
ability”, developed as an analytical framework, to assess the ability of states and 
non-state actors to perceive, institutionalize and practice strategy.  
Knowledge of how strategy works or should work in theory (strategic logic) and 
practice (ability) is fundamental to answering the question of how the political goals 
of war can be achieved. Political winning in the immediate aftermath of war can be best 
explained by having advantageous strategic ability in the practical sphere; 
generating sound grand and military strategies, and guiding the operational 
capabilities and art to fulfil strategic requirements. 
The fundamental issue is that defective strategic performance is the primary cause 
of the failure of states with military prowess to use their military power wisely in 
war, whether or not they achieve military victory. Military victory, an operational 
and tactical concept, lends itself to strategic appreciation which decides on its 
nature, scale, restrictions and whether it is even an essential requirement for 
political success. Moreover, strategy should shape the operational conduct and 
objectives meticulously and closely, and in harmony with non-military means, for 
its requirements.   
 Other variables also affect the political outcome of war, such as poor diplomacy in 
containing the opponent or seeking stable alliances and regional order, and 
defective war termination process to shape the post-war political, social and 
geostrategic environment to achieve a satisfactory long-term outcome. There is also 
the difficulty of winning asymmetric wars, and the question of the leverage military 
victory has by itself on the political ends, or the assumed qualitative and 
quantitative means of power.  However, these variables are of less significance than 
strategic effectiveness.   
 The political outcome in the immediate aftermath of war is directly connected to 
strategic performance, primarily military, during the war. Beyond that, however, 
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different methods and variables come into play and the peace process and 
restoration or maintenance of order become more complex.    
The grand strategy concept in its long-term sense, which is not the primary focus of 
this research, was only considered when the requirements of the long-term 
achievement of political aims are clearly defined by the policy before or during the 
war. 
Winning the war can be measured over three grades. “Strategic success” is the 
achievement of the political aims of the war, and the requirements of long-term 
policy if these are clearly delineated.  “Strategic advantage” is when one actor does 
not achieve its full list of political aims but its political achievement is proportionally 
higher than the opponent’s. “Relative superiority” occurs if neither side achieves its 
political aims or both achieve them in a stalemate, in which case other factors 
become significant in recognising the winning status, mainly the costs of war, the 
advantageous status of post-war arrangements for either party, and long-term 
political/grand strategic superiority even if not clearly aimed for within the war 
time scale.  
Strategic ability is the ability to perceive the logic of strategy conceptually through 
strategists with sound strategic logic, to fulfil its requirements institutionally, and 
apply it to guide the fighting power. 
Strategic logic is how strategy works in theory and links policy to operations (see 
table 1). The crux of this logic is the use of military and non-military means to affect 
the political will of the enemy while keeping the means-ways-ends calculus right.   
Policy has to pass the achievability test and operational art and performance should 
reflect the strategic requirements. 
Institutional strategic ability is measured by five criteria: information sharing, 
critical and comprehensive assessments, clear political authorization, strategy-
sensitive political intervention and the formidable position of the military. In the 
case of non-state actors, where unification of the political and military commands 
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exists, balanced strategic centralization and operational/tactical decentralization 
replace the formidable position of the military. 
Practical strategic ability involves generating sound strategies (clear policy, 
competent grand strategy and military strategy) and guiding the fighting ability 
(enhancing counter-operational capability and shaping the operational art and 
structure to meet strategic requirements). 
The strategic ability of each side is assessed in each layer and graded high, medium 
or low. Advantageous practical strategic ability was graded high, medium or low. 
This study also explores how competent making of strategy (the practical tier) 
reflects the actor’s grade in sound strategic logic and effective institutionalization of 
political-military relations. Generally, executing strategy reflects competence or 
weakness in the conceptual and institutional tiers, unless other variables interfere 
such as personal aberrations or being outmanoeuvred by the enemy’s performance. 
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                                                         Table 1 
                                                *                   *                     *  
 Three other major themes researched in this thesis are connected to the primary 
theme of winning wars by better executed strategy.  
The first is continuity of strategic logic in regular or irregular war, with variable 
contextualization according the type of war and specific cases.  
The second is how political-military relations should be organized to permit the 
proper functioning of institutional strategic ability mentioned above. The study 
supports the idea that no ideal relational model or regime type (democratic vs. non-
democratic) leads on its own to competent institutionalization of strategy. Rather, 
institutional competence may require shaping civil-military relations in ways that 
are sensitive to political structure and functionally driven.  
Elements of Strategic Logic 
 War is a duel where military means are used for policy ends 
 Strategy attempts to keep means – ways – ends in harmony 
 Strategy works by affecting the enemy will to accept the required 
end state 
 In War with total aims: the will of enemy is destroyed by attacking 
COG which is contextual 
 In War with limited aims: the will is modified by affecting the 
enemy’s calculation and security 
 Military objectives are variable and decided by strategy in each war 
 Levels of war are hierarchical but fusional 
 Operational level of war is a modern age requirement 
 Operational art is not a fixed formula but its contextual and should 
be strategy sensitive 
 Strategic logic is invariable but its contextualization in age and 
specific case varies 
                                                 
  
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The third theme illustrates how the operational level of war becomes a political, 
strategic and organizational necessity, and over-segmentation of the levels of war 
jeopardizes strategic logic and practice. Linked to that, operational art and 
capabilities, not conduct alone, should reflect strategic requirements in each war. 
All components of the “fighting power” as laid down in Western doctrines should 
meticulously reflect the strategic insight. Operational art, considering all the debates 
on its historical evolution and practical complexities, is not a fixed or one-arm 
formula. In addition to reflecting the strategic requirements, it should be very 
sensitive to the opponent’s operational art and capability, cultural variations and 
other factors such as learning operational lessons, and socio-technological and 
institutional derivatives. 
 
                                                                    *            *            * 
 
On the practical side, the Arab-Israeli wars, this study attempts to offer an 
objective and balanced account of this sensitive conflict whereas most studies with 
very few exceptions are either strongly partisan in content and conclusion or deal 
exclusively with the political or military spheres, with little attempt to link the two 
from the strategic perspective. Nevertheless, the main motive for choosing the Arab-
Israeli wars as the subject for analysis was the richness they offer for testing and 
developing theory. 
By using the proposed theory that advantageous strategic ability (in the practical 
tier) should lead to advantageous war outcome, this thesis examines the Arab-Israeli 
Wars of 1948, 1967, Attrition, 1973 and the wars with irregulars (the PLO, Hezbollah 
and Hamas).  
This causal link proposition will now be traced in these wars and compared with 
competing explanations. The primary proposition about losing or winning wars is 
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best examined by causal link tracing and cross comparisons. Final remarks and 
summation about the other study themes will follow. 
 
The 1948 War 
This had the most successful outcome in Israel’s strategic history; hence it provides a 
valuable methodological opportunity for exploration of a variation in dependent 
variable that is the opposite of the main study question: failure to achieve political 
war aims in spite of military prowess. Israel achieved strategic success in the war but 
it was restricted for understandable cultural and ideological reasons.  
Israel’s success can only be interpreted by looking at her strong strategic ability vis-
à-vis Arabs. The pure military school of explanation may propose a link between the 
war outcome and the battlefield decisions of the Danny, Yoav and Horev operations.  
However, this only touches a part of the reality as it does not highlight the role of 
strategic guidance on the operational side of war. It  ignores the role of the strategic 
leadership in keeping other fronts quiet which kept Jordanian and Iraqi forces 
temporarily out of the military equation and made it possible to achieve the 
outcomes of Yoav and Horev. It also fails to consider that these battlefield decisions 
were reached after a lengthy period of military incompetence, even on the southern 
front, and omits the fact that operational success was a fruit of a huge military build-
up which was the responsibility of the strategic leadership. This build up, while 
preserving the critical bases on the coastal strip, was also supported by the local 
defences of the peripheral settlements, a reliance that the IDF saw as contradicting 
the principle of concentration of forces.  
 Comparison of the state power means, especially quantitative, and the fighting 
ability that Israel and the Arabs started the war with, shows that the outcome was 
totally incongruent as Israel was in a very disadvantageous position. Israel did have 
the advantage in qualitative means of state power (better social-technological 
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criteria, resolve, and governance) but can this be effective without a sophisticated 
strategy?  
The Asymmetric theory attributing political success to the war being irregular was 
not applicable in this case since the Arab irregular warfare was defeated before May 
1948 when the regular phase of the war began.  
Israeli diplomacy certainly had a positive impact on the outcome, especially by 
rallying international support from the US and USSR, and by luring Transjordan to 
defect from the Arab coalition, but it also had very awkward elements such as its 
blindness to the possibility of a political resolution. Beginning with Ben-Gurion, 
Israel considered diplomacy an operational auxiliary arm rather than a grand 
strategic means on its own merits. This consideration also applies to Israel’s war 
termination ability, which was far from ideal.  
The 1967 War 
 Like many other wars, the 1967 war is very complex to analyse. There are 
difficulties involved in outlining the political aims of both sides and judging 
strategies and obscure policies. The frictions of personal and domestic politics and 
contested agendas, and the intervention of international and regional players are all 
sources of difficulty. Nevertheless, the war serves as a clear example that even a 
unique and decisive military victory does not suffice to attain political war aims; 
neither those capable of political resolution nor the direct aims (restoring deterrence 
and avoiding further wars), even if they are modest and short-term. Israel only 
succeeded to relieve what was infused in propaganda, in contrast to reality, as 
existential threat, and to open Tiran Strait which was a low-profile political aim 
(strategic advantage), but by launching this high scale war with all subsequent grave 
strategic, political and social sequences regionally and even internationally.  
The Egyptian strategic ability was totally bankrupt in institutional and practical 
components. In Israel however, the practical strategy was strong in enhancing 
operational counter-capabilities and mobilizing the state means of power for war, 
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with poor performance in formulating grand and military strategies, and shaping 
the operational art strategically. 
The causal link tracing in this war was slightly incongruent with the presumed 
theory. Israel’s low advantageous ability should give her a relative superiority, 
but she had strategic advantage. 
In other words, the outcome for Israel was better, even slightly, than her practical 
strategic ability suggested even when compared with the Egyptian. The reason for 
this is possibly related to the dynamic and reactive nature of war. Outstanding 
operational decisiveness severely affected Egypt’s strategic choices and ability 
further, especially given her institutional chaos at the time illustrated by the sudden 
order to retreat issued by the psychologically unstable Amer, which caused the rout 
of the army and difficulties in quickly re-forming it. This essentially masked the false 
assumptions governing the Israeli operational art, which needed two further wars to 
uncover. 
Indeed, Egypt’s weak institutional ability totally undermined its entire strategic 
performance in the war even though this was of medium conceptual ability. 
 If strategic ability is evaluated in an algebraic way -- by considering that all layers or 
variables have the same power to produce an effect -- the proportional importance 
of strong or weak points may be missed, to a greater or lesser extent depending on 
the context. Some elements of strategic ability, say tacticization and militarization of 
Israeli strategy and an obsession with security, or defective civil-military relations on 
the Egyptian side may affect the outcome in different ways. 
The cascade of events during any war creates sensitive points at which good or bad 
ability may have a greater effect on the outcome. For instance, the two examples 
mentioned above were far more decisive than the other elements in shaping this 
war. This phenomenon may be called “variable expression”.1 Hence, medium ability 
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360 
 
in a specific layer, say institutional or conceptual, may lead to a worse outcome than 
expected if a problematic element was critical in determining the outcome of war in 
a specific context, in addition to the cross reaction and compensation among the 
elements of strategic dimensions.  
The actual problem for both Egypt and Israel was strategic ability, although there 
was a slight Israeli advantage, especially in guiding the fighting power. This paid off 
some strategic advantage resulting from a clear military victory over a weak enemy.  
In this war, all competing theories for interpreting the weak link between Israel’s 
military prowess, and political winning can be dismissed.   
1-  Quantitative superiority in numbers and resources did not help Egypt 
achieve its desired political or military outcomes, although it may have 
helped in the policy of resisting and restoring.  
2- Israel’s qualitative superiority in social, political and military terms was 
clearly manifested in its excellent mobilization and fighting ability but was 
not congruent with the outcome. This was not offset by quantitative 
inferiority, as the decisive military victory showed. 
3- The Israel’s end stage strategy and diplomatic methods were problematic, as 
has been shown, but the sources of these problems can be traced to its 
defective grand and military strategies from the pre-war period up to the later 
stage of the war.  
The Attrition War 
This rehearsal for the 1973 War proved critical in affecting the strategic perceptions 
and practice of the Israelis and Egyptians. Israel maintained the status quo at the end 
of this war without any diplomatic concessions but had to pay a high price in heavy 
human losses. For Egypt, the injured national and military spirit after the 
humiliating defeat of 1967 was to a large extent repaired.  Egypt had also rebuilt her 
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army, used the Rogers’ initiative to move anti-air missiles to the front, and pushed 
the USSR to take a direct responsibility in her war effort. 
 The indirect effects of the war no doubt favoured the Egyptians in the long run as 
they matured different planning concepts and operational methods that proved vital 
for the next war. In Israel, however, the political and military leaderships misread 
the War of Attrition which led to a false “concept” that Egypt would be unable to 
resume fighting until there was a dramatic change in the military balance.  
The 1973 War 
Both sides had vague political aims before the war, but there were strategic 
objectives, clear on the Egyptian side and opaque on Israel’s. The Egyptian Army 
was to smash Israel’s “national security doctrine” and occupy and consolidate a strip 
of territory on the East Bank of the Suez Canal to strengthen the country’s 
subsequent negotiating position. Israel’s objective was an implicit formula requiring 
the IDF to defend occupied territory, keep its qualitative military edge and 
annihilate all advancing Arabs forces, with further occupation of territory in order to 
deter any subsequent attack and consolidate its successes. 
The war outcome was relative superiority for Egypt: achieving a degree of the 
strategic effect aimed for which was undermining the Israeli security theory, better 
post-war territorial gains and post-disengagement military deployment, and 
restoring honour versus a more coercive leverage for Israel at the end of war, better 
long-term grand strategic outcome but was not planned for and was only feasible 
after long and complex diplomatic pathway, and less casualty. 
Egypt had a low advantageous practical ability (medium ability versus lower Israeli 
ability). Despite her vague policy, assumptions of grand and military strategies were 
effective, especially for the first half of war. Her strength however was in enhancing 
the operational capability and shaping the operational art strategically. Israel had 
poor practical strategic ability, but improved the components of grand and military 
strategies, enhancing the operational capability, and adapting the operational art in 
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the second half of war benefiting from the Egyptian grave strategic and operational 
faults, and the US air-lift. 
The causal link of this war, hence, was almost congruent with the presumed theory. 
Linking strategic practical abilities to both conceptual and institutional abilities was 
congruent with our hypothesis in the Egyptian case but deviated in Israel’s case. 
Israel performed better in the practical sphere than her conceptual and institutional 
ability suggested. This can be seen as resulting from Egypt’s military and strategic 
setback in the second half of the war which gave Israel more strategic leverage, and 
from the critical intervention of the United States to rein in the Israeli obsession with 
operational decisiveness.  
The ultimate outcome of this war cannot be interpreted thoroughly and 
comprehensively by the competing theories:  
-  Egypt’s high quantitative superiority in manpower was only reflected partially in 
the conflict due to its defective mobilization. Economic and qualitative social 
resources were in Israel’s favour which offset its quantitative inferiority, but the 
margin was less than in 1967 due to Egyptian improvements. However, the complex 
and dynamic military and political outcomes do not fit with this simplistic equation.  
- Militarily, the outcome was an operational advantage for Israel, but the strategic 
outcome was still different. Egyptian forces outnumbered the Israelis, but their 
formations were different: Israel had four enhanced armoured divisions against 
Egypt’s five infantry divisions in static defences supported by two mechanised 
divisions, two armoured divisions, and various Sa’aqa battalions. The Air Forces and 
navies were comparable in size (although Israel had also to fight on another front), 
and the IAF status was operationally and technologically superior. Israel’s general 
operational superiority, evidenced in its swift recovery from the initial shock, may at 
best explain the final operational outcome, but not the strategic or political 
outcomes.  
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 The conversion of Israel’s operational superiority into a strategic effect (coercive 
power) was limited by a number of factors: Cold War dynamics made both 
Superpowers keen on de-escalation; Israel’s greater dependency on the United States 
due to its airlift program made it more susceptible to pressure; the operational risks 
and challenges Israeli divisions faced in maintaining and employing the counter-
crossing; and of course Israel’s security concept and psychology that were 
challenged deeply by the war. 
- Diplomatic factors also had significant input, including poor Egyptian diplomacy 
and the US intervention to supply then restrain Israel. However, while diplomacy 
was considered here as a grand strategic means, military practice, if not the 
operational outcome, was more important in determining the political gains in the 
war. 
- The war termination was no doubt critical, but the early strategic ordeal for Israel 
also made a strong impression on the outcome. 
In the 1973 War, and the regular wars generally, it is important to indicate the effect 
the war duel had, to a large extent, on the psychology, cognition and perception of 
the enemy and the intervening regional and super powers, during the war or after it, 
in achieving the Clausewitzian strategic effect in limited wars of modifying the 
political will of the enemy.   
The party which had the advantage, regardless of any solid formula of operational 
art or a military victory, was the one which was more able to perceive this logic and 
apply it in the very complex environment of strategic practice involving military 
operations, diplomacy, signalling Super Powers, and mobilizing its own resources in 
a way that recognized its own strengths and vulnerabilities and those of the enemy. 
The Irregular Wars (PLO, Hezbollah and Hamas) 
Although the irregular Arab-Israeli wars were unique from certain aspects --   severe 
historical enmity, the perception that the conflict was politically unsolvable, the total 
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aims raised by the insurgents and the ongoing nature of the conflict-- some 
theoretical conclusion can still be reached. 
Irregular wars do not have a different strategic logic from regular wars, since they 
use military force to achieve a strategic effect sufficient to modify the enemy’s 
political will, but they take place in a very different context. As the irregulars are 
much weaker and do not have access to state resources, they have to draw a strategic 
pathway along which force is not only used to modify the enemy’s will by bleeding 
it, but to build a cause, a legitimacy, and to gain access to resources. They 
accomplish this by affecting the perception and will of the population as well as the 
regional and international actors. These actors are the objects of strategy in regular 
wars too, but they are much more important in irregular wars. 
As irregular wars need meticulous strategic handling of the utility of force, Israel’s 
strategic weakness in this area was further strained and led to lesser outcomes than 
those it achieved in regular wars. Tacticization of strategy and obsession with 
operational decisiveness, which intensify the popular grievance and insurgents’ 
legitimacy, were not good enablers in this type of war.  
No competing theories, whether of material superiority, battlefield decisiveness, 
diplomatic inertia or war termination, are sufficient to interpret the complex 
behaviour and outcome of these wars, nor is the simplistic equation of direct versus 
indirect strategy, as proposed by Arreguin-Toft, (which supposes the irregular actor 
wins if the stronger adopts a direct strategy that aims to defeat the opponent 
militarily). 2Israel used direct strategy in many phases but still achieved some 
successes when the indirect strategy of the irregular movement, whether PLO or 
Hamas, led occasionally to poor outcome. 
Finally, irregular war does not follow a specific strategic model, as force will be used 
in different forms and on different scales, and with different combinations of non-
                                                          
2
 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak win Wars: A theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 
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military means to affect different targets: the target population, the enemy, and 
regional and international actors. However, it aims generally to build its own 
capabilities to run the conflict and affect the enemy’s political will to concede. Such 
conflicts are heavily politicised which require much closer strategic guidance of 
military actions. Operational art, as the sequential and cumulative effects of tactical 
actions to achieve intermediary objectives, does not follow a specific formula, and it 
entails using military and non-military paths simultaneously to achieve geographical 
or functional operational objectives.   
Cross Comparisons: 
Testing the theory in the Arab-Israeli Wars showed congruity in 1948 and 1973 and 
slight deviation in 1967, as discussed. Irregular wars were generally congruent.  
In the 1948 War, Israel’s highly advantageous practical ability led to its strategic 
success, though its long-term grand strategic situation was negatively affected. Israel 
had a low advantageous practical ability in the 1967 War which led to strategic 
advantage due to the sudden breakdown of the Egyptian military. In the 1973 War, 
Egypt’s low advantageous ability led to its relative superiority. 
In the Irregular Wars the insurgents had a general advantageous position to start 
with due to the complexities that states have in fighting such wars. This was 
specially the case for Israel due to its bias towards militarization and tacticization of 
strategy.  
Fighting the PLO, Israel had a moderate advantageous ability and got relative 
superiority. 
The conflict with Hezbollah was a major soft point in Israel’s strategic history, like 
the 1973 War. Hezbollah had advantageous practical ability which led to strategic 
success despite its drawbacks and the grave situation after the 2006 War resulting 
from its awkward strategic moves regionally.   
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Hamas showed a bipolar strategic attitude. Before 2006 it enjoyed a low 
advantageous ability and achieved relative superiority over Israel. But after 2006, 
due to its new situation as ruler of the Gaza strip, which was totally alien to the 
operational and strategic logic of irregular war, Israel had a low advantageous 
ability which led to its relative superiority, especially in 2014 campaign. 
 
This study has acknowledged the role of competing variables/theories in 
facilitating the strategic ability to achieve political winning in wars, either directly as 
being a mean of power or indirectly (by creating favourable conditions for strategy 
to exploit for military victory).  
These competing theories are quantitative advantages including economic and 
fighting capabilities; qualitative advantages including resort, societal development 
and operational art; military victory itself, efficient diplomatic techniques especially 
for war termination; and the degree of asymmetry between regular and irregular 
actors fighting each other.   
The presence or absence of these actors might affect the ability to achieve military 
objectives or the ability to translate them into political success. However as this 
study has shown, the outcomes of the Arab-Israeli wars cannot be attributed to these 
factors in all cases, as they are either silenced (in regular wars there is no place for 
an explanation based on asymmetric strategy) or can be part of our offered theory 
(as the lack of diplomatic competence and proper war termination); or have a 
reverse   relationship with the war outcome or be grossly incongruent with it 
(military victory and quantitative or qualitative superiority).  
(1) Material advantage: The Arabs had a moderate advantage in this sphere in the 1967 
War and low advantage in the 1973 War, but the political and military outcomes 
were reversed (total failure in 1967 and relative superiority for Egypt in 1973).  In the 
three asymmetric wars Israel had high material advantage over the irregulars but 
generally poor political outcomes. Israel also had a low material status vis-à-vis 
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Arabs at the beginning of 1948 War but its enhancement later was a sign of 
competent strategy. 
(2) Quality measures advantage: Israel had a moderate advantage in the 1967 War and 
low advantage in 1973 but reversed the political outcomes. It had a high qualitative 
advantage in the three asymmetric wars but differing political outcomes. Israel’s 
high advantage in 1948 was a facilitating factor for the war outcome but this can in 
fact only be explained by competent strategy in building fighting ability and its 
derivatives.  
(3) Military victory:  Israel’s high-scale military victory in the later phase of the 1948 
and 1967 Wars and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and her operational advantage in 
the concluding phase of the 1973 War, were totally incongruent to the political 
outcomes of these wars (apart from the 1948 War which was a component and result 
of its excellent strategic performance).   
(4) Poor diplomatic measures: Israel had poor diplomatic techniques in 1967 and the 
Attrition wars but the political outcomes were not matching. Its diplomatic 
techniques were moderate in 1973 due to Cold War dynamics and Sadat’s personal 
aberration which compensated Israel’s natural weakness in this area, but the political 
outcome was not totally matching. In the 1948 War, diplomacy was also moderate 
but its purpose was to serve the war efforts. In the irregular wars, the failure to offer 
a political alternative and containment to end the conflict and delegitimize the 
insurgents, and build a stable order, can be considered at first sight due to 
diplomatic weakness. However, it is related essentially to a bankrupt  strategic 
approach which did not only prevented diplomacy from carrying out its mission  
but also undid initial diplomatic achievements (such as in breaking down Oslo 
Accords whose success would totally delegitimize the insurgents’ case). 
(5) Asymmetric War: This does not explain the suboptimum political outcome in the 
regular wars of 1967, Attrition and 1973 in spite of military prowess. The failure to 
appreciate strategic logic and practical requirements in asymmetric wars is a sign of 
a general strategic weakness. But, admittedly, this Israeli weakness was aggravated 
by the complexity of this kind of war, as mentioned above. 
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(6) War termination: This has a role in explaining how wars ended, but the strategic 
defects in the early stages of the wars of 1967 and 1973 and in Lebanon in 1982 
affected the later stages and outcomes to the extent that a sound war termination 
was not possible. Notwithstanding, war termination is still a critical component in 
strategy making in war whether in the short term, or in paving the way to its long-
term conclusion. 
 
 
This demonstration of the very limited ability of competing theories to explain the 
war outcomes shows the need to advance a new theory with more interpretive 
power. This theory does not necessarily contradict the others; rather it may adopt 
them within its own structure. More importantly, however, it explains their 
discontinuity in affecting the war outcomes.  
This theory proposes that the advantageous practical strategic ability of the state 
and state actors to generate sound strategies that aim at affecting the will of the 
enemy in order to achieve their political aims, and to mould the operational art and 
conduct to strategic perspective, is decisive in reaching the political winning of the 
war in its immediate aftermath. 
The theory also proposes that practical strategic ability is generally a reflection of 
the conceptual ability of strategy makers to have a valid strategic logic and the 
institutional ability to keep a functioning link between political and military leaders. 
However, two remarks should be added which make our theoretical formula far 
from being mechanical. 
Firstly, strategic logic and ability are limited by conditioning variables such as 
geography, culture, society, and regime type. As has been shown, the Israeli 
obsession with decisive and short battles of annihilation, which leads in turn to the 
problem of “tacticization” of strategy, is not fully understood without 
acknowledging the geographical, economical, regime-type and societal factors. The 
same applies to the Arabs, and this can explain their limitations in mobilizing their 
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human and economic resources and improving the social/industrial requirement for 
competent military power, especially in high industrial war. 
Strategic ability should address material and qualitative strength or weakness, 
cultural biases, diplomatic sensitivities and the type of war whether regular or 
irregular. Then, it either attempts to manipulate these factors to align them with 
strategic requirements, or it modifies the political ends altogether to reflect a sound 
means-ends-ways calculus of strategy.  
Secondly, as stated in the discussion of the 1967 war, the effect of each element in 
strategic ability may pay off differently in each war depending on the type of war 
and the strategic effect required. There is also interdependence between strategic 
variables which prove to be facilitating or obstructing to each other.  
Final Remarks 
The main argument of this thesis is twofold: firstly -- having an advantageous 
strategic ability in the practical layer (sound strategies and guiding operational art 
and capability) leads to advantageous war outcome in the short aftermath of war 
over a scale of grades. If a state or non-state actor loses the war politically in spite of 
military prowess this is due to weak strategic ability rather than any other reason. 
Second -- the degree of competence in the conceptual and institutional tiers of 
strategic ability should be reflected in the practical strategic tier. However, this 
pathway is shaped, facilitated or obstructed by conditioning variables such as the 
personal competence and/or aberrations of leaders, the reactive nature of war, in 
which the enemy has a vote, and the regional and international players as well as 
dimensional constraints in geography, culture, society and regime type. 
In the applied aspect of this research, Israel showed a consistently weak strategic 
ability in the 1967 and 1973 Wars and the Irregular Wars, and this explains the 
comparatively small political gains it won despite its outstanding battle-space 
decisiveness. Only in 1948 was the high grade of Ben-Gurion’s conceptual and 
institutional abilities rewarded in the war outcome. 
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The Arabs (to use an admittedly heterogeneous and dynamic term) have been 
shown to suffer malfunctioning political and social dimensions which have 
prevented their huge human and natural resources (together with a long thread of 
suffering and sacrifice) from being channelled into operational counter-capabilities 
or strategic ability. Only in the first stage of the 1973 War and in the case of 
Hezbollah specifically, has the modest development in Arab strategic ability been 
sufficient to expose Israel’s consistent weakness in strategy making which has 
otherwise been concealed by the hugely incompetent Arab performance. 
However, rather than advancing a theory linking strategic ability and the winning 
of wars in a deterministic way, this study has intended to contribute to a wider 
understanding in the field of strategic studies regarding three issues: the 
theoretical underpinnings of strategic logic and performance, methodological 
questions of how the generation of strategy can best be studied, and how these 
developing approaches can be applied to explain the complexity of the Arab-Israeli 
Wars. 
It offers a framework to deal with the phenomenon of strategy while engaging with 
ongoing debates in the field that challenged its basic assumptions: how war 
generally is used to achieve the ends of policy, how we define and measure the 
success of war while not confusing this success with any definition of tactical or 
operational victory, and understanding what the elements of strategic logic are.  
The study has focused on Clausewitz’s formula for success in war being the use of 
war to affect the opponent’s will, and it has differentiated between two types of war 
depending on how far this will was intended to be modified. In war with total aims, 
political success is only achievable by destroying the enemy’s political system via 
the demolition of its centre of gravity, which should be understood in very 
contextual and variable way. In war with limited aims, the political behaviour of the 
enemy/opponent is altered by affecting its calculation, security and its level of 
conviction of the probability of winning.   
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This will-change is achieved through strategic effect - which is  the net effect of 
manipulating all military and non-military strategy means - on the will of the enemy 
so that the political aims are met. It is shown that strategic effect is a non-material 
currency related to will-change, and therefore involves considerable complexity. 
 
This study also offers theoretical supplements in attempting to resolves some of 
the ongoing debates in strategic studies.  
It showed that the concepts of an operational level of war and operational art are 
practical, instructional and analytical necessities that should be addressed in a 
flexible and contextually sensitive way. For example, the levels of war work by 
channelling means to achieve ends but not with a sharp or sealed demarcation 
between them. The highest level of strategy is policy and its lowest level tends to be 
operations. The study concludes that no permanent and static model of operational 
art can be offered, but that it evolves over time with the changing characteristics of 
war and cases. Operational art should be strategically guided, contextually relevant 
and promoting jointness. 
The study also dealt with another two important issues.  
The first is how political-military relations and functions are best organised and 
whether there is a solid formula for “ideal” civil-military relations or whether they 
should be functionally oriented and contextually relevant to each specific case, as 
the study advocates. The functional criteria of the institutional layer include 
information sharing and critical thinking in the decision-making process in 
investigating all options and scenarios. Political supremacy should be preserved, but 
as the study emphasises, the military’s ability to offer professional advice and 
undertake operational tasks with autonomy is also to be respected. The political 
level has the right to intervene in all operational and tactical moves, but should 
confine itself to those with strategic significance.  
However, political-military relations have more complex requirements than 
advancing a specific relational framework; they are a product of political, 
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sociological, cultural and strategic developments of the state and non-state actors. 
Nevertheless, there is usually a “competent”, rather than ideal, structure compatible 
with the prevailing socio-political settings which results in a balance of power that 
enables the institution to perform the required functions. 
The second important issue is that guiding the fighting capabilities has to be under 
the close eye of the strategists. This fighting power does not simply evolve in a linear 
fashion, or even only to counter that of the enemy, but it has to fit the “strategic” 
mission, which can and should vary over time. From the strategic perspective 
guiding fighting ability is composed of two tasks as shown earlier: providing strategic 
assumptions about the mission on which operational capability should be modelled, 
and overall guidance for the proportional military capability vis-à-vis the enemy. The 
strategic leadership may delegate many of the details of the second role, albeit being 
politically responsible anyway, but its role in the first task is utterly indispensable. 
The fingerprints of this task can be traced, as this study shows patiently in the 
regular and irregular Arab-Israeli wars, in the four dimensions of fighting power: 
doctrinal, organisational, human and material. Strategic insight, or its absence, is 
shown to affect each component of “fighting power”, from the complex articulation 
of operational art at the upper operational level, where different arms 
(ground/air/air-defence/navies/Special Forces/nuclear) may be used to enhance or 
avoid those of the self and enemy, to modify the Soviet doctrine by Egyptians to suit 
the new strategic mission of a war with limited aims, or modifying the operational 
and tactical art and structures swiftly under fire by Israelis to adapt to the battlefield 
surprises in 1973, to the minute detail of the infantryman’s load.  
Methodologically, the study emphasises the importance of keeping a balance 
between the eternal governing principles of strategy and its contextualization 
depending on the situation of the specific case. Ignoring the first risks uprooting the 
analysis from the strategic thinking base in favour of technological and practical 
facades and neologisms.  Ignoring the second would ossify strategy making, leaving 
it unable to respond to changes in the environment. Hence, for example, irregular 
wars have unique characteristics that affect the way strategic logic is applied, and its 
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contextualization is taken a step further depending on the specific case, but this two-
step “contextualization” is not at the expense of the basic logic, the neglect of which 
would result in a chaotic and misleading understanding. The assumption behind 
this thesis is that strategic logic is the same in all wars (nature) in the abstract, but 
what varies is its contextualization in age and cases (characters).  
The value of examining history in this sense, adding its exemplary value to ideas 
and concepts, is not to formulate a determinist or positive theory, and certainly not   
formulate specific directions for action, but to refine provisional theoretical assumptions 
about war and strategy. The result would be a well formed theory - but far from a 
doctrine - to guide the strategist in his/her way of intellectual self-development. 
Strategic theory in this sense is to guide the strategist’s praxis3; the internalization 
and refining of theoretical and practical abilities, rather than practice. And critical 
analysis of history would be dealing with understanding historical phenomenon 
through better-prepared questions, and developing habits of minds to improve the 
ability to find answers. But the purpose is not to pick up lessons on detailed 
practice, apart from emphasising those related to the general strategic level and 
showing their variable contextualization.  
This methodological attitude is essential in dealing with the main concept of this 
thesis, “Strategic ability”.  This is a new analytical framework that the study offers 
and it has wide practical applications. The “fighting power” framework on which 
some Western doctrines have been based is efficient when dealing with the 
operational level of war (how military means are used to achieve military 
objectives), but it turns out to be insufficient when dealing with the strategic level of 
war (how military and non-military means are used to achieve political aims).  
In addition to its analytical value in explaining why state and non-state actors 
perform better or worse in wars, “strategic ability” offers strategy-makers a tool to 
                                                          
3
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), p.90 and Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
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measure, organise and review the components of their strategic performance, while 
keeping cause and effect clear. “Fighting power” is a tool that should be 
manipulated and shaped by strategy to achieve the ends of policy. Strategic faults 
are much harder to repair than those at operational and tactical levels. Moreover, as 
the hard lessons of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, “tactical 
superiority is likely to prove disastrous when strategy is weak or policy is ill judged: 
soldiers would be doing the wrong things well, and for the wrong reasons”.4 
Strategic Ability should not be considered a directive method with a determinist or 
predictive value; it is rather a framework of analysis to guide the strategist’s mind in 
approaching the strategic system holistically, by evaluation, reviewing or reforming. 
He/she should be able to ask the right questions rather than relying on sharp 
answers, which can be very contextual. 
Studying the Arab-Israeli Wars has been especially beneficial from this aspect. 
Adding to its value in refining the theoretical assumptions of this study and helping 
to explain these wars strategically, it illuminates the practical dilemmas which make 
the pathway from theory to practice very elusive. Strategic principles, as linking 
means-ways-ends or political supremacy and the military’s role in strategy making, 
or guiding the military art and conduct to be attuned to strategy requirements, 
though they are many times missed conceptually, most of the time  are hard to 
maintain and apply in the shattering atmosphere of war and conflict. But only the 
strong grasp of concepts, in addition to institutional and practical prudence and 
resilience can help. History is very informative in this sense also, as Sumida 
indicates; it educates the strategists’ subconscious to expect these practical 
dilemmas.5  
States which have all these lessons in mind regarding the crucial place of thinking 
strategically, dealing with history in a critical and inquisitive but non-prescriptive 
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 Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.19-20 
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 Jon Tetsuro Sumida. “The Relationship of History and Theory on War: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its 
Implications”. The Journal of Military History, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April 2001) pp. 333-354. 
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way, and which hold a valid strategic theory and a sound framework of analysis, 
can do better in managing their armed forces in the context of war while avoiding 
dramatic mistakes or dealing with them appropriately if they happen.  
In examining the British political-military command failures in the recent wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Christopher Elliott, effectively showed how institutional 
flawed settings, especially at the political-military interface, the high military 
command and the higher defence management levels, precluded the operation of 
the basic strategic functions. However, improving institutions to work efficiently 
would only be possible if guided by sound theoretical assumptions on how strategy 
works. Moreover, even institutional competence would be insufficient if not 
anchored by people thinking strategically, or as Elliott summarised “the cry should 
not be for more strategists, but for the military elite to think more strategically”. “One 
way to build strategy as a core instinct in officers would be to have specific 
education in the subject”. 6 This can only be achievable by educating strategic theory 
to both political and military leaders, and studying history strategically without 
falling into the common preoccupying and reductionist misuses of history lessons.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Christopher Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2015, pp.232-233. 
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